THE PEOPLE,
S277962
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
July 11, 2024
Sixth Appellate District H049413; Santa Clara County Superior Court 159386
Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.
PEOPLE v. ARELLANO
S277962
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
We hold that the limited resentencing procedure under
I. BACKGROUND
In January 1992, J. Sacramento Benitez was killed during a residential burglary and attempted robbery. The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging defendant Luis Ramon Manzano Arellano and two codefendants, Arturo Mendoza and Jesus Antonio Mandujano, with Benitez‘s murder (
In October 2020, Arellano, through counsel, filed the current petition for resentencing. The district attorney initially opposed the petition, arguing that
At a hearing held on April 26, 2021, defense counsel agreed that Arellano “should be resentenced on the target offense” and offered no objection to the district attorney‘s request that Arellano be resentenced on the originally charged attempted robbery and the firearm use enhancement attached to it. The trial court confirmed the parties’ agreement to resentence Arellano on the attempted robbery offense and the firearm enhancement and referred the matter to the probation department for a presentencing report. The court explained its understanding of the impending resentencing under then-current
The district attorney‘s resentencing brief asserted that “[b]ased on information provided by witnesses, detectives were able to identify the suspects, along with a fourth participant who was killed shortly after the crime. Defendants Jesus Mandujano and Arturo Mendoza told police that Petitioner Arellano was present during the robbery/murder. [Arellano] told police he knew other individuals were planning to commit the robbery, but that he did not participate. [Arellano] provided several conflicting statements regarding his whereabouts at the time of the murder.” In addition, the district attorney noted the defense‘s agreement as to the “underlying felony committed by [Arellano]” (i.e., attempted robbery) and “that an arming enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.5 be imposed.”
At this point in the proceedings, defense counsel objected to the inclusion of the firearm enhancement. Counsel argued that former
At the May 24, 2021, hearing on redesignation and resentencing, counsel reiterated her view the court lacked authority to impose the firearm enhancement and asserted “it isn‘t clear in the evidence . . . as to whether or not Mr. Arellano possessed a firearm.” The court disagreed, reasoning it had the authority to impose the previously dismissed enhancement and finding there was “evidence in the record” to “suggest” Arellano was armed: “[G]iven the fact that there were Penal Code Section 12022.5 subdivision (a) enhancements attached to . . . counts against Mr. Arellano in this case, given the fact that the Court is going to move forward and resentence him only on . . . what was previously Count 2 [attempted robbery], even though I think [People v. Watson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 474] would give the Court the ability to sentence him for the burglary as well, given the fact that this was a negotiated disposition in which the firearm enhancement was stricken as opposed to . . . a not true finding, and given what the Court does have available to it in the record of conviction regarding the circumstances of the underlying offenses, and it is unfortunate that the stipulation is no longer something the parties can agree upon, but I am going to move forward with resentencing on the attempted robbery charge with the arming allegation pursuant to [section] 12022.5 subdivision (a).”
The “evidence in the record that would suggest that [Arellano] did possess a handgun during the time of the underlying offenses” apparently consisted entirely of hearsay exhibits — including police reports recounting interviews of Arellano and his codefendants as well as a single page from a prison psychological evaluation quoting a correctional counselor‘s report — Arellano had submitted in support of his resentencing petition. According to the police reports, Arellano made “several conflicting statements” during his police interview about his proximity to the residence at the time of the crime but maintained that he was not present for the attempted robbery. Codefendant Mendoza, on the other hand, told the police that he, Mandujano, and Arellano each had guns during the course of the robbery. Mandujano similarly told the police that he, Mendoza, and Arellano possessed guns during the incident. The correctional counselor‘s report dated December 2002, more than 10 years after the murder, recounted what the murder victim‘s sister had said about the incident: “According to the victim‘s sister, four young males had come to her door looking for another address. About one hour later, they came back to her house and rang the doorbell. When she opened the door, Jesus Antonio Mandujano and Ramon Arellano rushed past her. Arturo Mendoza came in next and held a gun to the left side of Benitez‘s sister. Benitez, the victim, appeared from a rear bedroom, saw what was happening and attempted to get back into the bedroom. Mandujano and Arellano saw Benitez and chased him
Based on this record, the court vacated Arellano‘s second degree murder conviction as well as the accompanying life sentence and “redesignated Count 1” as attempted robbery with a firearm use enhancement. On redesignated count 1, the court sentenced Arellano to a total term of seven years: the upper term of three years for the attempted robbery and the middle term of four years for the firearm enhancement. The court found the seven-year prison term had been satisfied by time served and released Arellano on parole.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It found the trial court had erred under
We granted the Attorney General‘s petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. General Procedures for Resentencing Under Senate Bill No. 1437
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which altered the substantive law of murder for accomplices in two respects. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule so that a “participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs” can be liable for murder only if “[t]he person was the actual killer”; “[t]he person was not the actual killer, but, with
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created “a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) The Legislature subsequently amended the statute to expand the categories of those eligible for relief,3 codify certain aspects of our decision in Lewis, and clarify certain procedures at the evidentiary hearing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.) In 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2 (Strong).) Neither party claims that these statutory changes affect the issue raised in this appeal, so we generally refer to the current statute in this opinion.
