THE PEOPLE,
H047775
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Filed 6/30/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1520120)
A jury convicted Darrell Andrew Deleoz of involuntary manslaughter of his girlfriend, Jennifer Lee. At trial, it was undisputed that Lee had died from the consequences of a skull fracture, but its cause was vigorously contested. The medical examiner for Santa Clara County opined that Lee had been beaten to death. The district attorney relied on the medical examiner‘s testimony in arguing to the jury that Deleoz beat Lee to death and
At issue in this appeal are two confidential, internal memoranda written by the office of the district attorney that Deleoz contends should have been disclosed to the defense as relevant to impeachment of the medical examiner‘s trial testimony. Before trial, the defense received redacted copies of the memoranda and moved for an order to disclose the unredacted portions under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) and
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that, although portions of the redacted memoranda qualify under the facts here as impeachment material under Brady, the failure to disclose them was not material to the outcome at trial. Accordingly, no Brady violation occurred. For similar reasons, we decide any failure to disclose evidence under
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
In July 2017, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an information charging Deleoz with the murder of Lee. (
The jury trial began in October 2019. In an in limine motion, Deleoz moved the trial court to order the disclosure of impeachment information related to the medical examiner, Dr. Michelle Jorden. Specifically, Deleoz requested unredacted copies of two internal memoranda prepared by the office of the district attorney discussing investigations in which Dr. Jorden had been involved and which had been provided to the defense before trial, heavily redacted. The trial court denied the defense‘s request to disclose the unredacted portions of the memoranda, stating “I believe the redacted portions constitute work product and are not Brady or exculpatory material.” We examine the trial court‘s ruling in more detail in our discussion, post.
In January 2020, the trial court sentenced Deleoz to three years in prison and deemed the sentence satisfied based on time served. Deleoz timely appealed.
B. Evidence Presented at Trial
The narrow claim presented on appeal, regarding Deleoz‘s federal constitutional and/or state statutory rights to disclosure of the unredacted memoranda, makes it unnecessary to recount all the trial evidence. We nevertheless summarize those portions of the prosecution and defense evidence, including testimony of the medical experts, as context for our discussion of the issues on appeal.
1. Prosecution Evidence
Deleoz and Lee began dating in late 2013 or early 2014, when they lived in Southern California. In April 2015, they moved to San Jose. Lee was 30 years old and worked as a nurse.
Lee‘s sister and friends knew that Lee and Deleoz had relationship problems. Lee drank alcohol to excess. Lee‘s sister, Sarah, had previously seen a bruise on Lee‘s wrist; Deleoz explained he had accidentally caused the bruise while trying to get Lee into a car to go home. Another time, Deleoz called Sarah asking for help getting Lee home. Sarah and her husband drove to Hollywood and found Lee sitting on the sidewalk, drunk, while Deleoz was in his car nearby. Deleoz was embarrassed and apologized for asking them to come and help.
Lee‘s childhood friend Cindy Chong, who reconnected with Lee when she moved to San Jose, at one point noticed scratch marks on Lee‘s neck or arm as well as marks on Deleoz‘s neck or arm. At a dinner with two other couples in July or August 2015, Lee had taken a Benadryl before going out and seemed to be falling asleep at the table. Deleoz insisted on taking her home, though she wanted to stay with their friends to go to karaoke. Deleoz yanked her arm to pull her from the table. After Lee‘s death, her nursing supervisor found a domestic violence brochure in her locker at work.
On the night of September 11, 2015, Deleoz and Lee went to a restaurant with the same two couples who had attended the dinner in July or August 2015. Everyone ate and drank a lot. The mood shifted when Lee and Deleoz
A resident of the apartment complex where Deleoz and Lee lived was walking his dog shortly after 10:00 p.m. when he saw the couple arguing as they entered the building. Several residents later that night heard shouting, arguing, and screaming.
