People v. AdornoPeople v. Adorno
ORDER
¶ 1 HELD: Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction for the lesser offense of reckless conduct when he knowingly fired a weapon in the direction of his victim; defendant‘s due process right to a fair trial was not violated by the trial court‘s comments to the jury during voir dire; the trial court properly denied defendant‘s motion in limine after applying the factors established in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971).
¶ 2 This appeal arises from defendant Miguel Adorno‘s convictions for attempted first degree
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The evidence presented at trial established that defendant fired a weapon during a disturbance at a party which occurred in the early morning hours of January 23, 2010. As a result of the shooting, Shannon Fanning was shot in the arm.
¶ 5 Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to bar evidence of defendant‘s prior conviction for conspiracy to commit murder on the basis that it would be more prejudicial than probative. The trial court denied the motion, stating:
“Relying on the standard in People vs. Montgomery,
certainly it‘s within that purview. The next step is to find out if it‘s material and relevant. I do find that out. The next step is the
balancing step to see if it‘s more probative than prejudicial. I determined that it would be more probative than prejudicial, so your motion in limine is denied.”
¶ 6 During voir dire, while questioning the prospective jurors on the Zehr principles, the trial court stated the following:
“Then the other thing is, the State has the burden of proof, and that burden of proof is proof bеyond a reasonable doubt, and that lasts throughout each and every stage of the trial.
Does anybody have any qualms about the State has the burden of proof or the proof being proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Raise your hand either in the inner or outer part of the courtroom.
Nobody has raised their hand.
Illinois does not define reasonable doubt, but any of you who may have sat on a civil jury there‘s a preponderance of the evidence, reasonable doubt is the highest burden of proof in our country and in our State. Those of you who may have sat on civil cases, preponderance of the evidence, if you look at this like a scale, all you have to do is tilt it. So the definition of preponderance of the evidence is, it‘s more likely than not that the event occurred.
Again, Illinois doesn‘t define reasonable doubt. That‘s up for you to decide in words, but in analogy to the scale thing, you would have to tip it like this, so that would be some insight into what proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be.”
¶ 7 There was no objection made by defense counsel to the trial court‘s comments regarding reasonable doubt during voir dire.
¶ 8 At trial, Jasmine Nagamine testified that she was a 24-year old nurse who lived in the basement apartment at 2026 North Karlov in Chicago on January 22, 2010, with her then roommate, Melissa West (Missy). Missy has since joined the Army. Jasmine hosted a small party at her apartment with her brother, Jeffrey, and his friends: Shannon Fanning, the victim, Sharall, John, Billy, Ashlee and Alex. Defendant, whom she knew through a friend, arrived with two males and three fеmales that she did not know. She knew defendant both as Miguel and as K-Oz. Everyone in the apartment was drinking except Jasmine and one of the girls who had come with defendant because she was “passed out.”
¶ 9 Jasmine saw her roommate Missy engage in an argument with defendant, and Missy told her to get defendant and his group to leave. Jasmine told them to leave and looked for Missy‘s laptop computer in the living room, but could not find it there. Jasmine heard a horn beeping outside. She subsequently went outside and retrieved Missy‘s laptop from the backseat of a car parked outside and went back into the apartment.
¶ 10 Jasmine further testified that her brother stood in the doorway telling defendant and his group that they had to leave. Everyone inside exited the apаrtment and arguments ensued
¶ 11 Jeffrey Nagamine testified that on the night of the shooting, he and some of his friends went to his sister Jasmine‘s apartment at approximately 10:15 p.m. for a small gathering. When they arrived, only Jasmine and her roommate Missy were present. Sometime later, defendant, whom Jeffery knew by his nickname K-Oz, arrived with two other men and three women. They appeared to have been drinking and one of the women was throwing up. Everyone at the party was drinking.