Under
Within 60 days after the order to show cause has issued, the court is to conduct a hearing to determine whether “the prosecution [can] prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (
B. Review of the Text, Structure, and Purpose of Section 1172.6 Demonstrates That Courts May Not Impose Uncharged and Unproven Allegations or Enhancements as Part of Resentencing
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in adding a firearm enhancement to the redesignated attempted robbery conviction. This conclusion rests on a careful review of
The text of
Nothing in the statutory text suggests there should be a different outcome under
This reading is supported by the fact that
The structure of the sentencing reform effected by
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides that a person who was convicted of murder under a theory that is now invalid may file a petition to be resentenced. Subdivisions (b) and (c) detail the procedures governing the content of the petition, its filing, and service; the prosecutor‘s response; the petitioner‘s response; and the order to show cause. Once the order to show cause has issued, subdivision (d) directs the court to hold a hearing (unless the parties have stipulated to relief), at which the burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder as now defined. Subdivision (d)(3) specifies that either party may offer new or additional evidence to demonstrate the petitioner is or is not guilty of murder as now defined; that the admissibility of evidence at the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, “except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed”; that the court may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion; and that hearsay evidence that was admitted at the preliminary hearing undersection 872, subdivision (b) shall be excluded, unless the evidence is admissible under another exception to the hearsay rule.Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) also provides that “substantial evidence” to support a conviction of murder “is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.”
Had the Legislature intended to allow courts to make findings of uncharged and unproven allegations and enhancements and to include them in the resentencing, one would expect
Limiting resentencing to the “remaining counts” or “remaining charges” (
To support his contention that
C. Court of Appeal Decisions Addressing the Redesignation of the Target Offense or Underlying Felony Do Not Support the Imposition of Uncharged and Unproven Sentence Enhancements or Allegations
The Attorney General, like the Howard court, argues that because subdivisions (d)(3) and (e) of
In Howard, the parties agreed that the underlying felony was burglary, but disagreed on the degree of the offense. (Howard, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 730.) The prosecution urged the trial court to redesignate the underlying felony as first degree residential burglary (
the other hand, argued the court was required to redesignate the conviction as the lesser offense of second degree burglary (id., subd. (b)). (Howard, at p. 736.) The trial court redesignated the murder conviction as first degree burglary, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at p. 730.)
