People v. AbdullahPeople v. Abdullah
In April 2012, defendant was charged by a multicount indictment with various crimes stemming from a series of encounters with police in December 2010, March 2011, April 2011 and October 2011. Defendant thereafter made multiple motions to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds and alternatively moved for, among other things, severance from the remaining charges of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance arising from his April 2011 arrest. County Court partially granted defendant‘s first speedy trial motion, dismissing two counts of the indictment stemming from the December 2010 and March 2011 incidents, and otherwise denied his remaining motions relevant to this appeal. A series of jury trials and resulting mistrials followed resulting in partial verdicts convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, resisting arrest and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in
We cannot agree with defendant‘s contention that the People violated his statutory right to a speedy trial. Where, as here, a defendant is indicted on multiple charges, at least one of which is a felony,
Defendant was indicted on April 20, 2012 and the People declared their readiness for trial the same day. As relevant here, the indictment contained charges from two separate criminal actions, the earliest of which was commenced by the filing of a felony complaint on April 2, 2011. The People concede that they are chargeable for a prereadiness delay of 151 days between the filing of the complaint and a hearing scheduled for August 31, 2011. Defendant did not appear at that hearing, however, prompting his counsel to request an adjournment, which was granted. At the next court appearance, on September 28, 2011, defendant was present, but he again was granted, at his counsel‘s request, a one-week adjournment to pursue further plea negotiations. In light of the fact that the foregoing delays were the result of adjournments “granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, . . . defendant or his counsel” (
On October 5, 2011, still unable to reach a plea agreement, defendant explicitly waived his speedy trial rights in open court to allow for more time to negotiate. On November 9, 2011, defense counsel informed the court that defendant had been arrested again on October 31, 2011 and that he was engaged in
As for defendant‘s allegations of postreadiness delays attributable to the People, we note that County Court originally scheduled defendant‘s trial to begin on November 26, 2012, but later rescheduled it for April 15, 2013 due to defendant‘s request for an adjournment, making this period of delay almost entirely attributable to defendant (see People v Simmons, 252 AD2d 825, 826 [1998]). While defendant correctly contends that the People were granted two postreadiness adjournments—totaling 11 days—during the same time period, even if we were to assume that “the cause of the[se] delay[s] directly implicate[d] the People‘s ability to proceed with trial” (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210 [1992]; see People v Dushain, 239 AD2d 151, 153 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 1007 [1998]), and are, therefore, chargeable to the People, their declaration of readiness would still be timely pursuant to the requirements of
Nor can we agree with defendant‘s argument that County Court erred in denying his motion to sever the two counts charging him with criminal possession of a controlled substance from the remainder of the indictment. Where, as here, offenses arise from separate criminal transactions, they are nonetheless joinable in a single indictment if, among other things, “proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the second” (
Defendant‘s remaining claim of “malicious prosecution” is without merit.
Peters, P.J., McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.