Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Supervalu, Inc.

INDEPENDENT OWNER-OPERATOR ASSOCIATION, INC.;

DRIVERS Jo- Rajkovacz; Schaefer;

seph Carl Carl

Schaefer, LLC, individually and on be- similarly situated,

half of all others

Appellants,

v.

SUPERVALU, INC., Appellee.

No. 09-3577. Appeals,

United States Court of

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. Aug.

Filed: Herrick-Stare, argued, Paul

Randall S. Cullen, Jr., Cullen, Sr., on Paul D. Damien brief, DC, Washington, Appellants. Salvo, Wells, argued, Glenn M. Steven J. brief, Mead, Minne- D. on the Gabrielle MN, apolis, Appellee. SMITH, COLLOTON, and

Before SHEPHERD, Judges. Circuit SMITH, Judge. Circuit Drivers Owner-Operator Independent (“OOIDA”), Association, Raj- Joseph Inc. (“Schae- kovacz, Schaefer, and Carl LLC fer”), Inc. Supervalu, (“Supervalu”) sued for the reim- under 49 U.S.C. the load- of fees associated with bursement Superva- trucks at pair granting In a of orders lu’s facilities. favor, summary judgment Supervalu’s court1 construed the district Tunheim, United sota. 1. The Honorable John R. Judge of Minne- States District for the District Minnesota, of its

require prove, grocery is a wholesaler that (a) goods shipped by received its truckers were OOIDA. prima facie respec- otherwise reimbursed their This practice ease involves a known (b) shiрpers tive the amount of insur- interstate-trucking parlance “lumping.” as coverage Supervalu required ance that “Lumping” and, refers to the loading, to maintain was unreason- OOIDA drivers often, more goods of from a court, According able. to the district OOI- upon delivery. truck Naturally, the indi- present DA failed to more than a scintilla perform viduals who loading these and un- of evidence as to either of these elements. loading commonly services are referred to Finally, the district court also construed “lumpers.” opportunistic Prior to 14704(a)(1) preclude recovery of lumpers Supervalu unaffiliated with habit- monetary remedy a relief as for the viola- ually congregated at docks of alleges. tions that OOIDA For the follow- Supervalu’s distribution centers to solicit reasons, affirm. their ing wе services to OOIDA and other arriv- But, truckers. in Supervalu con- tracted professional unloading compa- Background

I. nies for their lumping services, exclusive appeal grant As this is an from the of resulting only Supervalu’s lumpers be- summary judgment, we review and recite ing present at its distribution centers. In light the facts in the most favorable to March Supervalu a instituted new non-moving party. OOIDA as the Mirax coverage requirement insurance applicable Corp. Chem. Prods. v. First Interstate OOIDA, only to like opted drivers who Corp., Commercial load or unload their own vehicles rather Cir.1991). OOIDA, incorporated in Mis- than Supervalu’s hire lumpers. new aAs maintaining precondition souri and its principal place of self-loading/unloading, there, business is a OOIDA and other nonprofit trade associ- truckers had to show prоof general-liability of signifi- ation of truck drivers who insurance operate own and cantly exceeding required by the minimum heavy-duty Rajkovacz, trucks. also a Mis- federal In August Supervalu law.2 souri citizen and a current member of reduced the amount of insurance it re- OOIDA, independent was an truck owner- self-loaders/unloaders,3 quired of and after operator who goods per- delivered on a OOIDA commenced the instant lawsuit on Likewise, Schaefer, load basis. a Dela- 5, 2005, December Supervalu finally re- corporation ware maintaining principal policy require proof laxed its of insur- Ohio, place indepen- of business is an coverage ance merely matching federal owner-operator dent that delivers on a law. per-load basis. For simplicity, we will re- OOIDA, Rajkovacz,

fer to and Schaefer Nevertheless, on December as, collectively Supervalu, OOIDA, “OOIDA.” representing its members as well corporation Delaware headquartered similarly truckers, as other situated filed Supervalu required issuance). self-loading/unloading 31139(b)(2) after its Section of 49 proof general liability drivers to show of in- requires proof only United States Code of aggregate $3 surance of million annual $750,000 worth insurance. limit, per $1 million occurrence automobile liability $ insurance in the amount of 1 million August Supervalu announced that single coverage, fidelity combined limit require proof only it would $1 million $50,000 (Superva- bond or crime insurance of aggregate per $1 and million occurrence. requirement shortly lu rescinded this final [wjhenever or receiver against Superva clаss action putative who requires alia,4 property Supervalu’s lu, inter alleging, trans- operates a motor vehicle effectively owns or insurance-coverage property interstate commerce porting purchase Su- drivers required OOIDA or unload- services, ... be assisted in violation pervalu’s new shipper or re- ing of such 14103(a). requires Section providing ceiver shall be compen- operator be a truck owner or compensate the assistance or shall requires or receiver when a sated for all costs associat- operator owner or lumpers. utilize him or her to securing compensating ed with by ostensibly Supervalu, contended assis- persons providing self-loading/unloading truckers requiring tance. exceeding of insurance proof to tender mínimums, effectively compelled added.)

