PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v TODD DOUGLAS ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 365226
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
June 13, 2024
Jackson Circuit Court LC No. 2012-003652-FC
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and N. P. HOOD and YOUNG, JJ.
YOUNG, J.
In 2013, a jury convicted Todd Douglas Robinson on one count each of first-degree premeditated murder,
Robinson now appeals by delayed leave granted1 the trial court‘s order denying his successive motion for relief from judgment. On appeal, Robinson contends that the trial court erroneously denied this motion because, after the Michigan Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381; 984 NW2d 80 (2022), Robinson‘s charges and subsequent prosecution were void when the case commenced via indictment by a one-man grand jury, without a preliminary examination, thus depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the casе. Robinson relatedly argues that Peeler applies retroactively, and the trial court committed
I. BACKGROUND
In previously affirming Robinson‘s convictions, this Court summarized the underlying facts as follows:
[Robinson] was convicted of shooting and killing the victim as part of a drug deal involving promethazine. The evidence against [Robinson] was both direct and circumstantial. Two witnesses—Joe Kelley and Troy Heard, both long-time friends of [Robinson]—testified that the three men were playing their regular game of dominoes at Kelley‘s house. Kelley testified that [Robinson] went to the kitchen to talk with someone, probably a man but Kelley did not know who it was, and went out the back door with the person. Minutes later, Kelley heard a gunshot from “out back.” Heard went outside briefly, returned, and said he had to leave. Kelley saw [Robinson] looking in his truck, saw a man he did not recognize lying down by the fence, and called 911. On cross-examination, Kelley said that he did not see [Robinson] with a gun that night.
Heard testified that someone knocked at the back door, and [Robinson] answered. Heard identified the victim as being the man at the door. [Robinson] and the victim were negotiating over the sale of promethazine. [Robinson] came back to the table, laid a gun on the table, and said “it ain‘t gonna go down like they think.” There was another knock at the back door and [Robinson] answered. Heard then heard what sounded like a gunshot. Heard looked out the kitchen window and saw [Robinson] move the victim to the fence. As Heard was leaving, [Robinson] said that the victim drew a gun on him and walked him out of the house. The next morning Detective Stiles went to Heard‘s house and Heard told a different story. Later, Heard got arrested with a gun, and Stiles again came to see him. Heard testified that he had a gun charge pеnding but expected nothing in exchange for his testimony at [Robinson]‘s trial. [People v Robinson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 9, 2015 (Docket No. 317282), pp 1-2.]
After this Court affirmed Robinson‘s convictions, he moved in propria persona for relief from judgment, making various arguments irrelevant here. The trial court denied the motion, and both this Court and the Michigan Supreme Court denied Robinson‘s applications for leave to
Later, on July 20, 2022, Robinson filed a second pro se motion for relief from judgment, this time in light of the Michigan Supreme Court‘s recеnt decision in Peeler, 509 Mich 381. Peeler held that
Robinson argued that relief from judgment was warranted under
Without holding a hearing, the trial court denied Robinson‘s motion. The court acknowledged the recent change in law under Peeler, but disagreed that this entitled Robinson to relief. It reasoned:
There is no [caselaw] that has decided whether Peeler is to be retroactive or prospective. Although it is true that the general rule is that judicial decisions аre to be given complete retroactive effect, prospective application of judicial decisions [is] limited to decisions which overrule clear and uncontradicted [caselaw]. Hyde v Univ of Mich Bd Of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d 847 (1986). Since the Peeler decision overruled Green,3 [Robinson] is not entitled to relief from judgment under
MCR 5.502(G)(2) .Even if the Peeler decision could be applied retroactively, [Robinson] has still not met his burden for relief from judgment under
MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b) . [Robinson] has not established that if a preliminary examination had occurred, there would have been a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. [Robinson] was convicted by a jury and there is no evidence to show that a preliminary examination would have changed the outcomе of the jury trial.
Robinson now appeals.