¶ 12 According to Jeffrey, approximately an hour and a half after defendant‘s arrival, he saw defendant walk into the bathroom, which was connected to Missy‘s bedroom, and stay there for an extended period of time. Jeffrey saw Missy knock on the bathroom door, but defendant did not answer. Missy then went into her bedroom and Jeffrey heard her yelling. Missy and defendant came out of her bedroom arguing and wеnt out of the front door. They then argued in front of the apartment. Subsequently, Jeffrey saw Jasmine and Missy walk over to a silver Chevrolet Impala which was double parked near the apartment with its engine running and
¶ 13 As all of the people from the party began walking back to the apartment, defendant ran over to the Chevrolet Impala and started banging on the trunk saying, “Open the trunk, I have to get my banger.” Jeffrey testified that he took that to mean that defendant had a gun, and he began pushing people back into the apartment. He heard defendant demand that his friend who was standing next to the car “pop the trunk.” The friend reached into the car and did so; defendant then reached into the trunk. Jeffrey then heard six to eight gunshots. Once back inside the apartment, Jeffrey saw that Shannоn was bleeding from his inside right forearm. The paramedics were called, and Jeffrey later identified defendant from a lineup.
¶ 14 Shannon Fanning testified that he was friends with Jeffrey and Jasmine and also knew Missy. On January 22, 2010, he went to Jasmine and Missy‘s apartment with some other friends for a gathering and defendant, whom he did not know, arrived approximately 40 minutes later with a group of people. Shannon noticed people “pacing” - going in and out of rooms, “looking
¶ 15 Shannon was standing behind Jeffrey and defendant during their fight, and saw оne of the men who had come with defendant approach the fight. Shannon grabbed the person by the jacket and pulled him back. Shannon did not punch, kick or injure the person. The fight between defendant and Jeffrey ended with defendant on the ground; Jeffrey did not hit defendant once he was on the ground. People from the party were standing around, separating the two, until defendant said he was going to get a gun. At that point, everyone started walking back to the apartment. Meanwhile, defendant walked to the rear of a Chevrolet Impala that was parked in the middle of the street with its engine running. Defendant was banging on the trunk, asking for someone to open the trunk. Shannon and the others were going back inside the apartment when he heard gunshots. He was the lаst one in, and turned around to see defendant moving forward as he fired the last few shots. Shannon felt a hit in his arm before getting the license plate to the car and going inside. Paramedics were called and he was subsequently taken to the hospital where he was treated for a broken arm. Shannon identified defendant from a photo array while he was being treated in the hospital.
¶ 16 Ernest Alexander, who testified pursuant to subpoena, stated that he had known defendant for a few months prior to the shooting. Earlier that evening, Ernest was at Serbio Urbino‘s house drinking with defendant and three girls he just met that evening: Ashley, Monika and one whose name he did not know. Defendant showed him a gun and said something like “I don‘t go out
¶ 17 Ernest testified that he saw defendant go to the trunk of the car they arrived in and heard defendant say, “Give me my banger, give me my banger,” meaning “give me my gun.” Ernest did not remember if the trunk was open and was walking to retrieve his vest when he heard gunshots. Ernest saw defendant shooting the gun towards the group of people and heard five to six shots. Ernest eventually got back in the car, followed by defendant, and the group went to defendant‘s house. Ernest then called a friend to pick him up and later voluntarily turned himself in to police.
¶ 19 Chicago police department evidence techniсian Sheila Caldwell testified that she took photos of the scene on Karlov, defendant‘s bedroom, and the Chevrolet Impala. She recovered four shell casings from the ground in front of 2026 North Karlov and recovered a gun from defendant‘s bedroom.
¶ 20 The parties stipulated that the gun recovered from defendant‘s bedroom, People‘s Exhibit No. 6, was a FIE-Titen Model .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol and that the four fired cartridges recovered at the scene were fired from that gun.