statutory (Emphasis Supervalu purchase truckers to OOIDA that, not- Finally, Supervalu contended cost, with no at their own lumping services withstanding the merits of OOIDA’s al- For these subsequent reimbursement. 14704(a)(l)’s § remedial scheme 49 U.S.C. violations, sought “restitu- leged OOIDA only “injunctive for viola- authorizes relief’ tion,” “accounting an and dis- as well as § not “restitution” or tions of by drivers for money paid gorgement of disgorgement money of “accounting March 28 and lumping between services by sought OOIDA. See 49 U.S.C. paid” as 2005.” December 20 of (“A 14704(a)(1) person may bring § a civil of injunctive action for relief violations Supervalu countered with response, 14103.”). sections 14102 and First, arguments. Superva- primary three expressly it never re- lu contended court set out its view of the The district § to utilize quired OOIDA under case in orders re- governing law two service, and that self-load- its separate rounds of cross-mo- solving two their ing/unloading pre- truckers retained summary judgment. In the first tions for long they so rogative to order, 29, 2006, self-load/unload the dis- dated November adequate insurance. Accord- maintained summary judgment trict court denied require- Supervalu, its insurance parties on OOIDA’s claim under both requirement as a ment could be construed 14103(a). Specifically, ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍§ the district court lumpers only Supervalu hire if mandat- that the reason- “agree[d] Supervalu] [with coverage. ed an unreasonable amount of coverage of the insurance re- ableness that, urged even Alternatively, Supervalu key to the determination of quirement is it assuming arguendo required 14103(a)[,]” OOI- § Supervalu violated whether Supervalu lumpers, DA to OOIDA employ “Supervalu cannot be considered of a violation under produced solely no evidence required lumpers the use of to have plaintiff § all truck driv- because for in- imposition its subsequently statutory ers were reimbursed their minimum if surance above respective shippers. coverage requirement their is rea- lumping fees the insurance contention, Construing requirement’s Supervalu As the for this sonable.” basis 14103(a)’s plain language, disputed § reasonableness to be issue relied on fact, noting that merits dis- provides that: material which pers. Ultimately, parties this coer- Additionally, sought under settled relief claim, thus, 14103(b), it is not of OOIDA’s which makes unlawful at- cion utilizing appeal. tempt lum- to coerce a trucker into covery infancy, court necessarily juris- was its district evoked the equity broad diction of district summаry courts. parties’ denied both motions judgment. March On the district court parties’ resolved the second round of

Additionally, the court denied OOIDA’s cross-motions summary judgment. Supervalu’s motion to strike eleventh affir- appeal, Relevant to this the district court defense, mative which asserted non-liabili- “ disposed of OOIDA’s claims under ty ground on the that OOIDA al- ‘ha[d] 14103(a). granted The district court ready paid by shippers been or others for summary judgment Supervalu toas any himping[-]service costs incurred at Su- its counterclaim declaratory judgment pervalu during applicable facilities ” 14103(a) and, that it did not violate cor- period.’ agreed time The district court respondingly, OOIDA’s affirmative 14103(a)’s Supervalu’s injunctive claim for relief under plain language. The court con- district 14103(a). As the basis for ruling, its interpretation cluded that thе statute district court found that “plaintiffs have might be burdensome to drivers like OOI- presented not more than a ‘scintilla’ of DA “but is absurd.” The district court evidence that drivers were not reimbursed that, in prove ruled its order that “[t]o lumping Supervalu services at docks.” 14103(a), § Supervalu violated [OOIDA] Having found OOIDA’s evidence to be must that show neither a receiver nor a wholly element, insufficient on this the dis- shipper paid a lumping driver for service trict court made no mention of whether at Supervalu.” costs incurred The district Supervalu’s requirement insurance was court accompanied this rule with the fol- reasonable. lowing footnote: Supervalu OOIDA and settled all re- interpretation, plain- Under court’s claims, maining subject to OOIDA retain- prove tiffs must as an element of the right to appeal some of the district offense that neither the shipper nor re- pretrial court’s timely orders. OOIDA ap- paid ceiver for the lumping costs. It is pealed and now alleges that the district therefore to improper characterize this court erred in three respects when con- defense, an as affirmative but there is 14103(a) 14704(a)(1): (1) §§ struing and in nevertheless no reason to strike it. 14103(a) § reading require to OOIDA to Finally, granted the district court sum- prove part prima as of its facie case that it mary judgment Supervalu to as to its sec- shipper; was reimbursed a in counterclaim, sought ond which declarato- ruling Supervalu’s that require- insurance 14103(a) ry judgment § did not afford ment effectively could be construed as a right monetary OOIDA to relief. Again, mandating OOIDA purchase lumping to relying on the plain language, statute’s only if called “unrea- district court found “no statute explicitly coverage; sonable” amounts of and authorizing] remedy restitution as a 14704(a)(l)’s provision for “in- alleged against violation of a junctive relief’ to only injunc- authorize property,” consequently receiver of and tions, equitable and not other forms of that if ‘Congress “determine[d] wished to monetary relief such as “restitution” or provide private damages remedy, a it knew “accountings disgorgement.” how to do so and have so [would done] ” II. Discussion Moreover, expressly.’ the trial court re- jected Congress, OOIDA’s contention that urges OOIDA this court to read 14103(a) employing phrase “injunctive relief,” “imposing] U.S.C. an un- ” ‘judicial inquiry complete.’ Id. last: Supervalu like duty on receivers