The next morning, at 7:26 a.m., Deleoz called 911. Firefighters and paramedics arrived a few minutes later. Deleoz was distraught, asking ” ‘Did I do this?’ ” The first responders found Lee on her back in the kitchen with her head up against a cabinet. She was pale and cold to the touch and had no pulse. The first responders moved Lee‘s body away from the cabinet and saw blood underneath the back of her head. Lee had blood and vomit in her hair and blood near her face. Paramedics tried to resuscitate Lee using chest compressions and a defibrillator. They pronounced her dead three minutes after they arrived.
A police officer interviewed Deleoz at the apartment; the interview was recorded and played for the jury. A second police officer accompanied Deleoz into the hallway. Deleoz sobbed intermittently and at one point spontaneously said, ” ‘I may have done this.’ ”
Crime scene investigators used a blood reagent to look for signs of “blood cleanup.” The reagent showed presumptive positive for blood on the kitchen floor, small stains on the counter and refrigerator, and in the bathroom sink and tub. Investigators found a blood stain on a shoe and on Deleoz‘s shirt. DNA analysis showed that the blood found on the refrigerator and the shirt matched Lee, blood found in the bathroom matched Deleoz, and both Deleoz and Lee were possible contributors to DNA profiles in the blood found in the bathtub. The Fitbit Lee was wearing when she died registered movement up until 10:16 p.m., no movement until 12:09 a.m. when it recorded 10 steps, then no more movement.
Dr. Jorden, chief medical examiner and neuropathologist for Santa Clara County, performed the autopsy. Lee‘s external injuries included a deep scalp laceration measuring one-and-three-quarter inch by one-quarter inch, a bruise
Lee‘s internal head injuries included massive bleeding beneath the scalp, a skull fracture across the crown of the head, and bruising on the left frontal lobe. The skull fracture caused an arterial bleed, which over time compressed the brain downward, causing death. As compression of the brain occurred, possible symptoms would include snoring and vomiting. Dr. Jorden‘s neuropathology of the brain revealed diffused axonal injuries of the nerve cells, indicating severe traumatic brain injury involving multiple strikes and a rotational motion of the head. Dr. Jorden opined that the injuries were caused by multiple blunt force head trauma and were consistent with those of a person who had been beaten to death. She concluded the manner of Lee‘s death was homicide. Dr. Jorden opined that Lee‘s injuries were not consistent with a ground-level fall for a person of that age.
On cross-examination, Dr. Jorden denied having described herself as an advocate for victims. She also denied getting angry at the police when they do not immediately accept her opinions or complaining that the police did not do their jobs. Dr. Jorden was familiar with two memoranda prepared by an assistant district attorney, one in 2012 and one in 2019, concerning other investigations. She stated that the memoranda reflected the opinions of the author, and she could not answer for his opinions about her. On redirect, Dr. Jorden explained that as a medical doctor, her patients are dead and she “use[s] [her] investigation in the autopsy to explain why they died.”
2. Defense Evidence
Deleoz testified in his defense. He described his background, education, and employment, including his work in military intelligence and honorable discharge and his career at an investment firm.
Deleoz and Lee met in Las Vegas through mutual friends and quickly entered into a serious relationship. Deleoz moved to Los Angeles to be with her. During that time, Deleoz and Lee partied a lot. Lee loved to drink and would get “extremely happy” and animated but there were times when her drinking was “out of control” and could be shocking. Deleoz described several incidents, including the time he grabbed Lee by the wrist to pull her away from her friend‘s car, causing a bruise, because Lee did not want to let
In 2015, they moved to San Jose. Lee‘s drinking increased. On the evening they met Lee‘s friend Cindy and the others for dinner in July or August 2015, Lee had taken over-the-counter drugs beforehand to get more drunk. They drank more at the restaurant and Deleoz decided he had to get Lee home. She was “a wreck” but didn‘t want to go and began pulling the other way, and he had to grab her to get her to the car.
Deleoz testified that he and Lee would argue about her drinking, that it would make him drink less because he would have to take care of her, and she would say he was no fun anymore and treated her like a baby. He did not know why she had the domestic violence pamphlet in her locker at work.
