*1 (Nos. 85180, 85181 cons. ILLINOIS,
THE PEOPLE OF THE OF STATE Appel lee, HAYNES, v. JONATHAN Appellant.
Opinion July 2000. filed *5 J., concurring. RATHJE, specially C.J., HARRISON, dissenting. Kathy Kelly, Freedman, Carol R. Heise and
Alan M. for Chicago, appellant. all of General, Springfield, of Attorney E. Ryan, James (William Chicago Devine, Attorney, State’s Richard A. General, Chicago, Browers, Attorney L. Assistant At- Walters, Assistant State’s and Jon J. Renee Goldfarb counsel), for the People. torneys, of the opinion McMORROW delivered JUSTICE court: three charged with
Defendant, Haynes, Jonathan arising out burglary count of of murder and one counts Dr. Martin Sulli death of shooting August of the in trial Following a bench Wilmette, Illinois. van guilty was found County, court of Cook circuit charges. right jury to a of all Defendant waived his for sentencing phase proceedings, and the circuit eligible penalty found defendant for the death court (1) eligibility of two factors: murder in the basis (720 1(b)(6)(West 1992)), felony course of a ILCS 5/9 — (2) pre cold, and murder committed calculated and (720 pursuant preconceived plan meditated manner to a 1(b)(11)(West 1992)). ILCS The court then deter 5/9 — mitigation presented mined that no factors in were preclude imposition penalty of the death and sentenced appeal, defendant to death. On direct this court affirmed defendant’s convictions for intentional murder and bur glary, knowing and vacated defendant’s convictions for *6 felony murder. This court also affirmed defendant’s (1996). death sentence. 174 Ill. 2d 204 People v. Haynes, During pendency appeal, of defendant’s direct de- petition pursuant fendant filed a to the Post- pro se (725 (West Hearing Conviction Act ILCS et seq. 5/122—1 1994)), alleging rights that his constitutional had been during hearing, sentencing. violated his fitness trial and obtaining post-conviction proceed- After for counsel ings, additionally defendаnt filed a motion to vacate his pursuant convictions and sentence to section 2—1401 of (735 (West the Code of Civil Procedure ILCS 5/2—1401 1996)), argued evidence, wherein defendant that new record, outside the indicated that he was unfit to stand disposition trial. After this court’s of defendant’s direct appeal, by petition defendant, counsel, filed an amended post-conviction supporting for relief with affidavits and hearing argument exhibits. After on the State’s motion conducting claims, court, dismiss all the trial without evidentiary hearing, post- an dismissed both defendant’s petition conviction and the section 2—1401 motion to 651(a) (134 Supreme vacate. Pursuant to Court Rule 111. 651(a)), appeals 2d R. dismissals, both which subsequently were consolidated this court. For the fol- lowing reasons, affirm we the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
previously
presented
This court
detailed the evidence
opinion
(1996).
appeal.
trial in our
on
defendant’s
direct
People
Therefore,
Defendant was with the murder of Dr. plastic surgeon, August Sullivan, Martin 1993. killing Defendant arrest, confessed to the after his stat- ing part that he marked Dr. Sullivan for death as of an plan targeting people promoted Aryan overall who “fake beauty” through plastic surgery, hair, bleached-blonde contact blue-tinted lenses. Defendant also confessed police previously to the that he had murdered Frank Ringi, colorist, a San Francisco hair and had been stalk- ing Stroupe, president Lake Forest executive Charles largest manufacturer of blue-tinted contact lenses. police, his statement defendant related that he targeted large Dr. Sullivan based the doctor’s Pages, appoint- advertisement and made an Yellow him ment with under an assumed name. Defendant shot range doctor at close his office to ensure that he right had killed the man. hearing
In March was held to determine Defendant, fitness to stand trial. who was represented by during hearing, counsel this waived his *7 right jury, proceedings to and the were conducted before judge. parties dispute the trial The did not that defen- purpose proceed- dant understood the nature and ings against parties disagreed, however, him. The over capacity whether defendant had the in to assist his Expert testimony defense. was adduced both the State hearing defendant, and, and after evidence, the trial court concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial. during hearing
The State’s first witness the fitness McConnell, officer Matthew who police was Wilmette that he met with defendant on three occasions testified retrieving in connection with after defendant’s arrest blood, hair, handwriting and fingerprint, palm print, his during from him. McConnell stated that samples defendant, ap- interactions with defendant established contact, propriate eye requiring read the court orders and that he understood the taking samples indicated orders, had no in the officer’s instruc- difficulty following tions, fully with the Officer cooperated sampling. McConnell testified that defendant did not ner- appear vous, twitches, did not make unusual movements or did hands, did not irrational wring give responses, and did not delay responding during conversations with the officers. McConnell also statеd that on one occa- sion he observed defendant confer with his counsel. Markos,
Dr. psychiatrist Mathew licensed forensic acting clinical director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook also testi- County, fied on the prosecution. behalf of Dr. Markos stated that he had previously performed thousands of evaluations to determine trial, a defendant’s fitness for and testified that he occasions, had examined this defendant on four pursuant orders, to court between 1993 and Feb- August ruary 1994. Dr. Markos first examined defendant on 27, 1993, August and on that occasion defendant was calm, articulate, coherent, cooperative, and maintained contact, good eye when he was especially responding questions. during doctor’s At no time this four-hour interview did defendant display any agitation, anxiety, Further, mania or depression, disturbed behavior. Dr. high superior Markos estimated that defendant had or intelligence. examination, de- during Markos testified that this association,”
fendant not display any did “looseness of thought which Markos defined as a disorder which the *8 logical and links between or sequential two more differ- thoughts distorted, ent become or rendering speech loose difficult to incomprehensible. Further, understand or Dr. Markos stated that he did not observe any evidence that disturbances, defendant suffered from perceptual such as hallucinations, and he if when asked defendant he had ever previously hallucinations, experienced defendant in replied the negative.
Significantly, Dr. Markos that he testified was unable to detect any evidence of a delusional thinking process defendant of the four during any examinations he conducted. Dr. Markos defined a delusion aas false belief reason, or conviction which is not logic amenable to or which is out of touch reality, with and which is not in with a keeping person’s educational and cultural back- ground. Dr. Markos related that he talked at length with defendant regarding “philosophy” Aryan supremacy, and the doctor concluded that defendant’s beliefs neither fit the definition of a delusion nor fell within a delusional psychotic Rather, Dr. process. Markos determined that defendant’s philosophy “highly was personalized idiosyncratic belief.” the criteria
Using set forth in the Diagnostic (Third Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Edition— Revised) (DSMIII-R) at the conclusion the first exami- nation diagnosed Dr. Markos having an Axis II personality schizoid, narcissistic, disorder with paranoid explained traits. Markos psychiatric diagnosis, an Axis II is diagnosis reserved for personality disorders, whereas an Axis I diagnosis is reserved for mental illness. Dr. Markos testified it opinion that was his that defendant was loner, aloof, schizoid because he was a and had very limited social that defendant relationships; was narcissistic because defendant believed that he had a race; role to save the special white and that defendant he paranoid feeling because had a constant beauty Aryan and that fake race was threatened white bring race. destruction of the would about that, under the DSMIII-R further testified Dr. Markos suffering I an Axis from criteria, defendant was initially Although schizophrenic Dr. Markos had disorder. possibility could af- that defendant be considered the *9 upon defendant’s disorder, such a based flicted with strong family history included of mental illness which schizophrenia, explained the doctor that the DSMIII-R presence symptoms, requires one of the of at least two diagnosis prominent delusion, a of must be a for which schizophrenia. opinion, In Dr. Markos’ defendant exhib- thinking, no or delusional nor did he ex- ited delusions thinking, symptoms of delusional such as hallucina- hibit tions, catatonia or incoherence. acknowledged
Dr. Markos that both Dr. Fauteck diagnosed Psychiatric Rabin, Institute, also of the had schizophrenic, and Markos that he defendant as stated reaching opinions into account in his own di- took these agnosis. acknowledged that other doc- Dr. Markos also County jail diagnosed defendant as tors at the Cook had suffering However, from delusional disorders. apparent records, to review of defendant’s medical it was that had identified Dr. Markos that the “delusion” been by suprem- the examiners was defendant’s belief white beauty. acy opposition Aryan to fake and his symptoms by opinion Markos, of Dr. described support diagnosis did not of delusional other examiners under the criteria of the DSMIII-R. disorder diagnosis testified that his was further Dr. Markos custody, supported that, the fact while drugs, including antipsychotic was administered various was, however, no Serentil, Mellaril, and Haldol. There change medica- in defendant’s as a result of the beliefs dosages the medications were tions, even when the significant increased. Dr. Markos testified: “What was from the clinical psychiatric standpoint was the fact that thought [defendant] was to have either schizophrenia or disorder, delusional had received more than four months of treatment potent with antipsychotic medica- ***, tions and these medications did little at all to change any his beliefs and thаt was significant to me because had it been a true process, delusional had it been a true schizophrenic process, then from the clinical I standpoint *** would have expected degree some of improvement, I would have seen some remissions with respect intensity of his belief or his belief would have disappeared because a true delusion would be amenable to treat- ment.” Dr. Markos on cross-examination acknowledged, however, that will drugs always cure a delusional dis- order.
