PEOPLE v CHRISTIAN; PEOPLE v EDWARDS; PEOPLE v HINTON
Docket Nos. 162354, 162355, and 162374
Michigan Supreme Court, Lansing, Michigan
Decided July 27, 2022
Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack; Justices: Brian K. Zahra; David F. Viviano; Richard H. Bernstein; Elizabeth T. Clement; Megan K. Cavanagh; Elizabeth M. Welch
Reporter of Decisions: Kathryn L. Loomis
In an opinion by Chief Justice MCCORMACK, joined by Justices BERNSTEIN, CAVANAGH, and WELCH, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
- The interview transcript that the prosecution suppressed was both favorable and material to the defense. Having established both good cause for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal and actual prejudice for purposes of
MCR 6.508 , defendants were entitled to a new trial.
- Motions for relief from judgment are governed by
MCR 6.508 et seq. A defendant bringing their first motion for relief from judgment has the burden of demonstrating two things. First, underMCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) , they must show good cause for having failed to raise the grounds that they allege warrant relief on appeal. One way to establish good cause is by showing that an
- To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution has suppressed evidence that is material and favorable to the accused. In this case, the only element of defendants’ Brady claim that was in dispute on appeal was materiality. To establish that exculpatory evidence is material, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A defendant need not demonstrate by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal; rather, the relevant question is whether the defendant received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. This standard is legally simple but factually complex, and whether the standard is met must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. Suppressed evidence may be material if it would have raised opportunities to attack the thoroughness or good faith of the underlying investigation.
- Defendants demonstrated good cause for not raising the issue of the missing transcript on direct appeal because doing so was prevented by an external factor, namely, that the prosecution had suppressed the transcript. Defendants also demonstrated actual prejudice from the fact that the prosecution did not provide them with the transcript. The transcript was material because it would have provided more substantial impeachment evidence than any of the evidence defendants were provided, it would have undermined the other prosecution evidence and supported the defense theory, and it called the thoroughness and good faith of the investigation into question. To prevail at trial, defendants needed the jury to believe that Murphy was not telling the truth, and the suppressed transcript would have provided more support for their strategy than the evidence that was known to defendants at the time of trial. The transcript, which documented the first statement that Murphy gave to the police and the one closest in time to the crime, differed from Murphy’s trial testimony and his other statements in eight important ways: the time line of events on the day of the shooting, discrepancies regarding the possible motive, the failure to mention a
reasonably likely chance of acquittal. Having established both good cause and actual prejudice, defendants were entitled to a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice CLEMENT, joined by Justices ZAHRA and VIVIANO, dissenting, agreed that the prosecution’s failure to provide defendants with the transcript constituted suppression of favorable evidence under Brady, but she disagreed that the evidence met Brady’s materiality requirement because its impeachment value was limited and other inculpatory evidence admitted at trial corroborated defendants’ guilt. She noted that Murphy’s narrative was largely consistent each time he gave it, including the chronology of his movements on the day in question and the descriptions of the shooters, and she stated that the inconsistencies appeared to be the result of frailties in human recall rather than organized mistruths. Accordingly, she would have denied Christian’s and Edwards’s applications for leave to appeal. However, she would have remanded Hinton’s case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, which was based on trial counsel’s failure to call two alibi witnesses. She explained that although Hinton’s appellate counsel technically raised an ineffective-assistance argument on direct appeal by moving for a remand, the motion was denied because it failed to identify any particular deficiency for which factual development was required. Under those circumstances, she did not believe the procedural bar of
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 162354
KINO DOMINIQUE CHRISTIAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 162355
JOSHUN EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION Chief Justice:
Bridget M. McCormack
Justices:
Brian K. Zahra
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
Elizabeth M. Welch
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 162374
C’QUAN MICHAEL HINTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MCCORMACK, C.J.
One of the foundational principles of our criminal legal system is that the state cannot keep evidence from the accused—especially exculpatory evidence. The United States Supreme Court said so long ago in Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), but you don’t have to go to law school to understand that fundamental fairness requires the government to disclose evidence that calls an individual’s guilt into question when it charges them with a crime. The legal test for determining whether relief follows the government’s failure to give an accused exculpatory information isn’t as intuitive, however: the suppressed evidence must have been “material.”
Determining whether suppressed evidence is material is always a fact-driven task. As the United States Supreme Court has said, it can be “legally simple but factually complex” to sort out whether “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the [suppressed] evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Turner v United States, 582 US ___, ___; 137 S Ct 1885, 1893; 198 L Ed 2d 443 (2017), quoting Cone v Bell, 556 US 449, 470 (2009); see also United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 682 (1985).
