Loretta PAGE, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; Larry Norris; East Arkansas Regional Unit; James T. Banks, Assistant Warden, East Arkansas Regional Unit, Appellees, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; J. Glover; M. Riley, Defendants.
No. 00-1123EA.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: June 6, 2000. Filed: Aug. 23, 2000.
222 F.3d 453
A claimant‘s allegations of disabling pain may be discredited by evidence that the claimant has received minimal medical treatment and/or has taken only occasional pain medications. See id. at 589. However, this is not the case with Singh. The record shows repeated and consistent visits to doctors. Singh presently takes, and has taken, numerous prescription medications.3 He has availed himself of many pain treatment modalities including chiropractic treatments, nerve blocks, a TENS unit, and has undergone surgery and many diagnostic tests. Further, Singh is not an individual who lacks an impressive work record. See, e.g., Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir.1995) (noting unimpressive work record when discrediting subjective complaints). In short, there is nothing in this record to justify the rejection of Singh‘s complaints of disabling pain.
In view of our findings that the ALJ improperly rejected both the opinion of Singh‘s treating physician and Singh‘s subjective complaints of pain, we find that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert did not adequately reflect Singh‘s impairments. Accordingly, the testimony of the vocational expert that jobs exist for Singh cannot constitute substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Pratt v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830, 836 (8th Cir.1992).
III. CONCLUSION
Having found that the Commissioner has not met his burden of proving that Singh can perform other jobs in the national economy, we reverse the judgment of the district court affirming the Commissioner‘s decision. The evidence supports a finding of disability. Consequently, we reverse and instruct the district court to remand to the Commissioner for an award of benefits. See Andler v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir.1996) (if a claimant is disabled on the record, we may reverse and remand for entry of an order granting benefits).
Loretta Page, pro se.
Sherri L. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
Loretta Page appeals the orders of the District Court dismissing as untimely her action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
In a charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Page contended that her employer, the Arkansas Department of Correction, discriminated against her on the basis of race, sex, and retaliation. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter which Page received on April 16, 1999. On July 8, Page wrote a letter to the District Court, requesting assistance in filing a lawsuit. She submitted several documents with this letter, including her right-to-sue letter and EEOC charge. The charge alleged, in pertinent part, that Page had been “subjected to harassment” from her immediate supervisor and the assistant warden; that her supervisor told her she “did not have the authority to tell a white male employee that work[s] in the mailroom what to do“; that she “was written up” for coming to work early and leaving early, although “[a] white male does this all the time but he was not written up“; and that after she filed a grievance complaining about her differential treatment, her position was posted, and she was told the assistant warden “did not want [her] in that position.” She stated her belief that she was being discriminated against because of her race and sex, and in retaliation for filing her grievance, in violation of Title VII.
The District Court docketed Page‘s documents as a Title VII complaint, but informed her in a July 15 letter that the documents were not in proper form. She submitted an amended complaint on a district court form on August 2.
The District Court dismissed Page‘s action, holding that it was not filed within the ninety-day time limit of
After de novo review, we conclude that Page‘s July 8 letter and attachments were sufficient to initiate her Title VII proceeding in a timely manner. See Huston v. General Motors Corp., 477 F.2d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir.1973) (mere presentation of request for appointment of counsel within limitations period constituted bringing of civil action under Title VII); see also Winbush v. State of Iowa, 66 F.3d 1471, 1477-78 (8th Cir.1995) (substantial compliance with filing requirements of
Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal, and remand for further proceedings.