THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS v. WILLIE COLLINS
No. 1-14-3422
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division
June 13, 2016
2016 IL App (1st) 143422
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Cunningham and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion.
THE
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 10 CR 19295
)
WILLIE COLLINS, ) Honorable
) Luciano Panici,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Cunningham and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Willie Collins, appeals his convictions after a jury trial of aggravated battery
with a firearm and attempted armed robbery. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred
by (1) refusing to present the jury with an instruction on the affirmative defense of compulsion;
and (2) precluding the testimony of witness Taylor Chapman as hearsay. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 JURISDICTION
¶ 3 The trial court sentenced defendant on Seрtember 19, 2014. He filed a notice of appeal on
October 16, 2014. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the
Illinois Constitution (
606, governing appeals from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case entered below.
¶ 4 BACKGROUND
¶ 5 Defendant, along with two codefendants who are not parties to this appeal, was charged
with attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, attempted armed robbery,
aggravated discharge of a firearm, and aggravated battery, in connection with an incident that
occurred on September 29, 2010. Defendant and his codefendants had separate trials with
separate juries.
¶ 6 At defendant’s triаl, Amir Muhammed Azhar testified that on September 29, 2010, he
was working alone at the Marathon gas station at 711 South Halsted
Illinois. Around 8:15 p.m. that evening, Amir was at the cash register in the store behind a
bulletproof glass window that could only be opened by the cashier. Defendant entered the store
and asked for a single cigarette. Keeping the bullet-proof glass window closed, Amir gave
defendant a cigarette through a drawer in the window. Defendant then asked Amir to light the
cigarette for him. To do so, Amir opened the bulletproof window. Defendant conversed with
Amir and Amir tried to close the window. Defendant, however, “kept asking [him] about things
which are behind the cоunter” and Amir kept the window open so he could answer defendant’s
questions.
¶ 7 Another person, later identified as codefendant DeAnthony Pearson, entered the store.
Amir noted that he had his face covered except his eyes, and he had a gun in his hand. Amir tried
to close the bulletproof window, but Pearson put his hand on the window so it would not close.
Amir saw that defendant was still in the store and when Pearson was about 1½ feet away he shot
Amir. Amir fell and used his cell phone to call 911. He soon lost consciousness and awoke three
days later in the hospital. A surveillance camera recorded the events in the store and the video
was entered into evidence.
¶ 8 Keiarа Boyd testified that in September 2010 she was dating and living with codefendant
Armoni Allen. Defendant lived across the street and would visit their house “[e]very now and
then.” Keiara also knew codefendant Pearson. On September 29, 2010, around 8 p.m., defendant,
Pearson and Allen were at Allen’s residence. Keiara noticed that Pearson had a gun and he was
“playing with it.” When she told him she “didn’t play with guns” he stopped pointing it at her.
Keiara and Allen then went upstairs and while they were upstairs, Keiara heard Pearson yell for
Allen to “come on.” Allen then left the room and he, Pearson and defendant left the house
together.
¶ 9 Approximately 5 to 10 minutes later, Allen returned alone but was soon joined at the
house by defendant and Pearson. Everyone was in the same room and Pearson, who had the gun
in his hands, stated that he shot someone but he did not “know where he shot the man.” Allen
told defendant and Pearson to leave, and when they left Pearson left the gun in the room. Keiara
noticed the gun and told Allen to tell Pearson to take the gun with him. Pearson returned and
took the gun with him. Keiara testified that every time she saw Pearson that day, he had a gun
but she never saw him point the gun at defendant. After defendant and Pearson left the house,
Allen received a call from Pearson telling him to look out his back window toward the Marathon
gas station and he looked out the window.
¶ 10 Detective Stepich testified that he responded to a shooting at the Marathon gas station on
711 South Halsted Street on September 29, 2010, around 8:20 p.m. He recovered surveillance
video and followed up on a 911 call that was made by a witness. Detective Stepich learned that
defendant was the person who made the 911 call and defendant was brought in for questioning.
