People v. Ambriz-TinajeroPeople v. Ambriz-Tinajero
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Defendant Julio Ambriz-Tinajero appeals a judgment following a jury trial in which he was convicted of multiple sex crimes against his stepdaughter, K.B.M., who was 14 years old at the time. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years 4 months in state prison. Ambriz-Tinajero contends that reversal is warranted because he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to: (1) object to improper expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS); and (2) raise certain mitigating factors at sentencing. Ambriz-Tinajero further contends, and the People concede, that he is entitled to an additional day of presentence conduct credit. We agree that AmbrizTinajero is entitled to an additional day of credit but otherwise affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
An information charged Ambriz-Tinajero with the following crimes
Shortly after trial began, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss counts III, V, XI, and XIII based on insufficient evidence. The jury found Ambriz-Tinajero guilty of all remaining counts. Following the verdict, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss count XII (battery against K.A.M.) due to the statute of limitations. As a result, only the convictions based on Ambriz-Tinajero’s sexual assaults against K.B.M. remained.
The trial court thereafter sentenced Ambriz-Tinajero to an aggregate term of 15 years 4 months in state prison and awarded him 115 days of presentence custody credits. Ambriz-Tinajero timely appealed.
B. Trial Testimony
1. K.A.M.
When K.A.M. was between 14 and 16 years old, Ambriz-Tinajero approached her in the hallway, grabbed her vagina over her pants, and said, “ ‘You are mine.’ ” K.A.M. was upset and told her mother, T.A., that AmbrizTinajero made her feel uncomfortable. She did not disclose what he did specifically because she was afraid of him. T.A. pulled both K.A.M. and Ambriz-Tinajero into a room and asked him what he did to make K.A.M. uncomfortable. He responded that he was “showing her normal family affection” and stated, “ ‘Fine, then I won’t be her dad.’ ” After this incident, Ambriz-Tinajero did not touch K.A.M. like that again. But when K.A.M. was 17 years old, Ambriz-Tinajero came up to her when she was sleeping on the couch and “whispered something really weird in [her] ear.” She could not make out what he said but it made her uncomfortable.
Finally, K.A.M. testified that Ambriz-Tinajero started disciplining her when she was 10 years old. When she was 18 years old, she recalled that Ambriz-Tinajero pinned her against the wall and choked her for a few seconds, after she came home from her then-boyfriend’s house. He stopped disciplining K.A.M. shortly thereafter.
2. K.B.M.
K.B.M. testified that when she was 17 years old, she lost her virginity and told her mother about it. Shortly after this, Ambriz-Tinajero “penetrated [her] with his penis” for the first time. This occurred “a couple of times” when she was 17 years old. When she was 19 years old, K.B.M. recalled being asleep in her bedroom when Ambriz-Tinajero came in and moved the blankets off her. K.B.M. repeated “ ‘No. Stop it,’ ” and pushed his hands off. Ambriz-Tinajero became angry and yelled at her, which scared K.B.M. He then “proceeded to rape [her].” Another time when K.B.M. was 19 years old, she made it known that she was menstruating so that AmbrizTinajero would stay away from her. They were in his bedroom with the door closed, and he responded that “he could just put it in [her] butt.” Ambriz-
3. Pretext Call
In 2023, K.B.M. began experiencing abdominal pain and believed she was suffering from endometriosis. She realized that her symptoms could have been caused by what Ambriz-Tinajero did to her. Her boyfriend sensed something was wrong and asked K.B.M. if she was okay, and she eventually told him about the sexual abuse. In July, K.B.M. reported the abuse to the police.
In September 2023, the police and K.B.M. conducted a pretext call with Ambriz-Tinajero. At the start of the call, K.B.M. told Ambriz-Tinajero that she was “not doing well” and needed to talk to him in order to get “some closure and move on.” She continued that her anxiety was “so bad” and Ambriz-Tinajero replied, “I’m sorry.” K.B.M. asked if he remembered when he first touched her. Ambriz-Tinajero responded, “No I don’t know what you’re . . . I don’t remember.” She then asked, “why did you choose to do that to me?” and Ambriz-Tinajero replied, “I’m sorry, I just don’t know, I don’t know how to help you.” After K.B.M. pressed that they needed to talk about it, Ambriz-Tinajero repeated that he could not help her and that she needed to work things out on her own.