During his with meetings defendant, Dr. Markos found defendant an have “excellent comprehension of the nature of the charges pending against him,” that de- fendant was aware of the if consequences he were to be found guilty charges, including the possible imposi- tion of the death penalty, and that defendant had a good *10 understanding of the court and the proceedings func- tions of the court personnel. The doctor also related that when he first examined defendant in August 1993, defen- dant made it clear that he wished to represent himself his during trial. Based upon conversation, this Dr. Mar- kos concluded that defendant’s decision to represent himself was that voluntary, defendant had the capacity to counsel, cooperate with and that defendant chose not to cooperate. According Markos, to Dr. defendant consis- tently adhered to the himself, decision to represent except on one occasion when defendant told that Markos defen- dant had decided to cooperate with the defender public legal as “a maneuver.” Defendant subsequently decided returned, against however, this cooperation, to his decision to represent himself during proceedings. first that from the Markos testified conclusion, diagnosis nor defendant, neither his time he examined opinion trial had fitness to stand to defendant’s his cooperate capacity changed: with to had the opinion, attorney, In Dr. Markos’ if he chose to do so. his always and not had been volitional decisions any underlying mental disorder. related to during presented the fitness witnesses Defendant six testify proceedings. to was Thomas Ver- The first witness assigned public dun, defender who was an assistant hearing. August represent 9, 1993,bond defendant at his hearing, spoke prior he testified that to the bond Verdun in an room defendant for 20 to 30 minutes interview with During lockup area of the courthouse. located directly Verdun, conversation, defendant did not look at long glance.” According gave him “a side instead judge during interrupted Verdun, defendant bond condemning hearing “fake in order to make a statement Aryan beauty.” disgusted Defendant he was stated give ugliness people, and that he was honored to his life for that defendant made it his cause. Verdun testified judge represent himself, clear that he wanted to and the undergo exam- ordered defendant to a behavioral clinical Psychiatric ination at the Institute. testify Carreira, Dr. Rafael
The next witness to of the Cook director of the residential treatment unit County jail. that he examined de- Dr. Carreira testified September 2, 1993, and, fendant on after that 45-minute suffering diagnosed session, defendant as from a delu- arriving that, sional disorder. The doctor testified diagnosis, opinions he took into account the jail diagnosed de- other examiners at the who had also He fendant with delusional disorder. also stated professionals jail diagnosed had defen- none of the at the schizophrenia, personally dant and that he had with *11 symptoms. any schizophrenic defendant observed exhibit Dr. further Carreira testified that defendant had an above-average insight into his condition as a psychiatric situation, patient, legal his his and surroundings, him, charges against although defendant’s views times, were contradictory they always at were not ir- Dr. opinion rational. Carreira did not offer an as to whether was to stand defendant fit trial. next testify
The witness to for defendant was Dr. Sat- Brar, a that, inder clinical Dr. stated psychologist. Brar in her as the coordinator of the treat- capacity residential ment of Cook jail, unit she was of defen- County aware dant’s mental health status her through supervision of the mental health who professional assigned was dorm. Dr. Brar also had one conversation with Aryan views, during defendant his which regarding very defendant was of his Based protective ideology. information, this diagnosed Dr. Brar defendant as suffer- disorder, ing grandi- from the mental of delusional illness Brar type. however, ose Dr. did not defendant diagnose schizophrenic. In Dr. Brar’s being opinion, defendant’s delusional disorder rendered him unaware conse- trial, his quences and it caused him to re- illogically fuse assistance in his legal clarifying position. Although opined Dr. Brar that defendant was unwilling cooper- ate with his defense as a of protecting counsel means his beliefs, ideological acknowledged Dr. Brar also that she had not discussed with defendant his with cooperation Dr. Brar also testified that had lawyers. no with difficulty functioning, and that al- day-to-day stated though defendant was medica- prescribed antipsychotic tion, the medication had no on his impact firmly held beliefs.
Dr. Usha Kartan on next testified defendant’s behalf. Kartan, psychiatrist jail, examined defendant diagnosed him with a delu- September disorder, sional but that defendant not schizo- found *12 being despite phrenic. also testified Dr. Kartan drugs, antipsychotic no prescribed there was various thinking. Specifically, change and in defendant’s beliefs months three defendant received Dr. Kartan stated antipsychotic very potent therapy Haldol, a with philosophy. no effect on defendant’s medicine, and it had often however, that defendant noted, doctor also The changes requested in medication. or refused medications qualified offer or to not feel comfortable Dr. Kartan did capable opinion was defendant an as to whether cooperating with defense counsel. Psy- psychiatrist at the Fauteck, a forensic
Dr. Paul defendant’s behalf. Institute, testified on chiatric also defendant order, Fauteck examined to court Dr. Pursuant August 19, 1993, and Febru- occasions between on four ary psychological tests 15, 1994, and administered of defen- first examination occasions. Dr. Fauteck’s two during approximately hours, time three which dant took very intense, maintain- the doctor found defendant be eye ing However, Fauteck also contact. unbroken appropriately behaved, defendant, overall, to found be gross at that of behavior and noted no abnormalities doctor and defendant discussed time. The philosophy, that he was alarmed and defendant stated population, increasing ugliness of the American availability of false that he believed this was due tо surgery, referring plastic Aryan specifically cosmetics, coloring, addition, lenses. In de- hair and tinted contact conveyed that defendant to the doctor his belief fendant (ADL), League being by the Anti-Defamation was tracked “very dangerous ADL had labeled him as a and that the examination, Dr. Fauteck Based this initial man.” suffering diagnosed mental illness from the persecutory type. disorder, Dr. Fauteck also of delusional personality disorder, to have a mixed found defendant However, features. obsessive schizoid and borderline with despite suffering from these illnesses, Dr. Fauteck also determined that defendant fit to stand trial.
During Dr. Fauteck’s second examination of defen- dant, Fauteck administered several psychological tests. After analyzing results, the test Dr. Fauteck diagnosed defendant as from suffering the mental illness of schizo- phrenia, paranoid type. Dr. Fauteck explained that delu- sions are a prominent feature paranoid schizophrenia, and, therefore, the prior diagnosis of delusional disorder was not inconsistent with his later diagnosis of schizo- phrenia. reaching this diagnosis, Dr. Fauteck testified that he took into account defendant’s statements behavior, defendant’s medical records while incarcerated, and a written social background prepared by defendant’s *13 parents which showed a history of apparent schizophre- nia in the family. Dr. Fauteck also testified that defen- dant exhibited a marked looseness of association, in that he did not have an internal consistency in delusions, his and that defendant had reported experiencing auditory hallucinations in 1983 while mildly intoxicated. Dr. Fau- teck also testified that it is not uncommon for psychosis a to be intractable and nonresponsive to medications; therefore, the fact that medication had no apparent ef- fect upon defendant’s beliefs did not alter the doctor’s opinion that defendant suffered from a mental illness.
