PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. WILLIAM COTY, Petitioner-Appellant.
No. 1-12-1799
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
August 28, 2014
2014 IL App (1st) 12-1799-U
JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.
FOURTH DIVISION. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court‘s order dismissing the defendant‘s section 2-1401 petition is vacated. The circuit court improperly dismissed the defendant‘s petition, sua sponte, on the basis of timeliness. The circuit court also improperly dismissed the defendant‘s petition on the merits. While the court was correct that the defendant had failed to properly state a facial challenge to the mandatory sentencing scheme under which he was sentenced to natural life in prison without the possibility of parole, it erred in finding that the defendant had also failed to state an as-applied challenge to that sentencing scheme on the basis of the Illinois Constitution‘s proportionate penalties clause.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The record before us reveals the following facts and procedural history. The defendant was arrested on November 21, 2004, and charged with, inter alia, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse.
A. Pretrial Proceedings
¶ 6 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit other crime‘s evidence, and following a hearing, the trial court granted that motion.3 This evidence was not presented at trial for the jury; rather it was used only by the trial judge for sentencing purposes.
¶ 7 Prior to trial, the trial court also conducted a fitness hearing. The State called Dr. Debra Ferguson, a forensic clinical services psychologist who admitted that the defendant‘s full scale IQ was 65, but who testified that the defendant was fit to stand trial. The defendant called Dr. Sandra Dawkins who testified that the defendant‘s full scale IQ was 55 and that he was unfit to stand trial. After hearing evidence and arguments by both parties, the circuit court found that although it was undisputed that the defendant was “mentally retarded,” he was nevertheless fit to stand trial.
¶ 8 The defendant then filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statements to police. At the
¶ 9 The State also called their expert forensic psychologist, Dr. Ferguson, who was tasked with determining whether the defendant was capable of understanding his Miranda rights. Dr. Ferguson averred that she interviewed the defendant and performed one part of the “Grisso scales” test--the “Function of Rights in Interrogation“-- to assess the defendant‘s capacity to understand his Miranda rights.4 According to Dr. Ferguson, the defendant successfully applied the Miranda warnings he had received to a hypothetical situation, and therefore passed this portion of the “Grisso scales” test. Dr. Ferguson also averred that during her interview with the defendant, the defendant exhibited an understanding of his Miranda rights. In particular, Dr. Ferguson explained that the defendant had acknowledged to her that the police read him his Miranda rights. When asked to explain what those rights entailed, the defendant told Dr. Ferguson that “yeah I know they (sic) supposed to read you your rights *** I‘m slow but I ain‘t
¶ 10 In opposition to the State‘s testimony, at the motion to suppress hearing, the defendant called his own expert, Dr. Michael Fields, who testified that he administered the full Grisso-scales test to the defendant to determine his understanding of the Miranda warnings. Dr. Fields testified that the defendant scored poorly on all four parts of the Grisso-scales test. In addition, he stated that during his interview with the defendant, the defendant could not name his Miranda rights. Based on the above, Dr. Fields opined that “there were significant doubts about [the defendant‘s] ability to understand Miranda.” However, when questioned further, Dr. Fields acknowledged that he could not state with certainty that the defendant was categorically unable to understand his Miranda rights.
¶ 11 After hearing the testimony and argument by the parties, the circuit court denied the defendant‘s motion to suppress his statements to police. In doing so, the court noted that Dr. Ferguson‘s interview provided the stronger and better evidence of the defendant‘s capacity. The court stated that Dr. Fields articulated an equivocal opinion that lacked certainty, and that his opinion was based more on testing rather than on a clinical interview of the defendant.
B. Jury Trial
¶ 13 At trial, the victim K.W., testified that she was six years old in November 2004 and that the defendant, whom she knew as “Shakey,” lived as a boarder in her grandparents’ house. The victim lived with her grandparents, her parents, her siblings, her cousin and “Shakey.” The defendant lived in the basement, as did K.W.‘s parents and siblings, and K.W. was allowed to sleep in the basement or upstairs with her grandparents. K.W. testified that on November 18, 2004, she was watching TV alone in the defendant‘s room in the basement, while her parents and
¶ 14 On cross-examination, K.W. denied telling the police that the defendant touched her vagina with his hand, and insisted that she told them he had used his tongue. She similarly admitted that she did not tell the emergency room physician that the defendant had used his tongue. When asked to explain why she did not tell the emergency doctor that the defendant had licked her instead of touched her, K.W. stated that she forgot.