K.B.M. emphasized that she was in “a lot of pain all the time” due to the “abuse [her] body has taken” and Ambriz-Tinajero again replied that “not being able to have babies” had to do with genetics and referenced her mother’s health. K.B.M. interrupted, “because at my young age, you had raped me, Dad, you had hurt me.” After a long silence, Ambriz-Tinajero asked, “Are you sure you want to talk to me about this?” K.B.M. responded, “yes,” but Ambriz-Tinajero repeated that he did not know how to help her and that she had “to work that out on [her] own.” K.B.M. countered, “But, I’m a victim of you sexually assaulting me.” Ambriz-Tinajero again responded that she needed to work things out on her own and that he did not know what closure she wanted from him. K.B.M. asked him why he sexually assaulted her, and he replied, “I don’t know what you’re talking about . . . . I truly think you need to work that out on your own.” K.B.M. ended the call at this point and stated to the police, “What the fuck is wrong with him? I think he knows. Why else would he be pretending. I couldn’t do it anymore. Sorry.”
4. G.A.
5. Expert Testimony
The prosecution called Angie Wynacht, an expert in child sexual assault. She did not know anything about the case and testified about child sexual assault victims in general. Wynacht testified about the many reasons why a child victim may not report abuse for some time, including shame, a fear of retaliation or of not being believed, and grooming. Grooming occurs when “the perpetrator has trained, coerced, [and] manipulated a child . . . in a way that allows that perpetrator access to the child.” It can take the form of purchasing gifts for the child or making threats so the child would be afraid to speak up. “Caregivers are able to groom a child . . . better and faster than noncaregivers” due to their greater access. In terms of how victims are chosen, Wynacht explained that a “perpetrator tend[s] to choose the victim that may be more quiet, shy, [and] have lower self-esteem.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Forfeiture
First, Ambriz-Tinajero contends that the admission of testimony by Wynacht about the rarity of false allegations of abuse by children was improper. Ambriz-Tinajero acknowledges that his trial counsel did not object to this testimony but asks that we reach the merits of this issue in our discretion. We, however, deem the issue forfeited. People v. Simon, 1 Cal.5th 98, 139 (2016) [party’s failure to object to testimony below forfeits the issue on appeal].)
Second, Ambriz-Tinajero contends that the trial court failed to consider two additional factors in mitigation at sentencing. He again acknowledges that his trial counsel did not raise these factors below but asks that we nevertheless reach the merits. We deem this issue forfeited as well. People v. de Soto, 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 (1997) [counsel’s failure to object at the time of sentencing waives any claims of sentencing error].)
Nonetheless, we address the merits of both ineffective assistance of counsel claims since Ambriz-Tinajero raises them again in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and reject them.2
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Standard
The standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is well-established. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning that it “fell below [the] objective standard of reasonableness.” (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–688 (1984).) “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Id. at p. 687.)
In evaluating a claim of deficient performance by counsel, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 689, 694.) “ ‘On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Guevara, 115 Cal.App.5th 919, 927 (2025).)
To prove prejudice, the “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding,” as “[v]irtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test.” (Id. at p. 693.) Rather, the defendant must show that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Id. at p. 687.)
2. Expert Testimony
i. Law on CSAAS
“Expert testimony on CSAAS has long been held admissible in California for the limited purposes of dispelling commonly held myths or misconceptions about child sexual abuse and aiding the jury in ‘evaluating the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.’ ” (People v. Sedano, 88 Cal.App.5th 474, 479 (2023), italics added.) It is also admissible “to rehabilitate [the complainant’s] credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation.” (People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300 (1991).)
CSAAS testimony, however, may not be used to “affirmatively vouch[ ] for the truthfulness of a complainant’s allegations against the defendant.” (Sedano, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 479–480.) It is therefore “an abuse of discretion to permit a CSAAS expert to testify—either qualitatively, or with specific statistics or percentages—to the infrequency with which children make false allegations of sexual abuse.” (Id. at p. 480.) “[T]he jury must be left to evaluate a complaining witness’s testimony, together with all the other evidence, ‘without statistical evidence placing a thumb on the scale for guilt.’ ” (Ibid.)
ii. Prejudice
First, ample evidence corroborated K.B.M.’s testimony about AmbrizTinajero’s sexual assaults. (People v. Lapenias, 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 180 (2021) [holding that erroneously admitted expert testimony was not prejudicial in part because there was “corroborative evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt”].)
For example, in the pretext call, K.B.M. made several statements to Ambriz-Tinajero regarding his sexual assaults of her that he could have but did not deny. During their call, K.B.M. told Ambriz-Tinajero, “you had raped me, Dad,” and Ambriz-Tinajero responded by asking her if she was sure she wanted to talk to him about this. Notably, he did not deny the statement. K.B.M. also asked Ambriz-Tinajero, “Do you remember when you first touched me?” Ambriz-Tinajero responded, “No[,] I don’t know what you’re . . . I don’t remember.” Later on, K.B.M. asked him, “Why did you sexually assault me?” Ambriz-Tinajero replied, “I don’t know what you’re talking about [K.B.M.]. I truly think you need to work that out on your own.” As the People note, “[a]ny person, especially any father,” would have denied these statements if they thought them to be false. Thus, the jury likely viewed Ambriz-Tinajero’s failures to deny as adoptive admissions because he: (1) “heard and understood the statement”; (2) “would, under all the circumstances, naturally have denied the statement if he thought it was not true”; and (3) “could have denied it but did not.” (CALCRIM No. 357.)