Because the prosecution suppressed evidence that was both favorable and material to the defense, the defendants are each entitled to a new trial.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 9, 2007, 14-year-old Robert Person was shot on a street corner just outside Flint. The prosecution eventually charged four men in connection with murder: Kino Christian, Joshun Edwards, C’Quan Hinton, and Dartanion Edwards. The jury found all four guilty of premediated murder and other charges, and they were sentenced to mandatory life in prison. Because Hinton was 17 at the time of the shooting, he was resentenced in 2015 pursuant to Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), to a term of 32 to 60 years’ imprisonment.
In 2014, Joshun Edwards’s family filed a request under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act,
Three of the four defendants filed motions for relief from judgment, 1 arguing in part that the suppression of Murphy’s October interview transcript violated their right to exculpatory information as required by Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83. The trial court denied all three motions. It found that the transcript of Murphy’s October interview had been suppressed by the prosecution and that it was favorable to the defense, but that it was not material. The court reasoned that because the defendants impeached Murphy with the November interview transcript and his testimony from the preliminary examination, “[c]ounsel had considerable opportunity to draw out contradiction by Murphy for the jury’s attention” without it. And in the court’s view, the summary of the October interview was “substantially similar” to Murphy’s statements in the suppressed transcript.
The court was also persuaded that because Murphy was not the only witness to implicate the defendants in the shooting, more impeachment evidence would not have made a difference. Ashlie Dye identified Christian as one of the shooters, and Robert Moore testified that Christian implicated the three other defendants in a jailhouse confession.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The panel reasoned that while the defendants did not have the transcript of the October interview, they knew it had happened and received a summary. Edwards, unpub op at 6. And the defendants were able to “undermine Murphy’s credibility respecting his identification of them as the shooters” and argue that Murphy “fabricated his testimony” with the evidence they were provided. Id. at 6-7.
The panel acknowledged that “discrepancies existed” between the suppressed transcript and Murphy’s trial testimony that were “not entirely insignificant.” Id. at 7. But, in the panel’s view, defense counsel were still able to question Murphy “extensively concerning his version of events.” Id. at 8. For example, they drew out a discrepancy about the color of the bike. In this example, though, the panel inaccurately reported the record: it explained that Murphy said the bike was black at the preliminary examination, contrasting with his trial testimony that it was purple and gray. Id. In fact, Murphy testified that the bike was purple at the preliminary examination.
The panel seems to have been convinced that the other evidence in the case made any missing impeachment of Murphy immaterial too. That is, the panel believed that the prosecution “presented direct and circumstantial evidence from which the jury could find each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” apart from Murphy’s testimony. Id. at 10.
That testimony, according to the panel, included Moore’s testimony about Christian’s jailhouse confession, Dye’s testimony implicating Christian, and the security camera footage showing Christian disposing of a gun at a gas station after the separate drive-by shooting involving Perry Manuel. Id. Although Dye’s testimony and the gun found at the gas station were potentially probative of only Christian’s guilt, the panel, without explanation, analyzed the evidence as if it applied to all three defendants. And this analysis led the panel to conclude that the suppressed transcript was not material in any of the defendants’ cases. Id. at 11.
The defendants sought leave to appeal in our Court. We ordered oral argument on the application, asking all three defendants to address whether “the lower courts erred by holding that the suppressed October 16, 2007 interview transcript was not material to their guilt such that they were not entitled to relief under Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 and People v Christian, 507 Mich 952, 952 (2021).” 2
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Washington, 508 Mich 107, 130 n 9 (2021). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court makes a decision that “falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes,” id., or “makes an error of law,” People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 723 (2013). A trial court’s decision on a Brady claim is reviewed de novo. People v Smith, 498 Mich 466, 475 (2015).
B. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
The defendants filed motions for relief from judgment governed by
Once a defendant demonstrates good cause, a new trial is only warranted if they also show “actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief.”
C. BRADY v MARYLAND
The defendants argue in their motions for relief from judgment that the prosecution’s failure to provide Murphy’s October interview transcripts violated Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83. To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150 (2014), citing Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282 (1999). The parties do not dispute that the transcript was suppressed and is favorable, and the lower courts agreed. The only element of the defendants’ Brady claim in dispute on appeal is materiality.
To establish that exculpatory evidence is material, a defendant must show that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Chenault, 495 Mich at 150, quoting Bagley, 473 US at 682. A “reasonable probability” means “ ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
3the outcome.’ ” Chenault, 495 Mich at 150, quoting Bagley, 473 US at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). A defendant need not “demonstrat[e] by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . . .” Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 434 (1995). Rather, the relevant question is whether the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id.
1. TURNER v UNITED STATES
First, in Turner v United States, 582 US at ___ the Court showed us how to evaluate the materiality of suppressed evidence “ ‘in the context of the entire record . . . .’ ” Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1893, quoting United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 112 (1976).
