O.G., a Minor, etc., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
S259011
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
February 25, 2021
Second Appellate District, Division Six B295555; Ventura County Superior Court 2018017144. Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuellar, Kruger and Kline* concurred. * Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Proposition 57, passed in the November 2016 general election (Proposition 57), requires prosecutors to commence all cases involving a minor in juvenile court. “Proposition 57 is an ‘ameliorative change[] to the criminal law‘” that “the legislative body intended to extend as broadly as possible.” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal. 5th 299, 309 (Lara).) Proposition 57 expressly allowed for amendments that “are consistent with and further the intent of this act. . . .” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145 (2016 Voter Guide).) As originally enacted, Proposition 57 allowed prosecutors to move to transfer some minors as young as 14 from juvenile court to adult criminal court. Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1391), enacted in 2018, amended Proposition 57 to prohibit minors under the age of 16 from being transferred to adult criminal court. (See
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill 1391 is inconsistent with Proposition
I. BACKGROUND
” ‘Historically, a child could be tried in criminal court only after a judicial determination, before jeopardy attached, that he or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law.’ ” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at p. 305.) In 1961, the Legislature set 16 years old as the minimum age that a minor could be transferred to criminal court. (See
In 1995, California began to move away from the historical rule when the Legislature permitted some 14 and 15 year olds to be transferred to criminal court. (See, e.g.,
In the years after the passage of Proposition 21, there was “a sea change in penology regarding the relative culpability and rehabilitation possibilities for juvenilе offenders, as reflected in several judicial opinions.” (People v. Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1106.) These changes were based upon developments in scientific research on adolescent brain development confirming that children are different from adults in ways that are critical to identifying age-appropriate sentences. (See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–571; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68–75 (Graham); Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 469–470; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1353, 1375–1376; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 267.) In the same period, the California Legislature enacted numerous reforms reflecting a rethinking of punishment for minors. (See, e.g., Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1; Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4; Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Stats. 2015, ch. 234, § 1.)
Consistent with these changes, in November 2016, the public implemented a series of criminal justice reforms through the passage of Proposition 57. For juvenile defendants, Proposition 57 “largely returned California to the historical rule.” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at p. 305.) “Among other provisions,
Senate Bill 1391 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) continued California‘s return to the historical rule. Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1391 amended Proposition 57 by eliminating the transfer of juveniles accused of committing crimes when they are 14 or 15 years old, unless they are first apprehended after the еnd of juvenile court jurisdiction. (See
Two days after the passage of Senate Bill 1391, the Ventura County District Attorney‘s Office (the District Attorney‘s Office) filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that when minor O.G. was 15 years old, he committed two counts of murder (
The juvenile court found that Senatе Bill 1391 is unconstitutional because it prohibits what Proposition 57 “expressly permit[s]: adult court handling of 14 and 15 year old minors accused of murder.” O.G. filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the juvenile court‘s ruling. The Court of Appeal denied writ relief and held that Senate Bill 1391 is unconstitutional because the language of Proposition 57 permits adult prosecution for 14 and 15 year olds, but Senate Bill 1391 precludes such prosecution. ( O.G. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 626, 628–629.) The Court of Appeal disagreed with what was at the time five and is now seven other Court of Appeal panels to have addressed the issue. (See People v. Superior Court (Alexander C.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 994 (Alexander C.); K.L., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 529; People v. Superior Court (T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257980 (T.D.); People v. Superior Court (I.R.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 383, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257773; People v. Superior Court (S.L.) (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 114, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258432; B.M. v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 742, review granted Jan. 2, 2020, S259030 (B.M.); Narith S. v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1131, review granted Feb. 19, 2020, S260090.) We granted review.
II. DISCUSSION
The parties disagree over whether Senate Bill 1391 is a constitutional amendment to Proposition 57. The District Attorney‘s Office, which is the real party in interest, argues that Senate Bill 1391 is an invalid amendment. O.G.‘s position, with which the Attorney General agrees, is that Senate Bill 1391 is a valid amendment. We agree with O.G. and the Attorney General.