Likewise, K.A.M.’s testimony that Ambriz-Tinajero grabbed her vagina over her pants when she was between 14 and 16 years old and told her “ ‘You are mine’ ” bolstered K.B.M.’s testimony. Ambriz-Tinajero counters that Wynacht’s improper testimony also “infected” K.A.M.’s testimony because she was “a supposed second victim of [Ambriz-Tinajero’s] misconduct.” But T.A., the mother of the twins, corroborated K.A.M.’s testimony. T.A. testified that K.A.M. felt uncomfortable after the incident. And when T.A. confronted Ambriz-Tinajero about it, he said “that he was showing her normal family affection.” K.A.M.’s testimony about her sexual assault also provided independent evidence that Ambriz-Tinajero “was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses,” because the jury only had to find that it was “more likely than not” that the assault occurred. (CALCRIM No. 1191A.)
Second, Wynacht’s purportedly improper testimony was brief. When the prosecutor asked her whether child sexual abuse victims commonly make false allegations, Wynacht responded, “no, it’s extremely rare for a child to make a false allegation to the point that it’s being investigated. And in my own work experience, I have not had a child disclose to me and then later found out that they were lying.” The prosecutor then asked her whether the same is true of adults who experienced sexual abuse as children. Wynacht responded, “Yes absolutely. . . . [I]t was all truthful with my adult victims.”
The brevity of Wynacht’s purportedly improper testimony distinguishes this case from People v. Julian, 34 Cal.App.5th 878, 888–889 (2019), a case Ambriz-Tinajero relies on. In that case, the CSAAS expert testified at great
As a result, People v. Melgoza, 115 Cal.App.5th 632 (2025) is far more instructive. In that case, the CSAAS expert briefly testified that “ ‘[f]alse allegations of sexual abuse are uncommon, rare, but they do occur.’ ” (Id. at p. 656.) In finding no prejudice, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the “expert’s testimony about the rarity of false allegations was brief.” (Id. at p. 657; see also Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 180 [finding no prejudice in part because the expert’s “testimony about false allegations of child sexual abuse was brief”].) In doing so, the court contrasted the expert’s testimony with the expert testimony in Julian, noting that the “limited nature of the testimony distinguishes this case from those finding reversible error.” (Melgoza, at p. 657.) The same is true here.
Third, the prosecutor only made two brief references to Wynacht’s purportedly improper testimony in her closing argument. (See Melgoza, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 657 [“The lawyers did not focus on [the expert’s] testimony during closing argument”]; see also Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 180 [“the mentions of [improper CSAAS] testimony . . . during closing arguments” were brief].) The prosecutor first told the jury
Indeed, these brief references to the rarity of false child sexual abuse claims are readily distinguishable from the closing argument in Snowden v. Singletary (11th Cir. 1998) 135 F.3d 732, which Ambriz-Tinajero relies on. In that case, an expert testified that “99.5% of children tell the truth.” (Id. at p. 737.) And the prosecutor, in his closing, “stressed the significance of the expert’s opinion about the credibility of child victims of supposed sexual abuse.” (Id. at p. 738, italics added; see also Julian, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 889 [“the prosecutor asked the jury to rely on [the expert’s] statistical evidence that ‘children rarely falsify allegations of sexual abuse’ ”].) For example, the prosecutor told the jury that “ ‘if you don’t remember anything else about [the expert’s] testimony, just remember . . . that it is his experience that 99.5 percent of the children who report an incident of sexual abuse are telling the truth.” (Snowden, at p. 738.) By contrast, the prosecutor in this case only briefly mentioned Wynacht’s testimony twice in her closing argument and did not place undue emphasis on it.
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury, “You must consider the [expert] opinion, but you are not required to accept it as true or correct. The meaning and importance of any opinion are for you to decide. . . . You may disregard any opinion that you find . . . unsupported by the evidence.” (CALCRIM No. 332.) In Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at page 180, the Court of Appeal found no prejudice from improperly admitted CSAAS
Accordingly, we find that Ambriz-Tinajero has failed to show any prejudice from the admission of Wynacht’s purportedly improper testimony.
3. Sentencing
Ambriz-Tinajero next contends that he received deficient representation that was prejudicial because his trial counsel failed to raise the following mitigating factors at sentencing: his volunteer work as a coach and his continuous employment. We find no deficient performance or prejudice.
i. Relevant Procedural History
When the trial court asked defense counsel if he had any evidence to present, he replied, “Submitted, Your Honor.” The court then asked the parties if they had any argument, and both counsel stated that they did not.