Dr. Fauteck testified that, aas result of further examining defendant, he arrived at the conclusion that defendant was now unfit to stand trial. The doctor testi- fied that defendant fully understood the role of his defense attorney, was able to communicate with his at- torney, was able to discuss defense options and strategic decisions, and was able to the question discuss of self- representation. Dr. Fauteck also found to be exceptionally bright, and determined that mental illness did not impair ability his to understand the charges against However, him. Dr. Fauteck deter- defen- illness affected mental that defendant’s mined ability Dr. Fauteck in his defense. assist counsel dant’s decisionmaking con- that defendant’s concluded depended upon de- by that civilization his belief stricted against sacrificing make a statement his life to fendant beauty, not Aryan could therefore, defendant and, fake by process a rational it would be viewed trial as view the that defen- Dr. Fauteck stated to defendant. Defendant by represented counsel because to be dant did wish clearly philosophy expound and as no one could he could. well as acknowledgedthat cross-examination, Fauteck
On diagnosing for schizo- criteria found the DSMIII-R the phrenia universally profession, in his are used almost just DSMIII-R, than a delusion that, more under schizophrenia. necessary diagnosis However, for a is necessary to make this if hаllucinations were when asked negative, diagnosis, replied in the and stated Dr. Fauteck correctly diagnosed schizophrenia without can be present finding hal- had no of hallucinations. Defendant although that there was lucinations, Dr. Fauteck believed report from hallucinations defendant did suffer Although past. defen- had testified that Dr. Fauteck association, Dr. Fauteck dant suffered from looseness acknowledged or cata- was not incoherent that defendant as character- onic, did he have “bizarre” delusions nor by testified that schizo- Dr. Fauteck ized DSMIII-R. long-term disabling phrenia illness, characterized ais *14 daily functioning. Fauteck Dr. in normal a disturbance early exhibited he that defendant stated that believed signs that there were from about of this illness functioning periods past in defendant’s when substantially However, Fauteck Dr. diminished. became acknowledged in a that, 1993, defendant worked as of laboratory, subsequently defendant had been that employed by and Fire- Alcohol, of Tobacco the Bureau
arms, and that there nowas evidence that defendant’s functioning setting in diminished. a work had
Dr. Fauteck further testified cross-examination schizophrenia ge- he holds belief that is 100/% acknowledged, “definitely however, netic. He that this is everyone schizophrenia. not” the of belief who studies opinion Dr. Fauteck also stated that his on defendant’s predicated cooperate fitness was on defendant’s failure to with counsel. Dr. Fauteck testified that defendant told spending him that defendant did not relish of the idea prison although and, the rest of his life in defendant did penalty, death if want the it him to enabled make a world, statement to the he would sacrifice his life for important what he believed to be an Dr. cause. Fauteck nothing admitted that there was irrational about these statements. Dr. Fauteck also testified that defendant did go willing along not tell him that defendant was to with part legal the advice his counsel as of “a maneuver.” position Dr. Fauteck admitted if defendant held that any length for of time, Fauteck would have reevaluate opinion ability cooperate as to defendant’s with defense counsel. testify
The final witness to for defendant was Dr. Mi- Gray psychologist Psychiatric Rabin, chael at the requested Institute. Dr. Rabin stated that Dr. had Fauteck analyze that he results defendant’s Minnesota (MMPI), Multiphasic Personality Inventory one of the August, tests Dr. Fauteck administered to defendant interpretation 1993. Based Dr. Rabin’s of the test diagnosed being paranoid results, the doctor defendant as schizophrenic. Dr. Rabin also sat on an examination February conducted defendant Dr. Fauteck in wherein defendant he stated that wanted to use his trial present warning popula- as a forum to to the American convey danger Aryan tion and to to the race because Aryan beauty. of fake Rabin testified that defendant *15 by- represented to be further stated that he did not want unique himself, ideas were to that counsel because his fully expound upon only he could understand and these adequately explain ideas, and that no one else could philosophy defendant’s to the court. interpretation test, MMPI
Based his his in defendant, interview with a review of the material including defendant’s charts Dr. Fauteck’s and Dr. Mar- police reports, examinations, kos’ and defendant’s social history, Dr. Rabin concluded that defendant’s dеlusional cooperate beliefs rendered him to with counsel to unable degree, and therefore defendant unfit reasonable was acknowledged, however, for trial. Dr. that defen- Rabin above-average intelligence, dant has did not have dif- ficulty understanding questions, responsive and was to inquiries. Although Dr. Rabin’s Dr. Rabin considered responses illogical times, defendant’s be Rabin difficultyunderstanding did not have them. acknowledged although that, Dr. Rabin also defen- prescribed potent antipsychotic dant had been drugs, various thinking changed defendant’s and not beliefs were any way. additionally acknowledged Dr. Rabin that just person diagnosed schizophrenic because a is as does necessarily just trial, mean that he is unfit for person necessarily because has a delusion does not prevent cooperating him from if with defense counsel he chooses to do so. rebuttal,
In Markos, the State called Dr. who testified represent that defendant deviated from his desire to only part “legal himself of what defendant termed a speed up maneuver,” which defendant believed would proceedings. However, the court defendant decided against cooperating with counsel after his case had been delayed on several that occasions. Dr. Markos concluded temporary change represent desire purely voluntary decision, himself was a and was not re- any underlying lated to mental disorder.
At the conclusion of the fitness the circuit hearing, court noted that the sole issue was whether defendant capable of cooperating with counsel in his own defense. holding trial, defendant was fit to stand the trial court found judge law does nоt “[t]he proscribe a trial where although suffering from a mental disease an I not, that, individual will underscore as *16 defense,” sist his and that the fact that an individual deep-seated has beliefs does not render that person “un able” to assist may counsel who not hold or agree with Therefore, those beliefs. the trial court judge determined that defendant was fit to stand trial. This court affirmed appeal. People Haynes, v. finding on direct 174 Ill. (1996). 2d 204
Defendant waived counsel for trial and sentencing, although the trial court appointed public defender as standby counsel during proceedings. As of the part chief, State’s case in defendant’s handwritten diary was read into the record. The diary contained details defendant’s murder of Dr. Sullivan and stalking his Charles Stroupe. The State also played cassette tape marked “taped confession” which the police found searching defendant’s apartment. In this defendant tape described his murders and his motivation for those crimes. Defendant had intended to send the tape to industry cosmetic executives to warn them against pro- ducing Aryan “fake cosmetics.” The State also presented defendant’s oral and written police. confession to the De- fendant, acting counsel, his own posed questions no witnesses, State’s and his defense consisted es- sentially of making statements of his “Aryan beauty” After philosophy. being witness, sworn as a testified as follows: “I have never denied that I shot Dr. Martin Sullivan. I I confess that did that. I wanted to make a statement. I condemn the Aryan cosmetics, fake hair, lenses, bleached blond blue tinted contact plastic surgery.” guilty court found defendant of all
The circuit eligible Subsequently, charges. thе court found defendant grounds penalty for the death intentionally on the that defendant during killed Dr. Sullivan the course of 1(b)(6) (West 1992)) (720 burglary and that ILCS 5/9 — cold, defendant killed Dr. Sullivan in a calculated and (720 l(b)(ll) (West premeditated manner ILCS 5/9 — 1992)). aggravation-mitigation stage sentencing
At the proceedings, again Markos, called State Dr. who opined that defendant not under the an influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the regret crime. Markos also testified that defendant lacked gave very remorse,
or coherent and detailed ac- above-average offense, counts of the and was of intel- ligence. The State also introduced evidenceof defendant’s prior confession to his murder hair colorist Frank Ringi, given police August to San Francisco detectives on 12, 1993, after defendant’s murder of Dr. De- Sullivan. presented mitigation gave fendant no evidence only reiterating philosophy a brief statement con- *17 demning Aryan beauty. fake The trial court found no mitigating preclude imposition factors to the of the death penalty, and sentenced defendant to death.