qualified Germain, delivery persons compen- (quoting part U.S. provide 1146). require the receivers where those sation S.Ct. unloading obtain ser- delivery persons Here, § provides pertinent maintains OOIDA Specifically,

vices.” that, shipper or receiv- “[w]henever like “third[-]party reimbursement” requires any person property er of from their its drivers received the kind ... operates owns or motor vehicle who “is irrelevant to a re- shippers respective or be assisted duty compensate under Section ceiver’s shipper or receiver shall law or 14103(a).” cites no case providing such assis- interpre- support this legislative the owner or compensate tance or shall that it is simply “[t]he tation but states operator” for the costs thereof. 49 U.S.C. interpreta- and least burdensome simplest added). (emphasis district Additionally, OOIDA tion of the statute.” plain languagе— court concluded argument that the policy public offers the disjunctive “or” situated particularly contrary construction court’s district “shipper” between “receiver”—when 14103(a) into a statute that “turns Section literally, confirms that the read delivery persons only relief to provides reimbursing a trucker’s receiver them of the through litigation deprives not be the same fees need con- benefits that the statute day-to-day required the trucker to incur receiver who de the dis- templates.” “We review novo Thus, them. under the district court’s summary judgment, grant trict court’s 14103(a)’s reading, plain language allows interpretation as the district court’s as well shipper or the receiver to for either Jessep ... v. Jacob of a federal statute.” trucker, irrespective of who reimburse Inc., Co., 739, 741-12 Transр. 350 F.3d son required purchase lumping the trucker to Cir.2003). reading Based on this of services. 11103(a)’s Language Plain Section 14103(a), the district court ruled as a plaintiff suing matter of law that a trucker Whether, 14103(a), under part of provision under the had show as reimbursing or receiver a truck shipper prima or her facie case that she had his ship must the same lumping er’s fees the shipper not been reimbursed either originally required who per or receiver turn, applying or the receiver. this rule impression. of first lumping question is of law to OOIDA’s the district court Still, any question statutory as with of summary granted judgment against OOI- begins analysis the court interpretation, identify any DA it failed to of its because statute, plain language with the of I.L., shipper already truckers whom a had not 817, States v. 614 F.3d 820 United (8th Cir.2010). noted, reimbursed. recently we As Supreme Court hаs ‘stated time and “[t]he in The district court erred con presume that a

again courts must 14103(a)’splain language is cluding that says in a statute it means legislature what unambiguous. particular statutory pro A says in it means a statute what and ” alia, when, it is ambiguous vision is inter (quoting there.’ Id. Conn. Nat’l to more than one Germain, 249, susceptible reasonable Bank v. 503 U.S. (1992)). 1146, interpretation. See Chickasaw Nation v. 112 S.Ct. 117 L.Ed.2d 391 States, 90, 122 534 U.S. S.Ct. of a statute are unam United “When the words “am- then, (defining 151 L.Ed.2d 474 biguous, this first canon is also the Cir.2009) biguity,” statutory-construction con (quoting United ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍States v. Ron text, “capable being Enters., Inc., of understood Pair 489 U.S. possible ways”