¶ 21 Defendant testified in his own defense, admitting that he was a convicted felon, having pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder in 2008. In January 2010, he lived at 5626 West Grand with his family, and on the night of the shooting, he went to Serbio‘s house with Ernest, Ashley, Monika and Marlene. Everyone there was drinking. Defendаnt stated that they all left together to attend a party on Cicero and Addison. Because that was a known “bad area,” defendant took his gun for protection, which Ernest put in the trunk. According to defendant, Jasmine texted him while they were out, so they went to her house instead.
¶ 22 After being at Jasmine‘s house for an hour and a half, defendant went to the bathroom. He heard Jasmine and Missy running through the room connected to the bathroom laughing, and
¶ 23 Jasmine then said that everyone had to leave. Defendant tried to apologize to Jasmine, but her brother Jeffrey started saying, “b**** a** n****** stealing.” Defendant stated that this is when the fight began and Jeffrey hit him first. Defendant acknowledged that Jeffrey had the upper hand during the fight, so he ran away. However, Jeffrey caught up to him and hit him again. The crowd started running towards them, which scared defendant so he kneeled down and put his hands over his head. While he was on the ground, defendant could see a lot of feet around him and testified that “people” continued to hit him while he was on the ground. Hе managed to push someone out of his way and run to the car. Defendant‘s initial plan was to get inside, but he was being chased by people who were saying, “grab him, we‘re going to kill him.” Defendant, fearing for his life, started yelling, “pop the trunk, I got a gun in the trunk,” thinking that the people chasing him would be scared and stop. When he reached the trunk however, people who were chasing him were right on his heels. Defendant testified he reached into the trunk, grabbed the gun and fired it from under his arm without turning around first. He fired the weapon several more times into the air. After that he went home, put the gun in his bedroom and went to sleep. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested.
¶ 25 Defendant also entered the stipulated testimony of Melissa West into evidence, which was as follows: Melissa was at her apartment with her roommate Jasmine on January 22, 2010, and some other friends. During the gathering, three males and three females whom she did not know came into her apartment. Defendant was one of those males. After a period of time, defendant went into the bathroom and remained a long time; when Melissa went to check on him, she found him in her bedroom going through her things. Melissa told Jasmine to have defendant leave. Melissa then noticed that her Ipod was missing from her bedroom and her laptop computer was missing from the living room. Melissa went outside and recovered her laptop computer from the car that defendant arrived in. She demanded that her Ipod be returned. Defendant then punched Jeffrey and a fight ensued. Jeffrey was getting the best of defendant and she stepped in and protected defendant. Defendant said, “I‘ll kill you, Jeff.” Defendant then banged on the trunk of the car he came in and said, “I got a banger,” the trunk opened and
¶ 26 The State entered evidence in rebuttal: a certified copy of defendant‘s May 20, 2008, conviction for conspiracy to commit murder; the testimony of Chicago police detective Brian Tedeschi who interviewed defendant on January 23, 2010, at 2:20 a.m., during which defendant stated that he knew nothing about what happened at 2026 North Karlov because he was home with his mother all day; and the testimony of Monika Herrera, one of the women who went with defendant to the party at Jasmine‘s apartment. Monika‘s testimony was substantially similar to that of the other State‘s witnesses, except shе stated that when defendant came to the car to get his gun from the trunk, Marlene, the driver, would not open the trunk. Defendant then pounded on the window, went in through the back, fought his way to the front, and opened the trunk. Defendant then got out of the car, walked around to the back of it, while the other group was walking back to the apartment. Monika then heard five to six gunshots.
¶ 27 The jury found defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder and that he was armed with a firearm. The trial court then sentenced him to 15 years for attempted first degree murder while armed with a firearm and a consecutive 15-year sentence. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 28 ANALYSIS
¶ 29 On appeal, defendant contends that: 1) the trial court should have instructed the jury on the offense of reckless conduсt as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm; 2) that the trial court violated his due process right to a fair trial when it attempted to define reasonable doubt during voir dire, thus inviting the jury to convict him using a constitutionally deficient standard; and 3) the trial court erred by denying his
¶ 30 Reckless Conduct Instruction
¶ 31 Defendant contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the offense of reckless conduct as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder. Defendant alleges that his testimony supports the giving of the reckless conduct instruction because his testimony is evidence that defendant acted recklessly in firing his gun and injuring Shannon. Therefore, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing defense counsel‘s request for a reckless conduct instruction. Defendant requests that his convictions be reversed and a new trial granted with proper jury instructions.