A. Legal Standard
“The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.” (
In making this determination, we “apply the general rule that ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality supports the Legislature‘s acts.’ ”
Guided by, but not limited to, the initiative‘s statement of purpose, we therefore are bound to afford a highly deferential standard: We must presume the Legislature acted within its authоrity if by “any reasonable construction” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256) of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391‘s amendments are “consistent with and further the intent” of the proposition. (Prop. 57, § 5.) This means that we must uphold the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391 even if the District Attorney‘s Office is able to proffer other, plausible interpretations of the purpose and intent of Proposition 57. As long as there is “any reasonable construction” of Proposition 57 such that Senate Bill 1391‘s amendments are “consistent with and further the intent” of Proposition 57, we must uphold Senate Bill 1391. In this case, Senate Bill 1391 is fully consistent with and furthers Proposition 57‘s purposes.
B. Express Purpose and Intent of Proposition 57
Proposition 57‘s statement of “Purpose and Intent” provides that: “[i]n enacting this act, it is the purpose and intent of the people of the State of California to: [¶] 1. Protect and enhance public safety. [¶] 2. Save money by reducing wasteful spending on prisons. [¶] 3. Prеvent federal courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners. [¶] 4. Stop the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles. [¶] 5. Require a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court.”
First, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the proposition‘s public safety purpose. (See 2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) Adjudicating juveniles in juvenile court where the focus is on rehabilitation, rather than in criminal court, may reasonably be considered as furthering public safety by discouraging recidivism. The voters who enacted Proposition 57 considered that “evidence shows that minors who remain under juvenile court supervision are less likely to commit new crimes.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) In passing Senate Bill 1391, the Legislature also considered that “[e]xtensive research has established that youth tried as adults are more likely to commit new crimes in the future than their peers treated in the juvenile system. . . .” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 4 (hereafter Senate Committee Analysis).) The Assembly Committee on Public Safety reiterated that “[y]outh who commit crimes fare much better in the juvenile system than in the adult system because they benefit from the rehabilitative services, and are also less likely to commit crimes in the future than youth in the adult system.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sеss.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 4 (hereafter Assembly Committee Analysis).) The practice of trying 14 and 15 year olds as adults “was started in the 90‘s, a time in California history where the state was getting ‘tough on crime,’ but not smart on crime. Back then, society believed that young people were fully developed at around age 14. Now, research has debunked that myth and cognitive science has proven that children and youth who commit crimes are very capable of change.” (Id. at p. 3.) Furthermore, as “stated by the Supreme Court, it does not follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.‘” (Id. at p. 5, quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 77.) The Senate Committee on Public Safety noted that “[m]ost youth will eventually be releasеd from prison and in the interest of protecting public safety, we need to ensure they get the treatment and tools they need to succeed when they return to society.” (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, p. 4.)
The District Attorney‘s Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 does not protect public safety because Proposition 57 adopted a flexible approach that permits 14 and 15 year olds to be tried as adults when public safety warrants, but Senate Bill 1391 ordinarily requires juvenile treatment for 14 and 15 year olds even if they have committed very serious crimes and pose a danger. The
It is also worth emphasizing that Senate Bill 1391 focused only on 14 and 15 year olds, leaving Proposition 57‘s procedures for handling 16 and 17 year olds completely intact. Nothing in Proposition 57 appears to forbid the Legislature from making a judgment that public safety can be better protected by keeping the subset оf particularly young, 14- and 15-year-old offenders in the juvenile system where they are more likely to receive appropriate education and emotional and psychological treatment, and less likely to reoffend after their release.