“We review a trial court‘s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion[.]” People v Swain (On Remand), 288 Mich App 609, 628; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, or [it] makes an error of law[.]” Id. at 628-629 (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Robinson contends that the trial court erroneously denied his successive motion for relief from judgment because, following Peeler, his charges and subsequent prosecution were void when the case commenced via indictment by a one-man grand jury, without a preliminary examination, thus depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the casе. According to Robinson, this lack of jurisdiction renders the judgment here void, such that his requested relief was warranted. Robinson relatedly argues that Peeler applies retroactively, and the trial court committed legal error by concluding otherwise.
A. GENERAL LAW AND KEY CASES; PEELER‘S RETROACTIVITY
“A defendant in a criminal case may move for relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence.” Swain (On Remand), 288 Mich App at 629, citing
alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates
(a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and
(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief. As used in this subrule, “actual prejudice” means that,
(i) in a conviction following a trial,
(A) but for the alleged error, the defendant would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal[.]
* * *
The court may waive the “good cause” requirement of subrule (D)(3)(a) if it concludes that there is a significant possibility that the defendant is innocent of the crime. [Emphasis added.]
A defendant may file a second or subsequent motion based on a retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment or a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion.
“Because a successive motion for relief from judgment may only be filed if, after the first motion, there is a retroactive change in the law or new evidence is discovered, the ‘good cause’ and ‘actual prejudice’ requirements of
As an initial matter, we conclude that Peeler did not involve a retroactive change in the law, so Robinson is not entitled to relief from judgment on this basis. In Michigan, “the general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect.” League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 508 Mich 561, 565; 975 NW2d 840 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “However, where injustice might result from full retroactivity, this Court has adopted a more flexible approach, giving holdings limited retroactive or prospective effect.” Id.; see also People v Barnes, 502 Mich 265, 268; 917 NW2d 577 (2018) (“[J]udicial decisions which express new rules normally are not applied retroactively to other cases that have become final. New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed[] because at some point, the rights of the parties should be considered frozen and a conviction . . . final.“) (quotation marks and citation omitted; omission in original).
Therefore, in determining retroactivity, courts must first address “[t]he threshold question” of “whether a decision amounts to a new rule of law.” League of Women Voters of Mich, 508 Mich at 566. “A rule of law is new for purposes of resolving the question of its retroactive application . . . either when an established precedent is overruled or when an issue of first impression is decided which was not adumbratеd by any earlier appellate decision.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; omission in original).
Concerning the specific effect of Peeler at issue here, this Court‘s analysis in People v Walker, 328 Mich App 429; 938 NW2d 31 (2019), is insightful:
A judicial decision‘s rule is considered to be new if it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. In other words, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction became final. [Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Importantly, Peeler‘s holdings did not establish any new rule because the Court did not announce a new rule that was not dictated by precedent. Instead, Peeler‘s decision was based on the proper interpretation of longstanding statutory authority in existence since well before Robinson‘s indictment and conviction in this case. See People v Phillips, 416 Mich 63, 67-75; 330 NW2d 366 (1982) (The Supreme Court‘s opinion in People v Dunigan, 409 Mich 765; 298 NW2d 430 (1980), did not announce a new rule of law because “[t]he right to [a preliminary examination] enforced in Dunigan has existed since 1859 . . . “; therefore, the trial court properly granted the defendant a new trial “because this juvenile defendant was not given the examination he timely demanded,” even though Dunigan did not explicitly apply this right to the class of juvenile defendants until after the defendant in Phillips was convicted.).
Given the foregoing, we cannot conclude that Peeler effectuated “a retroactive change in law” to warrant granting Robinson‘s successive motion for relief from judgment on this basis under
In People v Washington, 508 Mich 107; 972 NW2d 767 (2021), the Supreme Court addressed a claim of jurisdictional error raised in the defendant‘s successive motion for relief from judgment, which thе trial court had granted. Id. at 113, 116. The Supreme Court first discussed whether the trial court having earlier erroneously resentenced the defendant while his appeal from a final order was pending “is an error of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 121. “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal term of art that concerns a court‘s authority to hear and determine a case.” Id. “This authority is not dependent on the particular facts of the case but, instead, is dependent on the character or class of the case pending.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The courts do not have inherent subject-matter jurisdiction; it is derived instеad from [this state‘s] constitutional and statutory provisions.” Id.
