Page v. PreisserPage v. Preisser
Stephen C. Robinson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa (argued), Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Theodore R. Boecker, and John J. Piazza, Asst. Attys. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, on brief for appellees.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
Janice Ann Page commenced this action under
Janice Page‘s application for Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid benefits had been denied by the Department. In the course of her administrative apрeal, she requested access to her case file. The Department refused to permit total access but offered only those portions of her file the Department intended to use in the administrative appeal. She then sought in the District Court a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Department from conduсting her administrative hearing until the court had an opportunity to resolve her claims.
The District Court confronted the supremacy clause question first3 and held that the Iowa regulations were not inconsistent with the federal regulations. It granted the Department‘s motion for summary judgment. Then, pursuant to
A. Initially, we decide whether Janice Page can raise the supremacy clause issue in this appeal. Ordinarily, the period of time for taking an appeal begins to run from the time the district court certifies a claim as apprоpriate for immediate appeal under
It is clear that a district court‘s decision to issue a Rule 54(b) certificate is not conclusive. Appellate courts have broad reviewing power in determining whether a district court has properly applied the rule and correctly certified an appeal. See Schwartz v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 1968); RePass v. Vreeland, 357 F.2d 801, 804-805 (3d Cir. 1966); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2655 at 35 (1973). In most cases, however, unlike the present action, the party challenging the cеrtification takes a timely appeal from the court‘s order. Our research has failed to disclose any cases specifically deciding whether a party who neglects to take a timely appeal from a district court‘s Rule 54(b) certification may challenge the propriety of that certification aftеr the period of time for taking an appeal has expired; and if the certification is held to have been erroneous, whether the party may, in his appeal from the court‘s final judgment of the remaining claims, seek review of the district court‘s adverse decision on the substantive claim underlying the Rule 54(b) certification.
We hold that such challenges may be made; and when a district court erroneously certifies a claim as appropriate for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), a party may raise that claim in a timely appeal from an adverse decision on the remaining claims in the lawsuit. While, technically, the period for taking аn appeal begins to run from the time the district court enters final judgment pursuant to the Rule 54(b) certification, if the certification is erroneous, there is, in fact, no proper final judgment from which a party must appeal. Thus, if an action involving a single claim is incorrectly categorized by the district court as one involving multiple claims, a party ought not be precluded from raising the propriety of the court‘s certification in a timely appeal from an adverse judgment on the other claims in the lawsuit.
Thus, we turn to Page‘s contention that this lawsuit involves only a single claim with alternative arguments for relief and was improperly categorized by the District Court as a multi-claim action to which the application of Rule 54(b) was appropriate.
B. Rule 54(b) was originally enacted to avoid the possible injustice that might result if judgment of a distinctly separate claim were delayed until adjudication of the entire case. See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (1946), Reprinted in 5 F.R.D. 472 (1946). The rule did not, however, purport to amend or dilute the fundamental rule against splitting a cause of action and deciding appellate cases piecemeal. See In re Bromley-Heath Modernization Committee, 448 F.2d 1271 (1st Cir. 1971). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956). Thus, Rule 54(b) allows an appeal only from a judgment on a separate claim and both courts and commentators have expressed the exceptional nature of a Rule 54(b) certification. See 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2654 at 33 (1973). Rule 54(b) certifications should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel. See Panichella v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960).
Courts have struggled in attempting to delineate a precise definition of “claim” for purposes of Rule 54(b). See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743 n.4 (1976); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice PP 54.24, 54.33 (2d ed. 1976). It is clear that a claimant who presents a number of alternative legal theories, but whose recovery is limited to only one of them, has only a single claim of relief for purposes of Rule 54(b). See Edney v. Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company, 348 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1965). One commentator has aptly summarized the policies underlying this viеw.
The trial judge is generally not permitted to certify the dismissal of fewer than all of a party‘s counts when his remaining counts deal with the same transaction or occurrence as those appealed. * * * By thus forbidding certification of an order dismissing fewer than all of a party‘s legal theories based on the same transactiоn, the courts leave open the possibility that the party will still be awarded relief, an event that would render unnecessary an appellate determination on the dismissal; this possibility disappears where no alternative theory for relief remains. * * * In addition to eliminating unnecessary appeals, (this approach) avoids appellate review of the same evidence on more than one appeal.
Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 351, 360-361 (1961).
Rule 54(b) “does not apply to a single claim action. * * * It is limited expressly to a multiple claims actions in which ‘one or more but less than all’ of the multiple claims have been finally decided and are found otherwise tо be ready for appeal.”
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, supra, 424 U.S. at 743, Citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, supra, 351 U.S. at 435.
Thus, the District Court erroneously held that the supremacy clause issue constituted a separate claim. Because the court improperly certified the supremacy clause issue under Rule 54(b), Page is not precluded from raising that issue in this appeal.
II.
Page contends that certain rеgulations of the Iowa Department of Social Services conflict with those of HEW and are invalid under the supremacy clause.
Iowa participates in the cooperative federal-state AFDC program. The program, which emerged from the Social Security Act of 1935, As amended,
Under
(a) State Plan Requirements. A state plan * * * shall provide for a system of hearings under which:
(13) The claimant, or his representative, shall have adequate opportunity:
(i) To examine the contents of his case file and all documents and records to be used by the agency at the hearing at a reasonable time before the date of the hearing as well as during the hearing(.)
Page argues that these regulations require a participating state to provide an AFDC recipient with complete access to his file prior to a hearing at which a determination whether to terminate his benefits is made. The Iowa regulations, she argues, do not provide complete access.
The Iowa regulations provide that prior to an administrative appeal, “the department shall make available to the * * * recipient * * * all documents and records to be used by the department at the hearing as well as during the hearing.” Iowa Administrative Code § 770-9.1(1). In аddition, the recipient is permitted access to his entire case file with the following exceptions:
a. All medical and psychiatric information contained in the * * * recipient‘s case record shall be released only to a doctor or psychiatrist designated in writing to be the representative of said * * * recipient and the attorney of record for said applicant.
b. The names of third parties unless said third parties have expressly agreed in writing to waive whatever rights to confidentiality that such persons may possess. The information provided by said third parties is available for inspection by the * * * recipient unless the release of said information will make the third party readily identifiable to the * * * recipient.
Iowa Administrative Code § 770-9.1(2)(a) & (b).
The recipient may, if he believes the name of a third party or the information provided is necessary for presentation of his appeal, request the hearing examiner to inspect the file In camera to determine whether release оf the information is necessary. If the examiner decides that the information should not be released, he may not consider it in disposing of the appeal. Iowa Administrative Code § 770-9.1(2)(b)(1) & (2).
- the applicant has the right to have an In camera inspection and determinatiоn by a hearing officer as to the need for releasing (third party) information;
- any information not subject to the claimant‘s examination must be totally disregarded as a basis for a decision at the administrative hearing;
- it would be a rare occasion * * * when a third party, who had provided information * * * (beneficial to) the claimants’ сause at the hearing, would refuse to waive the disclosure of his name to the claimant.
We disagree with the District Court‘s analysis. The court appears to have examined whether the Iowa regulations afford an AFDC recipient a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. This analysis, to be sure, would be rеlevant in deciding whether the Iowa regulations satisfy due process. In determining whether the state regulations are inconsistent with the federal regulations and in violation of the supremacy clause, however, a court need only examine whether, in light of the federal regulations, the AFDC recipient is afforded disparate treаtment under the state scheme.
Reasonably construed,
Reversed.
ALBERT G. SCHATZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action * * * the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the clаims * * * only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction for the entry of judgment.