The Howard court reasoned that “the absence of a first degree burglary instruction and verdict did not preclude the court from redesignating Howard‘s conviction as first degree burglary, because the evidence at trial demonstrated beyond any dispute the building was a residence.” (Howard, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 738.) Had the Legislature intended courts to impose the lesser degree of an underlying felony, the court noted, “ ‘it easily could have done so.’ ” (Ibid.) The court also read subdivisions (d)(3) and (e) of former section 1170.95 — which, as relevant here, are substantially similar to subdivisions (d)(3) and (e) of section 1172.6 — to support its conclusion “that the Legislature intended to grant the trial court flexibility when identifying the underlying felony for resentencing under subdivision (e).” (Howard, at p. 739.) Finally, the court deemed the redesignation “consistent” with the
Two Courts of Appeal have subsequently relied on Howard to permit resentencing courts to redesignate the underlying felony as multiple offenses. (People v. Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505, 515, 531 (Silva) [affirming the redesignation of two counts of first degree murder as four home invasion robberies in concert (
We need not decide here whether a court has discretion under
Under
Neither sentence enhancements nor allegations, on the other hand, form any part of the essential predicate for relief under
underlying felony, would therefore more closely resemble a new prosecution, not a resentencing proceeding. (Cf. Estrada v. Superior Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 915, 925.) We disagree with the Attorney General that
Arellano further warns that reopening the charging decisions for sentencing enhancements and allegations would work much mischief because of the sheer number of such provisions in the Penal Code. According to the Office of the State Public Defender, appearing as amicus curiae, California law includes over 100 unique sentencing enhancements. The Attorney General responds that the universe of possible sentencing enhancements and allegations is more limited. In his view, expressed for the first time at oral argument, resentencing under
We deem it unlikely the Legislature intended to allow the prosecution to effectively revisit its charging decisions for the entire range of offense-specific sentencing allegations and enhancements every time a petitioner succeeds in setting aside a murder conviction under
The Attorney General focuses specifically on the legislative finding that “a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(d)) to argue that courts should be allowed to impose any uncharged and unproven offense-specific sentencing allegations and enhancements so long as they are supported by the record. But the Legislature sought to “fairly address[] the culpability of the individual” in a particular way: by “amend[ing] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(e), (f).) It expected the new legislation “to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing” and “assist[] in the reduction of prison overcrowding.” (Id., § 1(e).) We do not believe the legislative goal of proportional punishment would be so unbounded as to direct courts to evaluate culpability anew by adding enhancements and allegations to the underlying felony or target offense that were not previously charged and then proven at trial.
The Attorney General also contends that the imposition of the enhancement here falls within “ ‘the traditional latitude for sentencing hearings’ ” (Howard, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 741-742), but we are not persuaded that such discretion has ever extended to the imposition of uncharged and unproven sentencing allegations and enhancements. The Attorney General has not pointed to any instance, and we can think of none, where courts have been allowed to impose uncharged and unproven sentencing allegations and enhancements that are neither authorized by the text of a resentencing statute nor a predicate to resentencing relief. Selecting among
III. CONCLUSION
Courts may not impose uncharged and unproven sentence allegations or enhancements when resentencing a successful petitioner under
The Court of Appeal also reversed the redesignated conviction for attempted robbery “and remand[ed] the matter for further proceedings to redesignate Arellano‘s vacated murder conviction as a conviction of the underlying felony and resentence him,” leaving “it to the trial court and parties on remand to determine whether the underlying felony for resentencing purposes should comprise either or both attempted robbery and first degree burglary.” (Arellano, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 437.) Neither party, however, asked the Court of Appeal to remand for the trial court to reconsider the redesignated conviction, and neither party in this court has asked for a remand in the event we affirm the striking of the firearm enhancement. Moreover, a remand would be an idle act, given that the trial court at the resentencing proceeding stated its belief that it could redesignate the underlying felony as the burglary (or both the burglary and the attempted robbery) — yet chose not to do so. (See id. at p. 427, citing Watson, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 474.) We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent it ordered a remand to the trial court for redesignation of the underlying felony or felonies.
EVANS, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Arellano
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 86 Cal.App.5th 418
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S277962
Date Filed: July 11, 2024
Court: Superior
County: Santa Clara
Judge: Daniel T. Nishigaya
Counsel:
Peter F. Goldscheider, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Galit Lipa, State Public Defender, Adriana Gonzalez, Associate Deputy State Public Defender, AJ Kutchins and Jennifer Hansen, Deputy State Public Defenders, for the Office of the State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
William J. Arzbaecher for the California Public Defender‘s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A Swenson, Alan L. Amann, Arlene A. Sevidal, James H. Flaherty III and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Peter F. Goldscheider
Attorney at Law
600 Allerton Street, Suite 201
Redwood City, CA 94063
(650) 323-8296
Christine Y. Friedman
Deputy Attorney General
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 738-9050