2. WEARRY v CAIN
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court found that suppressed evidence was material in Wearry v Cain, 577 US 385 (2016). In that case, a man named Sam Scott contacted the police while incarcerated and implicated the defendant in a brutal murder that occurred two years earlier. Scott’s original account did not match the physical evidence of the crime, and his story changed substantially over time to become more consistent with the other evidence. Still, he was the prosecution’s “star witness” at trial. Another prosecution witness—Eric Brown—testified, consistently with Scott’s account, that he saw the defendant with a man who looked like the victim that night.
3. KYLES v WHITLEY
Finally, Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419 (1995), is also important. The defendant was convicted of the murder of Dolores Dye, who was shot in the head while putting grocery bags in her car. The man who shot her took her keys and drove away. Two days later, a man named Beanie called the police station and reported that he had bought a car matching the description of the stolen car from the defendant. Beanie claimed he came forward to the police because he feared the defendant had stolen the car. But Beanie’s story changed over time and grew inconsistent with the details of the crime known to the police. And yet, “[t]he police neither noted the inconsistencies nor questioned [him] about them.” Id. at 427.
The prosecution withheld recordings of the conversations between the police and Beanie in which his story changed. Id. at 428. The Court found that the suppressed evidence was material in part because it “would have raised opportunities to attack . . . the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation . . . .” Id. at 445. Beanie’s statements to the police “were replete with inconsistencies and would have allowed the jury to infer that Beanie was anxious to see [the defendant] arrested” for the murder. Id. The statements would have “revealed a remarkably uncritical attitude on the part of the police.” Id. Kyles shows that determining whether defendants received “a trial resulting in a verdict worth of confidence” requires an analysis not just of the evidence presented, but of the quality of the investigation.
D. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED GOOD CAUSE
The prosecution does not dispute that the defendants have demonstrated good cause. While neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of good cause, both concluded that the prosecution suppressed the transcript. That suppression was an “external factor” that preventing appellate counsel from raising a Brady violation on direct appeal. Reed, 449 Mich at 378.
E. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED ACTUAL PREJUDICE BECAUSE THE OCTOBER TRANSCRIPT WAS MATERIAL
The transcript of Murphy’s October interview was material for three reasons. First, it would have provided far more substantial impeachment evidence than any of the evidence the defendants were provided. Second, it would have undermined the other prosecution evidence and supported the defendants’ theory of defense. And third, the suppression of the transcript calls the thoroughness and good faith of the investigation into question.
To prevail at trial, the defendants needed the jury to believe that Jarylle Murphy was not telling the truth. The transcript of his October interview would have provided far more support for their strategy than the evidence that was known to defendants at the time of trial. The transcript differed from Murphy’s trial testimony and from his prior statements that the defendants were provided—the November interview and preliminary examination testimony—in eight important ways. These inconsistencies are more compelling because it was the first statement he gave to the police, and the one closest in time to the crime. And even worse, the summary of the October interview that was provided instead of the transcript left out or changed the important inconsistencies.
First, the time line of events on the day of the shooting. The suppressed transcript reveals that Murphy told Sergeant Gaspar that he boarded a bus to South Flint at 6:30 p.m. and that the shooting took place around 9:00 p.m. or 9:30 p.m. Testimony of other witnesses, including Xavier Regimbal, the security guard patrolling the Evergreen Regency Apartments that night, made clear that the shooting happened around 8:00 p.m., as Murphy himself would later say in his November interview and preliminary examination testimony. The jury never learned about this change in Murphy’s story because the summary changed the detail; it says he reported that the shooting took place at 8:00 p.m.
Besides the changed story, Murphy’s statement that he did not board the bus to South Flint with his sister until 6:30 p.m. in his original interview would have made it virtually impossible for him to be present at the shooting by 8:00 p.m. He would have had to ride the bus across town, visit with his sister’s uncle, walk 1.9 miles, meet Person for the first time, have the initial confrontation with the two shooters, and meet the girl—all in an hour and a half. Because Murphy never again mentioned boarding the bus at 6:30 p.m.—and that detail did not appear in the summary of the October interview—the defendants could not question Murphy on how he would have been able to be present at the crime scene when it happened.
Second, motive. The suppressed transcript reveals that Murphy said that one of the men accused Person of snitching on his mom—unlike his later accounts, where he says one of the men accused Person of snitching on his brother. The jury never knew about this inconsistency either, as the summary falsely changed this detail to make it consistent with Murphy’s revised story.
Third, the van. The suppressed transcript reveals that Murphy never mentioned Person getting a phone charger and bike from a Dodge van during the October interview. Those details first emerged in his November interview and remained consistent moving forward. But because the defendants only had the summary, the jury never found out that Murphy never mentioned the van in his original interview.