two or more senses or S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d 290 and (quoting Collegiate Ninth New 14704(a)(2)). Webster’s construing § court, This (1985))). 14103(a) Here, § Dictionary 77 is statute, when interpreting very has susceptible interpreta two reasonable explained that rule “[t]his ‘results from tions. The district court’s endeаv deference to the supremacy Legisla- of the give disjunctive ors to full effect to the ture, as well as recognition that Congress- thereby provision “or” and renders typically men vote on language of a ” satisfied when either the or the Tr., bill.’ (quoting Id. Lamie v. U.S. receiver reimburses the trucker for lump 526, 538, U.S. S.Ct. 157 L.Ed.2d ing. This construction of (2004)). Thus, plain “[w]here the Likewise, however, reasonable. a reading clear, meaning of statute is ‘we are not gives full effect to the free to replace it with an legis- unenacted ” “the,” definite article phrase, “the (quoting lative intent.’ Id. in part v. INS receiver shall be Fonseca, Cardoza 480 U.S. providing such assistance or shall compen (1987) (Scalia, S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d 434 operator,” yields sate the owner or a simi J., However, concurring)). if the statute’s larly reasonable ship construction that the language plain is not but ambigu- instead per or required receiver who the lumping ous, may legislative we resort provide must either pay other might authorities that facili- “In determining it. statutory whether lan tate our efforts to Congress’s discern in- guage plain unambiguous, the court particular tent behind the statutory provi- must read all parts together of the statute in question. Famam, sion Estate give full effect to part.” each Estate “ Moreover, F.3d at 584. in those ‘rare Farnam v. Comm’n Internal Reve plain cases’ when a produces statute’s text nue, (8th Cir.2009). Ac ‘demonstrably a result at odds with the cordingly, gives when the court full effect drafters, intentions of its ... those inten- disjunctive “or,” conjunction, both the ” tions controlling.’ must be United Van phrase receiver,” the “shipper or and the Lines, LLC, 556 F.3d at 694 (quoting Grif- article, “the,” definite prеceding that same Contractors, Inc., v. Oceanic 458 U.S. fin phrase,” alternatively two reasonable in 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 973 14103(a)’s terpretations Thus, § result. (1982)). language ambiguous. is Given this ambi guity, “may Section legislative we examine is of the revised Act, and version of the other authorities to Motor Carrier to determine which [Con gress’s] as, legislative “MCA-II,” intent” we hereinafter pro behind the refer to Farnam, vision. though properly Estate at it is F.3d 584. called the Interstate of (ICC) Commerce Commission Termination 11103(a)’s 2. Legislative History Section Act. MCA-II evolved from the first Motor that, Carrier Act of again 1980 [hereinafter We stress the “[i]n MCA-I]. 1, 1980, Ill, Act July usual if of ch. language ‘the statute’s 94 Stat. plain, repealed by the sole function of the courts is to ICC Termination Act terms,’ it according Act], enforce to its without of 1995 ICC [hereinafter Termination I, reference tо legislative history.” Indeed, Title Oum Stat. 891. er-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. provision Unit MCA-II’s section—the Lines, LLC, ed Van at issue in a virtually this case—is verba- purpose provision this In MCA- trucks. of MCA-I’s.5 tim iteration of (“S. Bill 2245 spawned suggest any partic- out of Senate to or endorse I was (“H.R. 6418”), 2245”) Bill 6418 and House loading or un- apportionment ular of technically Congress passing S. with loading responsibilities between and pursuant an of but in lieu H.R. carriers, receivers, and among shippers, amend- between both chambers agreement fact, the Com- owner-operators. it is to contain text the Senate bill the apportionment this mittee’s belief 96-1069, No. at H.R.Rep. House bill. is a decision to responsibility market (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. by the parties determined Report au- 2283. As stated .... transaction Public by thored the House Committee on owner-operator is leased [W]here Transportation authorita- and Works —the carrier, to a regulated the Committee given the Senate report tive amended expects specify responsi- the lease to contain the House lan- its own bill to the carrier owner-opera- bilities of and of the Motor Carrier guage purpose —“the loading unloading, tor in- regarding unnecessary to reduce Act of 1980 [wa]s cluding compensation. by regulation the Federal Government.” reprinted Id. at 10, reprinted Id. at in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. added). at 2312-13 (emphasis U.S.C.C.A.N. with general at Commensurate “suppose[s]” in its brief “that deregulation, theme of Committee stat- receivers!,] shippers, brokers freight specific regard to Section 15—the ed may among must concerning lumping agree themselves who following: section —the [unloading] bеar the burden those circumstances, it may Under be dif- costs,” indeed, but, appears its supposition prove ficult for trucker to that the Congress’s intention broker, precise have been shipper, agreed or receiver conclu- promulgated when it MCA-I. This in- repay expenses trucker sion is further bolstered the floor state- curred in the of his Howard, Representative truck.... ments of James J. (cid:127) then-chairman of the Committee’s Surface promote system In order to which Transportation Subcommittee. In those preclude will the use of coer- force or statements, docks, immediately which he made cion new section preceding of title 49 the third final guide- establishes