THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIGUEL DELGADO, Defendant and Appellant.
G059650
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 4/29/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. 94NF2484)
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Benjamin Kington, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
We find ourselves in the unfamiliar position of choosing to publish an opinion regarding an issue the parties are in agreement on. Having no prior experience with this scenario, we feel the need to explain that we publish because the issue implicates evolving precedent that has greatly altered our perception of past legislation, and we hope by writing on this change to be able to head off a multitude of briefs before they reach the trial courts.
Following a series of United States Supreme Court decisions affording juvenile offenders greater sentencing protections under the Eighth Amendment, the California Legislature enacted a statutory scheme granting early parole consideration for most youthful offenders. The California Supreme Court has since ruled those offenders are entitled to make a record related to their future parole consideration in a special type of hearing that has come to be known as a Franklin proceeding. (See People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).)1 The
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During his early 20‘s, appellant was involved in three separate criminal incidents. The first occurred in 1994, when the police found a loaded handgun in the trunk of his car during a traffic stop. The second and third incidents involved armed home-invasion robberies appellant and his cohorts committed four months apart in 1995. During the robberies, appellant and his confederates kidnapped, assaulted, and threatened to kill several of their victims.
As a result of those incidents, appellant was convicted of kidnapping for robbery and multiple counts of robbery, burglary, false imprisonment and illegal gun possession. He was also found to have personally used a firearm during the offenses and suffered a prior strike conviction. The trial court sentenced him to 59 years to life in prison under the “Three Strikes” law. (See
In 2020, appellant requested a Franklin proceeding to present mitigation evidence in anticipation of his youth offender parole hearing (YOPH). However, the trial court correctly determined appellant was not eligible for a YOPH because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. Therefore, it denied his request for a Franklin proceeding. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant admits he is statutorily ineligible for a YOPH because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. However, he contends he is entitled to a YOPH – and a concomitant Franklin proceeding – as a matter of equal protection. Although we reject appellant‘s equal protection argument, both parties now conclude he is entitled to a Franklin proceeding under the standard rules applicable to all parole hearings. We agree.
Legal Framework
Over the past two decades, the United States Supreme Court has redefined the parameters of juvenile sentencing. In Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, the court held the Eighth Amendment proscribes capital punishment for minors. Then, in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, the court found it cruel and unusual to sentence juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life in prison without parole (LWOP). The high court followed that decision with Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, which prohibits mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders. (See also People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 [barring de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders].)
The underlying rationale of these decisions is that “[b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” as compared to adult offenders, “‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’ [Citation.]” (Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471.) Consequently, except in the rarest of circumstances – not presented here – juvenile offenders facing life-long prison terms must be given a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society at some point in the future. (People v. Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 268.)
To that end, the Legislature enacted
In Franklin, the California Supreme Court discussed the import of
Franklin further stated, “Assembling such statements ‘about the individual before the crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of
The record in Franklin was unclear whether the juvenile in that case had been given a sufficient opportunity at sentencing to make a record that included this sort of information. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to make this determination. (Ibid.) In so doing, the court also instructed that if the trial court determined the juvenile had not been afforded a sufficient opportunity to make a record, he should be allowed to present “any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender‘s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.” (Ibid.) Writing separately, Justice Werdegar described this as a “baseline hearing” relevant to the juvenile‘s future parole prospects. (Id. at p. 287 conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)
Since Franklin, the California Supreme Court has decided its holding applies retroactively to all eligible youthful offenders regardless of when they suffered their conviction. (In re Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 450.) Therefore, the fact appellant did not request a Franklin proceeding until after the judgment against him was already final has no bearing on his entitlement to relief. (Id. at p. 452.)
Equal Protection Claim
Appellant‘s equal protection argument is grounded in the fact he was 23 and 24 years old at the time he committed his offenses. As we have explained, when a defendant is sentenced for crimes he committed when he was under the age of 25, he is typically entitled to early parole consideration in the form of a YOPH no later than the 25th year of his incarceration. (
To succeed on his claim this statutory framework violates equal protection, appellant must first show he is similarly situated to other
But even if we assumed youthful offenders with prior strikes were similarly situated to youthful offenders without prior strikes, “the Legislature could rationally determine that the former – ‘a recidivist who has engaged in significant antisocial behavior and who has not benefited from the intervention of the criminal justice system’ [citation] – presents too great a risk of recidivism to allow the possibility of early parole.” (People v. Wilkes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.) Therefore, “the differential treatment of youth offenders sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Law for purposes of youth offender parole hearings does not violate equal protection.” (Id. at p. 1167; accord, People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856 [excluding Three Strike defendants from youth offender parole consideration is a rational approach to addressing the problem of recidivism].)
In arguing otherwise, appellant points out that some youthful offenders who are excluded from early parole consideration under
However, in Edwards, the court was comparing first-time offenders to first-time offenders. “‘The distinguishing characteristic of Three Strikes offenders, of course, is that they are not being sentenced for a first-time offense. Thus, the ample authority rejecting equal protection challenges from Three Strikes offenders did not apply in Edwards. Indeed, Edwards itself took pains to “note that criminal history plays no role in defining a One Strike crime” and that “[t]he problem in this case is” the categorical exclusion of “an entire class of youthful offenders convicted of a crime short of homicide . . ., regardless of criminal history . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 864.)
In contrast, appellant‘s exclusion from early parole consideration is directly attributable to his criminal history and the fact he failed to reform after
Section 4801
But there is another legal basis for granting appellant a Franklin proceeding. As respondent concedes, that entitlement lies in subdivision (c) of
Like
Those are the same factors the board must consider in conducting a YOPH under
We accept this concession as a logical extension of the Franklin decision. Because appellant was sentenced before
DISPOSITION
The trial court‘s order denying appellant‘s request for a Franklin proceeding is reversed and the matter is remanded for such a proceeding.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
ZELON, J.*
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
*Retired Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.