Fourth, the girl. The suppressed transcript reveals that Murphy claimed that the girl was still with him and Person when the shooting happened, unlike his later statement and trial testimony that the girl had left before Person was killed. The jury never learned about this change in Murphy’s story either because the summary omits this detail too.
Fifth, the bike and who rode it. The suppressed transcript reveals that in October Murphy was adamant that one of the shooters, and not Person, was on a bike; and he sticks to this story even when asked multiple times. By his November interview, Murphy said that Person was on a bicycle at the time of the shooting, and this is what Murphy told the jury as well. But the jury never learned that Murphy’s story changed in this important way because the misleading summary omitted this inconsistency too.
Sixth, the location of the shooting. The suppressed transcript reveals that Murphy claimed he and Person were sitting down when the shooters approached. By his November interview he said they were walking at the time, and he told the jury that as well. The jury never knew about this change of story either; it too was omitted from the summary.
Seventh, Murphy’s ability to see. The suppressed transcript reveals that Murphy did not express confidence in his ability to see the shooters because it was “kinda dark.” He told the jury, however, that he was confident that the defendants shot Person. The defendants challenged Murphy’s ability to identify the shooters given the time of night and the fact that the shooters approached from behind. But their challenge would have been more convincing if they had known that when Murphy first spoke to Sergeant Gaspar he told her he was not confident he could identify the assailants. The jury never learned that fact because the inaccurate summary omitted it.
And eighth, where Murphy fled after the shooting. The suppressed transcript reveals that Murphy claimed that as shots were fired he ran into the middle of the Evergreen Regency complex, which is at the intersection where Person was killed. But he told the jury that he ran about a mile due west of the shooting, just as he had at the preliminary examination. The jury never learned about this story change either—it, too, was omitted from the summary.
Each inconsistency is significant, but the sum of them is striking.
Murphy’s testimony was central to the prosecution’s case, and the suppressed transcript would have significantly undermined it. The jury never knew the extent to which Murphy’s story changed from his first interview. The transcript of that interview was not “too little, too weak, or too distant from the main evidentiary points . . . .” Turner, 582 US at ___. Quite the opposite.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged some of these inconsistences, although incorrectly in part, but was not persuaded the additional impeachment evidence mattered. It is true that the defendants were able to highlight some inconsistencies between the versions of Murphy’s story they were aware of, but the inconsistencies that could have been emphasized with the October interview are more significant. That the defendants argued to the jury that there were reasons to doubt Murphy’s story does not make more evidence that he was lying immaterial. To the contrary, it makes the possibility that the result of the trial would have been different more likely.
The Court of Appeals made a second error in its consideration of the other evidence presented. The panel concluded that the transcript was also not material because “the prosecution presented direct and circumstantial evidence from which the jury could find each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses independent of Murphy’s testimony.” Edwards, unpub op at 10 (emphasis added). Put another way, because there was sufficient evidence notwithstanding Murphy’s testimony, even if the transcript led the jury to discredit him completely, the panel concluded that there was not a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
But this reasoning misses the quality of the other evidence, and Murphy’s centrality to it. That other evidence “would have been further diminished had the jury learned” about the suppressed evidence. Wearry, 577 US at 393.
Beyond Murphy’s testimony, the prosecution’s evidence included: (1) the .380 caliber casings and the .380 caliber gun hidden by Christian at the gas station, (2) Ashlie Dye’s testimony implicating Christian, (3) Laquashia Blake’s testimony about Christian and Hinton’s possible involvement, and (4) Robert Moore’s testimony about a jailhouse confession by Christian implicating the other defendants. Without Murphy’s testimony to organize and tie together the remaining fractured stories, the sum of this other evidence loses much of its value.
If Murphy was discredited, the fact that Christian was found with a .380 caliber gun after his involvement in an unrelated shooting becomes less relevant. Without Murphy implicating Christian as one of the shooters, then Christian likely hid the gun because of its connection with the drive-by shooting we know it was connected to. And without Murphy’s testimony connecting Christian to the shooting, that gun implicates Perry Manuel and William Harris at least as much as Christian; it was registered to Harris’s girlfriend and used in connection with the 2007 shooting of Manuel. Manuel and Harris, of course, are two of the three men the defendants argued were responsible for this crime.
Detective Ronald Ainslie’s expert testimony would also lose its relevance in connecting Christian to the murder without Murphy’s testimony. Detective Ainslie testified that the spent .380 caliber casings recovered from the scene of Person’s murder had been fired from the gun found at the gas station. But his opinion was based not on a unique attribute of the recovered casings or on the particular gun found, but on generic characteristics of that model of gun. That is, a .380 caliber was fired by Person’s assailants, and while Ainslie told the jury the casings were from the particular .380 caliber recovered, he apparently did not identify any “lands” or “grooves” or other specific markings that supported his conclusion.
