Pahls v. PahlsPahls v. Pahls
Clayton G. Napier, 29 North “D” Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45013, for defendant-appеllant
Susan C. Lipnickey, 14 West Park Place, Suite D, Oxford, Ohio 45056, guardian ad litem
O P I N I O N
RINGLAND, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony T. Pahls, appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, regarding child support and dependent tax exemptions. We reverse the trial court‘s decision.
{¶2} The pertinent facts as they relate to this appeal are as follows: Anthony and plaintiff-appellee, Bobbi Jо Pahls, were married on March 2, 1991. Two children were born
{¶3} The trial court named Anthony legal custodian and residential parent for both children, and designated Bobbi Jo the nonresidential parent.1 Bobbi Jo received parenting time on alternating weekends and one evening a week for three hours. During summer vacation, the trial court ordered both parties to alternate physical care of the children on a weekly basis. Other holiday parenting time was allocated pursuant to the court‘s standard schedule. In his brief, appellant describes thе parties’ custody arrangement as a “ten month two month split.”2
{¶4} The trial court complied with the requirements of
{¶5} “This order is not in the best interest of the children as Mrs. Pahls has just obtained a job at $7.00 an hour. Mr. Pahls claims a loss of earnings due to no longеr running his own business. He is now an employee, earning $500.00 per week. Child support is set at 0 (zero) per month due to the low earnings of Mrs. Pahls and the equal split of time between the parents in the summer.”
{¶6} In addition, the trial court ordered each party to claim a child as a tax exemption. After J.P. could no longer be claimed, the parties would alternate yearly claiming C.P. as an exemption. Anthony filed a timely appeаl from the trial court‘s December 23,
{¶7} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶8} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO MAKE AN AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT.”
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Anthony argues the trial court erred in ordering a deviation from Bobbi Jo‘s child support obligation from $317.05 per month to zero. We agree.
{¶10} “The trial court possеsses considerable discretion in child support matters.” Murray v. Murray (1999), 128 Ohio App.3d 662, 666. “The decision of the trial court will be reversed only if it is the product of an abuse of discretion.” Id., citing Pauly v. Pauly (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law; it implies the trial court acted is unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.
{¶11} “The terms of R.C. [3119.01-3119.024] are mandatory in nature and must be followed literally and technically in all material respects.” Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139, at paragraph 2 of the syllabus (requiring strict compliance with
{¶12} The factors and criteria the trial court may consider in ordering a deviation pursuant to
{¶13} However, as noted above, the trial court must comply with all child support statutes, including
{¶14} Anthony contends the trial court erred in ordering a deviation, especially in light of the faсt that he is the children‘s residential parent for approximately ten months out of the year. He further argues that Bobbi Jo is employed and is receiving $400 per month in spousal support in addition to earning approximately $770 as a cashier. Anthony contends the trial court abused its discretion in deviating from Bobbi Jo‘s child support obligation because child support is mandatory; and the factors cited by the court in ordering the deviation do not exist in the statutory framework. Lastly, Anthony suggests the trial court violated the requirements of
{¶15} The trial court‘s decision in ordering a downward deviation to zero of Bobbi Jo‘s statutory child support obligatiоn was unreasonable. Although the trial court stated the deviation was in the children‘s best interest, we find the circumstances in this case do not warrant such a substantial deviation. In addition, the trial court did not cite sufficient findings оf fact in support of its decision. The record reveals that even though Bobbi Jo will have the children 50 percent of the time during the summer months, and has parenting time on alternate weekends and one evening а week, Anthony is primarily responsible for the
{¶16} Most significant however, is the trial court‘s abuse of discretion in failing to award the statutory minimum support award. See
{¶17} Therefore, we sustain Anthony‘s assignment of error and remand this matter to the trial court to reassess Bobbi Jo‘s child support obligation.
{¶18} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶19} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SPLITTING THE TAX DEDUCTION FOR THE CHILDREN WHERE APPELLEE NON[ ]CUSTODIAL PARENT PAYS NO SUPPORT.”
{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Anthony maintains the trial court erred in allowing Bobbi Jo to claim a child for income tax purposes when she is the nоncustodial parent. We agree.
{¶21} In general, we review a trial court‘s decision allocating tax exemptions for dependents under an abuse of discretion standard. See Eickelberger v. Eickelberger (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 221, 225-26, citing Hughes v. Hughes (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 165.3 However,
{¶22} The Internal Revenue Code creates a presumption in favor of the custodial parent in the allocation of the federal income tax dependency exemption. Gregory v. Kottman-Gregory, Madison App. Nos. CA2004-11-039, CA2004-11-041, 2005-Ohio-6558, ¶35, citing Singer v. Dickerson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 408, 411. See, also, Section 152(e), Title 26, U.S.Code. However, the trial court may award the tax exemption to the noncustodial parent if (1) the custodial parent executes a written deсlaration surrendering of the exemption to the noncustodial parent; or (2) the trial court determines to award the noncustodial parent the tax exemption because it would “produce a net tax savings for the parents, thereby furthering the best interest of the child.” Gregory at ¶35, quoting Singer at 411, 415. “Such savings would occur through allocation to the noncustodial parent only if the noncustodial parent‘s taxable income falls into a higher tax bracket than the tax bracket of the custodial parent.” Singer at 415-16, citing Bobo v. Jewell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 330, 333.
{¶23} In order to determine whether awarding the tax exemption to the noncustodial parent will result in a net tax savings, “the trial court must review all of the rеlevant factors, including ‘the parents’ gross incomes, the exemptions and deductions to which the parents are otherwise entitled, and the relevant federal, state, and local income tax rates.‘” Gregory at ¶36, quoting Singer at paragraph three of the syllabus. See, also,
{¶24} A careful review of the record does not indicate the trial court satisfied the requirements of Singer, or
{¶25} Based on the foregоing, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in granting Bobbi Jo a dependency exemption, and sustain Anthony‘s second assignment of error. We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court in order to comply with the rеquirements of
{¶26} Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
BRESSLER, P.J., and YOUNG, J., concur.