After reviewing the surveillance video, Detective Stepich believed defendant was involved in the
crime based on the footage. Detective Stepich testified that in viewing the footage, he saw that
defendant “was in the store, he got the victim to open up the bulletproof glass window. He stuck
his hand through the opening a few times, it appeared, and they got–the gentleman wasn’t trying
to close it, but it seemed like he was trying to keep the window open when the shooter and the
other suspect came inside, and he shot,
the shooting, the codefendants ran but defendant “went outside, picked up a cigarette, and was
standing outside smoking a cigarette, and eventually he just walked away from the scene.”
¶ 11 Detective Stepich read defendant his Miranda rights and defendant agreed to speak.
Defendant stated that he, Pearson and Allen planned to rob the gas station and “his job was to go
inside and get the gas station attendant to open the bulletproof glass window.” Defendant would
be on the cell phone with Pearson and Allen and when he used the code word “condom,” that
was his signal the window was open and they could come in for the robbery. In the gas station,
while on the phone with Allen, defendant asked for a cigarette and then he asked for a light.
When told he could not smoke in the store, defendant went outside and put the cigarette on the
ground. He then came back inside and asked the gas station attendant some questions and asked
about the condoms. After he said the word, Pearson and Allen came into the store and defendant
was pushed to the ground. Defеndant stated that this was part of the plan, “to act like he had fell
to the ground.” Pearson and Allen approached the gas station attendant; Pearson shot him and
then he and Allen ran from the gas station. Defendant went outside to get his cigarette, returned
and asked the gas station attendant if he was alright, then left the scene. Defendant stated that he
called 911 and then went back to Allen’s house to meet up with Pearson and Allen. He returned
the phone he had used during the incident.
¶ 12 After speaking with defendant, Detective Stepich went to Allen’s house and arrested
Allen. He then went to Pearson’s residence and was given permission to search the house. He
recovered a pair of shoes that appeared to be the ones worn by one of the offenders in the video
and a green cell phone that defendant appeared to be holding at the gas station. After a search
warrant was issued on Allen’s house, Detective Stepich recovered a black Hi-Point 9-millimeter
semiautomatic handgun and clothing that appeared to be clothes worn by the shooter when he
entered the store.
¶ 13 Detective Murtagh was assigned to investigate the shooting and he watched the video
surveillance tape recovered at the gas station. Detective Deel processed the crime scene, tаking
fingerprints from the bulletproof glass window and recovering discharged cartridge casings.
Detective Murtagh received this evidence for processing. Officer Estock took fingerprints of
defendant, Allen and Pearson. Karen Heard, an expert in fingerprint identification, determined
that the fingerprints found on the bulletproof glass window matched those taken from Pearson.
Jeffrey Parise, an expert in the field of firearm identification, determined that both the fired
cartridge case and discharged cartridge came from the recovered handgun.
¶ 14 Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Farah Brass interviewed defendant on September 30,
2010. He agreed to spеak with her and she took a handwritten statement in which defendant
detailed the circumstances of the shooting as he had told Detective Stepich earlier. ASA Brass
testified that during his interview, defendant never mentioned that Pearson or Allen threatened
him or his family in any way. ASA Brass informed defendant that she would be speaking with
his codefendants and “he seemed to be okay with that.” Defendant told ASA Brass that Pearson
allowed him to borrow a phone because defendant’s phone could not make outgoing calls.
stated that when he arrived at the hospital, Amir was not conscious or breathing on his own. A
gunshot wound to Amir’s upper chest area caused injuries to his right lung, bronchial arteries,
and lower rib. He also suffered a gunshot wound in his right arm. Dr. McElmeel stated that if he
had not received the emergency surgery Amir would have died.
¶ 16 The State rested and defendant called Taylor Chapman, defendant’s cousin, as a witness.
Taylor testified that on September 29, 2010, between 7 p.m. and 7:45 p.m., she and her friend
Alexis were walking home from school. As they were walking in the alley they saw defendant,
followed by Pearson who had his hand in his pocket. Defendant and Pearson walked into Allen’s
garage. She saw Allen there and defendant “looked scared.” Pearson took out his gun and Taylor
heard a “little click” from the loaded weapon. He started waving the gun around and then he put
the gun to Taylor’s head, grabbing her ponytail. He then took the gun and after saying some
words, placed the gun on Alexis’s abdominal area. Pearson next “placed the gun on” defendant.
