PARKER COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Aрpellant v. James D. FRANCIS, Appellee.
No. 02-13-00182-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
June 19, 2014.
438 S.W.3d 845
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Suzlon India lacks sufficient minimum contacts to support the trial court‘s exercise of specific jurisdiction with respect to each of Trinity‘s claims. As a result, the trial court erred when it denied Suzlon India‘s special appearance. We reverse the trial court‘s order denying Suzlon India‘s special appearance and render judgment dismissing Suzlon India from this cause for lack of personal jurisdiсtion.
Joshua W. Carden, Davis Miles McGuire Gardner, PLLC, Irving, for Appellee.
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and McCOY, JJ.
OPINION
SUE WALKER, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a property tax appeal from a judgment following a bench trial on stipulated facts. The primary issue we address is whether under the Texas Tax Code a tract of real property may qualify for the residence homestead exemption and the open-space land valuation at the same time. See
II. THE STIPULATED FACTS1
Francis owns three contiguous tracts of land in Parker County: a three-acre tract, a one-acre tract, and a nine-acre tract. A home in which Francis lives is located on the one-acre tract. The properties are contiguous, forming one thirteen-acre tract of property.
After a bench trial based on the stipulated facts, the trial court ruled for Francis and signed a judgment applying the residence homestead exemption to the three-acre tract so that it received the residence homestead exemрtion and was also valued for ad valorem tax purposes as open-space land for the years 2010 and 2011. Because the parties stipulated that the appraised value of the three-acre tract—if it qualified for the residence homestead exemption in addition to the existing open-space land valuation—was $53,616, the trial court signed a judgment ordering a reduction in the appraised value of the three-acre tract to that amount. PCAD perfected this appeal from that judgment.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We apply a de novo standard of review to a case tried on stipulated facts. See Panther Creek Ventures, Ltd. v. Collin Cent. Appraisal Dist., 234 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). The stipulations are binding on the parties, the trial court, and the reviewing court. Alma Grp., L.L.C. v. Palmer, 143 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied). We are limited to the stipulated facts unless other facts are necessarily implied from the express facts stipulated. See Highlands Ins. Co. v. Kelley-Coppedge, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997), rev‘d on other grounds, 980 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.1998). We do not review the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence in a case tried on stipulated facts. Orange Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Agape Neighborhood Improvement, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 597, 598 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied). The sole question on appeal is whethеr the trial court correctly applied the law to the stipulated facts. Id.
IV. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Tex. Lottery Comm‘n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex.2010) (citing Galbraith Eng‘g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.2009)). We rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Id. We presume that the legislature selected language in a statute with care and that every word or phrase was used with a purpose in mind. Id. (citing In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex.2008)). Courts should read statutes as a whole and interpret statutes to give effect to “every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof [will] be rendered superfluous.” City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex.2003) (quoting Spence v. Fenchler, 107 Tex. 443, 457, 180 S.W. 597, 601 (1915)).
PCAD raises two points that we address on appeal.2 In its first point, PCAD claims that the trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that the three-acre tract qualified for both open-space land valuation and also a residence homestead exemption. PCAD‘s third point argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to strictly construe Francis‘s right to the residence homestead exemption. We will address these two points together.
A. The Relevant Tax Code Provisions
1. Residence Homestead Exemption
A residence homestead is defined as a structure (including a mobile home) or a separately secured and occupied portion of a structure (together with the land, not to exceed 20 acres, and improvements used in the residential occupancy of the structure, if the structure and the land and improvements have identical ownership) that:
(A) is owned by one or more individuals, either directly or through a beneficial interest in a qualifying trust;
(B) is designed or adapted for human residence;
(C) is used as a residence; and
(D) is occupied as the individual‘s principal residence by an owner or, for property owned through a beneficial interest in a qualifying trust, by a trustor or beneficiary of thе trust who qualifies for the exemption.
When a tax-paying landowner is actually residing on a parcel of less than twenty acres of land, the chief appraiser may not refuse to accord residence homestead status to the entire parcel of land. Tex. Att‘y Gen. Op. No. JM-40 (1983); see also Tex. Att‘y Gen. Op. No. GA-0752 (2009) (“If the chief appraiser finds that contiguous lots totaling less than twenty acres are being used as a residence homestead, the taxpayer is entitled to an exemption on the entire property.“).