On September 11, 2015, Deleoz and Lee had some drinks at their apartment before taking an Uber to the restaurant. There, they ate and drank more. Lee got drunk. She slipped and fell to the floor on the way to the bathroom and Deleoz immediately picked her up and helped her to the bathroom. They were not arguing. The slap on her buttocks was affectionate and they would do it as an “inside couple thing,” not to hurt or objectify. At the table, Deleoz playfully nudged Lee, and she fell off her seat. He had not meant to push her with enough force to make her fall and had not known she was that drunk. He immediately helped her up.
When Deleoz and Lee got home, they blamed each other for having had an embarrassing night. They bickered while walking to the apartment. In the hallway, Lee stumbled and dropped her purse and some items fell out. Deleoz picked them up and “kind of threw” the purse back into Lee‘s hands and chastised her for being so drunk. Once inside, Lee threw the purse contents in Deleoz‘s face and cursed at him. She wanted to argue and pushed him a few times. He braced for another push but then she pulled him and they “fell fast.” He fell on top of her and they hit heads. She did not appear injured and he saw her trying to get back on her feet. She was “furious” and began yelling even more in Korean.
Once Lee started yelling in Korean, Deleoz knew to leave her alone. He went into the bedroom and fell asleep. He did not believe anything was wrong. He did not see blood or vomit. At some point during the night he woke and heard her snoring loudly. He thought Lee was sleeping on the couch.
Deleoz‘s cousin‘s husband, a San Francisco police officer, testified that he had known Deleoz since 2005 and had lived with him for about six months. He never saw Deleoz become violent or aggressive. He believed Deleoz to be truthful.
Dr. Katherine Raven, a forensic pathologist, reviewed the autopsy and neuropathology reports, autopsy photographs, and other materials in evidence. Based on all the evidence, Dr. Raven would not have assessed the manner of death a homicide and instead would have characterized it as “undetermined.” She agreed with Dr. Jorden‘s conclusions that the cause of death was due to epidural hemorrhage from a skull fracture and that Lee would have survived several hours after suffering the skull fracture. But given the “one big area of hemorrhage” under the skull fracture line, Dr. Raven believed the injury, though consistent with multiple impacts, did not exclude a single impact as the cause. Dr. Jorden did not shave Lee‘s head to search for evidence of additional external impact sites, and the evidence shown was inconclusive as to multiple impacts. According to Dr. Raven, the injuries could have been caused by a single, ground-level fall with the head turned slightly left, even in a person as young as Lee. The laceration on the back of Lee‘s head may have been caused by a separate impact not associated with the skull fracture, likely during a “terminal fall” before death. The other injuries found across Lee‘s body were likely caused by blunt force trauma but were not consistent with a beating. Many of the external injuries were “extremely subtle.” Dr. Raven could not determine the age of the bruises. There was no evidence of multiple impacts to the face or head, which would be expected if someone was beaten to death.
Lee‘s external injuries were consistent with the types of falls experienced by an intoxicated person. The rib fracture, though less common, could have been suffered during a fall; it also could be caused by a single kick or a stomp, though there was no external evidence of such impact. The injuries to Lee‘s liver are “extremely common” following the administration of CPR by a layperson, and the scant amount of hemorrhage from those injuries suggests
Dr. Jorden‘s autopsy report included a pathological diagnosis of “intimate partner violence.” Dr. Raven would not have stated that information in the autopsy report, since intimate partner violence is not a medical diagnosis. Instead, there is a place on the death certificate where that information can be included.
In the prosecution‘s rebuttal case, Dr. Jorden testified that she has never seen a case where a healthy 30-year-old individual sustained the same kind of injuries suffered by Lee from a ground-level fall. It is possible that a fall where the left temple hit the floor could have caused Lee‘s skull fracture. Dr. Jorden explained that she included “intimate partner battery” in her autopsy report because her patients “are deceased” and “cannot speak.”