Afterwards, Taylor and Alexis left. Taylor testified that she tried to call her mother at work but
was unable to speak with her. After her mother got off of work, they went to the police station
but the people at the front desk told them to come back the next day. When they returned, the
police informed them it was too late to file a poliсe report because charges had been filed against
defendant.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, Taylor stated that Pearson “made several threats.” Taylor could
not describe the officer behind the front desk who talked to her and her mother. She stated that
the first time they spoke to defendant’s attorney about the incident in the garage was a week
before trial.
¶ 18 Alexis Pratt testified that on September 29, 2010, she was coming home from school with
Taylor and arrived at her house around 4 p.m. An hour later, they left her house and went to
Taylor’s house. As they were walking, they saw defendant and Pearson going into Allen’s
garage. Taylor tried to get defendant to come out, but Pearson “had a gun and started playing
with it,” putting it to defendant’s chest. Pearson loaded and unloaded the gun and he waved it
around. After putting the gun to defendant’s chest, Pearson put the gun “towards [Taylor’s] head
and held her ponytail.” He then pointed the weapon at Alexis, toward her vagina. Alexis stated
that Pearson made threats to her, defendant and Taylor. Alexis and Taylor went to the police
station with Taylor’s grandmother. The police told them to come back in the morning to make a
statement. When they returned the next morning, the police told them that defendant had been
charged and it was “too late.”
¶ 19 Renee Johnson, defendant’s grandmother and guardian, testified thаt on November 16,
2010, she saw Allen’s mother with Keiara Boyd at one of defendant’s court dates. Keiara told
her that defendant did not want to participate in the crime but Pearson “forced him.” Ms. Johnson
stated that after she returned home from work on September 29, 2010, she went to the police
station with Taylor and Alexis. She testified that she was not allowed to file a police report until
the following day, but when she returned she was told it was too late because defendant had
“already been processed.”
¶ 20 Defendant testified in his defense. He stated that on September 29, 2010, he was 18 years
old and after school he stopped by the Marathon gas station to buy cigarettеs. When he crossed
the
Pearson told defendant that he “wanted to talk for a second” but was being a little assertive.
Pearson asked defendant questions about the gas station attendant and if he knew how often the
bulletproof glass window in the gas station was opened. Defendant responded that he did not
know and that “[a]ll I know is that I need to get home.” As defendant started to walk away,
Pearson touched his shoulder and said “come on, let’s go to [Allen’s] house for a second.” He
put his arm around defendant’s shoulder and they took the alley to Allen’s house.
¶ 21 As they approached Allen’s garage, Pearson no longer had his hand on defendant’s
shoulder and was “a little bit in back of” defendant. He saw Taylor and Alexis coming up the
alley but he “didn’t pay no attention” and “kept going toward the garage.” Allen was in the
garage. Pearson kept asking defendant questions about the gas station and defendant “started
getting annoyed” and wanted to leave. At that point, Pearson reached into his hoodie pouch and
pulled out a black gun. Defendant “got a little bit panicky” and stepped back. Pearson told
defendant that “all I need you to do is go into the gas station and get him to оpen up the gas
station window” so they could commit the robbery.
¶ 22 Defendant heard Taylor ask him what he was doing in the garage, and Pearson pointed
the gun toward defendant’s chest. Pearson and Taylor got into an argument and Pearson stated,
“Bitch, mind your own business. This ain’t got nothing to do with you. This is between me and
baby Willie. So what you need to do is leave, leave this garage and go home.” Pearson pulled on
Taylor’s braids and pointed the gun toward her head. Taylor and Alexis did not leave and Alexis
told Pearson to take his hands off of Taylor. Pearson then pointed the gun toward Alexis’s groin
area. Pearson told Alexis that if she did not “mind [her] fucking business,” he would make
“another piss hole to piss out of.” Peаrson then took the gun off of Alexis and pointed it at
defendant’s chest. Pearson stated “I don’t need you all no more. I got who I need to do what I
need to do.” Taylor turned to leave but she told defendant that he should “go home.”