MCA-I, just lines for who should load and before its passage unload (MCA- Compare persons providing Carrier Act of Motor such assis- Ill, I), repealed ch. Stat. tance. I, by ICC Termination Act of Title with 49 U.S.C. (a) 109 Stat. shipper prop- Whenever a or receiver of erty requires any person who owns or (a) prop- Whenever a or receiver operates transporting prop- a motor vehicle erty requires any person or who owns (whether erty or not in interstate commerce operates transporting prop- a motor vehicle transportation subject jurisdiction such is to (whether erty in commerce interstate or not 135) subchapter chapter I of as- under be transportation subject juris- such the to loading unloading sisted in the or of such subchap- diction the Commission under vehicle, shipper or title) the receiver shall chapter ter II of this 105 of be assisted providing responsible for assistance or such unloading of such compensate operator shall owner or or receiver shall be securing all with com- providing costs associated and assistance or such shall com- operator pensating persons providing pensate the owner or for all costs securing compensating associated with and such assistance. House, Representative legislative process Howard advised producing predeces- sor, bills, general body that the Committee had MCA-II arose out of two House (“H.R. 2539”) Bill sections once more and Senate Bill amended (“S. 1396”), interpre- broader-than-intended with H.R. 2539 prevent being to passed in lieu of counterpart, its Senate tations: pursuant to an agreement between both Following markup, many the Committee H.R.Rep. houses. No. at 165 suggested that the “words” in section 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. section) (the lumping could be con- [ ] (Conf. Rep.). Most of legisla- in a much manner than strued broader tive in a report contained House by intended the Committee. These by authored Transportation House amendments to sections 15 and 16 are (the Infrastructure Committee House any question intended to eliminate as to on Transportation Committee and Public the Committee’s intent. successor). H.R.Rep. Works’s See No. say orig- Let me that the Committee’s (1995), reprinted 104-311 (1) inal intent was to eliminate extortion- U.S.C.C.A.N. 793. Summarizing H.R. (2) docks, ate that occur on the practices 2539’s motor provisions, carrier the Com- given to ensure that clear notice is mittee wrote that “H.R. 2539 eliminates owner-operators they respon- when are and then reenacts a revised Motor Carrier sible for their ... eliminating] Act numerous unneces- trucks, identify any compensation sary provisions and streamlining] many owner-operator that the is to receive for other of the ICC’s functions regarding the loading or unloading, regulation of the industry.” motor carrier any compensation ensure that provided 84, reprinted Id. at in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. by owner-operator. for is received at 796. The Committee went on to de- convey These amendments this intent clare that “H.R. important 2539 is another a more clear manner than does the bill in a step 15-year effort to deregulation reported. the motor carrier industry.” [sic] Id. at (1980) (statement Cong. Rec. 15643 803; reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. Howard). Rep. Representative Howard’s (1995) (state- accord 141 Cong. Rec. 38235 emphasize Congress’s statements fo- (“With Hollings) ment Sen. biparti- enacting cus in lumping provi- MCA-I’s bill, Congress san completed will have was on ante sions ex notice of reimburse- begun the work with the Motor Carrier responsibilities, ment not on assigning Act of to free the transporta- surface responsibilities any particular par- those industry tion from unnecessary and out- ty trucking to the transaction. regulation.”). moded later, years Congress Fifteen Act, Concerning enacted the ICC Termination dissolv- lump- current 14103 and ICC, stated, much along regu- ing, of its the Committee sec- “[t]his framework, latory and transferring preserves tion current law regarding (the surviving regulatory obligations ‘lumping’ to the utilization of other persons truck) newly Department formed of Transporta- freight to load or unload from a in (DOT). trucking industry,” tion ICC Termination Act of the and that “directed] 104-88, transfer, upon Pub.L. No. 109 Stat. 803 DOT [codified should nоt continue § at seq.l any dispute 49 U.S.C. 13101 et The ICC resolution regarding functions rules, provisions only Termination Act included these but rather oversee the newly regulations.” revised MCA-II. Much like the H.R. Rep. No. at behind MCA-II and legislative purpose 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (1995), in reprinted 14103(a): added). Moreover, extor- § to curtail coercive and (emphasis by inducing ship- practices tionate lumping Com- Conference the Senate-House when receivers, freely and truckers to ne- pers, H.R. 2539 to reconcile convened mittee pre- in lumping among themselves gotiate that that Committee noted and S. Jessep, 350 F.3d delivery contracts. See were “identi- lumping versions both bills’s “legislative that adopted (observing at 742 MCA-I’s cal,” simply and the Conference 104-422, history section 14103 was meant indicates H.R.Rep. No. House version. prac- extortionate (1995), prohibit coercive and reprinted at tices”). (Conf. intend Congress did Rep.). U.S.C.C.A.N. 14103(a) any particular § on impose these committees only “current law” which duty to party unqualified reimburse preserv- themselves have envisioned could And, I, lumping fees. as we have provisions of MCA incurred lumping was noted, goal statutory analy- of indeed, already recognized, II’s “[t]he