¶ 15 K.W.‘s mother, Keafa W., testified that on the night in question at about 11 p.m., K.W. came into her room. K.W. told Keafa, “Shakey touched me” and then patted her vaginal area to show her mother where she had been touched. Keafa woke her husband up and they went upstairs with K.W. to talk to K.W.‘s grandparents. While they were upstairs, Keafa heard the front door close and her husband observed the defendant leaving.
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Keafa admitted that K.W. never told her that the defendant licked her, and that she only accused him of “touching her.” Keafa also acknowledged that she did not call the police until the next afternoon, November 19, 2004. She explained, however, that she waited
¶ 17 Pediatric emergency physician Dr. Gail Allen testified that she examined K.W. on November 21, 2004. Dr. Allen stated that on that date K.W. was six years old and weighed 53 pounds. According to Dr. Allen, K.W. pointed at her vagina, and told her that the defendant had “touched her.” Dr. Allen stated that she conducted a physical examination of K.W. but that the exam was normal and that she found no signs of penetration, trauma, or “touching.” She explained, however, that in her experience this was common in abuse cases because evidence of trauma is usually seen if the child is examined immediately after the traumatic event or if there was “repeated, repetitive trauma over a chronic period” of time.
¶ 18 On cross-examination, Dr. Allen acknowledged that K.W. did not tell her that the defendant had touched her with his tongue. She also admitted that K.W.‘s chart from the emergency room visit revealed that K.W. had told a resident that she was wearing shorts, and not a skirt on the night of the incident. On redirect examination, however, Dr. Allen testified that accorindg to the resident‘s notes K.W. had stated that the defendant looked “down there,” that he had touched her “down there,” and that he had “put his finger in the hole and moved it around in circles.”
¶ 19 Chicago police officer Donald Story testified that at about midnight on November 21, 2004, he and his partner, Officer Elkins, arrested the defendant at his sister‘s home. Once in the police car, Officer Elkins gave the defendant his Miranda rights, and asked him if he wanted to answer the police officers’ questions. According to Officer Story, the defendant agreed and asked what the arrest was about. Upon being told of the allegations, the defendant told the officers that K.W. “came into [his] room, sat on [his] lap, [and] rubbed around a little bit and.” Once at the station, Officer Story contacted Area 1 police.
¶ 21 ASA Dean Fugate next testified that he arrived at the police station on November 22, 2004, and spoke to the defendant in an interview room in the presence of the two detectives. Fugate averred that he gave the defendant his Miranda warnings from memory and explained to him who he was, and that the defendant indicated that he understood his rights and was willing to speak to him. Fugate and the defendant then had a 15-minute conversation, at the end of which the defendant agreed to memorialize his statement in writing. After Fugate asked the defendant to read the Miranda warnings on the form for the handwritten statement, he learned that he defendant was illiterate. Fugate therefore read the Miranda rights to the defendant from that printed form and had him sign his name on the form. According to Fugate, the defendant was able to sign his name. Fugate then took down a handwritten statement, after which the defendant, Fugate and the two detectives signed each page.
¶ 22 The defendant‘s handwritten statement was then published to the jury. In that statement, the defendant stated that he was 46 years old and that in November 2004, he rented a room in the basement of 7036 South Aberdeen Avenue in Chicago, where he shared the basement with K.W. and her family. The defendant stated that on November 18, 2004, he was changing his clothes in his bedroom with his door open when K.W. walked into the room. The defendant told K.W. to leave but she would not. The defendant stated that he finished changing his clothes behind a
¶ 23 In his handwritten statement, the defendant further stated that K.W. pulled her shorts and panties down to her knees before sitting on his lap. He then stated that she was not wearing pants when she was seated on his lap. The defendant also stated that after K.W. got off his lap and pulled her pants up, she left the room and he saw her go upstairs with her parents into her grandparents’ room. The defendant then left the house out of the front door and went to his sister‘s house. He also stated that he “felt bad that he touched the little girl” and that he was aware that she was six years old.
¶ 24 In his statement, the defendant also indicated that he understands and writes English, but that he cannot read it, and that he was treated well by the police officers.
¶ 25 After the defendant‘s statement was read into the record, the State rested. The defense presented no witnesses and the parties proceeded to closing arguments. After arguments were heard, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. The defendant‘s motion for a new trial was denied.
“[T]he parties recognize that the court‘s hands are tied because of the prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault, which makes this conviction one for which he must receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The facts of the cause certainly warrant a substantial sentence here. It would not be the sentence that the court is required to give, had I any discretion, but I must follow the law nonetheless. The legislature has determined a second aggravated criminal sexual assault in one‘s lifetime means what they say it means.”