¶ 23 Pearson pushed defendant toward the house. He told defendant that “[e]ither you are
going to do this or something can happen.” Pearson asked defendant for information about when
the gas station attendant opened the bulletproof window. Defendant told him that sometimes they
open it for people who purchase cigarettes. Allen got up to go into his house and Pearson pushed
defendant toward the door and told him to follow Allen. They stayed in Allen’s kitchen for about
30 minutes and during that time Pearson’s hands were on the kitchen counter, “but the gun is just
literally sitting in front of him.”
¶ 24 Someone came to the door and defendant heard a voice say “get that damn gun out of my
face.” Keiara then came into the kitchen followed by Pearson. She asked what was going on and
Allen told her to go upstairs. Allen pulled Pearson to the side and they discussed their plan.
Pearson had his gun in the pouch of his hoodie. Allen went upstairs and Pearson was pacing back
and forth, talking to himself. He stopped and yelled to Allen to “[b]ring your ass on.” Allen came
downstairs and they all went into the gаrage. Pearson told defendant that when he gets in front of
the Marathon gas station to give him and Allen a call. Defendant told Pearson that his phone
could only call 911 so Pearson gave him his phone.
gun in his pouch. Defendant entered the store and asked for a cigarette. Amir slid it under the
glass window and when defendant asked for a light, Amir opened the window and lit the
cigarette for him. Pearson waited outside the store and after defendant exited they walked back to
Allen’s garage. Allen was in the garage and Pearson stated that it had gone well and to “get
ready.” They went back inside Allen’s house and Pearson and Allеn changed clothes. Defendant
testified that while they changed, Pearson’s gun was on the kitchen island.
¶ 26 After they changed, Pearson told defendant what route he should take to the gas station
and instructed him to call them when he got to the gas station parking lot. Pearson and Allen
were going to “stay in the alleyway, because the alleyway can look over all three buildings. You
have the Starship Video, the pub, the Marathon gas station.” Defendant “walked down
Southgate, turned that left on Halsted, and walked toward the Marathon gas station.” When he
got to the gas station parking lot, he called them and said, “I’m in front of it.” He then saw Allen
and Pearson behind a fence.
¶ 27 Defendant entered the store and told them that no one was in the store at that time. He
asked Amir for a cigarette. Amir slid the cigarette under the glass and when defendant asked for
a light, Amir opened the glass window. When it was open, defendant said the word “condom”
which was the code word for Allen and Pearson to come into the store. As part of the plan, Allen
and Pearson pushed defendant down using a “little more force than what they said it was going
to be.” Defendant could not see what was happening. He heard someone repeatedly tell Amir to
“give me the money” and Amir responded, “no, no.” Defendant heard a gunshot and his “vision
went black and [his] ears started ringing.” He got up and went to the counter. He saw Amir’s legs
“sticking out” and he asked if Amir was “all right.” He heard “mumbling and grumbling” from
Amir and was going to call 911 but then he received a call from Allen asking where he was.
When he told Allen that he was still at the gas station, Allen told him to “[h]urry the fuck up.”
¶ 28 Defendant panicked, walked out of the store and picked up his cigarette. He called 911 to
report the shooting and then started walking toward Allen’s house. Pearson came up to him and
asked what had taken defendant so long and whether Amir had been shot. Defendant told
Pearson that he did not know and Pearson “got a little more frustrated.” Pearson grabbed
defendant and asked him to rеturn his phone. When they returned to Allen’s house, Allen asked
defendant what had taken him so long and Pearson pushed defendant into the kitchen. In the
house, Pearson stated that he had shot Amir. Pearson still had the weapon while they were in
Allen’s house. Pearson and defendant went upstairs to speak with Allen and when defendant
tried to go back downstairs Pearson grabbed him and told him to wait. Pearson then led
defendant to the kitchen. Allen called for Pearson and Pearson told defendant to follow him back
upstairs. At that point, Allen returned Pearson’s gun to him. Defendant told Pearson he was
leaving the house and shortly thereafter he received a cаll from the 911 operator. He gave his
name and address and agreed to speak to the police about the incident. Defendant acknowledged
that he voluntarily gave a statement to the police and to the ASA.