Put differently, while he told the jury about how a ballistics expert can tie a particular bullet or casing to a particular firearm, and that some of the bullets recovered from the crime scene had markings that would allow such a connection to be made, he offered no information about the particular casings he said came from the gas station gun.
If the jury didn’t believe Murphy, it would have had more reason to doubt Ashlie Dye too. Dye, who told the police the night of the shooting that she did not see the shooters, identified Christian as one of them a year later. The jury learned about this inconsistency, and about Dye’s possible motive to implicate Christian, but Murphy’s identification of Christian as one of the shooters bolstered Dye’s.
If the jury didn’t believe Murphy, the value of Blake’s testimony would also diminish. Blake told the police before trial that Hinton had told her that Christian committed the murder and “got him involved.” But at trial, she testified that Hinton told her unequivocally that “he didn’t do it.” Murphy’s testimony bolstering her first statement made this impeachment evidence more believable. Blake also testified that Hinton told her, “[T]hey can’t put me there or pull my prints off any gun or bullets.” Without Murphy’s testimony identifying Hinton as one of the shooters, this statement would have been consistent with Hinton claiming that he was falsely accused of this crime.
And if the jury did not believe Murphy, Robert Moore’s account of Christian’s alleged confession would likely also not be believed. Moore claimed that Christian confessed to committing the shooting exactly as Murphy described it happening in his November interview, and as recorded in the police reports Moore had access to before he came forward. That coincidence would have been far more salient if the jury disbelieved Murphy. And since neither the gun found at the gas station nor Ashlie Dye implicated Hinton or Edwards, if the jury did not believe Murphy, Moore’s testimony would have been the only evidence linking Edwards to the crime. Similarly, only Moore’s and Blake’s testimony would have linked Hinton to the crime.
Finally, exculpatory evidence is material if it calls into question “the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation . . . .” Kyles, 514 US at 445. The transcript of the October interview surely does. When Murphy came into the police station for his first interview, the police knew that a good friend of Person, Anthony Williams, told the police the day after the shooting that he had spent the afternoon and evening hanging out with Person until moments before the shooting. Williams did not mention Jarylle Murphy. And Murphy never mentioned Williams. Murphy’s story contradicted Williams’s, and yet the police never asked Murphy about Williams. And neither the police nor the prosecution ever contacted Williams again, despite his willingness to testify. Murphy’s story also contradicted both Ashlie Dye’s and Williams’s accounts that Person was alone when he was shot. Murphy’s story also contradicted Leroy Marks’s testimony at trial that after hearing gunshots, he saw one boy running away from his bike before getting shot with no one else around. Yet the police “neither noted the inconsistencies nor questioned” Murphy about them. Id. at 427.
Murphy arrived at the police station with a detailed written description of the four shooters down to the color and brand of their shoes and the guns they carried, and yet told the police that he could not get a good look at them because it was “kinda dark,” they were approached from behind, and the interaction happened in a matter of seconds. But the police failed to question Murphy about how he generated such a detailed description of the four men.
Murphy’s version of events also was inconsistent with the physical evidence. In the suppressed interview, he had the time of the shooting wrong, said Person had been sitting on the sidewalk at the time of the shooting, claimed that Person did not have a bike, that one of the shooters was on a bike, and that a girl was with them. But the bike was discovered right by Person’s body, suggesting he had been riding or walking it at the time he was shot, not sitting on a sidewalk, and the police did not locate a girl who had been with Person during the shooting. Finally, none of the defendants’ DNA matched the DNA recovered from the .380 caliber casings found at the scene—three other DNA profiles were identified on those casings.
Despite all these problems with Murphy’s story, the prosecution built its case around it—and kept the most significant problems with his story from the defendants by providing them with a false and incomplete summary of his first interview instead of the transcript. The investigation reveals an “uncritical attitude” on the part of the police, Kyles, 514 US at 445, and the suppressed transcript “would have raised opportunities to attack . . . the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation,” id.
Because we conclude the transcript is material, the defendants easily meet the standard for actual prejudice under
The standard for actual prejudice is strikingly similar; a defendant can show it where “but for the alleged error, the defendant would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal[.]”
Given the centrality of Murphy’s testimony and the strength of the suppressed impeachment evidence, we conclude that if the defendants had had access to the transcript, they would have had both a “reasonable probability” of a different result and at least a “reasonably likely chance of acquittal.” Chenault, 495 Mich at 150;
III. CONCLUSION
The transcript is material because the defendants have demonstrated a reasonable probability that had it been disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different. It would have been powerful impeachment evidence of Murphy, the prosecution’s central witness, making the defendants’ argument that he was fabricating his story more likely. And if the jury did not believe Murphy, the other evidence would also be less believable. The state’s suppression of the transcript calls the thoroughness and good faith of this investigation into question.