The District Attorney‘s Office cites cases where 14 and 15 year olds committed particularly serious crimes and argues these individuals pose such a danger to the public that releasing them at age 25 under the juvenile system would not protect the public. Again, the fact the District Attorney‘s Office does not agree with Senate Bill 1391‘s approach to public safety does not mean that there is no reasonable interpretation that, like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers protecting public safety. Moreover, in the case of the particularly heinous crimes cited by thе District Attorney‘s Office, other avenues are available to retaining jurisdiction over juvenile offenders that pose a danger to the public. In signing the law the Governor “considered the fact that young people adjudicated in juvenile court can be held beyond their original sentence” under
Third, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the goal of preventing “federal courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) Proposition 57‘s ballot materials explained that “[o]vercrowded and unconstitutional conditions led the U.S. Supreme Court to order the state to reduce its prison population. Now, without a common sense, long-term solution, we will continue to waste billions and risk a court-ordered release of dangerous prisoners. This is an unacceptable outcome that puts Califоrnians in danger — and this is why we need Prop. 57.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) The federal court order required California to “reduce the prison population to 137.5% of the adult institutions’ total design capacity.” (Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2009) 922 F.Supp.2d 882, 962; see also Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 501–503.) The federal court later refused to vacate its order because, inter alia, the state failed to produce a “‘durable remedy‘” to the problem of prison overcrowding. (Coleman v. Brown (E.D.Cal.2013) 922 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1043 (Coleman II).) The federal court warned that the state had “thus far engaged in openly contumacious conduct by repeatedly ignoring both this Court‘s Order and at least three explicit admonitions to take all steps necessary to comply with that Order.” (Id. at p. 1049.) The federal court further advised “Governor Brown has a duty to exercise in good faith his full authority, including seeking any changes to or waivers of state law that may be necessary to ensure compliаnce with the Supreme Court‘s judgment.” (Id. at p. 1054.) Proposition 57 therefore
Fourth, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the purpose of stopping “the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) The District Attorney‘s Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 is inconsistent with this purpose because Proposition 57 already stopped “the revolving door” by implementing “a more balanced approach, which specifically includes the transfer of certain 14- or 15-year-olds to adult court.” However, by its terms, Proposition 57 sought to broadly emphasize rehabilitation for all juveniles, including 14 and 15 year olds. In approving Proposition 57, voters considered “[e]vidence show[ing] that the more inmates are rehabilitated, the less likely they are to re-offend. Further evidence shows that minors who remain under juvenile court supervision are less likely to commit new crimes.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) Proposition 57 “focuses our system on evidence-based rehabilitation for juveniles and adults because it is better for public safety than our current system.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in enacting Senate Bill 1391, the Legislature considered that “[t]he juvenile system is very different from the adult system. The juvenile system prоvides age-appropriate treatment, services, counseling, and education, and a youth‘s participation in these programs is mandatory. The adult system has no age-appropriate services, participation in rehabilitation programs is voluntary, and in many prisons, programs are oversubscribed with long waiting lists.” (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.) “When youth are given age-appropriate services and education that are available in the juvenile justice system, they are less likely to recidivate.” (Assem. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 4.) “Keeping 14 and 15
Finally, under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the purpose of requiring “a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) Proposition 57 accomplished this purpose by repealing a prosecutor‘s power to directly file charges against juveniles in criminal court. Senate Bill 1391 does not attempt to reinstate direct filing. Rather, Senate Bill 1391 “repeal[ed] the power of the prosecutor to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court if the minor was alleged to have committed certain serious offenses when he or she was 14 or 15 years old.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1391, supra, as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 2, boldfaсe and italics omitted.) Proposition 57 took away prosecutorial power to bypass juvenile court jurisdiction by eliminating the direct filing authority. Senate Bill 1391 then narrowed that power further. In this way, both Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 had the same goal: to limit prosecutorial authority to prosecute juveniles as adults.