II. DISCUSSION
Deleoz requests that this court conduct an independent, in camera examination of the unredacted memoranda concerning Dr. Jorden and determine whether the trial court‘s decision not to order further disclosure of the unredacted memoranda violated federal due process under Brady or was an abuse of discretion under
A. Impeachment Evidence Based Upon the Confidential Memoranda
1. Additional Background
Before trial, Deleoz moved in limine for the trial court to order the disclosure of impeachment information related to Dr. Jorden. Specifically, Deleoz requested the disclosure of all information in the prosecution‘s possession “that tends to show a bias on the part of Dr. Michelle Jorden, M.D., or detracts from her credibility in any way.” Deleoz sought the disclosure of 12 pages of internal memoranda written in October 2012 and January 2019 by the assistant district attorney. In response to an earlier discovery request, defense counsel had received a redacted copy of the memoranda; the redacted memoranda revealed the partial contents of approximately three of the 12 pages. The remaining nine pages were entirely redacted.
Deleoz argued that the prosecutor had a federal constitutional duty to disclose the requested information under Brady, and a state statutory duty to do so under
In ruling on the motion to disclose, the trial court noted the redacted memoranda were produced in another case over which it had presided, as a result of “extensive hearings about the unredacted memos and [this] court‘s determination that the redacted portions constituted work product.” The court denied the defense‘s request to disclose the unredacted portions of the memoranda in this case, stating “I believe the redacted portions constitute work product and are not Brady or exculpatory material.” The court received a lodged copy of the unredacted memoranda and placed it under seal for purposes of appellate review.
During trial, defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Jorden as described ante, including in reference to the memoranda. Dr. Jorden denied calling herself an “advocate for the victims” or criticizing the police if they do not immediately accept her opinions. Dr. Jorden testified that the memoranda reflected the
In closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged there was no direct evidence that showed Deleoz “beating Ms. Lee to death” but “plenty of circumstantial evidence.” Referencing Dr. Jorden‘s autopsy report, the prosecutor asserted that “undoubtedly Ms. Lee was beat to death.” Discussing Dr. Jorden‘s trial testimony, the prosecutor reminded the jury that “Dr. Jorden told you there was no doubt [Lee] suffered from multiple blows to the head. No doubt in her mind.”
The prosecutor also discussed what he characterized as Deleoz‘s “story” in his trial testimony that Lee was accidentally injured during a fall. The prosecutor asked the jury, “How likely is it that a healthy 30-year-old fell to the ground to her death?” Answering his own rhetorical question, he asserted, ” ‘Dr. Jorden in Santa Clara County has told you “never.” In our county? Never.’ ”
When discussing the jury‘s consideration of the testimony of conflicting experts, the prosecutor contrasted Dr. Jorden‘s qualifications and reputation to that of defense expert witness Dr. Raven. “Raven went to Reno medical school. Jorden went to Stanford Medical School. Jorden is the chief medical examiner in Santa Clara County. Raven was not. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [Raven is] an unpaid volunteer at UC Davis. [¶] Dr. Jorden still teaches at Stanford. [¶] . . . [¶] Dr. Jorden has to review each and every single autopsy in Santa Clara County. [¶] Who is the more qualified doctor to talk about a brain injury? One of 36 neuropathologists in the country or someone who pretends to be one.”
In its closing argument, defense counsel suggested that Dr. Jorden displayed “confirmation bias” and jumped to conclusions. The defense argued that Dr. Jorden “failed to gather important evidence before she rendered her opinion” because “she had her mind made up,” made mistakes in the autopsy report that were not immediately corrected, included intimate partner violence as part of her pathological diagnosis despite that it is not a medical diagnosis, and gave “really confident” answers that showed “no gray area” and “no nuance.”
2. Legal Principles and Standards of Review
The United States Supreme Court in Brady established that a criminal defendant has a federal due process right to pretrial discovery of material
The United States Supreme Court has identified three components of a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the defendant must have been prejudiced by the nondisclosure. (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 281-282.) “Prejudice” in the context of a potential Brady violation turns “on ‘the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043 (Salazar).)