Because the transcript is material, the defendants were prejudiced by its suppression. But for the Brady violation, “the defendant[s] would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal[.]”
Bridget M. McCormack
Richard H. Bernstein
Megan K. Cavanagh
Elizabeth M. Welch
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND TRIAL
These cases arise from the fatal shooting of 14-year-old Robert Person on October 9, 2007, for which the prosecutor charged Christian, Joshun Edwards, Hinton, and Dartanion Edwards1 with first-degree premeditated murder, assault with intent to murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.2
Murphy testified that after the confrontation, he and Person went to the store. En route, they were joined by a girl with whom Murphy was unfamiliar. They also came into contact with multiple people riding in a van, from whom Person retrieved an item— possibly a phone charger—and a bicycle before they departed. Murphy described the bicycle as “a mountain bike, gray and [he] believe[d] purple.”
Murphy testified that later that evening—“after 7,” as the sky “was in transition” between light and dark and “towards nighttime”—he and Person walked the unknown girl to another apartment complex. They spoke briefly, “for maybe five more minutes,” at the front of the apartment complex before walking back toward the Evergreen Regency
According to Murphy, his grandparents eventually convinced him to disclose his involvement in the shooting to law enforcement, and he was voluntarily interviewed by law enforcement on October 16, 2007, one week after the shooting. Before the interview, Murphy expressed in writing detailed information about the shooters and their firearms based on his observations.3
He would later testify at trial that, when the shooters were pursuing him and Person, the shooters were near and then underneath a streetlight and at a distance of “somewhere around” 35 to 50 feet away.4
According to Murphy, the light, the distance, and his photographic memory allowed him to perceive and recall these details despite the short amount of time he viewed the shooters. From this information, Murphy was able to identify defendant Hinton from a photographic lineup during his October 16, 2007 interview and the remaining defendants during his November 8, 2007 interview.
At trial, each defendant’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined Murphy about this narrative, including specific challenges to his identification of defendants as the shooters. After Murphy acknowledged having seen the shooters for only about five seconds, the cross-examiners pressed him on the details of his observations and thoroughly impeached his assertion that he had a photographic memory. Specifically, upon questioning, Murphy was unable to recall what clothing defendants Hinton and Christian were wearing when they initially confronted Person on the day of the shooting, and he was also unable to recall Hinton’s and his defense counsel’s clothing or facial hair from the previous day of trial. (In return, Murphy explained that his photographic memory encompasses only what he focuses on, and that colors and sometimes scenery are difficult to recall.) Further, Murphy struggled to match each defendant to the shooter descriptions he created before the October 16, 2007 interview. Finally, the defense also emphasized that Murphy’s descriptions of the shooters came one week after the shooting, as Murphy fled the scene and did not give a statement to law enforcement on the evening of the shooting.
In addition to Murphy’s testimony, the prosecution introduced several other pieces of inculpatory evidence. Ashlie Dye, defendant Christian’s former girlfriend, testified that she was driving in the area during the shooting and that a bullet hit her vehicle. Dye identified Christian as one of the shooters, and testified that he had apologized to her for her vehicle being shot. Robert Moore, a cellmate of Christian and defendant Edwards, testified that Christian admitted to murdering Person and that both defendants solicited Moore to murder Murphy on multiple occasions. Laquashia Blake, defendant Hinton’s former girlfriend, testified that Hinton told her that Hinton’s “Uncle Kino [Christian] did the murder and also got him involved in the situation.” Monica McGee also testified that, on the night of the shooting, Hinton appeared nervous and later spoke to Christian on the phone regarding the media coverage of the shooting.
Defendants, for their part, maintained their innocence. In addition to challenging the credibility of the various witnesses against them, defendants also presented the testimony of various witnesses who observed Person walking alone on the day of the
At the close of trial, the jury found defendants guilty as charged. Defendants were unsuccessful on direct appeal. People v. Christian, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 22, 2011 (Docket Nos. 291578, 291687, and 291744), lv den 492 Mich 864 (2012) and 492 Mich 865 (2012).
II. MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Years after defendants’ convictions, a relative of defendant Edwards requested and
received documents related to his case from the Flint Police Department pursuant to
Defendants moved for relief from judgment on the basis of the undisclosed transcript. They argued that the transcript contained favorable evidence insofar as it established inconsistencies in Murphy’s statements that could have been used to impeach his testimony at trial and that its suppression therefore violated their constitutional due‑process rights as established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Specifically, defendants identified the following differences with Murphy’s statements during the October 16, 2007 interview: the timing of the initial bus ride with his sister (at trial, sometime before their arrival at the uncle’s home “around 4:30ish” and at the interview, “6:30”), the timing of the shooting (at the preliminary examination, “around 8:00”, which was consistent with other testimony and the 911 call, and at the interview, around 9:00 or 9:30), the details regarding Person’s encounter with defendants Christian and Hinton before the shooting (at the November 8, 2007 interview and preliminary examination, Christian and Hinton accused Person of snitching on a little brother, and at the interview, of snitching on a mother), whether the unknown girl was present during the shooting (at trial, she was not, and in the interview, she was), whether Person was on a bicycle at the time of the shooting (at trial, he was, and in the interview, he was not), and where Person and Murphy were at the time of the shooting (at trial, they were walking, and at the interview, they were sitting talking to the unfamiliar girl).