Under Michigan‘s 1963 Constitution, circuit courts have “original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law . . . .”
(1) The circuit court has the power and jurisdiction that is any of the following:
(a) Possessed by courts of record at the common law, as altered by the state constitution of 1963, the laws of this state, and the rules of the supreme court.
(b) Possessed by courts and judges in chancery in England on March 1, 1847, as altered by the state constitution of 1963, the laws of this state, and the rules of the supreme court.
(c) Prescribed by the rules of the supreme court.
The Washington Court stated, “In construing these provisions, we have recognized that circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.” Washington, 508 Mich at 121-122, citing People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 268; 794 NW2d 9 (2011) (“Michigan circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and unquestionably have jurisdiction over felony cases.“) and
Moreover, the Washington Court observed that “there is a widespread and unfortunate practice among both state and federal courts of using the term ‘jurisdiction’ imprecisely, to refer both to the subject-matter and the personal jurisdiction of the court, and to the court‘s general authority to take action.” Washington, 508 Mich at 124. It also explained the type оf language that Michigan courts use to discuss jurisdictional defects as compared to errors in the exercise of jurisdiction:
Although the usage of these terms is not wholly consistent, generally, the terms “vest” and “jurisdiction” are used to refer to the existence of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Paley v Coca Cola Co, 389 Mich 583, 599; 209 NW2d 232 (1973) (discussing the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court and using the terms “vest,” “vested,” and “jurisdiction” rather than “power” or “authority“); Campbell v St John Hosp, 434 Mich 608, 613-614; 455 NW2d 695 (1990) (same); Davis v Dep‘t of Corrections, 251 Mich App 372, 374, 378; 651 NW2d 486 (2002) (same). In contrast, the terms “power” and “authority” are generally used to refer to errors in the exercise of jurisdiction and other nonjurisdictional errors. See, e.g., People v Comer, 500 Mich 278, 292-293; 901 NW2d 553 (2017)5 (discussing a trial court‘s nonjurisdictional error using the language “authorized” and “authority” rather than “vest” and “jurisdiction“). [Id. at 125 n 5.]
The Court ultimately concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced the defendant while his appeal was pending. Id. at 129. Moving to what relief, if any, was warranted, the Court noted “a longstanding rule that defects in a court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction render a judgment void ab initio“—i.e., from the beginning. Id.; see also In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 22; 934 NW2d 610 (2019) (“[W]hen there is a want of jurisdiction over the parties, or the subject-matter, no matter what formalities may have been taken by the trial court, the action thereof is void because of its want of jurisdiction, and consequently its proceedings may be questioned cоllaterally as well as directly.“). “[T]his Court has also recognized that courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and act accordingly.” Washington, 508 Mich at 130. “Courts may take such action at any point in the proceedings—whether in the trial court,
Next, the Washington Court specifically rejected the prosecution‘s argument that such a jurisdictional defect cannot be raised in a successive motion for relief from judgment. Id. at 130-132. It reasoned:
The prosecutor is correct that a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not encompassed by either of
MCR 6.502(G)(2) ‘s exceptions to the successive-motion bar ofMCR 6.502(G)(1) . However, the restrictions on a trial court‘s authority contained inMCR 6.500 et seq. are not implicated here because these provisions only limit a court‘s ability to review a “judgment of conviction and sentence,” and as already discussed, our caselaw establishes that the trial court‘s judgment of sentence, rendered when the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, was void ab initio. Thus, there was no valid sentence to review, andMCR 6.501 does not limit a trial court‘s ability to recognize a subject-matter jurisdiction error and remedy it.Rather, upon [the] defendant‘s raising of the issue, the trial court had the duty to recognize its lack of subjeсt-matter jurisdiction and act accordingly. In light of these longstanding rules, the trial court did not err when it granted relief to [the] defendant. The trial court‘s judgment of sentence was void and [the] defendant‘s failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, on his first motion for relief from judgment, or in a habeas petition cannot render the judgment of sentence valid. Unlike other errors that a defendant eventually loses the ability to raise, the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be ignored for purposes of finality because the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the trial court‘s very authority tо bind the parties to the action at hand. The trial court acted in accordance with its duty to recognize its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, although
MCR 6.502(G)(2) does not contain an exception for jurisdictional errors, the trial court did not err when it vacated its earlier judgment of sentence and set the matter for resentencing. [Id. at 131-132 (citations omitted).]
