THE PEOPLE, Plаintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER LEE COFER, Defendant and Appellant.
H050122
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Filed 6/28/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; Monterey County Super. Ct. Nos. 20CR010763; 20CR008059; 21C500245; 21CR001076; 21CR001243
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
This case involves the award of presentence credit in five criminal cases that were resolved together. We omit the facts of the offenses as they are not relevant to the analysis and disposition of this appeal.
The information in case No. 20CR008059 (“case A“) charged Cofer with vehicle burglary (
Several months later, Cofer was charged by information in case No. 20CR010763 (“case B“) with vehicle burglary (
Also that day, Cofer was charged by information in case No. 21CR001076 (“case D“) and case No. 21CR001243 (“case E“). The information in case D charged him with second degree burglary (
Cofer resolved all five cases by plea agreement some ten months later.1 Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the trial court sentenced Cofer to a six-year term in case B and concurrent terms in the other cases. In case A, the court awarded presentence custody credits of 66 actual custody days and 66 days conduct credit; in case B, the court awarded 21 days of actual custody and 20 days conduct credit; in case C, the court awarded 225 days of actual custody and 224 days conduct credit; in cases D and E, the court deemed the sentences served with 183 days of actual custody and 182 days conduct credit in each.
Cofer filed a timely notiсe of appeal, and the trial court granted a certificate of probable cause to challenge the calculation of presentence custody credits. Cofer then moved in the trial court under
In case A, Cofer was arrested on September 27, 2020, and remained in custody until November 10, 2020, when he posted bail and was released. He was in custody on the new charges brought in cases B and C from January 12
In his
The trial court denied the request for dual presentence credits, ruling that under Jacobs, Cofer was not entitled to dual credits for cases where he remained on bail or on his own recognizance while in presentence custody in other cases. The trial court awarded 15 additional days in case C and an additional 15 days in case B based on its interpretation of the records Cоfer submitted in support of the motion. The court denied Cofer‘s request to reduce his term of imprisonment with the credits exceeding one year in cases D and E.
II. DISCUSSION
A. SUPREME COURT AUTHORITIES
The Supreme Court has interpreted
The Supreme Court returned to
Joyner and Bruner thus involved situations where a defendant had already received presentence custody credits in another proceeding before being sentenced in the case for which he sought credit. That posture distinguishes them from this appeal, where defendant seeks presentence custody credits for all cases resolved in a single negotiated disposition and sentenced at a single hearing.
B. INTERMEDIATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS
Two intermediate appellate decisions involved a procedural posture more similar to that presented here. In People v. Kunath (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 906 the defendant was arrested for a controlled substancе offense and released on bail. Kunath was then arrested while on bail and charged in a new case for a new controlled substance offense. He remained in custody until he pleaded guilty in both cases and was sentenced concurrently at a single hearing. (Id. at p. 909.) It is not clear whether Kunath was remanded to custody in the first case once he was in custody in the second case, but the opinion describes Kunath as having been “in custody on both cases.” (Ibid.) The Kunath court determined that where a “defendant‘s custody is solely presentence on all charges and he is simultaneously sentenced on all charges to concurrent terms,” presentence custody credits “must apply to all сharges to equalize the total time in custody between those who obtain presentence release and those who do not.” (Id. at p. 911 In Jacobs, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of committing forcible rape. He posted bail and was released. While released on bail in the first case, Jacobs was arrested and charged in a new case with new offenses that included another forcible rape. For the next several months, Jacobs remained in custody in the second case while his custody status in the first case was noted as ” ‘released on bail posted.’ ” (Jacobs, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 72–73.) The two cases were resolved by a “plea bargain involving both cases.” (Id. at p. 73.) The trial court exonerated thе bail bond in the first case on the date of the change of plea hearing, but Jacobs remained in custody on a ” ‘body only hold’ ” in that case until sentencing. The court granted “own recognizance” release in the second case, even though Jacobs remained in jail in the first case. (Id. at p. 74.) At a single sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a prison sentence in the first case and a concurrent sentence in the second case. The trial court did not award presentence custody credits in the first case for time Jacobs remained “on bail” in that case, despite being in actual custody during that time in the second case. (Ibid.) Jacobs argued he was entitled to presentencе custody credit in both cases for all days spent in actual custody. (Jacobs, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 81.) Reviewing Joyner, Bruner, and Kunath, the Jacobs court interpreted ”Kunath as holding, consistent with [section 2900.5] and with Bruner, that when a trial court imposes only concurrent sentences in multiple cases at the same time, a defendant is entitled to all presentence custody attributable to each of the proceedings so long as that custody has not been already credited to a previously imposed sentence.” (Jacobs, at p. 83.) But the Jacobs court did not believe section 2900.5 or the cases interpreting it authorized “credit for a period of custody that cannot be attributed to a proceeding.” (Jacobs, at p. 83.) The court concluded that Kunath‘s holding did not extend to Jacobs‘s situation because his on-bail status in the first case meant “his presentence custody during that period was not attributable to that procеeding.” (Id. at p. 84.) C. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL PRESENTENCE CUSTODY CREDIT The parties agree that this case turns on how to interpret the first sentence of section 2900.5, subdivision (b): “For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” The sentence is ambiguous as applied to defendant‘s cases.2 The phrase “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct” could mean—consistent with Jacobs and the trial court‘s decision—that each criminal case must be considered a separate proceeding even if resolved and sentenced at the same time. Under that interpretаtion, a defendant would not receive credit in one case for time spent in actual custody in a second case if the defendant was technically “on bail” in the first case. But “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct” could also mean that a defendant is entitled to credit in all cases that are resolved and sentenced together for all custody attributable to all conduct in those cases occurring after the defendant‘s arrest in any given case. Under the latter interpretation, a defendant would receive credit for all days of actual custody without regard to contemporaneous “on bail” or “own recognizanсe” status in any particular case. We find the latter interpretation more consistent with the purposes of awarding presentence credit, and it is not foreclosed by any Supreme Court authority. We have noted Joyner‘s observation that courts should aim to “provide for section 2900.5 a construction which is faithful to its language, which produces fair and reasonable results in a majority of cases, and which can be readily understood and applied by trial courts.” (Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 495.) Where a defendant is convicted and sentenced at the same hearing on multiple open cases, we believe it is fair and reasonable that the defendant receive credit for all days actually spent in presentence custody; those days should not be limited based on purely technical noncustodial status in any particular case. Our interpretation can be readily understood and applied by trial courts because it will reduce the need to parse actual versus technical custody status in multiple open cases. And our interpretation is not foreclosed by Joyner or Bruner because the strict causation test they describe applies “where the defendant has already received credit for such custody in another proceeding.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) We note that the outcome we conclude is required by section 2900.5 on these facts applies to concurrent sentences. If a trial court elects to impose consecutive sentences, the statute specifies presentence credit “shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b).) There is also nothing in the statute to prevent the parties from expressly addressing in a negotiated disposition whether presentence custody days will be waived or awarded in any given case. The Attorney General argues awarding credits on all cases sentenced concurrently on the same date will result in a windfall. He contends awarding credit for time defendant “was simultaneously in custody and on bail and his own recognizance would simply reward his criminal behavior and incentivize other defendants to engage in the same while out on bail or on their own recognizance.” We aсknowledge defendant is an imperfect candidate for relief, and we in no way condone or ignore recidivism. But we nonetheless conclude that the result we reach here is compelled by section 2900.5Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 494 We also acknowledge that some defendants who are arrested while released on bail may seek to retain their on-bail status in an earlier case in the hope of finding sufficient resources to post bail in a later-filed case or cases. But we do not believe a defendant‘s decision to do so should prevent them from receiving credit for all time in actual custody when they are ultimately sentenced in multiple cases. We agree with Kunath in concluding that a defendant who is simultaneously sentenced to concurrent terms in multiple open cases, where all presentence custody derives solely from those charges, is entitled to presentence custody credit toward all of those sentences. The principle applies even when, as here, a defendant is not technically in custody at all times in all cases. We do not mean to suggest, however, that a defendant would receive credit for time spent in custody before the initial arrest in any given case. (As applied here, defendant will not receive credit in case B, the principal term, for custody days from 2020 before he was arrested in that case.) We commend the trial court for its consсientious attention to applying Jacobs, a published decision by a different panel of this court. With respect, both to the trial court and the previous panel, we disagree with the reasoning of Jacobs and decline to follow its path. We will therefore reverse and remand this matter for the limited purpose of recalculating presentence custody credits as we have described. In light of this result, we do not reach defendant‘s alternative argument for reversal. III. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for the limited purpose of recalculating defendant‘s presentence custody credits. Grover, J. I CONCUR: Greenwood, P. J. H050122 People v. Cofer Lie, J., Dissenting: I share the majority‘s belief that “it is fair and reasonable” for defendant Christopher Lеe Cofer to “receive credit for all days actually spent in presentence custody” and that “those days should not be limited based on purely technical noncustodial status in any particular case.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.) Other than its direct conflict with People v. Jacobs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 67 (Jacobs), I would agree as well that the rule announced by the majority today could be “readily understood and applied” by trial courts. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.) I am obliged to disagree, however, with the majority‘s conviction that we may bend Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (b)1 to our own sense of what is fair and reasonable—without either legislative action or the California Supreme Court‘s reconsideration of its own more restrictive interpretations of the legislative intent. I. Section 2900.5 and its Application Under section 2900.5, subdivision (a), Cofer is entitled to have “all days of custody . . . credited upon his . . . term of imprisonment.” In providing that “[c]redit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed,” the Legislature implicitly sanctioned giving credit more than once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses, so long as the sentences for those multiple offenses were concurrent. (§ 2900.5, subd. (b).) But “credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” (Ibid., italics added.) In other words, “[p]ersons who remain in custоdy prior to sentencing receive credit against their prison terms for all of those days spent in custody prior to sentencing, so long as the presentence custody is attributable to the conduct that led to the conviction.” (People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793 (Duff).) Unless words that are otherwise clear become “ambiguous with respect to the particular factual circumstances” of a novel application, we do not venture beyond the text and statutory context. (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 228.) I read section 2900.5 to mean that credit for a single period in presentence custody will be given against multiple concurrent sentences imposed in multiple cases, so long as the presentence custody is attributable to each of thоse cases. Here, Cofer seeks presentence credit in each of cases A, B, C, D, and E, for the time he was in custody for cases D and E (and later for case C) but nominally released on bail or on his own recognizance in cases A and B. Cofer‘s separate criminal cases, though later sentenced together in a negotiated disposition that resulted in concurrent sentences of widely varying lengths, arose from separate acts and arrests. His presentence credits earned while in actual custody for cases C, D, and E are not “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which [he] ha[d] been convicted” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b)) in cases A and B. (See, e.g., Jacobs, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) So under the statute, hе would not be entitled to credit in cases A or B for time accrued only in cases C, D, and E. That all cases were later sentenced in a single coordinated hearing did not retroactively change his release status in cases A, B, and C or expand the bases for his confinement in cases D and E. This is how trial counsel and the courts have long understood section 2900.5. (See Duff, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 793; see also People v. Adrian (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 868.) When “multiple proceedings lead[] to terms which are consolidated . . . , the ‘attributable’ limitation still applies. . . . [C]redits are not reallocated: they remain assigned only to the proceedings in which they were earned.” (Adrian, at p. 877.) The statute is sufficiently clear that the typical means of avoiding the suboptimal allocation of credits would have been for Cofer to promptly seek remand in cases A, B, and C upon his latest arrest and failure to secure release in cases D and E. Cofer himself understood this. Personally protesting the court‘s announcement of his custody credits, Cofer volunteered: ”I asked for my bail to be revoked when I came in. I had a parole hold. So I‘ve been here since February [2021]. And I asked my lawyer when I came in . . . to revoke my bail.”2 (Italics added.) Nothing in this unprompted acknowledgment of section 2900.5‘s limits suggests an expectation that the scheduling of his disparate cases for simultaneous sentencing might entitle him to credit in all cases for presentence custody nominally served in only some of them. The majority finds ambiguity in the statutory language as applied to Cofer‘s particular predicament and suggests that “proceedings” might be the equivalent of a coordinated hearing, in which multiple cases corresponding to one defendant‘s unrelated offenses “are resolved and sentenced together.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8, 9.) Choosing this interpretation, as the majority does, makes it unnecessary to differentiate between the five cases and Cofer‘s custodial status in each. But “California courts have long recognized that the term ‘proceedings’ is broader than the term ‘hearings.’ [Citations.] Indeed, . . . any attempt to equate the two ‘flies in the face of the ordinary meaning of “proceedings.” ’ ” (Recorder v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 258, 271–272.) ” ‘Proceeding’ ” has a “well-known and accepted sense as designating a form of action . . . .” (Thornley v. Superior Court (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 662, 663–664; see also People v. Williams (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 827, 833 [defining ” ‘legal proceedings’ ” as ” ‘all proceedings authorized or . . . instituted in a court . . . [for] the enforcement of a remedy’ “].) Consistent with these authorities, “proceeding” turns on the operative charging documents that allege the criminal conduct for which the People seek punishment, not on a purely procedural decision to coordinate scheduling for multiple actions. Presentence custody is not “attributable to” hearings, only to the cases heard. Nor is the coordination of multiple cases for sentencing a procedural innovation that invites the majority‘s reading of section 2900.5. Since at least In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487 (Joyner), had there been “separately imрosed concurrent sentences,” even the presentence custody credited in the first case(s) to be sentenced would have become unavailable to be credited to any of the later sentences, absent a showing that “the claimant would have been at liberty during the period were it not for a restraint relating to the proceedings resulting in the later sentence.” (Joyner, at p. 489, italics added [announcing requirement of “strict causation“]; cf. People v. Kunath (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 906, 908–909 (Kunath) [holding that, unlike ” ‘difficult problems’ ” involving separately imposed sentences, a defendant is entitled to credit against each of concurrent sentences imposed at the same time “for the time he was in custody on both cases” (italics added)].) In оther words, had the sentence in case C been imposed first and presentence custody duly credited, the custody available to be credited to cases D and E would have been reduced by the days that Cofer had been in presentence custody on all three of these cases, and by the days between the imposition of sentence in case C and the eventual sentencing date in cases D and E. In this scenario, denominating the sentences D and E as concurrent to sentence C would not spare Cofer the obligation under Joyner to prove that he would have been at liberty but for cases D and E, a showing that his in-custody status in case C would defeat. Coordination of Cofer‘s cases for sentencing ensured only that the trial court would credit him in each case with the days he was in custody for that particular case, even though those same days were also credited in another case or two or three—because his custody was attributable to each case to be credited. (Kunath, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 910–911.) But nothing in the statute authorizes more than this. II. The Supreme Court‘s Treatment of Custodial Status It is true that my disagreement with the majority turns on what it aptly terms a “purely technical” distinction in custodial status. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.) And yet it is just such a technical reading of custody “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct” that the Supreme Court imposed in Joyner and reaffirmed in People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178 (Bruner) when it repudiated the “relaxed causation” standard it had once espoused in In re Atiles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 805 (Atiles). (Bruner, at p. 1180; see also Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 494, 493 [faulting Atiles for going “astray” from the legislative purpose of § 2900.5].) Indeed, the Joyner court “attacked” Atiles for having construed section 2900.5, subdivision (b)—much аs the majority‘s interpretation does here—to “maximize the concurrency of sentences imposed in multiple proceedings.” (Bruner, at p. 1190 [characterizing Joyner‘s rejection of petitioner‘s reliance on Atiles]; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) In Joyner, the high court in applying its technical “strict causation” test required trial courts to deny dual credit against separately imposed concurrent sentences, even for days spent in presentence custody on both cases. (Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 489section 2900.5 to implement an “equalization-of-concurrent-terms rationale.” (Joyner, at pp. 494–495; but see id. at p. 496 (dis. opn. of Broussard, J.) [criticizing majority ruling as “inconsistent with our previous interpretation of the applicable statute,” “inequitable,” “discriminat[ory] against indigent defendants,” and bound to be “an administrative nightmare“].) And in Bruner, the court interpreted section 2900.5 to deny the petitioner pretrial credits for time served in a parole revocation proceeding attributable in part to the same conduct charged in the criminal action. (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1180section 2900.5‘s requirement of ” ‘proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted,’ ” the Bruner court opted to construe the statutory language restrictively, for the “straightforward” fear of “bestow[ing] [a] windfall of duplicative credits . . . .” (Bruner, at p. 1191.) Building on Joyner, Bruner announced for the first time that section 2900.5 “is intended only to prevent inequalities in total confinement among defendants, each similarly sentenced in a single proceeding” and not to maximize presentence credits across multiple proceedings. (Bruner, at pp. 1191–1192.) The Legislature could reasonably have disagreed with the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of section 2900.5. (See, e.g., Stats. 