People v. BoosePeople v. Boose
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Illinois lawyers and judges are grappling with a watershed change to pretrial detention under article 110 of the
Background
¶ 3 Lisa Boose petitioned for credit under the
¶ 4 This prosecution began before amendments to the Code effectively eliminated cash bail in favor of a new detention system. See Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52. The State charged Boose by information with retail theft (
¶ 5 Boose’s arrest occurred after the effective date of the Pretrial Fairness Act. She appeared before the trial court, which released her and set a date for the preliminary hearing. But Boose again failed to appear. Again, the trial court issued an arrest warrant. After Boose’s second arrest, the State petitioned for sanctions under a new provision to the Code. See
¶ 6 While serving that sanction, Boose petitioned for sentence credit, arguing the sanction she received was like a finding of criminal contempt and should qualify for
¶ 7 But the trial court hoped that a reviewing court would rule on the merits of Boose’s contentions, which it found “compelling.” The trial court noted that Boose’s counsel from the Cook County Public Defender’s Office and counsel for the State found themselves “in uncharte[d] waters” with the Pretrial Fairness Act’s amendments and “the public defender certainly has the right to appeal and, perhaps, the obligation to appeal.”
¶ 8 Boose appeals, arguing (i) exceptions to the mootness doctrine permit this court to review her contentions, (ii) the new sanctions process under the Code is facially unconstitutional, and (iii) alternatively, her sanction is eligible for sentence credit under the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act.
Analysis
¶ 10 The parties proceed as if this court has jurisdiction. Still, we have an “independent duty” to determine jurisdiction. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 36 (2009). Indeed, “the ascertainment of [our] jurisdiction is one of the *** most important tasks of an appellate court panel when beginning the review of a case.” People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 106 (2008).
¶ 11 Nor may we defer to the trial court’s assertion that Boose “certainly” had a right to appeal its ruling. We review jurisdiction de novo without deference to the trial court. People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 11. We hold that we lack jurisdiction.
¶ 12 Boose filed a notice of appeal before the deadline the trial court had set. Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal initiates appellate review. See, e.g., Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 16 (analyzing timeliness of defendant’s filing under statute and supreme court rule). But appellate jurisdiction ultimately turns on the parties’ compliance with pertinent statutes and the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Windsor, 2024 IL App (4th) 231455, ¶ 17.
¶ 13 Boose purports to appeal under section 110-6.6(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
“(i) by the State and by the defendant from an order imposing conditions of pretrial release;
(ii) by the defendant from an order revoking pretrial release or by the State from an order denying a petition to revoke pretrial release;
(iii) by the defendant from an order denying pretrial release; or
(iv) by the State from an order denying a petition to deny pretrial release.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(i)-(iv) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
Boose identifies the third paragraph as her basis: an appeal by the defendant from an
¶ 14 But Boose fails to explain how denial of her petition for credit under the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act fits within this category. Generally, we interpret statutes and the Illinois Supreme Court rules with an eye toward plain and ordinary meaning of the language used. Windsor, 2024 IL App (4th) 231455, ¶ 19. Given a plain and ordinary reading of
¶ 15 Nor can we discern a statutory basis for Boose’s appeal. Cf. People v. Young, 2018 IL 122598, ¶ 14 (holding Rules 651 and 606 provide appellate jurisdiction when defendant timely files notice of appeal from dismissal of successive postconviction petition). Rule 604(h) identifies the Pretrial Fairness Act’s amendments to sections 110-5, 110-6, and 110-6.1 of the Code (see
¶ 16 Still, we do not suggest Boose’s contentions lack a “compelling” quality, as the trial court described them. And Boose may raise them again when the time is right. See, e.g.,
Conclusion
¶ 18 Reviewing courts must assure themselves of their jurisdiction no matter how compelling the appeal’s merits. Boose’s interlocutory appeal lacks a proper basis.
¶ 19 Appeal dismissed.
People v. Boose, 2024 IL App (1st) 240031
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 23111156201; the Hon. Anthony Calabrese, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Ross K. Holberg, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (David Greenspan, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.