Moreover, both before and after Senate Bill 1391, a judge, and not the prosecutor, still decides whether to transfer juveniles to criminal court, whenever the prosecutor has the authority to initiate the transfer process. After Senate Bill 1391, the prosecutor continues to make a motion to transfer charged minors age 16 and over and the juvenile court continues to determine whether the minor should be transferred. (
The District Attorney‘s Office argues the Senate Bill 1391 is inconsistent with requiring “a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141) because under Senate Bill 1391 a judge can no longer decide whether 14 and 15 year olds can be transferred to criminal court. The District Attorney‘s Office argues that Senate Bill 1391 is therefore at odds with the specific statutory provisions of Proposition 57 that allow a prosecutor to make a motion to transfer 14 or 15 year olds to criminal court in specified cases. (See
in no way detracts from Proposition 57‘s stated intent that, where a transfer decision must be made, a judge rather than a prosecutor makеs the decision.” (Alexander C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) Under a reasonable construction of Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers this purpose because, like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 further narrowed prosecutorial power to try 14 and 15 year olds in criminal court and, when there is a transfer decision to be made, a judge, and not the prosecutor, still makes that decision under Senate Bill 1391.
Of course, eliminating the ability to transfer 14 and 15 year olds to adult court is a change from Proposition 57‘s statutory provisions and the prior practice, but that change is what makes Senate Bill 1391 an amendment to Proposition 57. Proposition 57 provides that its provisions concerning the treatment of juveniles “may be amended so long as such amendments are consistent with and further the intent of this act by a statute that is passed by a majority vote of the members of each house of the Legislature and signed by the Governor.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145.)
The District Attorney‘s Office nonetheless suggests this would not make the amendment clause a nullity because amendments “consistent with” Proposition 57 could still include “minor” amendments to “clarify ambiguous terms, to correct drafting errors in the original language” or adjust procedures. There is no reason to believe that Proposition 57‘s amendment clause сontemplated only the correction of typographical and drafting errors. To the contrary, in enacting an initiative, voters are presumed to be aware of existing laws. (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1048.) Because existing case law had interpreted similar amendment clauses by the time of the passage of Proposition 57, we presume that in authorizing “amendments” that “are consistent with and further the intent of this act” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145), the voters
intended that authorization to carry the broad meaning defined by case law. (See In re J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1483, 1482 [even though one “plausible reading” of an initiative was inconsistent with subsequent legislation, “an alternat[e] and equally plausible reading” of the initiative “would satisfy the proposition‘s requirement that any amendment be consistent with and further its intent“]; Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 426, 441 [“[I]f the mental health services funding requirements [of Proposition 63] prove too onerous, the electorate or thе
Finally, the District Attorney‘s Office‘s interpretation — which seeks to read the amendment clause in exceedingly narrow terms — also runs counter to the express language of Proposition 57, which provides that it “shall be broadly construed to accomplish its purposes” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 5, p. 145) and that it “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes” (id., § 9, p. 146). Both provisions call for broadly or liberally construing Proposition 57‘s provisions to serve its “purposes.” If voters want to specifically limit amendments to clarify terms or change procedures, there are amendment clauses that do that. (See, e.g., Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) text of Prop. 63, § 18, p. 108 [“The Legislature may by majority vote add provisions to clarify procedures and terms including the procedures for the collection of the tax surcharge imposed by Section 12 of this act“].) The drafters of Proposition 57 could have explicitly limited amendments to minor clarifications or to procedural changes not affecting transfer eligibility. The drafters could have also stated more overtly a purpose to ensure that judges retain the discretion to transfer some 14 and 15 year olds to criminal court. Noticeably, they did neither.
