Patterson v. TylerPatterson v. Tyler
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below:
Jeffery W. Cavender
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Date: July 1, 2026
Mr. Daniels’s Complaint asserts two judgments he obtained against Mr. Tyler in 2008 and 2009 were not discharged in Mr. Tyler’s 2011 chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he raises two theories in support of his position. First, he contends the debts were not discharged under
The Court heard a full day of testimony on April 8, 2026, with respect to the Complaint and the Motion. After considering the pleadings, the testimony offered, the evidence admitted, the record in this adversary proceeding and the underlying bankruptcy case,2 and the arguments of the parties presented at the trial, the Court will deny the relief requested in the Complaint and grant in part and deny in part the relief requested in the Motion for the reasons that follow.3
I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to
II. MATERIAL FACTS
A. Underlying Bankruptcy Case
Mr. Tyler filed the underlying bankruptcy case on March 28, 2011, as a chapter 13 proceeding. The list of creditors attached to the petition included “Tyree Patterson”
Throughout the entirety of the bankruptcy case, the clerk’s office served notices and filings to Mr. Daniels at 7868 Cofax, and Mr. Tyler never amended his list of creditors. The present issues arose thirteen years after Mr. Tyler’s discharge when Mr. Daniels moved to reopen the bankruptcy case, asserting he was not properly scheduled in the case, had no knowledge of the case until 2024, and holds two prepetition judgments against Mr. Tyler that are nondischargeable under
B. The Trial
At trial, both parties testified and answered questions by each other and the Court.
Mr. Daniels’s evidence consisted mostly of testimony and exhibits regarding the two judgments he received against Mr. Tyler in 2008 and 2009. Mr. Daniels testified that the first judgment for $528 was for harassment regarding ten messages Mr. Tyler sent him. On October 16, 2008, Mr. Daniels filed a lawsuit against Mr. Tyler in the City of Richmond General District Court, Civil Division. Mr. Daniels introduced into evidence a document titled “Warrant in Debt (Civil Claim for Money)” which appears to be a court summons. [Doc. No. 41, Ex. 38-1.] The document contains what appears to be a few factual allegations handwritten by Mr. Daniels, but they are mostly illegible. [Id.] The document also appears to include the handwritten judgment of the state court for $528 entered on December 16, 2008. [Id.] The judgment includes no factual findings of any kind and was entered after Mr. Tyler failed to appear. [Id.] The document contains several handwritten words circled on it,
As to the second judgment for $1,500, Mr. Daniels testified that Mr. Tyler filed a lawsuit against him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois in 2008. [See case no. 2008-MI-191956.] Mr. Daniels testified he has been a practicing attorney for 23 years and previously represented Mr. Tyler. Mr. Daniels filed a counterclaim in the action for past attorney’s fees owed by Mr. Tyler. When Mr. Tyler initially filed the case, he served Mr. Daniels at a mailing address of 7944 S. Escanaba Avenue, Chicago, Illinois (“7944 Escanaba”). Although Mr. Daniels testified 7944 Escanaba was a family property and he did not live there, he did not contest service. At that time, Mr. Daniels lived at 609 Westover Hills Boulevard, Richmond, Virginia (“609 Westover”). On May 13, 2009, the state court entered a judgment on Mr. Daniels’s counterclaim, awarding him $1,500. [Doc. No. 41, Ex. 38-3; Doc. No. 35, p. 22.]
After entry of these judgments, the parties’ friendship was on and off at various times. At the time Mr. Tyler filed bankruptcy in 2011, Mr. Daniels testified the pair had not been friends, while Mr. Tyler testified they were friends. Because they were often not in communication with each other, Mr. Daniels testified that he forgot about the judgments until 2024.5 Before he was aware of the bankruptcy, Mr. Daniels revived both judgments. On January 31, 2024, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered orders for revival of the judgments regarding his $1,500 judgment with accrued interest of $3,715.49 and his $528 judgment with accrued interest of $1,372.17. [Doc. No. 35, p. 22, 27, 143; see case nos. 2009-MI-501004 and 2008-MI 191956.] Subsequently, on March 26, 2024, and June 5, 2024, Mr. Daniels filed notices and affidavits in Georgia to register the revived judgments in the Superior Courts of Fulton County and Douglas County. [Doc. No. 35, p. 5, 19, 20, 23; see case nos. 24CV003762 & 24CV00953.] The Superior Court of Fulton County registered the judgment from the Circuit Court of Cook County in the amount of $1,500 on August 12, 2024. [See case no. 24CV003762.] In response to the Douglas County action, on November 7, 2024, Mr. Tyler filed a Motion to Deny and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Proposed Order to Domesticate Foreign Judgment and attached the discharge order from his 2011 bankruptcy. [Doc. No. 35, p. 100–102; Doc. No. 32, Ex. 10, case no. 24CV00953.]