During pendency appeal of the direct of defen- court, defendant, dant’s conviction and sentence to this petition post 21, 1995, filed pro December for se alleged relief, conviction wherein he his constitu- rights during hearing, tional were violated fitness sentencing. Among allegations, trial, and other defen- dant stated that he denied of was effective assistance during hearing, counsel and that the State fitness process right due fair trial violated and defendant’s to a by disclosing during certain information that hear- ing. April appointed 1996, defense counsel for the was
post-conviction proceedings. May On counsel filed a petition vacate defendant’s convictions death sentence to section 2—1401 of pursuant the Code (735 (West 1996)) of Civil Procedure ILCS 5/2 —1401 based discovered upon newly information outside of the record. Counsel attached affidavits and other documents which, of later-discovered evidence it argued, was would probably have of changed hearing. result the fitness that, These documents indicated days two after defen- death, dant was sentenced to defendant was examined at Pontiac Correctional Center and diagnosed suffering as I from an Axis One of psychotic disorder. the documents submitted in support petition of this was the affidavit of Jin, Dr. Kwan-Bon who defen- subsequently diagnosed dant I suffering from an Axis of either psychosis delusional disorder or schizophrenia. The documents also indicate that when Dr. Jin increased dosage defendant’s Haldol, significant showed improvement 19, 1994, until November when Dr. Jin observed defen- dant to be free from delusional behavior. 28, 1997,
On February post-conviction counsel filed an post-conviction amended petition. Among other claims, petition alleged defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for certain failing present evidence at the fitness hearing. Defendant attached various docu- ments that he indicating diagnosed and treated for schizophrenia the San Mateo Mental Health County Services in California during 1982 and 1983. The admit- ting documents show that defendant at the time stated that he had had previously symptoms hearing voices. The evidence also included a document prepared defendant’s parents, showing family history of mental illness which included schizophrenia, affidavits relatives, friends, and acquaintances relating their observations concerning past behavior.
The post-conviction amended also petition alleged
459 certain evidence until improperly that the State withheld of v. hearing, Brady Mary- after the fitness violation (1963). 83, 215, land, 373 U.S. 10 L. Ed. 2d 83 S. Ct. of defendant’s allegedly The withheld evidence consisted and the audio marked diary tape “taped handwritten trial, at made by confession” used the confession defen- dant to detectives from the San Francisco police depart- ment used at and the medical sentencing, records and treatment trial diagnosis after at Pon- tiac Correctional Center Dr. Jin and others. February counsel,
On after argument trial granted court the State’s motion to dismiss the post- conviction without an petition evidentiary hearing. The post-conviction Markos, noted that judge well- respected psychiatrist, length during testified the fit- ness proceedings regard with to his knowledge defendant’s psychiatric history, defendant’s family’s psy- chiatric and the history, reports of the other profession- als who had examined defendant. Based this infor- mation, noted, court Dr. Markos concluded that defendant him was aware of the charges against as well as the possible consequences of those charges, and that although counsel, was able to cooperate with defendant made a choice voluntary cooperate. not to
The post-conviction found that judge Dr. Markos’ opinion was “bolstered by what occurred subsequent hearing fitness when the defendant chose to repre- sent himself based on the articulated reason that he only was aware of the political that he was philosophy trying out to the get public, and that no one was in a better position than he to insure that that occurred.” The post- judge conviction further found that Dr. Markos’ opinion counsel, defendant was able to cooperate with trial, thus was fit to stand was substantiated and cor- roborated by the fact that despite being administered psychotropic medication, that medication had absolutely
no effect on defendant’s desire to continue to preach about his political philosophy. to the regard alleged Brady violations, the post- judge
conviction held that an affidavit filed the by assis- case, tant State’s who Attorney prosecuted this Bruce Paynter, indicated that all discovery was tendered to the Further, Paynter’s defense. attached to affidavit awas memo written Assistant Public Defenders Bernard Sarley Crystal Marchiagianni Psychiatric to the Institute that “all they discovery had kinds” of at their should the Institute disposal wish view it for purposes of rendering Further, an opinion. post-conviction noted that judge fitness was hearing completed 4, 1994, March and within six began. weeks trial At trial, the State introduced the evidence that de- very had, fendant claims the defense judge never and the observed that there is no evidence the record that there was an a objection Brady or claim of a violation.
The post-conviction judge argument then heard brief of counsel on the section 2—1401 petition and dismissed petition as well. Defendant filed of appeal notices from both denial orders. These have appeals been consolidated.
ANALYSIS Section 2—1401 Petition Defendant first contends the post-conviction erred in judge denying his sectiоn 2—1401 petition to vacate his convictions and death sentence on newly based evidence, discovered conducting without first an eviden- tiary hearing. Section 2—1401 of the Code of Civil Proce- (735 (West 1996)) dure ILCS a provides 5/2 —1401 orders, final comprehensive statutory procedure by which judgments, may and decrees be vacated after 30 days from their entry. Although petition section 2—1401 is usually characterized as a civil its remedial remedy, pow-
461
People Sanchez,
extend to criminal
v.
131 Ill.
ers
cases.
(1989).
petition
417,
A
relief
2d
420
section 2—1401
for
judgment
a final
is the forum in a criminal case in
from
occurring
prose
to correct all errors of fact
which
petitioner
cause,
cution of a
unknown to the
court
judgment
entered, which,
known,
the time
if then
prevented
People Berland,
would have
its rendition.
v.
74
(1978);People
Hinton,
Ill. 2d
313-14
2d
v.
Ill.
(1972).
petition, however,
A section 2—1401
is “not
designed
provide general
all
review of
trial errors
appeal.”
nor to
Berland,
substitute for direct
74 Ill. 2d at
previously
314. Points
raised at trial and other collateral
proceedings cannot form the basis of a section 2—1401
petition
Berland,
for relief.
The of defendant’s section 2—1401 is newly that, had the trial court known of the evidence by defendant, discovered this evidence would have precluded ruling the court from that defendant was fit to prevented stand and, turn, trial in would have being from convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant contends that this new evidence undermines Dr. Markos’ oрinion fit, that defendant was to the extent im- that mediately following sentencing, his convictions and de- diagnosed suffering fendant was as from an I Axis psychotic disorder, and that defendant’s delusions responded appropriately to medication administered at an higher reject arguments. level. We defendant’s presented by support
The evidence defendant in petition occurring his section 2—1401 consists of events subsequent imposition to defendant’s conviction and the 4,May
of his death sentence on 1994. Defendant was thereafter transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center 6, 1994, and, May mental given preliminary health evaluation wherein he was as diagnosed suffering Jin, from an I psychotic Axis disorder. Dr. Kwan-Bon Pontiac, psychiatrist employed submitted an affidavit in of defendant’s 2—1401 support petition stating he began treating defendant June and subse- quently diagnosed defendant as from an I suffering Axis disorder, either delusional disorder or In schizophrenia. affidavit, his Dr. Jin stated that his interactions during defendant, he strong with observed delusional content in thinking, as well looseness association thoughts. of defendant’s addition,
In affidavit, defendant relies Dr. Jin’s upon as well as an affidavit submitted Dr. Jonathan by Lip- man, a in the effect of neuropharmacologist specializing brain, on the drugs to show that defendant’s delusions responded to medication when the medication was increased to a than defendant had higher dosage been administered at the time of his fitness hearing.
Specifically, diagnosis accordance with his of an illness, IAxis mental Dr. Jin increased defendant’s daily intake of Haldol to 10 At this increased level of mg. medication, significant Dr. Jin observed improvement and, November, 1994, defendant’s condition Dr. Jin found defendant to be free of delusional behavior. affidavit, that, Dr. Jin stated based his observa- tions, “it appears [defendant’s] delusional *21 under psychotic symptomology brought control as a result of increasing maintaining dosage his of Haldol concluded, at 10 milligrams.” Similarly, Lipman Dr. based of upon his review defendant’s medical records and treat- records,
ment that the documented “given response [de- daily fendant] later demonstrated” to an increased dos- Haldol, defendant’s Haldol “in age previous dosage
463 *** was subeffective for treatment retrospect at the of his psychotic legal delusional and state time proceedings.” stated,
As
a section 2—1401
purpose
petition
facts to the attention of the circuit court
bring
is
which, if
at the time of
would have
judgment,
known
Airoom, Inc.,
v.