C. Direct Appeal
¶ 28 The defendant subsequently appealed his conviction, arguing that: (1) he was convicted of
D. Petition for Relief from Judgment
¶ 30 On March 8, 2012, the defendant filed the instant pro se section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment (
¶ 31 On May 10, 2012, the circuit court sua sponte denied the defendant‘s petition. In its written
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 We begin by setting forth the well-established principles regarding such petitions.
¶ 34 Where the claims in a section 2-1401 petition are insufficient to warrant relief as a matter of law, the circuit court may sua sponte dismiss the petition with prejudice or deny relief, even where the State has not filed any responsive pleading to such a petition. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 12. We review a circuit court‘s order dismissing a section 2-1401 petition de novo. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 18. In doing so, we are mindful that we are not bound by the reasons relied upon by the circuit court and may affirm on any basis supported by the record. People v. Harvey, 379 Ill. App. 3d 518, 521 (2008)).
A. Timeliness
¶ 36 The State initially contends that the circuit court properly dismissed the defendant‘s petition as untimely. It is well-established that a section 2-1401 petition must be filed within two years after entry of the judgment being challenged.
¶ 37 The State contends that the circuit court properly dismissed the defendant‘s petition as untimely because the defendant‘s sentence was not void but rather only voidable. In support the State cites to People v. Gray, 2013 IL App (1st) 112572. In that case, this appellate court addressed the issue of what constitutes voidness for purposes of a section 2-1401 petition. See Gray, 2013 IL App (1st) 112572. There, a juvenile defendant was found guilty of first degree murder through accountability and because he had a prior murder conviction, by statute he received a mandatory life sentence. See Gray, 2013 IL App (1st) 112572, ¶ 3 (citing
¶ 38 On appeal, the defendant in Gray argued that “a sentence which *** violates the constitution is void from its inception and may be challenged at any time.” Gray, 2013 IL App (1st) 112572, ¶ 8. We disagreed. In addressing the voidness issue, we initially explained that our supreme court has repeatedly held that a judgment is void, rather than voidable, only if the court that entered it lacked jurisdiction, i.e., lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or, the power to render a particular judgment. Gray, 2013 IL App (1st) 112572, ¶ 10. We explained that “the power to render a particular judgment” does not necessarily mean that the judgment rendered is one that should have been rendered. Gray, 2013 IL App (1st) 112572, ¶ 10. Rather, as we noted “the power to decide carries with it the power to decide wrong, as well as right, and a court [does] not lose jurisdiction merely because it make a mistake in the law, the facts or both.” Gray, 2013 IL App (1st) 112572, ¶ 10.
¶ 40 The defendant acknowledges the holding in Gray, but asserts that it is inapplicable since in that case the State filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of timeliness, whereas here, the circuit court improperly sua sponte dismissed the defendant‘s petition on that basis. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
¶ 41 The record below reveals that unlike in Gray, the State here never challenged the defendant‘s petition on the basis of timeliness. In fact, the State filed no responsive pleading to the defendant‘s pro se petition with the circuit court. Rather, the court sua sponte dismissed the petition, inter alia, on the basis of timeliness. The court, however, was without authority to do so.
¶ 42 It is well-settled that while a trial court may sua sponte dismiss a section 2-1401 petition
B. Facial Unconstitutionality
¶ 44 On appeal, the defendant first contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his section
¶ 45 Roper, Graham, and Miller form a line of United States Supreme Court decisions that address how the eighth amendment‘s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” applies to sentencing juveniles. In those cases, the Court recognized three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults, which render their irresponsible conduct less morally reprehensible than that of adults. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70. These are: (1) that juveniles have a lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility; (2) that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and (3) that their character is not as well formed as that of an adult. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
¶ 46 On the basis of the aforementioned principles, in Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, the Court specifically held that the eight amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty “on offenders who [are] under the age of 18 when their crimes [are] committed.” Subsequently, in Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, the Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits the sentence of natural life without the possibility of parole “for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” The Court further held that the “State need not guarantee the offender eventual
¶ 47 Most recently, in Miller, the Court considered appeals by two 14-year-olds, convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, under sentencing schemes that did not permit the sentencing authority to have any discretion in imposing different punishment. Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. Relying on its earlier decisions in Roper and Graham, the Court in Miller recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” (Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. at 2464), and that “in imposing a State‘s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.” Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. The Court explained that a mandatory sentence precludes consideration of mitigating factors, such as: the juvenile‘s age and its attendant characteristics; the juvenile‘s family and home environment and the circumstances of the offense, including the extent of the juvenile‘s participation therein and the effect of any familial or peer pressure; the juvenile‘s possible inability to interact with police officers or prosecutors, or incapacity to assist his or her own attorneys; and “the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.” Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
¶ 48 Based on the above, the Court found that “[a] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. The court then held that “[b]y requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes,” the mandatory sentencing schemes before it “violated the principle of proportionality,” and thereby
¶ 49 In its decision in Miller, the Court refused to hold categorically that a juvenile can never receive life imprisonment without parole for a homicide offense. Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Nevertheless, the Court stated that “given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision ***, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
¶ 50 On appeal, the defendant contends that under the principles of Miller, Roper and Graham we must find that the statutory scheme under which he was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment is also facially unconstitutional. The defendant was sentenced to natural life imprisonment pursuant to
“A person who *** is convicted of the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child after having previously been convicted of the offense *** of aggravated sexual assault *** shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment.”