¶ 32 A trial court‘s refusal to issue a specific jury instruction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Douglas, 362 Ill. App. 3d 65, 76 (2005). Where some credible evidence exists to support an instruction for a lesser offense, it is an abuse of discretion to fail to give that instruction. People v. DiVencenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 249 (1998). Whether a defendant has met the evidentiary minimum for a certain jury instruction is a matter of law, and thus, our review is de novo. People v. Tijerina, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1030 (2008).
¶ 33 An instruction on a lesser included offense will be given upon a defendant‘s request if there is slight evidence in support of the offense. People v. Scott, 256 Ill. App. 3d 844, 850 (1993). A trial court‘s ” ‘refusаl to give an instruction is harmless error and does not warrant reversal where the evidence is so clear and convincing that the jury could not have reasonably found that the defendant was not guilty.’ ” People v. Blan, 392 Ill. App. 3d 453, 459 (2009)
¶ 34 A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: 1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or 2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person.
¶ 35 Defendant cites to People v. Williams, 293 Ill. App. 3d 276 (1997) in support of his contention. In that case, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm and involuntary manslaughter. Williams, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 278. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct thе jury on the offense of reckless conduct. Williams, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 278. In that case, defendant and the victim were involved in a confrontation, after which the victim fired a shot at him. Williams, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 278. According to the defendant, he then turned
¶ 36 The evidence presented here is distinguishable from that presented in the Williams case. Defendant testified at trial that he was beaten up by Jeffrey following a misunderstanding at the party; as the crowd of people approached him, he knelt to the ground and was hit by “people” as he was on the ground; he pushed his way through the crowd and ran towards the car; the group chased him to the car hot on his heels. When he got to the car, defendant reached into the trunk, got his gun and fired the first shot from under his arm without looking. He then fired the remaining shots into the air. In Williams, the defendant testified he fired all of the shots in the air with his eyes closed.
¶ 37 According to defendant‘s testimony, the people chasing him were right on his heels, therefore defendant knew he was firing the weapon in their direction when he reached into the trunk and fired the gun under his аrm without looking.
¶ 38 Illinois courts have clearly and consistently held that when a defendant points a firearm in the direction of an intended victim and fires the weapon, he has not acted recklessly. People v. Sipp, 378 Ill. App. 3d 157, 166 (2007).
¶ 39 Defendant argues the trial court refused to so instruct the jury because it mistakenly believed that an argument of self-defense was inconsistent with and negated a reckless conduct instruction. However if a decision of the trial court is correct, we may affirm the decision on any basis in the record, regardless of the rationale. People v Dinelli, 217 Ill. 2d 387, 403 (2005).
¶ 40 Arguendo, if the court did commit error when it refused to give the reckless conduct instruction, the error was harmless because the evidence in this case is overwhelming. Five eyewitnesses, two of whom were defendant‘s friends who came to the party with him, contradicted his version of events. They testified defendant fired his weapon in the direction of the partygoers, not straight up in the air as defendant testified. After yelling words to the effect of “open the trunk, I‘m going to get my banger,” and “your brother is going to die tonight,” all the witnesses testified that defendant went to the car after the fight was over, retrieved the gun, and repeatedly fired at the group that was retreating to the apartment. The evidence elicited in this case shows that defendant knew the victim and others were present in the gеneral vicinity of the apartment building, and defendant fired his weapon multiple times in their direction. Because the evidence is overwhelming, any error in failing to give the instruction was harmless. People v. Stewart, 406 Ill. App. 3d 518, 539 (2010). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as to reckless conduct.