The trial court—which presided over defendants’ entire trial, sentencing, and resentencing—ultimately denied defendants’ motions for relief from judgment, concluding that although the prosecution had failed to disclose favorable evidence to defendants before
Defendants subsequently applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we issued an order to schedule oral argument on the applications and directing the parties to address “whether the lower courts erred by holding that the suppressed October 16, 2007 interview transcript was not material to their guilt such that they were not entitled to relief under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and People v. Chenault, 495 Mich. 142, 149-150, 155 (2014). ” People v. Christian, 507 Mich. 952, 952 (2021).
III. BRADY ANALYSIS
In order to succeed on a Brady claim, a defendant must prove that “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” Chenault, 495 Mich. at 150. Whether the prosecution’s suppression occurred in bad faith is irrelevant to the inquiry. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 & n.17 (1976). Notably, the prosecution’s duty to disclose favorable evidence includes all favorable evidence held by other government actors, including law enforcement. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); People v. Dimambro, 318 Mich. App. 204, 213 (2016). Further, both substantive exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence are considered favorable Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 198 L. Ed. 2d 443 (2017) evidence for purposes of the Brady inquiry. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
I agree with the majority that the first two prongs of the Brady inquiry are met here. The prosecution failed to turn over the October 16, 2007 transcript of Murphy’s first interview with law enforcement to defense counsel before trial, and that transcript contained favorable evidence insofar as it contained inconsistencies with Murphy’s other statements. However, I disagree with the majority regarding the materiality of the October 16, 2007 interview transcript. In order to demonstrate that a piece of evidence is material, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). This standard “does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . . .” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. The question is whether, in the absence of the suppressed evidence, the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. In assessing the materiality of the evidence, courts are to consider the suppressed evidence collectively, rather than piecemeal. [Chenault, 495 Mich. at 150-151.]
Further, while impeachment evidence can be material under Brady, see Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016), its materiality in any particular case is dependent on the extent of the impeachment and the strength of the other evidence presented, see Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-113; Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). See also People v. Salazar, 35 Cal. 4th 1031, 1050 (2005) (“In general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the witness at issue supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime, or where the likely
I believe that the impeachment evidence contained in the October 16, 2007 interview transcript is not material under Brady because its impeachment value is limited and because other inculpatory evidence admitted at trial corroborated defendants’ guilt. Defendants identify several inconsistencies between the October 16, 2007 transcript and Murphy’s other statements, but many do not present new avenues for impeachment. For example, the October 16, 2007 transcript indicates that Murphy had previously been less certain about his identification of defendants than his trial testimony would suggest.” But defendants were aware of Murphy’s uncertainty. In the November 8, 2007 interview transcript, Murphy stated that he “couldn’t see [the shooters] really good” and that “[a]ll I did was turn around and take a glance.” And Murphy testified similarly at the preliminary examination that he had had “less than a minute,” perhaps “20 to 15 seconds,” to view the approaching shooters. These statements were substantially similar to Murphy’s statements from the October 16, 2007 interview that he could “[n]ot really” see the shooters’ faces clearly because “it was kinda dark” and that he would likely recognize the faces of the two shooters who had initially confronted him and Person but “[p]robably not” the other two.6
Given the substantial similarity of Murphy’s previous statements to the October 16, 2007 transcript, the October 16, 2007 transcript would not have added a new avenue for impeachment by the defense. With the information it was supplied from the November 8, 2007 interview and preliminary examination, the defense elicited testimony from Murphy regarding the brief time he was able to observe the shooters, and the defense successfully challenged Murphy’s claim of having a photographic memory through demonstrations of Murphy’s failure to recall appearances and outfits from trial and the day of the shooting. The addition of the October 16, 2007 interview transcript to this issue would not have introduced a new avenue for impeachment, and it would not have greatly increased the strength of the impeachment evidence that did exist such that the jury might have found Murphy’s testimony identifying defendants as the shooters incredible.