¶ 29 On cross-examination, defendant stated that although he had gone to school with Pearson,
they were not friends. Defendant
did not have any classes together. He called Pearson by the nickname, “D.” Although he did not
feel threatened when Pearson first spoke to him that day, Pearson became more agitated when
asking defendant about the gas station, and defendant becаme scared. Defendant stated that
Pearson threatened Taylor by telling her to “mind her own fucking business or she going to get
hurt.” Pearson also threatened defendant by telling him that “he was going to knock a patch” in
defendant’s head, which was slang for putting a bullet in his head. Pearson, however, did not
point the gun at defendant’s head and when they went into Allen’s house, Pearson put the gun on
the kitchen island near where defendant stood. Defendant acknowledged that he walked to the
gas station alone, taking a different route from Pearson and Allen. On the way, he did not always
see Pearson or Allen. Defendant also testified that he was not always in communiсation with
them by cell phone on his way to the gas station. He stated that while walking to the gas station,
he passed the Starship Video building and the pub. Defendant acknowledged that when he
passed those buildings he could not see Pearson or Allen walking down the alleyway. He stated
that he could see them, however, when he passed by the gap between the buildings. Defendant
never alerted anyone inside the buildings that he was being forced to participate in an attempted
robbery. When he first entered the gas station parking lot, Pearson and Allen were not there. He
did not ask Amir to call 911 or signal for him not to open the bulletproof glass windоw.
Defendant also acknowledged that he did not tell the 911 operator that he had been threatened,
and that he did not claim in his statements that he was threatened with a gun. Defendant stated
that he did tell Detective Stepich that he was threatened. He testified that the only time Pearson
threatened him was in Allen’s garage, hours before the actual shooting. In rebuttal, Detective
Stepich testified, over defendant’s objection, that defendant never told him he was threatened.
¶ 30 The defense rested and requested an instruction on the affirmative defense of compulsion.
The trial court denied the request, finding that “[t]he threat subsided when [defеndant] walked
out. He could have gone out–he had two phones. He had the green phone, which could have
called anybody. He could have called the [P]resident of the United States, if he wanted to, or he
could have called 911 on his own phone when he was away from them. He didn’t do that.” It
found that the threat of future injury in this case was “not sufficient to excuse criminal conduct”
and that defendant “had a number of ample opportunities to withdraw from the criminal
enterprise and he failed to take steps in that direction. That is the key. He failed to withdraw.”
¶ 31 After closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted armed robbery and
aggravated battery with a firearm, but not guilty of attempted first degree murder. Defendant
filed a motion for a new trial, contending as error the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on
the compulsion defense. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence established
defendant had “ample opportunity to withdraw” but he did not do so. Defendant was sentenced
to 20 years imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm, and a consecutive 10 years for
attempted armed robbery. Defendant filed this timely appeal.
¶ 32 ANALYSIS
¶ 33 Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request
on the affirmative defense of compulsion. Defendаnt is entitled to an instruction where some
evidence exists to support the giving of the instruction. People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 31 (2006).
The trial court should not give instructions which are not supported by evidence in the record.
People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (2008). We note that the standard of review regarding whether
evidence exists to support a jury instruction is unclear. See Jones, 219 Ill. 2d at 31 (“[t]he giving
of jury instructions is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court”); People v.
Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 19 (“whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to support
the giving of a jury instruction is a question of law subject to de novo review”). We need not
address this conflict, however, because our determination is the same under either standard of
review.
¶ 34 Compulsion is an affirmative defense whereby a defendant is not guilty of an offense “by
reason of conduct that he or she performs under the cоmpulsion of threat or menace of the
imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she reasonably believes death or great
bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or her, *** if he or she does not perform that conduct.”
present “some evidence” sufficient to raise an issue of fact for the jury and create reasonable
doubt as to defendant’s guilt. People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (1974). However, this
defense is not available if defendant had an ample opportunity to withdraw from participation in
the offense but failed to do so. People v. Scherzer, 179 Ill. App. 3d 624, 645-46 (1989).