Notably, the Supreme Court in People v Scott, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 164790), recently distinguished Washington to conclude that “interlocutory appeals do not divest the trial court of its subject-matter jurisdiction” and “[any] error arising during or from the taking of an interlocutory appeal is subject to subsequent appellate review following entry of the final order.” Id. at ___; slip op at 2-3. In doing so, the Court reasoned that the trial court‘s failure to comply with an automatic stay during an interlocutory appeal was “a procedural error” that did not affect subject-matter jurisdiction because, unlike the right to appeal from a final order at issue in Washington and “expressly recognize[d]” in Michigan‘s constitution, “[i]nterlocutory appeals have no constitutional pedigree.” Id. at ___; slip op at 18, 22; see also id. at ___; slip op at 18-29. “Interlocutory appeals simply do not implicate our Constitution and therefore remain outside the scope of jurisdictional concern.” Id. at ___; slip op at 24.
As stated above and reinforced by the preceding authority, the key issue here is the effect of Peeler on Robinson‘s indictment and the subsequent proceedings that led to his conviction—
Here, Robinson does not provide any substantive argument on appeal regarding good cause or prejudice under
Peeler, 509 Mich 381, involved three defendants—all state employees charged for their roles in the Flint water crisis—challenging in interlocutory appeals their indictments by a one-man grand jury. Id. at 386-389.6 Peeler held that
On the first issue, the Court specifically addressed “[w]hether
The Court likewise interpreted the one-man-grand-jury statutes as providing a right to a preliminary examination. Id. at 391-394. In doing so, the Court stated that “judge[s] should treat the one-man-grand-jury-charged case the same as a case in which a formal complaint has been filed.” Id. at 392. “We know how that process works too: When a formal complaint is filed, an arrest warrant is issued, the accused is apprehended, and the court holds a preliminary examination before an information may issue.”7 Id. “The circuit court [therefore] erred by denying [the defendant] Peeler‘s and [the defendant] Baird‘s motions to remand for a preliminary
B. ADDITIONAL CASELAW AND APPLICATION
It is admittedly a close call whether the improper indictment procedure here deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction and necessarily rendered the court‘s judgment void, with related аuthorities seemingly diverging on—and not clearly addressing—this issue. To reach a conclusion on this matter, we rely on cases dealing with errors both in indictments and informations, the two analogous charging procedures provided by the Legislature. See People v Glass (After Remand), 464 Mich 266, 276; 627 NW2d 261 (2001) (“Michigan law provides that criminal prosecutions may be initiated in the court having jurisdiction to hear the cause by either indictment or information.“).
Well before it decided Peeler, the Michigan Supreme Court in In re Elliott, 315 Mich 662; 24 NW2d 528 (1946), stated that “[t]he circuit court does not lose jurisdiction[] where a void or improper information is filed.” Id. at 675. More recently, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
The circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, having original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law . . . . Subject matter jurisdiсtion is presumed unless expressly denied by constitution or statute. It is the right of the court to exercise jurisdiction over a class of cases, such as criminal cases. In personam jurisdiction is vested in the circuit court upon the filing of a return of the magistrate before whom the defendant waived preliminary examination, or before whom the defendant had been examined. Having once vested in the circuit court, personal jurisdiction is not lost even when a void or improper information is filed. In re Elliott, [315 Mich] at 675. [People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 458-459; 579 NW2d 442 (1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted; omission in original).]