Mr. Daniels testified that this was the first time he learned about Mr. Tyler’s
On June 18, 2025, Mr. Daniels filed affidavits for Writs of Fieri Facias in the Superior Court of Douglas County. [See case no. 24CV00953.] On November 28, 2025, Mr. Daniels filed a lien in Illinois against the 16838 Wausau property. [Doc. No. 35, p. 24–5.] The judgment lien states it is in satisfaction of both judgments, which now total $8,399.89 with accrued interest. [Id.] 16838 Wausau was first owned by Mr. Tyler’s mother, Mary Ann Reed. On January 27, 2023, Ms. Reed transferred half her interest to Mr. Tyler as joint tenant. [Doc. No. 32, Ex. 16.] A second deed dated September 15, 2025, reflects Mr. Tyler transferring his interest in the property back to Ms. Reed. [Doc. No. 35, p. 56.] During the trial, Mr. Tyler testified that he has never owned the property at 16838 Wausau, he is only listed as the beneficiary for his mother. He further testified that the actions which he alleges violate his discharge order have caused him emotional distress.
With respect to the address for Mr. Daniels that Mr. Tyler used in his bankruptcy schedules, Mr. Daniels testified that he lived on Cofax around 2003 to 2004 for only a few months, but he lived at 7838 Cofax, not 7868 Cofax. He further testified that he did not know Mr. Tyler when he lived on Cofax. Both parties agreed that Mr. Daniels lived on Cofax, at some point in time, with another individual, Joseph McClure. Mr. Tyler testified that he knew Mr. Daniels lived at 7868 Cofax at
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Discharged Debts
i. Incorrect Address
The Complaint asserts that Mr. Daniels holds two state-court judgments against Mr. Tyler that are nondischargeable under
neither listed nor scheduled under
section 521(a)(1) of this title , with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit—(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph
(2) ,(4) , or(6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing; or(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph
(2) ,(4) , or(6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request.
The debtor bears the initial duty to properly schedule his creditors. See Oxford Video, Inc. v. Walker (In re Walker), 125 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990).
Mr. Daniels alleges that Mr. Tyler, although listing Mr. Daniels as a creditor, intentionally provided an incorrect address for Mr. Daniels so that he would not receive notice of the bankruptcy or the Court’s notices in time to file a dischargeability complaint. Mr. Tyler asserts he provided notice by listing Mr. Daniels as a creditor with an address of 7868 Cofax. During the trial, Mr. Daniels testified he never lived at 7868 Cofax and is not aware of what is at that address. He also testified about two other addresses which Mr. Tyler was aware of and could have used. First, Mr. Daniels testified that in previous years he lived at 609 Westover in Virginia. His testimony, however, makes clear that he lived in Virginia from September 2008 until April 2009, around two years before Mr. Tyler filed the underlying bankruptcy case in 2011. The state court documents listing 609 Westover as Mr. Daniels’s address are all from 2008 and 2009. [Doc. No. 32, Ex. 38-1, 38-2, 38-3.] Second, Mr. Daniels testified that Mr. Tyler was aware of Mr. Daniels’s address at 7944 Escanaba in Illinois. When Mr. Tyler sued Mr. Daniels in 2008 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, he served Mr. Daniels at 7944 Escanaba, and Mr. Daniels did not contest service. Several state court documents list this address for Mr. Daniels, both before and after Mr. Tyler’s petition date. [Doc. No. 32, Ex. 38-4, 38-5.] Although he testified that this address was family property and he never lived there, this address was known to Mr. Tyler through the various state court documents, and he was aware Mr. Daniels previously accepted service at this address.