Arguing that any doubts should be resolved in favor of precluding changes to the initiative, the District Attorney‘s Office relies upon People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008 and Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473. Kelly, however, involved legislative amendments to Proposition 215 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)). As stated earlier, the “Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without the electors’ approval.” (
C. The Fundamental Purpose and Intent of Proposition 57
In considering a challenge to a legislative statute that amends an initiative, we consider not only the initiative‘s statements of purpose or intent, but also the initiative “‘as a whole.‘” (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1257 [“we are guided by, but are not limited to, the general statement of purpose found in the initiative“]; see id. at p. 1259 [construing the “major purposes” of Prop. 103].) In this case, just as the District Attorney‘s Office‘s argument fails when reviewing each of Proposition 57‘s enumerated purposes, their argument also fails when reviewing the initiative‘s purpose as a whole.2
The major and fundamental purpose of Proposition 57‘s juvenile justice provisions — as evidenced by its express language and enumerated purposes, the ballot materials, and its historical backdrop and the changes it made to existing law — was an ameliorative change to the criminal law that emphasized rehabilitation over punishment. The impact of this ameliorative change was decarceration that, in turn, would prevent “federal courts from indiscriminatеly releasing prisoners.” (2016 Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) Our court has already stated that “Proposition 57 is an ‘ameliorative change[] to the criminal law’ that we infer the legislative body
Senate Bill 1391 is likewise an ameliorative change to the criminal justice system that emphasizes rehabilitation over punishment and serves the broader purpose of decarceration. Like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 focuses on rehabilitation by increasing the number of juveniles adjudicated in juvenile court and decreasing the number of juveniles tried in criminal court. Like Proposition 57, Senate Bill 1391 continued California‘s return to the state‘s historical rule on juvenile justice and undid a policy enacted at “a time in California history where the state was getting ‘tough on crime,’ but not smart on crime.” (Assem. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 3.) Senate Bill 1391, accordingly, moves the law in the same direction as Proposition 57 — toward the historical rule placing minors under 16 within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. (Cf. Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256 [striking down an amendment when the Legislature attempted to exempt surety companies from an initiative that had imposed rate rollback and rate approval provisions on them along with other types of insurance].)
The District Attorney‘s Office argues that Proposition 57 was intended to be ameliorative, but only to a point. The District Attorney‘s Office contends that the aim of Proposition 57 was also somewhat punitive in nature to ensure that certain 14 and 15 year olds could be tried as adults, and therefore Senate Bill 1391, which is even more ameliorative, is at odds with Proposition 57. But Proposition 57 did not seek to punish juveniles. Instead, Proposition 57 was clearly aimed at providing the “‘ameliorating benefits’ of rehabilitation (rather than punishment) . . . .” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 309.)
Viewed in its historical context, the juvenile transfer provisions of Proposition 57 functioned as a repeal of Proposition 21, the 2000 initiative that had required prosecutors to charge eligible juveniles directly in criminal
Nothing in the text or history of Proposition 57 suggests that by changing the relevant procedural mechanism from direct filing to transfer hearings, voters intended to ratify the Legislature‘s decision from over 20 years before to lower the minimum transfer age from 16 to 14, or to preclude the Legislature from revisiting that choice. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that Proposition 57 sought to endorse the punitive goals of the 1994 decision to expand eligibility criteria to include certain 14 and 15 year olds. (See Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 560 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan 27, 1994, p. 2 [the intended purpose of the 1994 amendment was “to deal with juveniles committing serious violent crimes who currently hide behind the protections of Juvenile Court law“].) Indeed, the passage of Proposition 57 was a repudiation of the punitive goals behind the 1994 amendment and Proposition 21 — not an endorsement of them. The Legislature‘s decision in Senate Bill 1391 to further the ameliorative purpose of Proposition 57 by rеpealing the Legislature‘s punitive 1994 statutory framework is fully consistent with Proposition 57 itself.
D. Conclusion
In sum, O.G. merely needs to show that by some “reasonable construction” of Proposition 57 (Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1256), Senate Bill 1391 is consistent with and furthers the purposes of the proposition. It does not matter if the District Attorney‘s Office has a different view as to whether Senate Bill 1391 advances public safety or Proposition 57‘s procedural scheme. The District Attorney‘s Office seeks to turn the applicable standard on its head and argues that any doubts whether such a reasonable construction exists should be resolved in favor of precluding changes to the initiative. That is not the standard. We start with the presumption that the Legislature acted within its authority. (See Amwest, at p. 1256 [“[S]tarting with the presumption that the Legislature acted within its authority, we shall uphold the validity of [a legislative amendment] if, by any reasonablе construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the purposes of [the]
III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
KLINE, J.*
* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to