¶ 35 For the compulsion defense to apply, the threat of death or great bodily harm must be
imminent. People v. Jackson, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068 (1981). A threat of future injury “is
not sufficient to excuse criminal conduct.” People v. Robinson, 41 Ill. App. 3d 526, 529 (1976);
Jackson, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1068. Thus, the evidence must show that the threat against defendant
would soon have been carried out if he had not followed the orders of the compeller. Id.
¶ 36 People v. Pegram, 124 Ill. 2d 166 (1988), is instructive. In Pegram, the defendant was at
the victim’s place of business to perform work. He was confronted by two masked men, one of
whom pointed a gun at the defendant’s head and told him that he would blow the defendant’s
brains out if he did not act as requested. Id. at 169. The masked men ordered the defendant to
take them to the victim, Mackin, and when they got to his office, they ordered Mackin to lie on
the floor and empty his pockets. After Mackin did so, the men ordered the defendant to open the
freezer door and they pushed Mackin into the freezer. Id. The defendant was then ordered to lie
on the floor while one of the men stood over him with a gun, and the other man ransacked the
office. They then ordered the defendant to take them to Mаckin’s car. While walking to the car,
they had the gun pointed at the defendant. He was ordered to lie on the floor in the back of
Mackin’s station wagon and about 40 minutes later, the men let the defendant out of the car on
an expressway. Meanwhile, back at Mackin’s place of business, Mackin managed to smash open
the freezer. He notified police
photograph. Id. at 170. The court in Pegram found that the record presented sufficient evidence
that the defendant had been forced, under threat of imminent harm, to participate in the robbery
supporting the use of the compulsion instruction. Id. at 173.
¶ 37 Here, the evidence showed that Pearson first approached defendant outside the gas station
after school asking questions about the gas station. Pearson and defendant walked to Allen’s
garage, and, soon after, Chapman and Pratt came into the garage. In the garage, Pearson took out
a handgun and started waving it around and pointing it at Chapman, Pratt and defendant. Pearson
made known his intent to commit a robbery at the gas station and defendant testified that Pearson
said he would “knock a patch” in defendant’s head. However, the actual robbery and shooting
did not occur until around 8:20 p.m., hours after the incident in Allen’s garage. In that time,
plans for the robbery were discussed and they even made a dry run where defendant entered the
store and purchased a cigarette to test out the plan. Although Pearson had the gun on his person,
defendant acknowledged that Pearson made no other threats and after the incident in the garage,
he did not point the gun at defendant. Unlike Pegram, where threats were made and soon after
the defendant participated with a gun pointed at him at points throughout the commission of the
crime, the evidence here does not support defendant’s contention that the threat of death or great
bodily harm to him was imminent.
¶ 38 Furthermore, “[t]he defense of compulsion is not available to one who passes up an
opportunity to withdraw from the criminal enterprise.” Scherzer, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 645-46. In
People v. Colone, 56 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1020-21 (1978), the defendant was visiting his
girlfriend’s house when he heard a group of men planning a robbery. The next morning, another
man came to the house and pointed a gun at the defеndant telling him he looked like a
“ ‘creep.’ ” Id. at 1020. Pointing the gun at the defendant, the man told him to go to the intended
victim’s house and ring the bell. The defendant did so and the grandmother in the house
answered the door. The defendant returned to his girlfriend’s house and told the group there that
he saw only the grandmother and a little girl in the house. The defendant testified that he had
heard the man with the gun had a reputation for being a killer and he acted because he feared for
his life. The group left to commit the robbery at the victim’s house and defendant stayed at his
girlfriend’s house until they left. Id. at 1021.
¶ 39 This court found that “the evidence before us proves beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant may not avail himself of the defense of compulsion.” Id. It reasoned that given the
defendant’s testimony and statement, he did not have a reasonable belief he was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm because he had ample opportunities to withdraw and failed
to take steps in that direction. Id. The court pointed to the fact that when he rang the victim’s
doorbell alone, he could have notified the people inside of the impending robbery. Also, when he
returned to his girlfriend’s house and the group left to commit the robbery, the defendant “could
have notified the police with safety at any time.” Id. It concluded that defendant’s failure to take
these opportunities “demonstrates the absence of compulsion.” Id.
criminal enterprise. Defendant testified that when they left Allen’s house to commit the robbery,
he took a separate route from Pearson and Allen. Defendant had two cell phones with him.