Lastly, Mr. Daniels testified that he once lived on Cofax at a different address number. During cross-examination, Mr. Daniels stated he lived at 7838 Cofax around
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Daniels met his burden of establishing that the address listed for him in the creditor matrix was inaccurate and did not give him notice of the bankruptcy case. No evidence before the Court establishes that 7868 Cofax was a proper address for Mr. Daniels at the time of Mr. Tyler’s bankruptcy case. Having determined that Mr. Daniels met his burden of establishing that the address listed for him in the creditor matrix was inaccurate, the Court now considers the dischargeability of the underlying debts under
ii. Dischargeability Under § 523(a)(3)
Mr. Daniels’s first claim for nondischargeability rests on
The Court first addresses whether Mr. Daniels had actual knowledge in time to file an action. Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have long held that a creditor’s actual knowledge of a case is “sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process requirements.” Ford Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Sure Card, Inc., 180 B.R. 294, 295 (S.D. Fla. 1994). This prevents a creditor who knew about the bankruptcy case but did not receive proper notice, “from standing back, allowing the bankruptcy action to proceed without adjudication of his claim, and then asserting that the debt owed [to] him is [non]dischargeable.” Washington v. Abreu (In re Abreu), No. 19-5301, 2021 WL 346112, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2021) (quoting Byrd v. Alton (In re Alton), 837 F.2d 457, 460 (11th Cir. 1988)). The creditor must have knowledge in time to timely file a complaint regarding dischargeability. See id. Pursuant to
The Court concludes that Mr. Tyler failed to carry his burden of establishing Mr. Daniels had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to either file a proof of claim (if such a deadline existed) or to file a nondischargeability action. The only evidence presented to the Court regarding actual knowledge is Mr. Daniels’s testimony that he was not aware of the bankruptcy case until November 2024, when Mr. Tyler responded to Mr. Daniels’s notices to register the judgments in Georgia.
After receiving notice, Mr. Daniels moved to reopen the bankruptcy case to file this adversary proceeding. The Court concludes that Mr. Tyler failed to establish that Mr. Daniels had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to file a proof of claim or a nondischargeability action.
Whether
In short, 246 claims are debts arising from fraud (
The creditor must prove nondischargeability by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.;
Analyzing the underlying judgments does not support a conclusion that they were based on willful and malicious injuries. Mr. Daniels alleges that the judgment for $528 was granted for “the intentional tort of harassment (which was willful and malicious under the circumstances).” [Compl. ¶ 22.] While Mr. Daniels testified that he received ten messages from Mr. Tyler which he categorizes as harassment and willful conduct, his evidence is insufficient for the Court to find that judgment resulted from a willful and malicious injury. First, Mr. Daniels put forward no evidence of Mr. Tyler intentionally causing injury. Even if Mr. Tyler’s ten messages to Mr. Daniels were intentional, Mr. Daniels failed to show they were delivered with the purpose of causing harm or knowingly done with substantial certainty of harm. Mr. Daniels’s evidence to establish willful and malicious conduct consists of the document titled “Warrant in Debt (Civil Claim for Money)” (Doc. No. 41, Ex. 38-1) and the Richmond Police Department incident report (Id., Ex. 38-2). The Warrant in Debt document includes the handwritten judgment of the City of Richmond General District Court, Civil Division, for $528, but the judgment includes no factual findings of any kind. The only information this document provides the Court is mostly illegible handwritten notes by Mr. Daniels including the circled words “harassment” and “tortious injury damages.” [Id., Ex. 38-1.] As for the incident report, it merely states that “[t]he victim is receiving annoying phone calls from a known person.” [Id., Ex. 38-2.] The state court’s finding of tortious injury damages, the incident report with
Second, Mr. Daniels failed to put forward evidence of malice, either showing Mr. Tyler’s actions were excessive or without just cause. The only evidence the Court has before it is his testimony that he received ten messages, one of which allegedly contained a death threat. Allegations of death threats were not supported by any physical evidence and were contradicted by the police report which references only “annoying phone calls.” [Id., Ex. 38-2.] Finding the messages “annoying” is not enough, and Mr. Daniels failed to provide any other additional evidence to support his contention that the judgment for harassment resulted from a willful and malicious injury under
As for the $1,500 judgment, Mr. Daniels does not contend that it is a 246 claim at all. The only evidence relative to the basis of the $1,500 judgment is testimony of Mr. Daniels that it was for unpaid legal work Mr. Daniels performed on behalf of Mr. Tyler. Mr. Daniels’s only argument is that Mr. Tyler’s intentional failure to provide his correct address in the bankruptcy case “robbed” him of the opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy case, including objecting to Mr. Tyler’s discharge for failing to disclose certain assets. The Court, however, addresses this argument below
The Court finds that Mr. Daniels established Mr. Tyler used an incorrect address and failed to provide him with timely notice of the bankruptcy filing. Despite the incorrect address, Mr. Daniels failed to establish the underlying debts are excepted from discharge under
iii. Dischargeability Under Baitcher
In Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986), the Eleventh Circuit implemented a judicially created supplement to
At trial, Mr. Tyler testified that he believed 7868 Cofax was where Mr. Daniels was living at the time he filed bankruptcy in 2011. Further, he stated that Mr.