¶ 41 Judicial Comments during Voir Dire
¶ 43 We first note that the record contains no contemporaneous objection to the court‘s comments nor did defendant include this issue in his motion for new trial. The waiver rule governs alleged errors made during voir dire. People v. Campbell, 264 Ill. App. 3d 712, 728 (1992). The record shows that defendant neither objected to the trial court‘s comments when made during voir dire nor mentioned any objection in his post-trial motion. Both a contemporaneous objection and a written post-trial motion are required to preserve an issue for appellate review, otherwise the issue is waived. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-88 (1988). Because defendant did not preserve the issue for review, we cannot review the merits of the trial court‘s error unless the alleged error constitutes plain error. Campbell, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 729.
¶ 44 Defendant, while apparently conceding that the issue is procedurally waived, nonetheless argues that we should review the merits of the issue under the plain error doctrine. He contends that both prongs of the plain error analysis are met because the evidence was clоsely balanced and the integrity of the trial was challenged because the error gave the jury permission to convict based on a lesser standard.
¶ 45 Fairness is the foundation of our plain error jurisprudence. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2005). A fair trial, however, is different from a perfect trial. Herron, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 177. The plain error doctrine is a not a general savings clause preserving for review all errors
¶ 46 Under the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error if 1) the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury‘s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence and 2) where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right and thus a fair trial. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79. Under a plain error analysis, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. United States v. Olano, 507 US 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993).
¶ 47 We must first determine whether error occurred at all before proceeding to consider whether either prong of the doctrine has been satisfied. People v. Brewer, 2013 IL App (1st) 07281, ¶ 21. The ultimate question of whether a forfeited claim is reviewable as plain error is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Brewer, 2013 IL App (1st) 07281, ¶ 21.
¶ 48 Here, we do not believe that the evidence is so closely balanced to permit us to reach the merits of the claimed error under the first prong of plain error. Five witnesses for the State testified to substantially the same sequence of events: defendant and his friends went to a party at Jasmine‘s house; a laptop and Ipod came up missing after defendant was discovered in Missy‘s room; both items were retrieved from the car that defendant and his friends arrived in; there were multiple arguments between those present and then a physical fight ensued between defendant and Jeffrey, during which Jeffrey bested defendant; defendant then went to the car that they
¶ 49 Turning to the second part of the plain error analysis, we note that a less rigid application of the waiver rule prevails when misconduct of the trial judge is involved. People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 260 (1989). Because of this relaxed standard, and because the judge‘s comments deal with a most serious subject matter - the State‘s burden of proof - we elect to resolve the plain error issue in defendant‘s favor and address the merits of thе issue. People v. Berry, 244 Ill. App. 3d 14, 25 (1991).
¶ 50 It is well established that the concept of reasonable doubt needs no definition and that it is improper for the court or counsel to attempt to define reasonable doubt to the jury. People v. Thomas, 191 Ill. App. 3d 187, 196-97 (1989). We must therefore consider whether these comments require reversal of defendant‘s conviction. For comments by a trial judge to constitute reversible error, the defendant must show that the remarks were prejudicial and that he was harmed by the comments. People v. Heidorn, 114 Ill. App. 3d 933, 937 (1983).
¶ 51 In this case, we conclude that reversal is not required. Not all improper comments
¶ 52 As previously stated, the trial judge made the following statements during voir dire:
“Then the other thing is, the State has the burden of proof, and that burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that lasts throughout each and every stage of the trial.
Does anybody have any qualms about the State has the burden of proof or the proof being proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Raise your hand either in the inner or outer part of the courtroom.
Nobody has raised their hand.
Illinois does not define reasonable doubt, but any of you who may have sat on a civil jury there‘s a preponderance of the evidence, reasonable doubt is the highest burden of proof in our country and in our State. Those of you who may have sat on civil cases, preponderance of the evidence, if you look at this like a scale, all you have to do is tilt it. So the definition of preponderance of the evidence is, it‘s more likely than not that the event occurred.