114
entry.
its
See Smith
Ill. 2d
precluded
(1986); Berland,
313-14; Hinton,
220-21
Ill. 2d at
74
Therefore,
general
In addition, even if proffered evidence awas for proper basis a section 2—1401 defen- petition, dant has failed to establish that this evidence would have changed the outcome of fitness hearing. Five experts testified during fitness proceedings
464 disorder schizo from either a delusional
suffered and/or Dr. Jin’s sim Therefore, cannot discern how we phrenia. altered the outcome would have findings ilar v. Berland, People 316; 74 Ill. 2d at See proceedings. v. Lam People (1992); 112, 139-41 Gandy, 227 Ill. 3d App. (1974). we 615, Accordingly, bert, 3d 619-20 App. 23 Ill. dismissed properly the circuit court find that hearing. evidentiary without an petition 2—1401 section Petition Post-Conviction erred in the circuit court argues next that Defendant in the claims evidentiary hearing, an dismissing, without to dis- that the State failed petition his post-conviction Brady of the defense violation certain evidence to close 215, 83 S. Ct. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d Maryland, v. 373 U.S. as- was denied effective (1963), and that defendant 1194 counsel. appellate of trial and sistance Act Hearing provides The Illinois Post-Conviction that can assert criminal defendants mechanism which denial of a substantial were the result their convictions Constitution, the United States under rights of their Constitution, 725 ILCS or both. See Illinois 5/122 —1 1994). (West a col relief is post-conviction An action for underlying from the appeal not an proceeding, lateral Williams, 186 Ill. 2d v. People and sentence. conviction Brisbon, 236, 242 Ill. 2d People v. (1999); 164 55, 62 (1995). relief, a to post-conviction In order to be entitled of deprivation establish a substantial defendant must proceedings in the rights constitutional federal or state v. challenged. People being judgment that produced (1997). Tenner, 175 Ill. 372, 2d 378 is proceeding a post-conviction The purpose involved issues into constitutional inquiry permit not, and could were and sentence that conviction original appeal. direct been, adjudicated previously not have v. People (1998); Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 502 People v. (1997). of res The doctrine 2d 72-73 Griffin, 178 Ill.
465 judicata raised bars consideration issues were appeal. Towns, 502; and decided on direct 182 Ill. 2d Further, Ill. 2d at have Griffin, 178 73. issues could presented appeal, not, been on direct but were are purposes post-conviction deemed for review. waived Towns, 503; Ill. 2d at Ill. Griffin, 2d at 73. These relating relaxed, however, rules are where facts post-conviction appear claim do not on the face of the *23 original People Whitehead, 355, record. See v. 169 2d Ill. (1996); People 501, 372 Eddmonds, v. 143 Ill. 2d 528 (1989). (1991);People 303, Owens, v. 129 Ill. 2d 308 evidentiary hearing post-conviction An on claims is only allegations post- warranted where the petition, supported appropriate by conviction where the accompanying trial or affidavits, record make a substan showing rights tial that a defendant’s constitutional have People Morgan, been 500, violated. v. 187 Ill. 2d 528 (1999); determining Towns, 182 2d Ill. at 503. In whether grant evidentiary hearing, well-pleaded to an all facts in petition any accompanying the and in affidavits are taken Morgan, 528; true. 187 Ill. 2d at Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at regarding 503. A trial court’s determination the suffi ciency allegations post-conviction of the in a contained petitiоn Morgan, are reviewed de novo. 528; 187 Ill. 2d at (1998). People Coleman, v. 366, 183 Ill. 2d 389 Brady Claim right Defendant that contends his constitutional to process due of law was violated because the State failed exculpatory to discloseto the defense certain evidence as required by Brady Maryland, v. 83, 373 U.S. 10 L. Ed. 2d (1963). argues 215, 83 Ct. S. 1194 Defendant that the Brady State violated the rule when it failed to disclose prior hearing: four items evidence to the fitness diary; defendant’s handwritten the audio cassette marked “taped by police apart- confession” found in defendant’s ment wherein defendant described his and his murders
466 taped audio them; of his transcript for the
motivation 1993, 12, August police Francisco by San interview Ringi of Frank his murder recounted wherein he was under surveillance that he believed and stated from Pontiac Cor- records ADL; and the medical 1994, 6, defen- May that on indicating Center rectional disorder, and on psychotic with a diagnosed dant was I an Axis diagnosed with 1, 1994, defendant June illness. mental required Court Brady, Supreme the United States is favor that both disclose evidence prosecution or to guilt and “material either the accused
able to 218, Ed. 2d at 87, 10 L. Brady, 373 U.S. punishment.” Sanchez, Ill. 2d v. People 1196; Ct. at 83 S. (1996). a reason “if there is is material Evidence 485-86 that, been disclosed had the evidence able probability have been would defense, proceeding the result of 667, 682, 87 v. U.S. Bagley, United States different.” (1985); Sanchez, 3375, 3383 494, 105 Ct. Ed. 2d S. L. at 486. 169 Ill. 2d judge post-conviction
Defendant contends Brady on his evidentiary hearing an denying erred *24 grant to determining whether the of purpose claim. For in the post facts well-pleaded all evidentiary hearing, an are affidavits accompanying any and petition conviction v. Hob Coleman, People 381; 183 Ill. 2d at taken as true. (1998). defendant, According Ill. 2d 428 ley, the by withheld allegedly the evidence above-described to the material hearing fitness was to the prior State of examples contained] [it] “because proceedings in the had not observed testified he conduct Dr. Markos least, the sessions,” very “[a]t their during petitioner the cross-examination information for relevant this was impact had an also have Markos; arguably it should of Dr. evidence should in that this determination on his fitness Defendant diagnosis.” him to rethink his caused have diary also asserts that his handwritten and his state- they present ments are material because defendant’s way thinking through “view of the world and his of his own words.” support Brady claim, his of defendant relies by Sarley,
an affidavit filed Bernard
defendant’s counsel
during
proceedings,
the fitness
in which counsel states
diary
that
the
defendant’s statements were not
by
prior
hearing,
tendered
the State
to the fitness
ap
counsel “never saw” these items from the time of his
my
pointment “through
representation
Haynes,”
of Mr.
sup
and that counsel would
used
have
this evidence to
port the contention that defendant was unfit to stand
by
trial. We find that the affidavit filed
defense counsel
origi
constitutes new information which
not in
the
nal trial record, and, therefore
could
have been ad
by reviewing
appeal.