To demonstrate materiality, a defendant ” ‘must show a “reasonable probability of a different result.” ’ ” (Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th. at p. 1043.) “The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the government‘s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 434 (Kyles).) “In determining whether evidence is material under this standard, we consider ’ “the effect of the nondisclosure on defense investigations and trial strategies.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 256 (Williams).) Furthermore, “while the tendency and force of undisclosed evidence is evaluated item by item, its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality must be considered collectively.” (In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 887 (Brown).)
” ‘Because a constitutional violation occurs only if the suppressed evidence was material by these standards, a finding that Brady was not satisfied is reversible without need for further harmless-error review.’ ” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 668 (Beck and Cruz).) On appeal, we independently review whether a Brady violation occurred, giving great weight to the trial court‘s findings of fact if
In addition to the disclosure requirements arising under the federal due process clause, California‘s reciprocal discovery statute ” ‘independently requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense . . . certain categories of evidence “in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or [known by] the prosecuting attorney . . . to be in the possession of the investigating agencies.” ’ ” (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 668.) As relevant here,
Privileged materials and certain attorney work product need not be disclosed under the statutory scheme.
We review the trial court‘s ruling denying disclosure of the unredacted memoranda under the abuse of discretion standard generally applicable to discovery motions. (See People v. Elder (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 123, 131; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299.) A violation of the reciprocal discovery obligations constitutes reversible error only where it is reasonably probable, by state-law standards, that the omission affected the trial result. (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280 (Verdugo); People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1135, fn. 13, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
3. Analysis
We first summarize our conclusions and then set out our analysis.
After independently reviewing the redacted and unredacted memoranda, we decide that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Deleoz‘s discovery motion under state law based on work product (
Further, we determine that the nondisclosure of potential impeachment evidence did not violate Deleoz‘s federal right to due process under Brady under the facts of this case. It is apparent that the jury rejected Dr. Jorden‘s opinion that Lee had been beaten to death, and it is not reasonably probable that additional evidence to support the defense‘s impeachment of Dr. Jorden would have altered the jury‘s verdict or led to an acquittal.
We begin our analysis under state law, which establishes that a criminal defendant‘s statutory right to discovery under
The reciprocal discovery statute sets forth explicit categories for disclosure (
Thus, Deleoz‘s entitlement to discovery of the unredacted memoranda under
Deleoz submits he was entitled to the unredacted memoranda on two statutory grounds. He argues that any impeachment evidence, including but not limited to evidence of bias, qualifies as exculpatory under
With respect to Deleoz‘s argument under
It is less clear that impeachment evidence must be disclosed under
Deleoz does not address Kennedy or suggest how to reconcile a broad or inclusive reading of “exculpatory evidence” under
To the extent the memoranda relate the assistant district attorney‘s impressions and opinions about Dr. Jorden‘s interactions with law enforcement and her evaluation of the evidence in those cases, those comments constitute core attorney work product and are excluded from discovery under
The redacted portions of the memoranda are additionally composed of case-specific information related to the death investigations included in the memoranda. For example, the redacted information in the 2019 memorandum pertains primarily to two death investigations which were still pending when
To the extent the memoranda demonstrate concern about Dr. Jorden‘s alleged tendency to “rush to judgment,” that sentiment is captured by the unredacted portion of the 2012 memoranda that Deleoz obtained before trial and which he utilized in his cross-examination of Dr. Jorden.
There are, however, additional, nondisclosed portions of the memoranda which document Dr. Jorden‘s conclusions regarding the cause and manner of death in specified death investigations, including one case bearing some factual resemblance here (to the extent it considered whether the decedent may have sustained the fatal injury during a fall or had been killed by another person). Further, nondisclosed portions include statements attributed to Dr. Jorden that describe shifts in her classification of cause and manner of death with additional or changing information from the investigation and suggest some omissions in the information considered or included in her reports.