720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(b)(2) (West 2004) .
¶ 51 The defendant asserts that because under the aforementioned statutory scheme the trial court had no discretion to consider his personal characteristics, most importantly his mental retardation, but also the particular circumstances of this offense, the statutory scheme itself is unconstitutional. The defendant acknowledges that Miller, Roper and Graham, apply to juveniles, but asserts that the principles articulated in those cases apply with full force to mentally retarded individuals. In support, he relies on Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
¶ 52 In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty “is not a suitable
¶ 53 The defendant argues that while he does not face the death penalty, like the defendant in Atkins did, the concerns outlined in Atkins remain relevant in light of the evidence of his mental deficiencies and his resulting diminished personal culpability. He asserts that
¶ 54 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute “is the most difficult challenge to mount.” Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305 (2008); People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 407 (2003). A statute is facially unconstitutional only if there are no circumstances in which the statute could be validly applied. Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 306. The fact that the statute could be found unconstitutional under some set of circumstances does not establish the facial invalidity of the statute. In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 269 (2004). Thus, a facial challenge must fail if any situation exists where the statute could be validly applied. In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d 517, 533 (2006) (and cases cited therein).
¶ 55 In the present case, there is nothing in
¶ 56 In coming to this conclusion, we find our supreme court‘s recent decision in Davis, 2014 IL 115595, instructive. In that case, a juvenile defendant, inter alia, challenged
¶ 57 In rejecting the defendant‘s argument, our supreme court in Davis, recognized the holding in Miller, but noted that its prohibition of mandatory sentence of life without parole was limited to juveniles. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 29. The court explained that, even under Miller, the sentencing statute challenged by the defendant, could still be validly applied to adults. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 30. Accordingly, the court refused to find the statute facially unconstitutional. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 30.
¶ 58 Applying the aforementioned rationale of Davis to the cause at bar, we too are compelled to reject the defendant‘s facial challenge to
¶ 59 In coming to this decision, we also find relevant that as of now, there is no Illinois or United States Supreme Court decision that stands for the proposition that a sentencing statute mandating life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for mentally retarded individuals, without
C. As Applied Challenge--Proportionate Penalties Clause
¶ 61 The defendant next asserts that
¶ 62 In determining whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant because it shocks to the moral sense of the community, our supreme court has explained:
“When the legislature has authorized a designated punishment for a specified crime, it must be regarded that its action represents the general moral ideas of the people, and the courts will not hold the punishment so authorized as either cruel and unusual, or not proportioned to the nature of the offense, unless it is a cruel or degrading punishment not known to the common law, or is a degrading punishment which had become obsolete in the State prior to the adoption of its constitution, or is so wholly disproportioned to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 339 (citing People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 421–22, 36 N.E. 76 (1894)).
In this context, however, our supreme court has refused to define what kind of punishment constitutes “cruel,” “degrading,” or “so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 339. Its rationale has been that “as our society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the ‘moral sense’ of the community.” Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 339 (citing Trop, 356 U. S. at 101) (whether a punishment shocks the moral sense of the community is based upon an “evolving standard[ ] of decency that mark[s] the progress of a maturing society“)).
