Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18294
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- In 1987 Colleen Williar was raped and murdered; James Owens was arrested and tried in 1988 based largely on testimony by James Thompson. Mid-trial interrogation produced multiple inconsistent statements by Thompson and forensic testing later linked the hair to Thompson, not Owens. Prosecutor Marvin Brave did not disclose those inconsistencies or DNA results to defense counsel at trial.
- Owens was convicted (burglary and felony murder) and sentenced to life; repeated post-conviction efforts failed until DNA testing after 2006 excluded Owens; a state court granted a new trial in 2007 and the State entered a nolle prosequi in October 2008, releasing Owens after ~20 years in prison.
- Owens filed a § 1983 suit in October 2011 alleging constitutional violations (Brady/impeachment-material suppression) by the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, ASA Brave, the BCPD, and individual officers Pelligrini, Dunnigan, and Landsman.
- The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred and on alternative grounds (sovereign immunity for the State’s Attorney’s Office; qualified immunity for officers; failure to state a Monell claim as to BCPD).
- The Fourth Circuit: affirmed dismissal only as to the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office (holding it is not a suable entity), reversed/ vacated other dismissals, holding Owens’ § 1983 claims were timely (limitations accrued at the nolle prosequi), officers plausibly violated clearly established Brady-related duties, and the Monell claim against BCPD survived Rule 12(b)(6).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statute of limitations accrual date for § 1983 Brady-like claim | Owens: limitations begin at nolle prosequi (Oct. 15, 2008); suit filed within 3 years | Defendants: accrual began when state court granted new trial (June 4, 2007) | Held: accrual borrows malicious-prosecution "favorable termination" rule; limitations began at nolle prosequi, so suit timely |
| Whether Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office is a suable entity | Owens: office is an entity amenable to suit under Maryland law | State’s Attorney’s Office: not a separate legal entity; ergo not suable (or an arm of the State) | Held: not a suable entity under Maryland law (term of convenience only); dismissal affirmed as to that defendant |
| Qualified immunity of individual officers for withholding impeachment/exculpatory evidence | Owens: officers acted in bad faith; Brady/Barbee/Goodwin made duty clear by 1988 | Officers: rights not "clearly established" in 1988; thus qualified immunity applies | Held: complaint plausibly alleges bad-faith suppression; Fourth Circuit held law was clearly established by 1988 and declined to dismiss on qualified immunity at Rule 12(b)(6) stage |
| Municipal (Monell) liability of BCPD for officers' suppression of evidence | Owens: BCPD maintained a custom/policy of condoning suppression; alleged reported/unreported cases and motions showing recurring misconduct | BCPD: allegations are conclusory and insufficient under Iqbal/Twombly | Held: Plaintiff alleged non-conclusory facts (volume of similar incidents); Monell claim survives 12(b)(6) and was remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutorial suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process)
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (§ 1983 accrual governed by common-law analogue; accrual when plaintiff has complete and present cause of action)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 judgment that implies invalidity of conviction barred until conviction is invalidated)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities liable under § 1983 only for their own customs/policies)
- Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (police suppression of exculpatory evidence imputable to prosecution; police conduct can taint trial)
- Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognized that a reasonable officer would know suppression of exculpatory information could violate constitutional rights and defeat qualified immunity)