as MCA and sis, course, give effect to the Con- §in are of is found lumping provisions Finally, gressional intent behind the statute’s en- supra n. 5. virtually identical. See Famam, as well actment.” Estate lumping, envisioned Congress that USA, therefor, by (citing Chevron Inc. v. Natural to be decided compensation Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842- is also reflected other Res. private contract Def. (1984)). enabling regu- 104 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d 694 provisions and the MCA-II Congress authorized DOT to lations that Returning to the facts of OOI- Indeed, we have noted promulgate. court, case, despite pro DA’s the district governing trucking statutes” “[r]elated faulty premise first ceeding from the agreements “clarify lease equipment 14103(a)’s language plain is and unam to enter expected carriers and drivers are ultimately arrived at the correct biguous, will agreements contractual as to who into legal plaintiff conclusion that a trucker unloading freight.” Jes- responsible provision must show as suing under alia, (citing, at 742 inter sep, 350 F.3d facie case that he has not prima of his 14102(b)); see 49 U.S.C. U.S.C. by been reimbursed either 14102(b) (“any arrangement, between a turn, In this con applying the receiver. any person, ... and other motor carrier struction of to OOIDA’s pro- other under which such properly granted court sum district by any portion transportation ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍vide of such mary judgment against OOIDA because carrier a motor vehicle not owned identify any failed to of its truck OOIDA writing, responsible specify, shall who is already ers whom a had not reim property unloading Likewise, court, finding bursed. vehicle”). from the motor Simi- onto and evidence that an record to be devoid larly, regulations enabling these re- DOT trucker was not reimbursed his or lated statutes mandate that lease “[t]he shipper, concludes her fees clearly specify shall who properly disposed that the court district onto property Finally, suit under Rule 56. OOIDA’s com- and from the motor and the conclusion, light of this we need not any, if ser- pensation, paid to be for this remaining address the issues wheth 376.12(e). vice.” 49 C.F.R. con Supervalu’s requirement er insurance sum, facto more exten stitutеd a de OOI- MCA-I’s purchase lumping; DA Congress’s reveals truckers legislative sive 14704(a)(l)’s ever, provi- whether U.S.C. does not authorize an award of mone- “injunctive only tary relief’ private sion authorizes relief action. civil On 14103(a), basis, injunctions for violations of that I judgment concur the af- equitable firming not additional remedies the including dismissal OOIDA’s claim. “accountings disgorge- “restitution” or I. ment.” provides: statute issue III. Conclusion Whenever a or shipper receiver of prop- erty requires any person that who owns Having that concluded the district court operates or a motor vehicle transporting properly read 49 pre- U.S.C. property in interstate commerce ... be clude relief un-reimbursed ab- assisted in the unloading or a plaintiff-trucker’s sent affirmative show- shipper or receiver ing that he or she was not reimbursed shall responsible be for providing such shipper receiver, either the or the we af- assistance or compensate shall the own- firm. er operator for all costs associated with securing and compensating per- COLLOTON, Judge, Circuit concurring son persons providing such assis- judgment. tance. This case a dispute pro- involves over a 14103(a). 49 U.S.C. vision of the ICC Termination Act of 1995 Here, the district court assumed that governs unloading shipper or receiver—in this a receiv- property transported in interstate com- er, Supervalu required owner-opera- — merce. See 49 U.S.C. 14103. As the tors be assisted in the unloading of their us, case comes to the district court as- event, vehicles. In that the statute re- analysis sumed for the sake of that Super- quires that “the or receiver shall valu, Inc., required owner-operators responsible” for compensating the own- of motor goods vehicles who delivered er-operator. Supervalu’s distribution centers be assist- ed so-called “lumpers” The text and structure of the statute of their vehicles. The court nonetheless lead to the conclusion that where a receiv- rejected the claims of Owner-Operator requires er the use of lumpers, that same Independent Association, Drivers Inc. receiver for compensating (“OOIDA”) that owner-operators were the owner-operator the associated compensation entitled to from Supervalu costs. The statute uses the definite arti- for the costs of that prevail assistance. To cle—'“the or receiver”—when iden- appeal, on this OOIDA must establish tifying party both responsible for compen- that Supervalu would be responsible for sating owner-operators in the second compensating owner-operators clause. This means that the second clause lumpers required by Supervalu, costs refers to specific. someone See Flandreau may and that OOIDA States, be entitled to mone- Santee Sioux Tribe v. United tary view, my Cir.1999). relief. governing F.3d It also raises provides statute that if a receiver requires inference the definite article refers owner-operators to use the assistance of specific party back to a previously identi- lumpers, then that required instance, receiver is to fied—-in this imposed whoever compensate the owner-operators for the to use lumpers under the statute, costs of the Wilcox, assistance. The how- first clause. See v. United States 868 (1980), a tenuous Cir.2007); is ba- 1163, Yam- U.S.C.C.A.N. Tech., Inc., 95-1362, § that fixes no concluding No. v. ESS sis Corp.