Although he was instructed to call Pearson and Allen once he got to the gas station parking lot,
he was not constantly talking to them on the phone while en route. Defendant also acknowledged
that on his way to the gas station, he could not be seen by Pearson and Allen at all times as he
passed a couple of businesses. He could have gone into one of the businesses on the way to the
gas station and safely notified рolice of the robbery, but he did not do so. On the dry run prior to
the actual robbery, when defendant went into the store to purchase a cigarette while Pearson
waited outside, defendant could have warned Amir that a robbery was being planned and to
notify police as a precaution. As we found in Colone, defendant’s failure to avail himself of these
opportunities “demonstrates the absence of compulsion.” Colone, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 1021.
¶ 41 Defendant argues that he presented sufficient evidence to allow for a compulsion
instruction, primarily citing People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d 231 (2007), and People v. Adcock,
29 Ill. App. 3d 917 (1975), as support. Sims is distinguishable because the 15-year-old defendant
was threatened immediately before getting into a car to commit the robbery that he was “there
when it started” and had “to be there for the finish.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted.) Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 268. The person made this threat in a menacing manner and
held a gun while speaking to the defendant. Here, Pearson did not make any threats against
defendant immediately prior to committing the robbery.
¶ 42 In Adcock, evidence was presеnted that the defendant was in a truck for a time without
the offender who had threatened him, but the court allowed a compulsion defense finding that he
had presented sufficient evidence to show fear of imminent bodily harm and the question should
go to the jury. Adcock, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 919-20. However, Adcock, which was decided prior to
Scherzer and Colone, did not even consider whether the defendant had an opportunity to
withdraw. It is now well-settled that the defense of compulsion is not available “if the defendant
had ample opportunities to withdraw from the criminal enterprise but failed to do so.” Sims, 374
Ill. App. 3d at 267. As discussed above, we are not persuaded that defendant has presented
sufficient evidence to support an instruction for compulsion. The trial сourt did not err in
denying defendant’s request to give the jury a compulsion instruction.
¶ 43 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in precluding as hearsay Chapman’s
testimony about Pearson’s threats in the garage. We note that other than providing a citation
supporting the general law of hearsay, defendant’s analysis of the issue contains no other
citations to authority. Therefore, defendant has waived review of this issue pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (argument “shall contain the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons therefor, with citations of the authorities and the pages of the record
relied on”).
¶ 44 Furthermore, the trial court did not commit error here. Generally hearsay, which is an
out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of the
because the credibility of such statements depends on that of an out-of-court declarant who is
unavailable for cross-examination. People v. Gayfield, 261 Ill. App. 3d 379, 387 (1994).
However, if the statement is offered for a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, it is
not hearsay and is admissible. Id. at 387-88. Defendant argues that Chapman’s statements about
Pearson’s threats should have been admitted to show defendant’s state of mind, and that his state
of mind is relevant to the issue of compulsion. This exception, however, is to establish the
declarant’s state of mind, not a listener’s. Statements indicating the declarant’s state of mind are
admissible as exceptions tо the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable to testify, there is a
reasonable probability that the statements is truthful, and the declarant’s state of mind is a
relevant issue in the case. People v. Floyd, 103 Ill. 2d 541, 546 (1984). This exception is not
applicable here.
¶ 45 Even if error occurred when the trial court precluded Chapman’s testimony, the error was
harmless. Chapman, Pratt and defendant testified about Pearson’s actions in the garage. They
stated that he had a gun, was waving it around, and pointed the weapon at Chapman, Pratt and
defendant. Pearson’s actions with the gun certainly indicated a threat to defendant. Furthermore,
at trial defendant himself testified about the threats Pearson made to him, which is even more
relevant to defendant’s state of mind on the compulsion issue. Defendant was not prejudiced by
the exclusion of Chapman’s testimony.
¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 47 Affirmed.