Baitcher provides no basis to conclude the two judgments are nondischargeable despite the incorrect address, and Mr. Daniels failed to establish the underlying debts were excepted from discharge under
B. Discharge Violations
Because the Court finds that the two judgment debts were discharged, the Court must consider whether Mr. Daniels’s actions violated
i. Violation of Discharge Injunction
To determine whether Mr. Daniels violated the discharge injunction, the Court must first consider two threshold matters: 1) whether Mr. Daniels had notice of the discharge; and 2) whether Mr. Daniels intended the actions which violated the discharge injunction. See Green Point Credit, LLC v. McLean (In re McLean), 794 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]o find contempt, the bankruptcy court needed only to find that [creditor] was aware of the discharge injunction and intended the action that violated it . . . .”). There can be no dispute that Mr. Daniels became aware of the discharge by no later than November 7, 2024, when Mr. Tyler filed a Motion to Deny and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Proposed Order to Domesticate Foreign Judgment in the Superior Court of Douglas County (Doc. No. 35, p. 100–102; Doc. No. 32, Ex. 10). Thus, any action taken after November 7, 2024, was done with actual knowledge of Mr. Tyler’s discharge. The record contains no evidence that Mr. Daniels had knowledge of the discharge prior to November 7, 2024.
(a) A discharge in a case under this title
. . .
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived
. . . .
In determining what constitutes a violation of the discharge injunction, the Eleventh Circuit has found that
The Court first considers Mr. Daniels‘s continuation of the Superior Courts of Fulton County and Douglas County actions to register the judgments once he learned of Mr. Tyler‘s discharge on November 7, 2024.
Further, because the Court finds that the underlying judgment debts were discharged, any act to collect against them is void. “[A]n act in violation of the discharge injunction is void.” Wagabaza v. Beveridge (In re Wagabaza), 582 B.R. 486, 498 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2018); see also Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Gurrola (In re Gurrola), 328 B.R. 158, 171 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“Once the discharge was entered . . . any judgment that [creditor] at any time obtained on the discharged debt would automatically be rendered ‘void’ by
ii. Fair Ground of Doubt
Not every violation of a debtor‘s discharge injunction entitles a debtor to contempt sanctions. The Supreme Court in Taggart v. Lorenzon, 587 U.S. 554 (2019) held that a court may impose sanctions for a discharge order violation only if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor‘s conduct. In other words, there must be no reasonably objective basis for concluding that the creditor‘s conduct might be lawful. “[A] good-faith belief that an action taken does not violate the discharge injunction will not shield a party if the belief is not objectively reasonable.” In re Cowan, No. 18-54666, 2020 WL 7330049, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2020). The burden to establish a fair ground of doubt as to whether the actions violated the discharge injunction rests upon Mr. Daniels. See In re McIntosh, 657 B.R. at 292.