That material—liberally construed—and insofar as it takes the form of statements or reported statements by Dr. Jorden (
While the record is not entirely clear on these points, if true, they would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Nevertheless, even assuming (without deciding) that the trial court erred under
b. Prosecution‘s Disclosure Obligation Under Brady
We turn to whether the trial court erred in declining to order further disclosure of any portion of the unredacted memoranda as exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to the defendant under Brady. In contrast with the enumerated categories for disclosure under California‘s reciprocal discovery statute, the scope of the prosecution‘s duty under Brady and its progeny is broad, encompassing impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 281.) Even so, “not every violation of that duty necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust.” (Ibid.) Rather, the suppression of qualifying exculpatory or impeachment material gives rise to a ” ‘real Brady violation’ ” only where the nondisclosure was material, meaning “the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” (Ibid.)
We have already determined in our statutory analysis ante that those portions of the redacted memoranda comprising factual information about the death investigations described in the memoranda (including detective findings, witness statements, and details about the deceased) are not exculpatory as to Deleoz. We therefore focus our analysis on those parts of the redacted memoranda that contain possible impeachment evidence with respect to the testimony of Dr. Jorden.
The first element of a Brady violation is whether the evidence at issue is “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.” (Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 281-282.) Deleoz contends that statements of Dr. Jorden reported in the memoranda that showed bias in the conduct of her duties qualified for disclosure because Dr. Jorden‘s expert opinion was critical to the jury‘s determination of guilt.
Case authority highlights the breadth of Brady‘s favorability inquiry. In Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1035, the California Supreme Court considered the petitioner Salazar‘s Brady claim in a second-degree murder case where Salazar sought a copy of a follow-up investigation report in a separate case involving the same forensic pathologist, Dr. Ribe, who had testified at the petitioner‘s trial. Salazar sought the disclosure of evidence that Dr. Ribe had altered his opinion as to the timeline of incapacitation and death
In this case, like in Salazar, Deleoz sought evidence based on Dr. Jorden‘s work in other death investigations that could be used to support the defense‘s theory of bias, which was that (in the defense‘s view) Dr. Jorden tended to characterize as homicides deaths that were in fact accidental and overlooked contrary evidence. What is more, while the limitations set forth in
Under Salazar, a medical expert‘s opinion or conduct in an unrelated death investigation may be impeaching—and thus favorable in terms of Brady, even if it is ultimately deemed not to be material on appellate review. (Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1050ante, there appear to be some statements in the redacted memoranda pertaining to opinions rendered by Dr. Jorden in other death investigations which the defense might have tried to use at trial to support Deleoz‘s efforts to impeach Dr. Jorden‘s credibility as a witness or objectivity as a pathologist by suggesting that she drew hasty conclusions, even if ultimately the evidentiary weight or value of the impeachment material would have been quite limited.
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “the Brady rule‘s ’ “overriding concern [is] with the justice of the finding of guilt,” ’ [citations], and that the Government‘s ‘interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done[.]’ ” [Citations.] Consistent with these principles, the Government assured the Court at oral argument that subsequent to petitioners’ trial, it has adopted a “generous policy of discovery” in criminal cases under which it discloses any “information that a defendant might wish to use.” [Citation.] As we have recognized, and as the Government agrees, . . . ” ‘[t]his is as it should be.’ ” (Turner v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. 313, 137 S.Ct. 1885, 1893 (Turner).)
The accuracy of Dr. Jorden‘s conclusion that Lee had been beaten to death was central to the case against Deleoz. The prosecutor in closing argument emphasized Jorden‘s expertise, professional qualifications, and reputation. He highlighted the certainty and precision of her conclusions, while denigrating those of Deleoz‘s own expert.
