PENNSYLVANIA v. LABRON
No. 95-1691
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided July 1, 1996
518 U.S. 938
*Together with No. 95-1738, Pennsylvania v. Kilgore, also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court.
In these two cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
In Labron, No. 95-1691, police observed respondent Labron and others engaging in a series of drug transactions on a street in Philadelphia. The police arrested the suspects, searched the trunk of a car from which the drugs had been produced, and found bags containing cocaine. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the trial court (but not with the intermediate court of appeals, 428 Pa. Super. 616, 626 A. 2d 646 (1993), whose judgment it reversed) that this evidence should be suppressed. 543 Pa. 86, 669 A. 2d 917 (1995). After surveying our precedents on the automobile exception as well as some of its own decisions, the court “conclude[d] that this Commonwealth‘s jurisprudence of the automobile exception has long required both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.” Id., at 100, 669 A. 2d, at 924. Satisfied the police had time to secure a warrant, id., at 100-103, 669 A. 2d, at 924-925, the court held that “the warrantless search of this stationary vehicle violated constitutional guarantees,” id., at 101, 669 A. 2d, at 924.
In Kilgore, No. 95-1738, an undercover informant agreed to buy drugs from respondent Randy Lee Kilgore‘s accomplice, Kelly Jo Kilgore. To obtain the drugs, Kelly Jo drove from the parking lot where the deal was made to a farmhouse where she met with Randy Kilgore and obtained the drugs. After the drugs were delivered and the Kilgores were arrested, police searched the farmhouse with the consent of its owner and also searched Randy Kilgore‘s pickup truck; they had seen the Kilgores walking to and from the truck, which was parked in the driveway of the farmhouse. The search turned up cocaine on the truck‘s floor. The trial court denied Randy Kilgore‘s motion to suppress the cocaine, holding the officers had probable cause to make the search.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the rule permitting warrantless searches of automobiles is limited to cases where “‘unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile [are] coupled with the presence of probable cause.‘” 543 Pa., at 100, 669 A. 2d, at 924, quoting Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 53, 669 A. 2d 896, 901 (1995) (emphasis deleted). This was incorrect. Our first cases establishing the automobile exception to the
Respondent Labron claims we have no jurisdiction to review the judgment in his case because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‘s opinion rests on an adequate and independ-
Respondent Labron‘s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted, the judgments of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting.
The decisions that the Court summarily reverses today are two of a trilogy of cases decided by the Pennsylvania Su-
In its per curiam decision, this Court concludes that because the decision in Labron cited state decisions which in turn referred to two 25-year-old cases of this Court, any reference to state law is “interwoven with the federal law.” Ante, at 941 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040 (1983)). These references, however, seem to me a rather short thread with which to weave—let alone upon which to hang—our jurisdiction.
The decision begins with the proposition, not at issue here, that “the
Rather than follow the developments of federal law, however, the decision then specifically and immediately notes that “[w]hen reviewing warrantless automobile searches in this Commonwealth, we have constantly held that ‘there is no “automobile exception” as such and [that] the constitutional protections are applicable to searches and seizures of a person‘s car.’ Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 103, 389 A. 2d 101, 106 (1978) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
Because White was issued on the same day as Labron and reached an identical conclusion regarding the “exigent circumstances” rule, that decision is worth reviewing. In White, the court hesitated before considering the merits of the case “to address the Commonwealth‘s claim that White has waived his claim that the search of his automobile was illegal under
Having established the importance of the state constitutional claim to the defendant‘s argument, White went on to discuss the “exigent circumstance” exception at issue here in light of both federal and state law. And although the court‘s analysis relied upon our decision in Chambers v. Maroney, it cited none of the subsequent cases in which this Court has effectively converted the “automobile exception” into an absolute rule allowing searches in the presence of probable cause. See 543 Pa., at 49-53, 669 A. 2d, at 899-901; n. 6, infra (noting that the Pennsylvania courts’ failure to refer to this Court‘s subsequent decisions in this area may be intentional rather than ignorant). Stressing the independent evaluation it makes of its State Constitution, the Pennsylvania court also rejected our decision in New York v. Belton,
Notably, the Commonwealth has not asked this Court to review the Pennsylvania court‘s decision in White, even though the search in that case would be affirmed under the Commonwealth‘s and this Court‘s understanding of Pennsylvania‘s holding regarding exigent circumstances. I also note that lower state courts have explicitly read White as establishing a state constitutional right, not a federal right. Commonwealth v. Haskins, 450 Pa. Super. 540, 545, 677 A. 2d 328, 330 (1996) (“In order to search an automobile without a warrant, the police must still show the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A. 2d 896 (1995). . . . In White, our Supreme Court reiterated that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires such a showing“); see also Commonwealth v. Yedinak, 450 Pa. Super. 352, 359, n. 5, 676 A. 2d 1217, 1220, n. 5 (1996) (“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution with regard to automobile searches in Commonwealth v. White“).
The lower courts’ understanding regarding the state-law nature of White—and my understanding regarding the state-law nature of Labron as well—is almost perfectly reflected in the dissents to each case that were penned by Justice Castille. In both instances, Justice Castille recognizes, even more explicitly than the majority, that the decisions were based on state law.