2. Open-Space Land Valuation
Both the Texas constitution and the Texas Tax Code contain provisions to promote the preservation of open-space land devoted to farm or ranch purposes. See
The appraised value of open-space land is determined on the basis of the category of the land—that is, based on the value classification of the land considering the agricultural use to which the land is principally devoted, such аs irrigated cropland, dry cropland, improved pasture, native pasture, orchard, waste, or other categories established by the chief appraiser—using accepted income capitalization methods applied to average net to land. See
If the use of land that has been appraised as open-space land changes, an additional tax—a rollback tax—is imposed on the land equal to the difference between the taxes imposed on the land for each of the five years preceding the year in which the change of use occurs and the tax that would have been imposed if the land had been taxed on the basis of market value in each of those years, plus interest.
B. Application of the Law to the Present Facts
The declaration of Francis, which the parties stipulated was admissible, along with the other stipulated facts establish that, absent the open-space land valuation, the three-acre tract qualifies for the residence homestead exemption. See
Likewise, the stipulated facts establish that, in the absence of the residence homestead exemption, the three-acre tract qualifies for the open-space land valuation; in fact, PCAD granted the three-acre tract open-space land valuation for 2010 and 2011—the years at issue here.4 Indeed, PCAD does not dispute that the three-acre tract is entitled to receive either the open-space land valuation or, if it had not already received the open-space lаnd valuation, the residence homestead exemption; PCAD‘s contention in its first point is that the three-acre tract cannot receive the homestead exemption and the open-space land valuation simultaneously. We turn to that point now.
Francis outlines several provisions in the tax code that he says implicitly recognize that certain land may qualify for both the residence homestead exemption and the open-space land valuation. Those are sections 11.13, 23.25, 23.51(1), and 23.55(i). See
Section 23.25 is titled, “Appraisal of Land Used for Single-Family Residential Purposes That is Contiguous to Agricultural or Open-Space Land with Common Ownership.” See
The statute then requires the chief appraiser to value the parcel utilized for single-family residential purposes based on the proportion of the size that the parcel of land bears to the size of the combined parcels.
Francis also points out that for land to qualify as part of the twenty acres allowed to be claimed as a residence homestead that is entitled to the residence homestead exemption, it need only be “used as a residence.” See
Finally, Francis points to section 23.55 of the tax code. See
PCAD presents three main arguments in support of its position that the three-acre tract is not entitled to simultaneously receive a residence homestead exemption and open-space land valuation. First, PCAD argues that only one “use” of the land is possible under the tax code; that open-space land agricultural use is incompatible with residence homestead use; and that section 23.55(i) means only that no rollback tax is imposed, not that there is not a change in use. We address these contentions in turn.
PCAD relies upon section 11.13(k) for the proposition that only one use of land is allowed under the tax code and for the proposition that open-space land valuation is incompatible with residential use. See
[a] qualified residential structure does not lose its character as a residence homestead if a portion of the structure is rented to another or is used primarily for other purposеs that are incompatible with the owner‘s residential use of the structure. However, the amount of any residence homestead exemption does not apply to the value of that portion of the structure that is used primarily for other purposes that are incompatible with the owner‘s residential use.
Likewise, PCAD has cited, and we have located, no authority for the proposition
PCAD also asserts that Francis‘s construction of section 23.55(i) thwarts legislative intent to impose a tax penalty upоn landowners for taking property out of agricultural production. PCAD contends that the rollback tax is assessed when the landowner stops using the land for agricultural purposes in order to recapture the taxes the owner would have paid had the property been taxed at market value for each year covered by the rollback. See Resolution Trust Corp., 926 S.W.2d at 800. We agree with PCAD; but here, Francis did not take his property out of agricultural production in 2010 or 2011. To the contrary, the stipulated facts and evidence before the trial court established that the three-acre tract qualified for the open-space land valuation throughout 2010 and 2011 because it was used principally for agricultural use. Moreover, the plain language of section 23.55(i) makes it clear that the legislative intent—at least with regard to having landowners obtain open-space land valuation of property that they subsequently may desire to claim as their residence homestead—was to encourage such landowners by specifically providing that for purposes of rollback taxes, the use of open-space land did not change solely because the landowner now claimed it as part of his residence homestead.
Applying a de novo standard of review to determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the stipulated facts, relying on the plain meaning of the tax code provisions set forth and discussed above, presuming that the legislature se-
VI. CONCLUSION
Having addressed and overruled the two points presented by PCAD that are reviewable in this appeal, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Notes
(a) To promote the preservation of open-space land, the legislature shall provide by general law for taxation of open-space land devoted to farm, ranch, or wildlife management purposes on the basis of its productive capacity and may provide by general law for taxation of open-space land devoted to timber production on the basis of its productive capacity. The legislature by general law may provide eligibility limitations under this section and may impose sanctions in furtherance of the taxation policy of this section.