dressed
a
court
direct
Because
procedural
of
rules
default are relaxed where the
relating
appear
facts
to defendant’s claim do not
on the
(see
original
face of
Whitehead,
record
Taking, allegations must, as we defendant’s of fact properly true, be we hold that the circuit court dismissed Brady evidentiary claims without an hear- ing. showing Defendant has failed to make a substantial probability diary, that there is a reasonable that the “taped confession,” and the statements made defen- police dant to the San Francisco would have altered the hearing. Although outcome the fitness maintains that these three items of evidence establish that he was “delusional” time of Dr. Sullivan’s disagree. murder, we A review this evidence indicates fully actions, defendant was aware as well as consequences of these actions. diary provides day-by-day Defendant’s handwritten *25 after the Sul- shortly his before and account of activities recounts of entries defendant many livan murder. the revealing stalking Stroupe, of Charles his methodical house under surveillance kept Stroupe’s that defendant Stroupe, to kill opportunity the best order to ascertain identities, that, repeatedly assumed defendant using Stroupe’s to determine telephoned Stroupe the household various cover whereabouts, and that defendant concocted At one police. he was the stopped by stories in the event he that he had wrote that believed point, defendant starting “I’m to that and that wish Stroupe, “scared off’ Let him have a the doorbell. just rung I’d walked up (Would’ve belly. late saved few in the Too now. slugs right 7, 1993, day the money).” August On a lot of time and Sullivan, that killed Dr. defendant wrote after defendant of I I that the stain deed, did the feel “Eylesterday Defendant related my has washed off shirt.” cowardice messy” murder of Dr. Sullivan “somewhat that his missed. a clear at his head and “[h]ad and that he shot of Reflecting consequences all 6 bullets.” Used up face that “decision to actions, defendant wrote his he that courage,” takes but possibility prison rape to back out now.” deeply had committed himself “too diary are to those found defendant’s Remarks similar “taped recording contained in the audio cassette labeled confession,” taped and in the statement transcript made the San Francisco police. defendant to that, far from supporting We conclude Brady, that, under these items required contention to and material were both favorable evidence evidence they because contained proceedings three items leads a review of these thinking, “delusional” methodical stalker that defendant is a conclusion record, de- killer. On this and a and ruthless calculating showing to make a substantial fendant has failed above-described probability there is a reasonable *26 evidence would have affected the outcome of the fitness hearing. Accordingly, reject Brady we defendant’s claim evidentiary as to these items. reject
We likewise defendant’s contention that the Brady the State violated rule the to when State failed disclose medical from records Pontiac Correctional indicating that, Center after defendant was convicted diagnosed suffering death, and sentenced to he was as argument from an IAxis mental illness. This is unavail ing previous argument because in the defendant claims that such information constituted “new evidence” and was not available until after defendant’s trial. If in proceedings, formation was unavailable for the it cannot be said that the State failed to disclose information Brady. People App. in Hinton, violation of See v. 302 Ill. (1998). propеrly 3d 623 Wefind that the circuit court dismissed this claim. Assistance Counsel Claims Ineffective of sirgues
Defendant next that the circuit court in erred dismissing, evidentiary hearing, without an defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel hearing. at the fitness Defendant contends that counsel during proceedings failing was ineffective the fitness present specific according to evidence, which, to defen- dant, establishes that he First, was unfit to stand trial. attorney defendant claims that his failed to introduce diary during proceed- defendant’s handwritten the fitness ings. Second, defendant maintains that defense counsel present documentary history failed to of evidence family. mental Third, illness defendant’s defendant as- attorney present testimony serts that his failed to from family, acquaintances regarding defendant’s friends, past impairment defendant’s self-care, in the areas of functioning, family functioning work and social life. Finally, defendant contends that counsel failed to introduce defendant’s health mental records from the early 1980s. counsel was defendant’s claim that
We first address diary to introduce dur failing ineffective for argument, defen prior In the proceedings. the fitness ing Brady rule that the State violated alleged dant counsel to the diary prior this to defense failing tender claim, that defendant filed support of hearing. fitness did who averred he attorney, the affidavit of trial in his at the time diary have defendant’s possession not must, Accepting, we proceedings. the fitness (see Coleman, counsel’s statement veracity defense 428), Hobley, 381; 2d at we hold Ill. 2d at 182 Ill. cognizable presented post- has not diary. to his Defendant can respect conviction сlaim with failing pres was ineffective for not claim that counsel Therefore, to him. that was tendered ent evidence *27 claim. this properly the circuit court dismissed failed to a present find that defendant has We also respect with to counsel’s claim cognizable post-conviction history to failure evidence alleged present Our in review of family. mental illness defendant’s Dr. Fauteck testi- that Dr. Markos and record reveals both proceedings regarding the fitness during fied at length in family defendant’s the incidence of mental illness this defendant’s impact family background that defendant’s health. Dr. Markos testified mental detailing his- information parents supplied had written including in family, illness defendant’s tory of mental had and that Markos taken schizophrenia, incidences of forming opinion in family history into account this Similarly, Dr. Fauteck also testified to defendant’s fitness. by history supplied written social that he reviewed the of mental illness detailing incidences parents defendant’s view, that, in his in Dr. Fauteck stated family. defendant’s he used this and that genetic, is schizophrenia 100/% at his conclusion arriving information in background and was unfit from schizophrenia that defendant suffered supplied by- addition, for In the information trial. concerning history parents ill of mental defendant’s family specifically considered ness in defendant’s opinion appeal. Haynes, this court’s defendant’s direct 2d at Ill. 229. similarly complains during that, the fit- Defendant hearing, evi- ness his trial failed to introduce counsel concerning impairment past dence in the ar- defendant’s functioning, family functioning self-care, eas of work However, social life. our review of the record discloses during proceedings, expert, the fitnеss defendant’s past periods Fauteck, testified there were in the functioning substantially when defendant’s became periods diminished. Dr. Fauteck surmised that these phases coincided with the active of defendant’s mental Accordingly, cog- illness. we hold that this claim is not a post-conviction nizable claim. by sum, the record that the evidence reveals cited the two above-detailed claims was before during proceedings.
the court can- fitness Defendant failing not claim now that counsel was ineffective for present already part evidence which was of the record. properly Therefore these two claims were dismissed the circuit court.
Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was during failing proceedings ineffective produce the fitness for prior mental Defen- health records. records, dant contends that these early which date from the only in California, 1980s show that he had *28 previously psychotic symptoms, been treated for includ- ing auditory hallucinations delusions, but also reveal diagnosed suffering that, 1984, defendant had been as schizophrenia. from chronic We find that defendant’s prior mental health records constitute new information original which not was contained within the trial court by and, therefore, record could not have been considered 472 ad accordingly We appeal. court direct reviewing See specific the of this claim. post-conviction
dress
merits
Steidl,
(1997); People
v.
v.
177 Ill. 2d
239,
250-51
People
(1996).
Britz,
163,
174
177
Ill. 2d
not entitled to an eviden
stated,
As
a defendant
is
a matter
post-conviction petition
on his
tiary hearing
where
evidentiary
only
is warranted
right.
hearing
An
petition, supported
allegations
post-сonviction
or accompanying
the trial
by
where
record
appropriate
affidavits,
showing that a defendant’s
make a substantial
Morgan,
187 Ill.
have
violated.
rights
constitutional
been
528; Towns,
503; Owens,
2d at
182 Ill.
129 Ill.
2d at
2d
evidentiary
an
determining
grant
308.
whether
any
and in
petition
facts in the
hearing,
well-pleaded
all
187
as true. Morgan,
affidavits are taken
accompanying
528; Towns,
a trial
2d at
The
of the assistance
constitutional
(U.S.
XIV)
Const.,
VI,
right
counsel
amends.
includes
Sullivan,
v.
(Cuyler
446
of counsel
effective assistance
1708,
335,
343-44,
Ed.
Ct.
344,
333,
U.S.
64 L.
2d
100 S.
(1980)),
ap
at trial and on a defendant’s
first
both
v.
396-97,
Lucey,
Evitts
387,
469 U.S.
as of
peal
right.
(1985).
821, 830-31,
Ed.
Ct.
836-37
L.
2d
105 S.
are
of counsel
Claims
ineffective
assistance
alleging
the standard set forth
United States
judged under
Washington,
Strickland v.
466 U.S.
Court
Supreme
(1984). Coleman,
674, 104
Ct. 2052
80 L. Ed. 2d
S.
asserting
To
on a claim
prevail
473
by
dant
the Sixth
Strickland,
Amendment.”
If rep- a defendant establishes that defense counsel’s objective resentation fell belоw an standard of reasonable- ness, then a defendant must demonstrate that “there is probability unprofes- reasonable that, but for counsel’s proceeding sional errors, the result of thd would have probability probability been A different. reasonable is a sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 at 694, U.S. 80 L. Ed. 2d at 104 S. Ct. at 2068. satisfy
A
prongs
defendant must
both
of the Strick
prevail
land test before he or she can
on a claim of inef
fective assistance of
However,
counsel.
if the ineffective
disposed
ground
assistance claim can be
of on the
prejudice,
the defendant did not suffer
a court need not
performance
determine whether counsel’s
was constitu
tionally deficient. Griffin,
Attached to defendant’s are copies prepared by of records the San Mateo Mental September May Health Services, dated 1982 to 1984. The summary,” documents, “pa- entitled “adult admission activity progress tient record and notes,” and “record of drug treatment,” indicate that defendant was referred by probation department for mental health services part as of his sentence for a conviction of misdemeanor reported mischief, malicious and reveal that defendant diagnosed that defendant was past, voices hearing Kaiser Medical from suffering schizophrenia various psy- was treated with Center, and that defendant pe- to the post-conviction Also attached chotropic drugs. Medical note from Kaiser a patient progress tition is contained the 12, 1982, which Center, dated December “schizophrenia from suffered diagnosis chronic.” *30 defendant, discovered evi- newly this
According to
Dr. Markos’
testi-
and undermines”
dence “contradicts
fit to stand trial.
that defendant was
mony and conclusion
evidence could
contends that
this
defendant
Specifically,
of mental
long history
defendant had a
have verified that
defendant
suf-
and that
illness,
including schizophrenia,
argues
Defendant
hallucinations.
auditory
fered from
this evidence
confronted with
that “had Dr. Markos been
that he would have
it is
testimony,
possible
his
during
ill-
a psychotic
did suffer from
agreed
[defendant]
Therefore, defen-
for trial.”
ness,
found him unfit
in
this
dismissing
court erred
concludes,
the circuit
dant
hearing.
evidentiary
an
conducting
without
claim
matter,
record in this
Based
disagree.
upon
We
make a substan
has failed to
conclude that defendant
we
introduced
that, had counsel
showing
tial
records,
prob
a reasonable
there is
mental health
prior
would
proceedings
the outcome of the fitness
ability that
Mar
hearing,
fitness
Dr.