The Supreme Court in a later case held that “the informatiоn filed in this case is null and void because it was filed pursuant to the invalid scheme set forth in
In contrast, People v Cherry, 27 Mich App 672; 183 NW2d 857 (1970),9 framed a challenge to an amended information, which this Court rejected, as specifically implicating the circuit court‘s jurisdiction. Id. at 675-676. We also acknowledge Robinson‘s reliance on People v Curtis, 389 Mich 698; 209 NW2d 243 (1973), which determinеd in relevant part that “the trial court could not gain jurisdiction over [a] higher charge based on [an] erroneous information” because “[t]he court‘s jurisdiction was limited to that offense specified in the return made by the examining magistrate.” Id. at 708. Notably, neither case specifies whether they were addressing a lack of personal jurisdiction, a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or an error in the circuit court‘s exercise of jurisdiction.
Admittedly, Glass (After Remand) arguably supports that the improper charging procedure here, like that in Glass (After Remand), rendered the indictment null and void, while Cherry and Curtis indicate that errors in an indictment or information implicate a court‘s jurisdiction in some way. But none of these cases clearly hold or otherwise indicate that such errors deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction, whether subject-matter or personal. Indeed, such would be contrary to our Supreme Court‘s prior declarations, at least with respect to informations, that jurisdiction is unaffected by a “void or improper” charging document. See Goecke, 457 Mich at 458-459; In re Elliott, 315 Mich at 675. With all that in mind, we now turn to the specific improper procedure at issue here and disallowed by Peeler.
As an initial matter, we are not bound by the circuit court‘s interpretation of Peeler on remand in that case, nor do we read our Supreme Court‘s оpinion in Peeler as implicating subject-matter jurisdiction. First, both parties misconstrue Peeler. The Peeler Court neither specifically instructed for any preliminary examination on remand, nor did it indicate that dismissal in particular was warranted. Rather, the Court merely indicated that the trial court erred by denying one defendant‘s motion to dismiss, and two other defendants’ motions for a preliminary examination. It provided no clear instruction for how the circuit court should address these separate errors on remand.
Importantly, Peeler includes no indication whatsoever that its holdings relate to a court‘s jurisdiction, whether subject-matter or personal. Peeler never uses the word jurisdiction except in quoting exact excerpts from
We also find that the error here did not deprivе the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction because it was “procedural.” See Scott, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 18. Like the issue in Scott and unlike in Washington, Michigan does not provide any constitutional right to a preliminary examination. People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 603; 460 NW2d 520 (1990) (“[T]he preliminary examination is not a procedure that is constitutionally based.“); People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 200 n 7; 889 NW2d 513 (2016) (“[A] preliminary examination is not a constitutionally based procedure . . . .). And the filing of an indictment, like the filing of an information after a preliminary examination, is governed not by any constitutional provision or right, but by statute. See
In sum, because the challenged error was harmless and did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to proceed in the case, Robinson has failed to show entitlement to relief from judgment. As a final note, our conclusion that the improper procedure here did not deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction is further supported by analogous authority from the United States Supreme Court and other states’ courts. See United States v Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630; 122 S Ct 1781; 152 L Ed 2d 860 (2002) (“defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case“); State v Ortiz, 162 NH 585, 589-590; 34 A 3d 599 (NH, 2011) (“[A] defective indictment does not deprive a trial court of its power to adjudicate a case. While a defect may be error—or even constitutional error, . . . the defect does not divest [a trial court] of the power to try the case.“) (quotation marks and citation omitted; omission and alteration in original); State v Maldonado, 223 Ariz 309; 223 P 3d 653 (Ariz, 2010) (“We hold that the State‘s failure to file an information before trial did not deprive the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction or constitute fundamental error.“); Sate v Gentry, 363 SC 93, 101; 610 SE2d 494 (SC, 2005) (“[S]ubject[-]matter jurisdiction of the circuit court and the sufficiency of the indictment are two distinct concepts and the blending of these concepts serves only to confuse the issue. Circuit courts obviously have subject[-]matter jurisdiction to try criminal matters.“).
Affirmed.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Noah P. Hood