Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Supervalu, Inc.
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16510
| 8th Cir. | 2011Background
- OOIDA, Rajkovacz, and Schaefer, LLC sue Supervalu under 49 U.S.C. §14103(a) for reimbursement of lumping fees at Supervalu facilities.
- Supervalu contracted lumping services and imposed higher insurance requirements on self-loading/unloading drivers in 2005, later reduced to federal minimums.
- District court granted summary judgment for Supervalu, holding OOIDA must prove non-reimbursement by shipper and that the insurance rule was unreasonable, and held §14704(a)(1) provides only injunctive relief.
- OOIDA argued the statute imposes a broad duty to compensate when lumping is required, not contingent on shipper reimbursement; sought restitution and accounting.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding the district court correctly ruled OOIDA failed to show unreimbursed lumping costs; the statutory language is ambiguous but the court’s interpretation is consistent with intent, and restitution is not available in private §14103 actions.
- Concurring opinion agrees with dismissal of restitution and emphasizes that monetary relief is not authorized in private actions under §14704(a)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is §14103(a) satisfied only if the trucker shows unreimbursed lumping costs? | OOIDA asserts the shipper/receiver reimbursement requirement is not tied to who required lumping. | Supervalu argues reimbursement can come from either shipper or receiver; the statute does not tie liability to the same party who required lumping. | Ambiguous; plaintiff must show unreimbursed costs by a shipper or receiver |
| Does Super valu's insurance requirement render a de facto lumping obligation unreasonably burdensome? | OOIDA contends the insurance requirement effectively forces hiring Supervalu lumpers at drivers' cost. | Supervalu contends the requirement is reasonable if tied to statutory minimums; no explicit coercion shown. | Not reached on final merits; issue reserved after ambiguity resolution; district court's outcome preserved |
| Whether private §14704(a)(1) allows restitution or only injunctive relief for §14103 violations against a shipper/receiver | OOIDA seeks monetary relief (restitution/accounting) under private action. | Supervalu argues §14704(a)(1) only allows injunctive relief in private actions and does not authorize restitution. | Monetary relief not available in private action under §14704(a)(1) for §14103 violations |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. I.L., 614 F.3d 817 (8th Cir.2010) (statutory-interpretation baseline; plain-language approach)
- Estate of Farnam v. Comm'n of Internal Revenue, 583 F.3d 581 (8th Cir.2009) (interpretation requires reading statute as a whole; ambiguity permitting history use)
- Jessep v. Jacobson Transp. Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 739 (8th Cir.2003) (context on MCA lumping provisions and private contracting framework)
- Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (limits private monetary relief when explicit remedies exist)
- Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1936) (private-equity relief boundaries; restitution not implied when statute specifies injunctive relief)
- Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (restitution not assumed absent explicit statutory authorization in public actions)
- Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (equitable relief scope in private actions governed by specific statutory scheme)
- United Van Lines, LLC v. Jessep, 556 F.3d 690 (8th Cir.2009) (statutory interpretation and legislative-history approach in MCA-II context)