During the
have been different.
examina
concerning
personal
in detail
his
kos testified
de
that he examined
Markos stated
tions of defendant.
occasions,
their
first
session
with
fendant
on four
after defendant
27, 1993, shortly
August
occurring
in
occurring
their
last session
Sullivan, killed Dr.
hearing. Based
the fitness
shortly before
February
this
during
of defendant
observations
upon
personal
capable
defendant was
Markos found that
period,
had
and that defendant
with defense counsel
cooperating
made a voluntary
cooperate
choice not to
with his at
Dr. Markos’
that defendant was fit for
torney.
opinion
that,
trial
the facts
largely premised upon
was
between
August
February 1994,
1993 and
not
suf
from delusions and
did
fering
change
that his beliefs
not
Therefore,
in
response
medication.
evidence that de
fendant was
in
diagnosed
schizophrenia
with
1982 wаs
particularly
question
relevant
of defendant’s
mental
in 1994,
Eddmonds,
state
when he was tried. See
addition,
that,
As his final defendant maintains that the circuit court erred in dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, his allegation that he was denied effective assis- tance of appellate counsel. Relying upon the United States Court’s Supreme Smith, decision Estelle v. 451 454, U.S. 359, 68 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1981), S. Ct. 1866 defen- dant claims rights that his under the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution, United States as well I, as under article 8, sections 2 and of the Illinois Consti- tution, when, were violated prior to the examinations conducted by Markos, Dr. neither the trial court nor defense counsel advised defendant that he had the right to remain silent and that him in by statements made
476 against
course of the examination could later be used him during sentencing proceedings. Markos,
Subsequently, based information defendant, gathered during his evaluations of testified sentencing. for the State aggravation Defendant contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for to raise this claim on direct failing appeal. this issue could raised on direct Although ap have been where, here, the waiver doctrine is peal, inapplicable defendant asserts that waiver stems from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. v. Win appellate People sett, 335, (1992); People Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 346 v. 153 Ill. (1992). 264, 2d 282 Like claims of ef alleging deprivation counsel, fective assistance of trial claims of ineffective as are also under the appellate sistance of counsel evaluated standard forth in v. two-prong People set Strickland. Ward, 249, (1999); Pecoraro, 187 Ill. 2d 258 v. 175 People (1997). 294, Ill. 2d 333 “A defendant who contends that assistance, counsel rendered ineffective appellate e.g., by failing issue, an must show that the failure to argue raise that objectively issue was unreasonable the decision prejudiced Appellate defendant. counsel obligated every ap is not to brief conceivable issue on and it is not to refrain peal, incompetence counsel which, raising judgment, from issues in his or her are merit, appraisal without unless counsel’s merits is patently Accordingly, unless the issues wrong. underlying meritorious, prejudice are defendant has suffered no from counsel’s failure to raise them on v. Chil appeal. People dress, 168, (2000); West, 191 Ill. 2d 187 Ill. People 175 v. (1999) (and therein).” 2d People cases cited v. (2000). 192 Ill. 2d We turn to the Easley, now merits of defendant’s argument. Estelle, defendant, murder, for awaiting trial the trial court to to a ex- pretrial
was ordered
submit
amination
for the
of determin-
by psychiatrist
purpose
*32
The defendant was
to stand trial.
ing
competency
and, in
to the
the
a letter
by
psychiatrist
interviewed
court,
found that the defendant was
psychiatrist
trial
the
to
trial. The trial commenced and the
competent
stand
Thereafter,
of murder.
at the
defendant was convicted
hear-
sentencing phase
penalty
of the defendant’s death
the State called as its sole witness the
ing,
psychiatrist
who had
examined the defendant
at the
previously
court’s
The
described defendant’s
request.
psychiatrist
condition,
severe
the
sociopathic
expressed
opinion
treatment,
the
could
by
defendant
not be remedied
concluded that
the defendant would continue to be
in the future. The
dangerous
psychiatrist’s
opinion
of the defendant
not
concerning
dangerousness
was
defendant,
based
merely upon his observations
but
detailed
of defendant’s
descriptions
statements
underlying
about
crime. Under
the then-existing
capital
Texas
of a
sentencing procedure,
question
dangerousness”
defendant’s “future
one of
was
three
which,
requisite questions
if answered in the affirmative
by the
resulted in the
sentencing body,
mandatory imposi-
facts,
tion of the death penalty. Given these
the Court
defendant,
held that
criminal
neither
“[a]
who
initiates
evaluation
psychiatric
attempts
any psy-
nor
to introduce
evidence,
chiatric
may
compelled
respond
be
if his
him
psychiatrist
against
statements can be used
Estelle,
a capital sentencing proceeding.”
We
the distinct circumstances present
Estelle render that decision
from
distinguishable
the mat-
ter at bar for several reasons. The Court’s decision in Es-
telle was animated
the concern that
psychiatrist
acting
State,
as an
incriminat-
agent
eliciting
ing statements from a defendant in a post-arrest custodial
setting without
Miranda
and then
providing
warnings,
those
statements
using
incriminating
support
Estelle,
sentencing
to death.
451 U.S. at
*33
469,
373,
Estelle is additionally distinguishable on the basis that the in psychiatric testimony that case was initially introduced the State at the sentencing hearing carry proof its burden of the showing future, would be in the dangerous that was proposition required to be established under the death penalty law of Texas at that in present case, contrast, time.
479 merely fit and that defendant was testified that Markos suffering Thus, unlike from a mental disease. not he was prosecution not in matter at bar was Estelle, challenged using interviews obtained in the evidence persuasion proof death under the or fulfill a burden penalty People Mahaffey, Ill. 2d See v. statute. (1995). premised on
Furthermore, the result in Estelle was
case,
defense counsel had
been
that,
the fact
psychiatric
scope
previously
ex
notified about the
thereby depriving
existence,
amination, or
of its
even
opportunity
examination
to discuss the
defendant of
Ed. 2d at
Estelle,
Unless the underlying issues are meritorious, a de fendant suffers no prejudice due to appellate counsel’s failure to raise those v. issues direct appeal. People Coleman, (1995). 168 Ill. 2d Estelle stated, As does not apply to the facts as presented. Therefore, circuit court appropriately dismissed this claim.
CONCLUSION For the stated, reasons judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing section 2— 1401 petition and defendant’s amended post- conviction petition is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, November 22, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death in entered the circuit court of Cook is to County be car- ried out. Defendant shall be executed the manner (West 1996). provided by law. 725 ILCS The 5/119 —5 clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate to the Corrections, Director of to the warden of Tamms Center, Correctional and to the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed. JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that we should affirm the dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition. Never- theless, one problem the majority’s analysis prevents me from joining its opinion.