The first discharge violation is the continuation of the action to register the judgments in the Superior Court of Douglas County. Mr. Daniels‘s evidence consists of an order entered in the Superior Court of Douglas County that addressed Mr. Tyler‘s bankruptcy discharge (Doc. No. 32, Ex. 12). In response to Mr. Tyler‘s motion to deny Mr. Daniels‘s proposed order to domesticate the judgments which referenced his discharge, the Superior Court of Douglas County denied Mr. Tyler‘s motion,
Considering, first, Mr. Tyler used the wrong address for Mr. Daniels, second, Mr. Daniels had no knowledge of the discharge at the time he sought to register the judgments on June 5, 2024, and third, the Superior Court of Douglas County continued the action despite the discharge, the Court concludes Mr. Daniels had an objectively reasonable basis to believe his actions were permitted. Mr. Daniels believed the two judgments were nondischargeable under
Whether Mr. Daniels had a fair ground of doubt when filing the judgment lien against the 16838 Wausau property presents a more difficult question. Mr. Daniels filed the lien November 28, 2025, seven months after he initiated this adversary proceeding and nearly a year after learning about Mr. Tyler‘s discharge. He initiated this adversary proceeding requesting that the Court find the two judgment debts nondischargeable and proceeded to take action to collect on the judgments at the same time. On one hand, filing this adversary proceeding arguably did not, in and of itself, remove the fair ground of doubt, and Mr. Daniels could still have an objectively reasonable belief that the judgment debts were nondischargeable for the same reasons explained above. However, creditors should not be enforcing their debts that are the subject of pending dischargeability actions, and they do so at their own peril. “Requiring the party subject to the injunction to bring a legal challenge before
Ultimately, the Court need not make this difficult determination because, even assuming there was no fair ground of doubt when Mr. Daniels filed the lien against 16838 Wausau, Mr. Tyler failed to prove any recoverable damages and sanctions against Mr. Daniels are not appropriate for the reasons set forth below.
iii. Sanctions and Damages
Although
At trial, Mr. Tyler presented no evidence of out-of-pocket monetary expenses resulting from the discharge violations, and he has no attorney‘s fees as a pro se party. He also presented insufficient evidence to recover damages for emotional distress. For emotional distress damages “a plaintiff must (1) suffer significant emotional distress, (2) clearly establish the significant emotional distress, and (3) demonstrate a causal connection between that significant emotional distress and the violation of the [discharge injunction].” Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271. Generally, a party must also produce corroborating evidence to establish significant emotional distress. Steed v. GSRAN-Z LLC (In re Steed), 2021 WL 1186482, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2021). Mr. Tyler presented no testimony or corroborating evidence to warrant emotional distress damages. He testified that Mr. Daniels‘s action of filing the judgment lien caused him emotional distress but provided no other testimony or evidence. Accordingly, the Court will not impose compensatory sanctions for actual damages, including emotional distress damages.
The Court has no evidence of losses sustained by Mr. Tyler and does not believe monetary sanctions against Mr. Daniels are appropriate under the unique facts and circumstances of this case. Mr. Daniels was not given proper notice of the bankruptcy, he did not learn of the existence of the discharge until twelve years after its entry, and he promptly filed an action in this Court seeking a determination of dischargeability. However, the Court must make clear that Mr. Daniels violated the discharge injunction. Mr. Tyler‘s Motion will be granted in part, and the lien attached to 16838 Wausau and any other liens associated with the renewed judgments are declared void, and Mr. Daniels will be ordered to take all necessary steps to have any judgment liens cancelled of record and any pending litigation relating to the judgments dismissed with prejudice. Since the Court finds the debts discharged and Mr. Daniels is now on notice of this finding, any further collection efforts would be a violation of this Court‘s discharge order and will result in a different outcome under Taggart if the parties find themselves here again. The judgments in question were discharged, and further collection efforts on them are prohibited.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Tyler‘s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED as to Mr. Tyler‘s request to have the lien attached to 16838 Wausau and any other liens associated with the renewed judgments declared void. Any renewals of the original judgments entered by the City of Richmond General District Court, Civil Division for $528, and the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois for $1,500, as well as the recording of any judgment liens related thereto, are void by virtue of the discharge injunction issued by this Court. Mr. Daniels is ordered and directed to take all necessary steps to have any liens associated with the judgments cancelled of record and any pending litigation relating to the judgments dismissed with prejudice. This Order may be recorded in the real estate records of any state, county, or municipality to effectuate the intent and purpose of this Order. The Motion is DENIED as to all other forms of relief not specified above.
The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Mr. Tyler, Mr. Daniels, and the Chapter 7 Trustee.
END OF DOCUMENT