Again, Illinois doesn‘t define reasonable doubt. That‘s up
for you to decide in words, but in analogy to the scale thing, you would have to tip it like this, so that would be some insight into what proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be.”
¶ 53 We note that the trial court made subsequent pre- and post-trial admonishments to the jury that its comments were to be disregarded as well as anything except the evidence received in the case. Specifically regarding the burden of proof, during the jury instructions phase of the trial, the trial court admonished the jury as follows:
“The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This presumption remains with him throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on the verdict and is not overcome unless from all the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.
The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and this burden remains on the State throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence.”
¶ 54 We do not believe that the court‘s comments during voir dire could reasonably be construed as inviting the jury to convict defendant based on less than the reasonable doubt standard. Moreover, the subsequent remarks cured any possible error. Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the comments, thus reversal is not required. See Berry, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 26; Heidorn, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 937. We conclude, in view of the overwhelming evidence
¶ 55 Alternatively, defendant raised trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness for the failure to preserve this issue. However, we have considered the merits of this issue and have determined that any error in the comments made during voir dire were cured by subsequent instructions to the actual jury and the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. To get a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance must not only show an error but he must show that but for the alleged error there is reasonable probabilty the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Here the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming and there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the alleged error. Therefore, defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
¶ 56 Admission of Defendant‘s Prior Conviction
¶ 57 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude his prior conviction for conspiracy to commit murder without proper consideration of the factors required by People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971).
¶ 58 Evidence of past crimes which do not relate to testimonial credibility may be admitted if they are relevant for some proper purpose other than impeachment. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 39 (1994). It is a fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system, however, that the introduction of evidence of other crimes to show or suggest a propensity to commit crime is an
¶ 59 In Montgomery, our supreme court held that evidence of a witness’ prior conviction is admissible to attack the witness’ credibility where: 1) the prior crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment; 2) less than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction of the prior crime or release of the witness from confinement, whichever is later; and 3) the probative value of admitting the prior conviction outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516. The last factor requires a judge to conduct a balancing test, weighing the prior conviction‘s probative value against its potential prejudice. People v. Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2011).
¶ 60 Montgomery further explained that in performing this balancing test, the trial court should cоnsider the nature of the prior conviction, the nearness or remoteness of that crime to the present charge, the subsequent career of the person, the length of the witness’ criminal record, and whether the crime was similar to the one charged. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 518; Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d at 14-15. If the trial court determines that the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of admitting the evidence, then the evidence of the prior crime must be excluded. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 518; Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d at 15. The determination of whether a witness’ prior conviction is admissible for purposes of impeachment is within the sound discretion of the court. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 517-18; Mullins, 242 Ill. App. 2d at 15.
¶ 61 In this case, we note that defendant‘s testimony was essentially his entire defense, thus his credibility was a central issue before the jury. Accordingly, his prior convictions were crucial in
¶ 62 Additionally, in Atkinson, our supreme court specifically rejected the notion that the Montgomery balancing test is not properly performed unless the trial court explicitly states that it is doing so on the record. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 462-63; see also People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 83 (1996) (trial court did not disregard Montgomery rule simply because it did not explicitly state for the record that it was balancing the opposing interests).
¶ 63 Here, defense counsel sought to exclude evidence of defendant‘s prior conviction fоr conspiracy to commit murder. In denying defendant‘s motion in limine, the trial court specifically stated that it was applying the Montgomery rule and further that in conducting the balancing step, it concluded that the prior conviction was more probative than prejudicial. Contrary to defendant‘s argument, the record does not demonstrate that the trial court failed to weigh the probative value of the impeachment against its possible prejudicial effect. Rather, the record reflects that the trial court was very much aware of the Montgomery standard and gave proper consideration to the relevant factors as part of its balancing process. Thus the trial court‘s decision to admit defendant‘s prior conviction was not error.
¶ 64 CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 66 Affirmed.