aha (Fed.Cir. 29, 146499, March at *3 compensating an owner- responsibility 1996WL Rubin, Foods, 1996); v. Inc. Nat’l In to the usual con- operator. addition Cir.1991). (2d The term F.2d weight given legisla- to cerns about the necessary to clause is in the second “or” history, specific bill that was dis- tive identify responsible allow the court report did in the 1980 committee cussed imposed party on which party, depending law, substantially it was not become first clause. under the of the and amended on the floor redrafted re- to “the But the reference 15,641-44 Rec. Cong. House. See 126 clause does not mean in the second ceiver” (1980) forth amendments offered (setting indetermi- party is resрonsible Howard). by Rep. report, The 1980 House required has a receiver nate. Where moreover, proceedings commented on clause, the under the first lumpers use of statute, the Motor Carrier led to a former reading that the definite natural more 96-296, Act of Pub.L. No. 94 Stat. clause refers to article in the second Although Congress reenacted receiver, shipper, a because not to specific significant provision relevant without has been identified specific shipper no Act change in see ICC Termination preceding text. § Pub.L. No. would frus- contrary interpretation A judicial there was no settled Stat. statutory design. Section trate provision of the that became interpretation 14704(a)(1) person may that a provides Abbott, 14103(a), § v. Bragdon U.S. cf. injunctive relief for bring a civil action 141 L.Ed.2d 540 118 S.Ct. addition, 14103; §of violations (1998), and no reason to assume Mem- $10,000 penalties upof authorizes civil Congress in 1995 acted on a bers of based knowingly who violates against any person from passage report a House committee 14103(a). provisions these ef- give To fect, designate responsi- a must event, that either party. assuming ble If the statute means the 1980 even a or a receiver proposed legisla- report regarding House owner-operator, but nev- compensating an interpretation tion should inform our responsible, the two is specifies er which of statute, report does not con- the 1995 for a court to impractical then it would be 14103(a). the better tradict impose civil injunctive award relief or to committee, reported by the 1980 House As рenalties. assign responsibility to a re- the bill did pay persons to unload property ceiver of by the legislative described a tariff or written property, such unless not dictate different opinion court’s does provided otherwise. See 126 contract Report conclusion. The 1980 of the House (1980) 15,600 (setting pro- forth Cong. Rec. Transpor- Committee on Public Works 11109(a)).6 Therefore, tation, H.R.Rep. posed No. 96-10691980 U.S.C. relating transportation to such proposed 6. The text reads as follows: less tariff of, relating to such or a written contract shipping property person A which is by, transportation entered into compensa- transported by motor vehicle for transportation provides oth- providing such ... load tion in interstate commerce shall erwise. property onto such vehicle or shall person receiving property which is A employ pay persons or more ... one compensa- transported by vehicle for property motor load such onto such un- report’s the committee statement that the valu for the costs using associated with apportionment responsibility lumpers to goods. unload The district or a market “is decision to be court concluded that restitution is not an by parties the to determined the transac- available remedy under the governing stat- tion,” 31, H.R.Rep. No. at 1980 utes. If that correct, conclusion is then 2283, 2313, contemplated a U.S.C.C.A.N. dismissal of remaining the claim ap- was statutory assignment of responsibility propriate. the absence of tariff or contract. The floor provision The that sets forth remedies Howard, statement Representative available a private action alleging viola- 15,643 Cong. (1980), Rec. that the commit- 14103(a) § tions of § is 49 U.S.C. tee “identify any intended to compensation 14704(a)(1) Section provides for relief in a that the owner-operator to receive” for private civil action: “A may bring a loading or unloading is consistent with this civil injunctive action for relief for viola- §

