Donald Pate, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18AP-142
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
March 19, 2019
2019-Ohio-949
KLATT, P.J.; BROWN and SADLER, JJ., concur.
(Ct. of Cl. No. 2017-211) (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
On brief: Donald Pate, Jr., pro se.
On brief: [Dave Yost], Attorney General, and Howard H. Harcha IV, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
KLATT, P.J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, Donald Pate, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC“).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{2} On March 7, 2017, Pate, an inmate at the Warren Correctional Institution (“WCI“), filed a complaint against ODRC. In the complaint, Pate alleged that he was assaulted by Jason Goudlock, another inmate at WCI. He stated the Goudloсk used a clothing iron to beat him in the head and face. He claimed that ODRC negligently provided Goudlock access to the clothing iron without securing or fixing it to any part of the standing
{3} ODRC filed an answer on March 30, 2017. In December, ODRC filed a motion for summary judgment. It argued that it could not be held liable for the intentional attack by Goudlock on Pate becausе it did not have notice of any conflict between the two inmates. In support of it motion, ODRC submitted two affidavits. Greg Craft, employed by ODRC as a warden‘s assistant, stated in his affidavit that inmates are provided with acсess to a clothes iron as part of the day-room activities. An inmate must present an ID card to a corrections officer to obtain an iron and ironing board. Craft also stated that following the incident between Goudlock and Pate, a separation order was issued to prevent Goudlock and Pate from being housed in the same unit. Goudlock was ultimately transferred to another institution.
{4} In the secоnd affidavit, Janet Smith, employed as a corrections specialist at WCI by ODRC, stated that she has access to inmates’ entire records. According to her, Pate and Goudlock were housed in the same unit at Ross Correctional Institution from July 25, 2016 through October 30, 2016. They both arrived at WCI on December 5, 2016. Neither Pate nor Goudlock had filed any complaints or grievances alleging misconduct by or fear of the other. Both inmates had filed complaints and grievances in the past demonstrating they were aware of the procedures. Smith stated that there was nothing in either file to alert ODRC of a possible conflict between the inmates.
{5} Pate opposed the motion for summary judgment. He argued that ODRC was aware that clothes irons could be dangerous. In two different level three prisons, clothes irons were securеd to the standing structure of the prison to prevent the iron from being used as a weapon. WCI, however, did not employ such safety measures. Pate argues that the crucial question is whether ODRC had a duty to exercise reasonable safety measures to secure the clothes iron to prevent its use in an assault. In support of his memorandum in opposition, Goudlock submitted his own affidavit and the affidavit of Seаn Swain, a fellow inmate at WCI.
{6} In his affidavit, Pate alleges that Goudlock had not exchanged his ID for the clothes iron and that WCI staff had not realized that the clothes iron was missing and that
{7} The trial court granted ODRC‘s motion for summary judgment. It stated that the crux of the case concerned the intentional attack on Pate. The trial court found that Pate did not offer any evidence to rebut ODRC‘s evidence that it lacked notice of a potential attack. Without notice, ODRC could not be held liable for Goudlock‘s actions.
II. The Appeal
{8} Pate appeals and assigns the following the error:
The Court committed error prejudicial to the Common-law rights of Appellant with granting summary judgment to Appellee.
{9} A trial court must grant summary judgment under
{10} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The moving party does not discharge this initial burden under
{11} For an inmate to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) ODRC owed him a duty, (2) ODRC breached that duty, and (3) ODRC‘s breach proximately caused his injuries. Briscoe v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1109, 2003-Ohio-3533, ¶ 20, citing Macklin v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-293, 2002-Ohio-5069. “In the context of a custodial relationship between the state and its inmates, the state owes a common-law duty of reasonable care and protection from unreasonable risks of physical harm.” McElfresh v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-177, 2004-Ohio-5545, ¶ 16, citing Woods v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 130 Ohio App.3d 742, 744-45 (10th Dist.1998). “Reasonable care is that degree of caution and foresight an ordinarily prudent person would employ in similar circumstances.” McElfresh at ¶ 16. The state‘s duty of reasonable care, however, does not render it an insurer of inmate safety. Williams v. S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 67 Ohio App.3d 517, 526 (10th Dist.1990), citing Clemets v. Heston, 20 Ohio App.3d 132 (6th Dist.1985). But, “once [the state] becomes aware of a dangerous condition it must take reasonable care to prevent injury to the inmate.” Briscoe at ¶ 20.
{12} The law is wеll-settled in this district with regard to ODRC‘s liability for an assault by one inmate against another. As this court recently explained:
When one inmate attacks another inmate, “actionable negligence arises only whеre prison officials had adequate notice of an impending attack.” Metcalf v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-292, 2002-Ohio-5082, ¶ 11. This notice may be actual or constructive. Id. The distinction between actual and constructive notice is “the manner in which the notice is obtained rather than the amount of information obtained.” Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 9. “Actual notice exists where the information was personally communicated to or received by the party.” Id. Constructive
notice ” ‘is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to givе notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice.’ ” Id., quoting Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1052, 2010-Ohio-4736, ¶ 14. “Whether ODRC had or did not have notice is a question that depends on all the factual circumstances involved.” Frash v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-932, 2016-Ohio-3134, ¶ 11.
Skorvanek v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-222, 2018-Ohio-3870, ¶ 29.
{13} On appeal, Pate аrgues that ODRC should be determined to have actual or constructive notice of an impending attack by inmates because he is incarcerated in a “tier 3A level” institution which houses violent inmates. He contends that ODRC also had notice supplying an unsecured “Class 2 tool Iron” without supervision created a dangerous condition because other institutions fasten clothes irons to the structure of the prison for the protection of inmates and employees. Pate also alleges the affidavits ODRC submitted in support of summary judgment were false because ODRC only allows policy or procedure violation on informal complaints and grievances. He complains that the trial court‘s decision removes any common-law or statutory duty from ODRC.
{14} The record in this case fails to present any evidence indicating that ODRC received actual notice that Gouldock would attack Pate. Pate does not claim that he or any other inmate informed ODRC that Goudlock was threatening any type of violence. Instead, Pate‘s arguments indicate that ODRC should be charged with constructive knowledge of an attack because WCI allowed inmates to have access to unsecured clothes irons and because WCI houses violent inmates. We disagree. The general nature of the prison and the use of an unsecured clothes iron as a weapon at other institutions are not sufficient facts on which it may be reasonably inferred that ODRC had constructive notice that a particular inmate would assault another. In Doss, this court rejected the appellant‘s argument that ODRC was negligent because it failed to sеcure a metal bar of an exercise machine so that it could not be removed and used as a weapon in an attack. Doss v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 99AP-661 (Mar. 28, 2000). Because there was no actual or constructive noticе of an impending attack provided to prison personnel, we determined that ODRC did not breach its common law duty of care owed to the appellant. Id.
{16} Based on the foregoing, Pate‘s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN and SADLER, JJ., concur.