1976, ch. 1045, § 2 [replaсing “charges arising from the same criminal act or acts” with the current “proceedings related to the same conduct“]; see also Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3653 (1975–1976 Reg. Sess.), background information, ¶ 2 [noting the amendment would “[e]nsure that the Adult Authority no longer frustrate[s] the intent of [§] 2900.5” by denying inmates custody credit in calculating minimum parole eligibility dates].) But in the intervening decades the Legislature has perceived no need to clarify the breadth of “proceeding” or “related to the same conduct” as used in section 2900.5. (See Stats. 1996, ch. 1077, § 28; Stats. 1998, ch. 338, § 6; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 466; Stats. 2013, ch. 59, § 7; Stats. 2014, ch. 612, § 5; Stats. 2015, ch. 209 § 2; Stats. 2016, ch. 769, § 2.) Nor does a looser interpretation of “attributable to proceedings” emerge from other caselaw. Of all the section 2900.5, subdivision (b) cases cited by the majority, save for Jacobs, it was undisputed that the custodial time for which the defendant was seeking presentence credits was attributable at least in part to the cases to be credited. (Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 489 [subject to a ” ‘hold’ ” for California offenses while serving a Florida sentence]; Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1180 [“presentence custody . . . attributable to two or more unrelated acts“]; Kunath, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 909 [presentence credits “for the time he was in custody on both cases“].) So too in In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 154–155 (defendant held in pretrial custody at one county‘s jail while serving prison sentence imposed in another county), in even the discredited Atiles, supra, 33 Cal.3d at page 807 (defendant in pretrial custody while also subject to parole hold), and in In re Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14, 19 (Marquez) (in custody in one county but subject to another county‘s hold). None of the cases Cofer cites in his own briefs, except Jacobs, involve a defendant seeking credit for days served in custody in one case against a sentence in another where he was (nominally) released on his own recognizance or on bail. To the contrary, in Marquez, for example, the Supreme Court made clear that for presentence custody to be attributable to any one case, that case must be at least a contributing cause of a defendant‘s restraint when the strict causation rule of Joyner and Bruner does not apply. (See Marquez, supra, 30 Cal.4th 14, 20–21; id. at p. 23 [Joyner and Bruner strict causation rule applies in cases involving the possibility of duplicate credit].) The petitioner in Marquez was sentenced first in Santa Cruz County (where presentence credits were applied) then in Monterey County (where the 113 days from the Santa Cruz sentencing hearing to the Monterey sentencing hearing were not applied, under Joyner and Bruner), but Santa Cruz eventually vacated its sentence and dismissed its charges. Despite concluding the Santa Cruz dismissal entitled petitioner to credit for the 113-day period against the remaining Monterey sentence, the court observed that ” ‘dead time,’ that is, time spent in custody for which [a defendant] receives no benefit” is sometimes “unavoidable.” (Marquez, at p. 20.) The Marquez court‘s illustration of unavoidable dead time is particularly telling and supports the trial court‘s application of Jacobs: The claimed custody credits, the high court explained, would have been “attributable solely to the Santa Cruz County charges” if “Monterey County [had] never placed a hold” on the defendant for Monterey County‘s own charges. In such a scenario, even “dismissal of the Santa Cruz County charges would have left petitioner with no sentence against which credit for that period could be applied.” (Marquez, at pp. 20–21.) I of course recognize the Marquez court‘s no-hold illustration as dictum based on hypothetical facts, but “an intermediate appellate court . . . [does] not lightly disregard dictum from our Supreme Court.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 330.) And under section 2900.5, subdivision (b), I am unable to meaningfully distinguish the omission of a hold from the omission of a remand order in cases A and B or the delay in issuing a remand order in case C. So remaining bound by the Supreme Court‘s express refusal in Joyner and Bruner to apply section 2900.5, subdivision (b) to maximizе concurrency of sentences, I am unable to join the majority‘s fairness-based reinterpretation of the statute to equalize Cofer‘s concurrent terms, when our conception of what is fair and reasonable under section 2900.5 appears at odds with what our high court long ago announced. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 454.) I respectfully dissent. Lie, J. H050122 People v. Cofer Trial Court: Monterey Co. Sup. Ct. Case Nos. 20CR010763; 20CR008059; 21CR000245; 21CR001076; 21CR001243 Trial Judge: Hon. Stephanie E. Hulsey Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent The People: Ron Bonta, Attorney General of California; Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorney General; Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Christopher Cofer: Mary Jo Strnad, By Appointment from the Sixth District Appellate Program