The trial court found the following three circumstances in aggravation: (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable; (2) the manner in which the crimes were carried out indicate planning; and (3) Ambriz-Tinajero took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offenses. It found Ambriz-Tinajero’s lack of a prior criminal record as the only circumstance in
At the conclusion of sentencing, the trial court commented that AmbrizTinajero had “received the maximum sentence authorized under the law” and stated to him, “Sir, I know you’re proclaiming your innocence, but I was present during the trial and heard the phone call. You—by your silence, you made an admission that you did . . . this to these girls. And the least you could have done in this case is acknowledge that and given them some closure.”
ii. Deficient Representation
In addition to the enumerated mitigating factors, the trial court may consider “additional criteria reasonably related to the decision being made.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.408(a).) Ambriz-Tinajero argues that his trial counsel provided deficient representation because counsel failed to highlight Ambriz-Tinajero’s volunteer work as a coach and his continuous employment as mitigating factors at sentencing. We are unpersuaded.
Here, Ambriz-Tinajero’s counsel stipulated to the admission of the probation report, which included Ambriz-Tinajero’s statement that he was a volunteer coach and was continuously employed. The trial court “read and considered” that report. Moreover, T.A., G.A., K.A.M., and K.B.M. all testified that Ambriz-Tinajero coached G.A., K.A.M., and K.B.M. Thus, the court was well aware of Ambriz-Tinajero’s volunteer work and continuous employment. Based on this, we cannot conclude that his counsel’s failure to raise it again at sentencing constitutes deficient performance.
iii. Prejudice
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that the trial counsel’s failure to offer additional mitigating evidence at sentencing was not prejudicial because “[g]iven the overwhelming aggravating factors, there [was] no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 700.)
We reach the same conclusion here. The trial court found three aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance even though it read and considered Ambriz-Tinajero’s written statement highlighting his volunteer work and employment. Thus, we cannot conclude that those factors would have made any difference here.
In any event, there was ample reason for the trial court to discount Ambriz-Tinajero’s volunteer work and employment as mitigating factors. First, Ambriz-Tinajero arguably took advantage of his role as K.B.M.’s volunteer wrestling coach when he committed the sexual assaults. Indeed, K.B.M. testified that she had to “disassociate [herself] from what would happen at home” while she was at practice.
Second, Ambriz-Tinajero’s employment arguably made it easier for him to commit the sexual assaults. From 2014 to 2018, Ambriz-Tinajero worked as an apartment manager for the apartment that he and his family lived in and would be at home “[o]ff and on during the day.” Thus, his job gave him unfettered access to K.B.M. while her mother was away at work.
Finally, the trial court’s comments about the pretext call confirm that consideration of Ambriz-Tinajero’s volunteer work and employment would not have affected his sentence. Citing People v. Key, 153 Cal.App.3d 888 (1984), Ambriz-Tinajero counters that we should disregard these comments because the court improperly faulted him for his lack of remorse since he never acknowledged guilt. (Id. at p. 900 [lack of remorse can only be an aggravating factor when the defendant acknowledges guilt].) But the court did not expressly find lack of remorse to be an aggravating factor here. Although the court did comment that Ambriz-Tinajero could have acknowledged what he did and “given [K.B.M. and K.A.M.] some closure,” the court made that comment after highlighting the adoptive admissions that Ambriz-Tinajero made during the pretext call. Thus, when its comments are viewed in context, the court was focused on the strong evidence of guilt, rather than any lack of remorse.
Accordingly, we find no prejudice at sentencing as well.
C. Custody Credits
Lastly, Ambriz-Tinajero contends and the People concede that he is entitled to one additional day of presentence conduct credit. We agree. “A defendant is entitled to actual custody credit for ‘all days of custody’ in county jail and residential treatment facilities, including partial days.” (People v. Rajanayagam, 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48 (2012).) He is also entitled to conduct credits at a rate of 50 percent of actual time served. (People v. Nunez, 167 Cal.App.4th 761, 764 (2008).) “But, if the defendant’s offense is statutorily defined as ‘violent,’ section 2933.1, subdivision (c) limits the presentence conduct credit to 15 percent of actual time served before sentencing.” (Ibid.)
Here, Ambriz-Tinajero was convicted of rape, a violent felony under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(3). He is therefore entitled to a 15 percent presentence conduct credit. The trial court correctly awarded AmbrizTinajero 101 days of actual custody credit (§ 2900.5) but only awarded him 14 days, rather than 15 days, of presentence conduct credit (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c)). Accordingly, the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect one additional day of conduct credit.
III. DISPOSITION
We remand this matter for the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting 116 days of presentence credit. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
CHOU, J.
WE CONCUR.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.