There is other impeachment evidence within the October 16, 2007 interview transcript that potentially would have presented new avenues for impeachment by the defense, including what time Murphy left the community center, the motive for the initial confrontation with defendants Christian and Hinton, what time the shooting occurred, whether the unknown girl was present during the shooting, whether Person was on a bicycle at the time of the shooting, and whether Person and Murphy were sitting or standing at the
However, I would emphasize that these new avenues for impeachment are still of a similar character as those that were presented at trial (i.e., asserting that Murphy’s narrative of events and identification were false because Murphy was not consistent in his reiteration of the shooting). The October 16, 2007 interview does not, for example, offer evidence that Murphy was not credible for other reasons, like that Murphy was testifying in exchange for leniency in a pending case or that other evidence demonstrates that Murphy’s narrative was impossible. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959) (wherein a witness’s attempt to obtain a plea deal before testifying was material).
Moreover, significant other inculpatory evidence was presented at trial that corroborated Murphy’s narrative. That inculpatory evidence included defendant Christian’s possession of a weapon involved in the shooting about one week later, Christian’s ex-girlfriend and witness to the shooting placing Christian at the scene of the shooting, Christian apologizing to her after the crime, Christian and defendant Edwards repeatedly soliciting their cellmate to murder Murphy, Christian admitting to his cellmate and to another acquaintance that he murdered Person, defendant Hinton stating to his former girlfriend that “his Uncle Kino [Christian] did the murder and also got him involved in the situation,” and Hinton and Christian’s suspicious phone call on the evening of the shooting. This inculpatory evidence is independent of Murphy’s testimony and is unaffected by the October 16, 2007 transcript’s potential for impeachment. And although the inculpatory evidence is independent of Murphy’s testimony, it does also bolster Murphy’s narrative. Notably, the trial judge, who personally and directly observed the admission of this evidence as well as Murphy’s testimony and therefore is better suited to judge Murphy’s credibility, concluded that the withholding of the evidence contained within the October 16, 2007 interview did not undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. See People v. Lemmon, 456 Mich. 625, 650 n.5 (1998) (M. F. CAVANAGH, J., concurring) (“The judge sees the witnesses, hears the testimony, and has a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.”) (quotation marks and citation
In sum, I believe that the October 16, 2007 interview transcript would not “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. Accordingly, I would not award defendants new trials on this basis.
IV. DEFENDANT HINTON’S ADDITIONAL CLAIM
In addition to his Brady claim, defendant Hinton also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call two alibi witnesses, Joanna Tedford and Anthony Williams. At trial, Hinton argued that he was not involved in or present at the shooting and had instead been at Tedford’s apartment. In support of that alibi, defendant Edwards testified that he saw Hinton in the parking lot near Tedford’s apartment between 7:45 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. Additionally, Mickey Jones testified that he saw Hinton leave Tedford’s apartment at some point after the shooting. However, the shooting occurred around 8:00 p.m., and neither of these witnesses could testify as to whether Hinton was at Tedford’s apartment at this exact time. And despite having filed an alibi notice before trial identifying Tedford herself as a witness, defense counsel never called Tedford. Hinton now asserts that Tedford would have testified that he was present in her apartment during the shooting. Regarding the potential testimony of Williams, Hinton argues that Williams would have testified, contrary to Murphy’s testimony, that
Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants
the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Hinton raised this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim within a motion for relief
from judgment. Generally speaking, a defendant may not raise in a motion for relief from
judgment “grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in a prior
appeal . . . .”
The Court of Appeals rejected Hinton’s claim, reasoning with regard to Tedford that appellate counsel had previously raised this claim on direct appeal—thus barring consideration under MCR 6.508(D)(2)—and that Tedford’s testimony was superfluous because Hinton’s alibi was established through the testimony of Jones and defendant Edwards instead. The Court of Appeals found Hinton’s argument with regard to Williams similarly meritless, reasoning that Williams’s testimony would not have challenged the prosecution’s witnesses.
I disagree, and I would have remanded for an evidentiary hearing to further develop the factual record on this argument. Although defense counsel on direct appeal did technically raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument as to Tedford, Hinton makes a convincing argument that defense counsel’s performance in that matter was deficient. Defense counsel initially moved for a remand in the Court of Appeals, but failed to identify any particular deficiency for which factual development was required. Accordingly, the motion was denied. Defense counsel subsequently filed a supplemental brief with more thorough argument, but failed to renew the motion to remand. Under these circumstances, I do not believe the procedural bar of MCR 6.508(D)(2) should apply.
To be clear, I express no opinion regarding whether Hinton should receive relief pursuant to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument. However, considering the circumstances of the direct appeal, I believe Hinton has made a sufficient offer of proof to warrant an evidentiary hearing to further develop the record.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the prosecution in this case failed to disclose Murphy’s October 16, 2007 interview transcript to defendants before trial, there is not a reasonable probability that, had defendants received this evidence, the trial result would have been different. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the withheld evidence was material, and I would not grant new trials to defendants. I would, however, remand for an evidentiary hearing to further explore defendant Hinton’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.
Brian K. Zahra
David F. Viviano