framework. Under as enacted tions of sections 14102 and 14103.” Sec- parties likewise apportion can 14704(a)(2) tion provides for damages in responsibility through contract, tariff or actions, OOIDA, private see Inc. v. New although activity such market must occur Prime, Cir.1999), against backdrop of a that oth- statute only but violations a “carrier or fixes responsibility erwise for compensat- providing transportation brokеr or ser- owner-operator on party re- vice,” not by shipper a or receiver. See 49 quiring the use of lumpers. § U.S.C. (defining “carrier” and reasons,

For “broker”). these if a requires receiver Another provision, 49 U.S.C. owner-operator to be 14905(a), assisted un- for a allows civil penalty upof a $10,000 motor then the receiver to per §of payable violation providing such assistance to the United States. or compensating owner-operator. The owner-operators contend court’s contrary district conclusion should 14704(a)(1), though it only refers to “in- adopted. not be relief,” junctive a authorizes district court grant all equitable relief, forms of in-

II. cluding restitution and disgorgement. The district court’s judgment nonethe- They cite Supreme Court’s statement may be less affirmed on an altеrnative in Mitchell v. Robert De Jewelry, Mario ground. Inc., agreement settlement ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍288, 291, be- U.S. 80 S.Ct. parties, tween the (1960), re- owner-operators L.Ed.2d 323 and Porter v. Warner served their right appeal Co., Holding the dismissal 328 U.S. 66 S.Ct. their claim for restitution (1946), under 90 L.Ed. 1332 “[u]nless 14103(a), but not their words, claims for declar- in many statute so or a neces- atory injunctive or relief sary under inescapable inference, restricts 14103(b). any of or their claims under jurisdiction the court’s in equity, the full Thus, only remaining claim of the scope own- of that jurisdiction is recog- to be er-operators Super- seeks restitution from nized and applied.” Porter held that a of, tion in commerce ... interstate shall un- tation or a relating written contract property of,

load such from vehicle transportation such such or a written con- employ pay shall persons one or relating transportation more tract to such entered ... to property unload such by, such vehi- person providing from into transpor- such cle, relating transpor- unless a provides tariff tation otherwise. type equita- junctive relief’ is distinct injunctive relief “or providing statute encompass restitu- ble relief that does a court to order authorized order” other See Mertens v. disgorgement. tion or 66 S.Ct. 1086. 328 U.S. restitution. Assocs., 508 U.S. further, that a stat- Hewitt holding went Mitchell (1993). 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 jurisdiction “to S.Ct. courts district granting ute availability of all to infer 15” of of section Whether restrain violations au- relief based on the equitable a forms of Act authorized Labor Standards Fair depends of one form on court, by the thorization brought in an action district Labor, statutory scheme. to award reimburse- Secretary of to un- wages that were lost due ment for view here is that restitution The better 361 or discrimination. discharge lawful are not available forms disgorgement According 80 S.Ct. 332. at U.S. a against in an action receiver of relief Mitchell, “affirmative confirmation Congress estab- a violation of to order reimbursement” power of the in a detailed remedial scheme lished statute’s through appeared Porter — 147 and 149 of Title 49. While Chapters permanent temporary “a reference monetary relief in provides the statute order, or- restraining or other injunction, contexts, designate such other it does not unnecessary to establish “the der” —was a remedy private a in a action for violation equity of the court’s scope” full district § 14103. Unlike this case and Me- (in- 291, Id. at 80 S.Ct. 332 jurisdiction. Supreme Court’s decisions ghrig, omitted); Porter, see 328 quotation ternal public involved Porter and Mitchell both 399, at 66 S.Ct. 1086. U.S. actions, and the ex- enforcement Court however, recently, the Court has More equitable powers that a court’s plained expressly Congress that where emphasized flexi- “assume an even broader and more remedy, a “a court designates particular in that context “than when ble character” into it.” chary others must controversy is at stake.” only private a W., Inc., Meghrig v. KFC 516 U.S. Porter, 1086; at 66 S.Ct. see 328 U.S. L.Ed.2d 121 116 S.Ct. 134 also United States v. Lane Labs-USA omitted). (internal espe- quotation This is (3d Inc., Cir.2005); FTC 427 F.3d cially Congress provided so when “has Corp., & Bullion v. Sec. Rare Coin for rem- provisions’ enforcement ‘elaborate (8th Cir.1991). light F.2d edying the violation of a federal statute.” most recent direction Supreme Court’s (quoting Mid- Id. 116 S.Ct. actions ‍​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​​‍private to be cautious about Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea dlesex ex- supplementing the remedies are Ass’n, 1, 14, 101 S.Ct. Clammers 453 U.S. by Congress, pru- authorized pressly (1981)). 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 monetary dent conclusion is that remedies in a action transporta- impliedly private are excluded In the context of interstate 14704(a)(1) carrier, alleged based on an property by tion of motor vehicle under monetary penal- violation of 14103. Consistent with Congress permitted civil Circuits, therefore, I §of in an action Ninth and Eleventh ties for violations States; agree the district court that the own- brought by provided the United it are not entitled to restitution. damages private brought er-operators in a action OOIDA, Co., broker”; Transp. au- Inc. v. a “carrier or but it See against Swift (9th Cir.2011); only “injunctive pri- thorized relief’ F.3d Inc., Sys., Inc. v. Landstar against action or receiver vate (11th Cir.2010). “In- premised on a violation of 1323-24 reasons, judg- I concur in the these For affirming the district court’s dismiss-

ment owner-operators’ claim for resti-

al of the §§ under 49 U.S.C.

tution

14704(a)(1). America, STATES of

UNITED

Appellee,

v. RUSH, Appellant.

Traves

No. 10-3004. Appeals, Court of

United States

Eighth Circuit. June 2011.

Submitted: Aug.

Filed: Rehearing En Banc

Rehearing and

Denied Oct. Frank, Omaha, NE, argued, A.

Julie Appellant. Everett, AUSA, Lin- argued,

Alan Lee coln, NE, Appellee. RILEY, Judge,

Before Chief GRUENDER, Judge, Circuit LIMBAUGH,1 Judge. District

Case Details

Case Name: Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Supervalu, Inc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 11, 2011

Citation: 651 F.3d 857

Docket Number: 09-3577

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.