JASON PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NICOLE E. JONES, ET AL., (NKA NICOLE FRENCH), Defendants-Appellees.
Case No. 14CA3421
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
RELEASED: 9/3/2014
[Cite as Parker v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-3862.]
Harsha, J.
APPEARANCES:
Aaron M. McHenry, Benson, McHenry & Sesser, L.L.C., Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant.
Melody L. Steely, Circleville, Ohio, for appellee Nicole E. Jones, nka Nicole E. French.
Harsha, J.
{¶1} Jason S. Parker appeals from a juvenile court judgment dismissing his claim for nonparent visitation with the minor child of Nicole E. Jones, nka Nichole E. French.1 In his sole assignment of error, Parker asserts that the juvenile court erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to grant visitation to him under
{¶2} A juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction only if expressly granted the authority to do so by statute, and
I. FACTS
{¶3} Parker and French married in December 2006. At the time the parties were married, French was pregnant with her minor child, Brogan Xavier Parker, who was born in July 2007. The parties knew that when they were married Parker might not be the child‘s father. Throughout the marriage Parker assumed the role of the child‘s father and the child believed that Parker was his biological parent. The Union County Court of Common Pleas terminated the parties’ marriage by dissolution decree in August 2011. A DNA test determined that Parker is not the father of French‘s child. Evidently, the dissolution decree did not set forth any visitation rights for Parker.
{¶4} French remarried in July 2012, and she subsequently informed her child that Parker was not his biological father. Between the date of the dissolution and July 2012, French permitted Parker to have parenting time with the minor child on alternate weekends with few exceptions.
{¶5} After this visitation stopped Parker filed a complaint in the Ross County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division for custody and visitation rights with the child pursuant to
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶6} Parker assigns the following assignment of error for our review:
- I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT IT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO GRANT VISITATION TO APPELLANT UNDER
R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) .
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶7} Subject-matter jurisdiction is defined as a court‘s power to hear and decide cases and may be raised at any time. Robinette v. Bryant, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 12CA20, 2013-Ohio-2889, ¶ 10, citing Enz v. Lewis, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3357, 2011-Ohio-1229, ¶ 10. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Parker asserts that the trial court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to grant visitation to him under
{¶9} “A juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction only if expressly granted the authority to do so by statute.” Rowell v. Smith, 133 Ohio St.3d 288, 2012-Ohio-4313, 978 N.E.2d 146, ¶ 13, citing
{¶10} Parker argues that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over his visitation claim because he originally sought custody of the child under
{¶11} The General Assembly authorizes nonparent visitation with a child in three situations: (1) in a divorce, dissolution, legal separation, annulment, or child support proceeding, the court may grant reasonable companionship or visitation rights to any grandparent, any person related to the child by consanguinity or affinity, or any other person other than the parent (
{¶12} The grant of authority in
{¶13} Consistent with this precedent, once Parker relinquished his claim to custody of the child through his stipulations the juvenile court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve his visitation claim. To hold otherwise would permit nonparents to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on juvenile courts that the General Assembly has not. No such power exists. See, e.g., Smiley v. Prison Official, Inc., 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3408, 2014-Ohio-1100, ¶ 7, quoting Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 22 (” ‘litigants cannot vest a court with subject-matter jurisdiction by agreement’ “).
{¶14} Parker cites the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision in Rowell to claim jurisdictional authority for the juvenile court to consider his visitation claim when he, in effect, dismissed his custody claim. In that case, however, the Supreme Court merely
{¶15} Finally, Parker claims that “if this Court were to hold that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to award reasonable companionship time to [him] he will be left without a remedy to seek reasonable visitation rights with a child that he raised as his own for six years.” This is not necessarily so. Under
{¶16} Parker‘s citation to our decision in Thompson v. Thompson, 4th Dist. Highland No. 94CA859, 1995 WL 481480 (Aug. 10, 1995) to support his contention that he lacks any remedy is misplaced because that case did not involve a dissolution or an interpretation of a nonparent‘s motion under
{¶17} Consequently, once Parker stipulated that he did not seek custody of the child and that French was a suitable parent, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider his visitation claim. The trial court did not err in granting French‘s motion and dismissing Parker‘s complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶18} We overrule Parker‘s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, P.J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY:
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.