¶ 63 We therefore review the gravity of the defendant‘s offense in connection with the severity of
¶ 64 In Miller, our supreme court held that imposing mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a juvenile offender convicted of murdering more than one victim under a theory of accountability and without considering the facts of the crime, including the defendant‘s age, offended the Illinois Constitution‘s proportionate penalties clause and was unconstitutional as applied to the defendants. See Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 339-42. Our supreme court held the mandatory life sentence for the 15-year-old look out was “particularly harsh and unconstitutionally disproportionate,” because it “grossly distort[ed] the factual realities of the case and [did not] accurately represent[] [the] defendant‘s personal culpability.” Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. In coming to this decision, the court, inter alia, noted the longstanding distinction between the culpability of adults and juveniles, and held that a sentencing statute, which entirely
¶ 65 In the present case, the defendant was sentenced pursuant to
¶ 66 We begin by noting that it is undisputed that at the time of the offense, the defendant was mentally retarded with an IQ score somewhere between 55 and 65. As such, under our prevailing social norms, we must recognize that his culpability was lesser than that of a person with normal cognitive capacity. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305. As the United States Supreme Court in Atkins aptly explained:
“Clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial, but, by definition, they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others’ reactions. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but diminish their personal culpability.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305.
¶ 67 In addition, while we in no way diminish the seriousness of the offense with which the defendant was charged and convicted, it cannot be ignored that the offense here included a single, brief act of penetration that did not result in any physical injury to the victim. The record below reveals that the defendant lived in the residence with the victim and her family for two or three years before the incident. Prior to the evening of the assault the family “never had problems with him.” The defendant made a single contact with the victim‘s vagina, either with his tongue, hand or finger, and the entire encounter lasted a minute. What is more, the encounter was not pre-planned or orchestrated, but rather was seemingly impulsive, and the defendant expressed remorse over what he had done.
¶ 68 The sentencing judge himself noted that under these particular circumstances, while the offense warranted a severe penalty, it did not warrant a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The judge nevertheless explained that he was bound to follow the statute and therefore had to sentence the defendant to life.
¶ 69 Despite the defendant‘s cognitive impairments and the brief and limited, albeit serious nature, of his offense, the defendant here was sentenced to the harshest penalty prescribed by our laws, which our jurisprudence dictates should be reserved for the most severe offense—i.e., murder. See Brown, 2012 IL App (1st) 091940, ¶ 68 (noting that “[Illinois] has long recognized that the murder of another human is ‘the highest crime known to the law.’ [Citation.] Because of the
¶ 70 In coming to this decision we have considered the cases of Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d at 129 and Peters, 2011 IL App (1st) 092830, relied upon by the State. We acknowledge that in Huddleston and Peters both our supreme court and the Illinois appellate court rejected as-applied challenges to the instant or similar provisions of the Criminal Code. We nevertheless find those cases readily distinguishable from the cause at bar.
¶ 71 First and foremost, neither Huddleston, nor Peters involved mentally retarded defendants
¶ 72 In addition, the circumstances of the crimes committed in those cases, are far more heinous than the ones with which we are presented here. In Huddleston, the defendant was a teacher, who placed his penis, which was covered with various food items, in the mouths of three of his students, each approximately 10 years old, within a two to three month period. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d at 325. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the mandatory life sentence, as applied to the defendant pursuant to
¶ 73 Similarly, in Peters, the defendant, who was the victim‘s step-father, inserted his penis into the victim‘s vagina two or three times a week for three years, starting when she was 10 years old and threatened to hurt her mother if she ever told anyone what he had done. Peters, 2011 IL App (1st) 092830, ¶ 54. The victim‘s sisters testified that the defendant had similarly assaulted them for two years. Peters, 2011 IL App (1st) 092830, ¶ 54. Under these circumstances, the appellate court found that the mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole imposed pursuant to
¶ 74 As already discussed above, unlike in Huddleston and Peters, in the present case, the defendant‘s conduct was neither repeated, nor orchestrated and planned. Rather, it involved a single and brief act, and was by all accounts done on impulse. What is more, unlike in Peters and Huddleston the defendant here did not have any supervisory authority (either by way of a family connection or by way of his status as a teacher) over the victim. Accordingly, we find Huddleston and Peters completely factually distinguishable, and reject their applicability to to the cause at bar. See Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (2002) (noting that a holding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied does not broadly declare a statue unconstitutional but narrowly finds the statute unconstitutional under the specific facts of the case).
¶ 75 In doing so, we by no means diminish the seriousness of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, nor the legislature‘s attempt to protect children from sexual predators. In fact we fully recognize and agree with our supreme court that “aside from any physical injury a child may suffer in a sexual assault, children who are sexually assaulted are subject to chronic psychological problems that may be even more pernicious.” Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d at 135. Indeed, sexual assault “is without doubt deserving of serious punishment.” Coker, 344 U.S. at 598. All we hold today, is that under the very unique circumstances of this case, the defendant, who is mentally retarded, should not have been sentenced to mandatory natural life
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 77 Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, we find
¶ 78 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; sentence vacated and cause remanded for resentencing.