The majority
improperly
addresses
the merits of
*35
defendant’s Brady claim. This issue is waived because it
could have been raised on direct
The
appeal.
majority
cоrrectly acknowledges that
issues that could have been
presented
on direct appeal,
not,
but were
are deemed
waived for
Towns,
purposes
post-conviction
review. See
“[I]t by appeal, but presented’ party or ‘raised’ on direct been been considered rather that such a claim could not have evidentiary basis reviewing court because the claim’s was de hors the record.” (Emphasis original.) Here, is not outside Brady the claim of violation for this claim is the evi- evidentiary record. The basis turned over prior defendant claims was not dence that at trial This evidence was introduced hearing. the fitness de- Accordingly, record. original and is trial part trial and both at argument fendant could have made this appeal.1 on direct nothing to the affidavit adds attorney’s
The defense ineffective defendant does 1Notably, raise this issue as an of counsel claim. assistance
Brady claim. The merely affidavit states that the defense did not have this information to prior the fitness hear- words, ing. other the affidavit is itself the argument that defendant should have made both at trial and on direct When the the appeal. State introduced evidence at Brady trial, should raised the defendant have claim. Had trial, that argument proved unsuccessful at defendant should have raised it as an issue on appeal. direct
If the is that majority correct redundant type affidavit filed in defense this case is sufficient to claim, a effectively renew waived then we have removed any distinction between and direct post-conviction ap- A peals. now post-conviction appeal apparently is noth- ing more a second in appeal than direct which defendants can raise of the arguments they all that should have raised, did raise, but in the first Even if appeal. evidentiary claim’s has a clear basis foundation original record, this court will consider the claim if an attorney files affidavit that does nothing more than state the very argument defendant wishes this court to address. I am not to make prepared such a of the mockery post-conviction process. out appellate I with the that agree majority is not entitled to an on his claim of a Brady evidentiary hearing However, violation. than addressing rather the merits of I this that argument, would hold defendant waived the claim by failing raise it direct appeal. HARRISON,
CHIEF dissenting: JUSTICE Six mental health at professionals Haynes’ testified hearing. fitness Psychiatrists Drs. Rafael Carreira Usha Kartan both diagnosed Haynes with delusional Brar, disorder. Dr. Satinder psychologist clinical coordinator unit of residential treatment Cook likewise that County jail Haynes testified suffered from a Although delusional disorder. Dr. Kartan felt unqualified to offer opinion Haynes’ ability cooperate an as to Haynes’ that counsel, Dr. Brar testified defense with cooperating in his defense. prevented from him condition Psychiat psychologist Fauteck, a forensic Dr. Paul during Haynes a six- times four Institute, examined ric schizophrenic, Haynes opined period. He that month Haynes’ agreed mental paranoid type. Dr. Fauteck assisting incapable defense him rendered illness Haynes Mi trial. Dr. fit to stand was not and stated Psychi psychologist at the Rabin, another forensic chael *37 He assessment. Dr. Fauteck’s Institute, shared atric schizophrenic, Haynes paranoid that he that was stated cooperate delu due to his counsel to with was unable for trial. v. that he was unfit People and sional beliefs (1996). 204, 228-31 174 Ill. 2d Haynes, professionals testified who mental health Of all the contrary only the view was one to take a trial, at the Haynes’ expert, Dr. Markos dismissed Dr. Markos. State’s being nothing Aryan beauty” more ideas “fake about idiosyncratic highly personalized In Mar- belief.” than “a schizophrenic Haynes and did not suf- view, was not kos’ psychiatric Mar- The basis for a true delusion. fer from change Haynes’ did not was that beliefs kos’ conclusion drugs. antipsychotic given he had various even after been According Markos, to any change to of did little at all
“these medications me because had it been significant to beliefs and was schizophrenic a true process, had it been true delusional standpoint I would have from the clinical process, then *** to the respect with seen some remissions expected or disappeared have intensity or his belief would of his belief to treatment ***.” be amenable a true delusion would because declaring Haynes trial, the circuit fit to stand to be rejected accepted that of and Markos’ assessment court testimony experts it considered. the other whose all of judgment court’s when deferred to the circuit We presented What we to us on direct review. matter was then, did not know what not the trial court did know accepted opinion, it when Markos’ and what Markos himself did not realize when he testified at the fitness hearing opinion is that the basis for his was incorrect. Haynes’ highly was, in fact, condition to treat- amenable through simply problem ment medication. The was given jailhouse proper doctors had him not dosage. proper Haynes medication in the After was custody and sentenced death remanded to the Department Corrections, a staff doctor there altered changed medication his Haynes’ with dramatic The doctor results. September by 24, 1994, medication Haynes’ November was observed to be “free of Aryan supremacy The delusional behavior.” notions forgo represen- legal kill that had led him to then tation trial had vanishеd. Haynes respond
Had Markos realized that would so remarkably change in medication, to a his assessment of Haynes unquestionably condition would have been dif- Depart- ferent. Faced with results obtained staff, ment Corrections medical not have Markos could everyone Haynes denied what was so obvious to else. just “idiosyncratic.” mentally He was ill. *38 Haynes’ schizophrenia No claim made can be that purposes was somehow fabricated for of criminal his Documentary support defense. evidence in submitted Haynes’ pleadings family in this that case show his has a history generations. spanning great- of mental illness His great grandmother involuntarily was in committed suffering from “confused” and ideas “irrational” and persecution.” great diagnosed “delusions of His aunt was praecox, paranoid” “dementia in with 1939 after she young daughters. murdered her two his first Bulgar, diagnosed “probably cousin, Stacia was as paranoid schizophrenic.”
Haynes, pronounced himself, exhibited aberrant in his killing people he started before long behavior non- supposed nation’s effort to eradicate the bizarre family noted by That ugliness. behavior was Aryan one-time members, associates, employers and even his the landlord, associated with psychiatrist who was trial, at the time of Markos military. Unknown schizophrenic for actually diagnosed Haynes in engaging in 1980s aberrant early first time after that his authorities in Califor- led to arrest behavior nia. had
Mental who have the benefit professionals health early his reviewing complete history, including Haynes’ following his convic- medical records and his treatment in 1980: tion, have confirmed what the doctors knew schizophrenic. Morеover, according is a Haynes paranoid Woods, M.D., a George psychiatrist board-certified pe- submitted in support Haynes’ whose affidavit was court, Haynes’ tition the circuit paranoid, cogni- him psychotic “severe disorder rendered tively prioritize, appropriately, sequence unable to rationally attorneys preparation in the of his own assist defense, thereby making him, my opinion, unfit to stand trial.”
Although Haynes’ amenability to treatment and the true condition were corresponding confirmation of his trial, after not discovered until those matters bore directly tried, on his status at the time he was convicted the circuit fit- They and sentenced. showed that court’s As ness determination was based on a medical error. error, no if earlier, question noted there is this earlier, have discovered would altered outcome Haynes’ complete fitness Had Markos known of hearing. the effects could history proper seen medication administered, have when basis for properly opinion doctor’s have eliminated. He would would been had no for all of the possible grounds contradicting have testimony evidence, other and medical and the expert *39 486 court
circuit would have had no basis for declaring fit. Haynes
The purpose petition of a 2—1401 under section is to before the bring court matters of fact which were un known at the the judgment entered, time and if known, would have affected or altered the judgment was entered. See In re Marriage Hoppe, 220 Ill. App. of (1991). view, 3d 282 In my this presents case of precisely sort situation section 2—1401 was Haynes’ intended to petition address. has provided court with an opportunity to corrеct an and obvious fundamental error. We should that opportunity. welcome At a time when the fairness and of our death reliability penalty law has under come intense this court scrutiny, should redouble its efforts to ensure that capital proceed Eire as error free as ings possible. Regardless-of whether my one shares view that the death present penalty law is all Bull, unconstitutional in its v. applications (People (1998) 2d 179, (Harrison, J., 185 Ill. 225 in concurring in pEirt dissenting part)), allowing a death sentence to stand based on a mistake of in magnitude present is If my colleagues this case are intolerable. serious about rehabilitating system, they is where this should begin. limited
Now is not the for a time construction of the Technical objections law. have no A place. section 2—1401 petition equitable invokes the court powers as justice and require fairness and should be considered light equitable principles. Whether a section 2—1401 should petition be the facts and granted depends equities presented. Relief is under granted this statute order and a justice, to achieve liberal construction is used to achieve that See In re Marriage end. Ill. Hoppe, 3d 282-83. App. section considering petition, 2—1401 the court petition true all uncontradicted facts in the
accepts Powell, 202 Ill. O’Malley See v. affidavits. supporting (1990). *40 challenged the facts are 529, 3d Where App. evidentiary hearing a full and fair party, opposing App. 247 Ill. Marriage of Breyley, must held. See In re be (1993). standards, the circuit 486, 3d Under these 2—1401 Haynes’ court should not have dismissed section judgment The circuit court’s petition pleadings. reversed, and the cause should be should therefore be remanded for further proceedings.
(No. 84564. ILLINOIS, THE THE PEOPLE OF STATE OF Appel NIEVES, lee, v. HECTOR Appellant.
Opinion July Rehearing denied October 2000. filed 2000.