In Labron, for instance, his main point was that the defendant had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of
In White, Justice Castille stated that he believed that “the automobile exception to the warrant requirements of this Commonwealth should be a per se rule regardless of how much time police may have to obtain a warrant,” 543 Pa., at 70, 669 A. 2d, at 909 (emphasis added), and he further concluded that he would “urge the adoption of a bright line rule that would allow warrantless searches of all automobiles for which police have independent probable cause,” id., at 71, 669 A. 2d, at 909-910. Of course, if Justice Castille were interpreting federal, rather than state, law, he would not have the luxury of “urging the adoption” of a particular rule.5
Having reviewed the range of the Pennsylvania courts’ statements regarding the source of the “exigent circumstances” rule, it is worthwhile to review this Court‘s understanding of when a state decision is based on adequate and independent state grounds. In Michigan v. Long, the Court adopted a “plain statement” rule for determining whether a state decision rested on “independent and adequate” state-law grounds. “[B]ecause of [our] respect for state courts,
Given the explicit and nearly exclusive references to state law that I review above, it seems to me that the Court‘s decision to take jurisdiction in Labron not only extends Michigan v. Long beyond its original scope, but stands its rationale on its head. Labron does not rest “primarily” on federal law; as Justice Castille understood it, as the briefing in White understood it, and as the Commonwealth‘s decision to stay out of White demonstrates, every indication is that the rule adopted in Labron and White rests primarily on state law. Nor are these holdings “interwoven” with federal law: Both Labron and White cite only two federal cases, both over a quarter-century old; rather than implicitly conclude that the absence of any reference to more recent decisions is due to poor legal research, I would trust the Pennsylvania courts’ ability to understand and choose to deviate from our federal law. Certainly it would be a more respectful approach, in a case where the question is as close as it is in this case, to conclude that the State had made a conscious decision to depart from the jurisprudence of this Court rather than an error of law.6
To this end, I find it particularly interesting that only two Pennsylvania courts have cited the decision in California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386 (1985), upon which the per curiam decision relies as modern support for its interpretation of federal constitutional law. See Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 443 Pa. Super. 616, 632-634, 662 A. 2d 1131, 1139 (1995); Commonwealth v. Camacho, 425 Pa. Super. 567, 625 A. 2d 1242 (1995). Each of those decisions expressly noted the presence of conflict between federal and state law on this issue.
In Camacho, the Superior Court noted “the discrepancy between some of the Commonwealth‘s past cases and federal cases which speak to automobile searches” in cases like those at issue here. Id., at 576, n. 2, 625 A. 2d, at 1247, n. 2. After reviewing the holding in Carney, the court noted that the state cases concluding that there was no per se “‘automobile exception‘” were “simply dated and not in keeping with the tenor of current law.” 425 Pa. Super., at 577, n. 2, 625 A. 2d, at 1247, n. 2.
The court in Rosenfelt reached an alternative explanation for the conflict—and a result identical to that reached in the cases reversed by the Court today. There, the defendant agreed that the search of the vehicle was not illegal under federal law. Citing Carney, the court noted that the federal “automobile exception” had “jettison[ed]” the requirement of exigency, essentially converting the exception into a per se rule allowing a search once probable cause exists. See 443 Pa. Super., at 633, 644-645, 662 A. 2d, at 1139, 1145. Noting that the State Constitution could extend greater protections to Pennsylvania citizens than did the Federal Constitution, but that its Supreme Court had not yet decided whether that was the case, the Superior Court went on to review the issue on its own and found a state constitutional violation. Ibid. After it decided the cases at issue here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth‘s appeal. See 544 Pa. 605, 674 A. 2d 1070 (1996) (table).
The nature of the Pennsylvania court‘s reliance on federal law in these cases, therefore, is quite different from that which spurred the Court to conclude in Michigan v. Long that the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court had not relied on adequate and independent state grounds. There, as the Court noted, the decision below “referred twice to the State Constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on federal law.” 463 U. S., at 1037 (emphasis
For these reasons, just as the decision in White would not merit summary reversal were it before this Court, the decision in Labron should not be summarily reversed. Although Labron and White both touch upon, and even place some historical reliance upon, federal search and seizure law, each also recognizes the broad interpretation that the Pennsylvania court has given its own constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches. I therefore seriously ques-
While Kilgore relies more explicitly on the Federal Constitution than the other two decisions, it decided the identical issue that was decided in Labron and White only three days before those decisions issued. The reference to the Federal Constitution upon which the Court rests its jurisdiction—only one of two references to federal law—must be read in the context of the other two decisions, each of which relied heavily upon the Commonwealth‘s own Constitution. In light of Labron and White, the judgment in Kilgore will almost certainly remain the same on remand. In such a circumstance, the rationales supporting the rule of Michigan v. Long simply do not support the decision to reverse. The petition in Kilgore should simply be denied.
On many prior occasions, I have noted the unfortunate effects of the rule of Michigan v. Long. See, e. g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 266-267 (1989) (concurring opinion); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 689-708 (1986) (dissenting opinion); Montana v. Hall, 481 U. S. 400, 411 (1987) (per curiam) (dissenting opinion); Ponte v. Real, 471 U. S. 491, 501-503 (1985) (opinion concurring in part); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 24, 31-34 (1995) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Because the state-law ground supporting these judgments is so much clearer than has been true on most prior occasions, see n. 5, supra, these decisions exacerbate those effects to a nearly intolerable degree. Particularly in light of my understanding of this Court‘s primary role—“to protect the rights of the individual that are embodied in the Federal Constitution,” Harris, 489 U. S., at 267—the decision to summarily reverse state decisions resting tenuously at best on federal grounds is imprudent and entirely inconsistent “with the sound administration of this Court‘s discretionary docket.” Ponte, 471 U. S., at 502-503.
These harms are particularly unnecessary given the likely result on remand. To reinvigorate the privacy protections extended to Pennsylvania citizens under Labron, Kilgore, and White, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court need only set forth the appropriate talismanic language and state, even more clearly than it already has, that the “Commonwealth‘s jurisprudence of the automobile exception [requires] both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.” Labron, 543 Pa., at 100, 669 A. 2d, at 924 (emphasis added).8 While the
I respectfully dissent.