THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v JASON P. DIBBLE, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department
845 N.Y.S.2d 203
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John J. Connell, J.), rendered July 16, 2004.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John J. Connell, J.), rendered July 16, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of burglary in the second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of burglary in the second degree (
While questioning defendant, the officers observed fresh mud stains on his elbows and knees, as well as blades of grass or pine needles dangling from his lower lip or chin. They also observed multicolored knit gloves protruding from each side pocket of defendant‘s jacket. Those officers further learned from their fellow officers that the church had in fact been burglarized, as indicated by pry marks and a broken handle on an exterior door, a broken window on an interior door, and burglar‘s tools found inside the building. The officers thereby acquired a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was at hand (see People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448 [1992]; People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 237-238 [1986]; People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [1975]). One of the officers then “request[ed]” or “asked” defendant to empty his pockets, i.e., the officer “asked” “if he had any problem with it or if he would give consent to [the officers‘] looking through his pockets.” In response, defendant emptied his pockets of, inter alia, the multicolored gloves. Because the consensual search was properly undertaken by the officers based on at least a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot (see Hollman, 79 NY2d at 191-192; cf. People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834 [2005]), there is no basis for suppression of the gloves.
At that point, the officers properly detained defendant for further investigation and transported him in their patrol car a short distance back to the scene of the burglary, where the officers continued their investigation (see Hicks, 68 NY2d at 242-243). Such an investigatory detention and transport of a suspect may be undertaken as an “incident” to a lawful forcible stop and detention and on the basis of reasonable suspicion of criminality (id. at 239), provided that, as here, the authorities know that a crime has actually been committed, the total period of detention is brief, the crime scene to which the suspect is taken is close by, “the police diligently pursue [ ] a minimally intrusive means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel suspicion quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain
Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Gorski, Centra and Green, JJ.