Given the centrality of Dr. Jorden‘s findings to this investigation, certain portions of the memoranda, particularly those describing incidents with factual similarities to this case, could have had impeachment value for Deleoz‘s contentions that Dr. Jorden displayed confirmation bias, failed to gather key evidence before rendering her opinion, and did not consider potential alternative causes of death. Rather than evaluate the memoranda for potential impeachment evidence in this case, however, it appears from the record that both the prosecutor and the trial court may have relied on prior redactions carried out in another case in concluding the redacted material is “not Brady.” In so doing, the trial court may have overlooked potential impeachment material contained in the redacted memoranda concerning Dr. Jorden‘s performance of her duties as the forensic pathologist in other investigations. (See Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th. at p. 1052, fn. 8 [noting that due to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry under Brady, “it is rarely possible to predetermine whether particular information in any individual case will be material“].)
In Salazar, the California Supreme Court observed that impeachment evidence generally ” ‘has been found to be material where the witness at issue “supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime” ’ ” (Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1050), or ” ‘where the likely impact on the witness‘s credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution‘s case.’ ” (Ibid.) There, the court decided that “even successful impeachment of Dr. Ribe‘s testimony would not have materially affected the jury‘s assessment of petitioner‘s guilt” based on other evidence establishing Salazar‘s guilt (id. at p. 1051) and because the “theory that Dr. Ribe shape[d] his testimony to fit the prosecution‘s case [wa]s neither the inevitable nor the most logical inference from the follow-up investigation report.” (Ibid.)
We recognize that Dr. Jorden‘s testimony in this matter, opining that Lee‘s injuries could not have resulted from a mere accidental fall, supplied ” ‘a critical element of the prosecution‘s case.’ ” (Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1050.) To that end, viewed through the lens of the prosecutor‘s disclosure obligations, we reiterate a well-worn point—that where materiality may have been in doubt prior to trial, ” ’ “the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.” ’ ” (Miranda, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 577.) However, viewed through the posttrial lens of the appellate court after in camera review of the evidence in question, and considering the collective evidence presented at trial (Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 887) and the jury‘s verdict, we conclude the third component of Brady is not met.
Deleoz was charged with murder. Yet the jury ultimately convicted Deleoz of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter (rather than first- or second-degree murder (
The jury‘s conviction on a theory of involuntary manslaughter indicates that it found the evidence supported commission of a crime akin to that presented by Deleoz at closing argument. In argument, defense counsel contended that what had occurred was a “tragic accident.” However, if the jury nevertheless believed Deleoz was criminally to blame for the fall he and
Given that the defense effectively utilized at trial that portion of impeachment evidence concerning Dr. Jorden‘s alleged bias which had been disclosed to it prior to trial, we decide the disclosure of any further impeachment evidence contained in the redacted portions of the memoranda—beyond that which the defense had already utilized—would not have had any material effect on the outcome. (See Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 280; Turner, supra, 582 U.S. at p. [137 S.Ct. at p. 1895]; Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 124.) Under these circumstances, the nondisclosure of the redacted memoranda material does not ” ‘undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 434).
In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the effect of the nondisclosure on the defense‘s investigations and trial strategies. (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 256.) While Deleoz may have sought to use the additional, nondisclosed impeachment evidence to bolster his theory about Dr. Jorden‘s purported tendency to rush to judgment regarding cause and manner of death, despite ambiguities in the evidence, we are unable to identify any aspect of the nondisclosed material that would have afforded the defense a new avenue for investigation or a different strategy at trial. We decide that, given the impeachment evidence that was disclosed and the particular trial outcome in this case, Deleoz has failed to establish the materiality of the nondisclosed impeachment evidence under Brady.
B. Abstract of Judgment
The parties agree that there is an error in the abstract of judgment. The jury found Deleoz guilty of involuntary manslaughter under
We agree that the reference to section “929b)” in lieu of “192(b)” is best characterized as a typographical error. As a typographical error is clerical in nature and correctable at any time, we will order the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment to correct the error. (See In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705; cf. People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 123-124.)
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall prepare and file an amended abstract of judgment to correct the statute of conviction to
WE CONCUR:
Danner, J.
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
Lie, J.
H047775 People v. Deleoz
Trial Court: County of Santa Clara
Trial Judge: Hon. Eric S. Geffon
Counsel: David W. Beaudreau, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the Sixth District Appellate Program, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
H047775 People v. Deleoz