Ozаrk Society v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; Judith L. Henry, Forest Supervisor, Ozark-St. Francis National Forests; Department of Agriculture; Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management; Department of Defense, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Little Rock District; United States Department of the Army; Bureau of Land Management; Dr. John Lyon, in his official capacity of Eastern States Director, Bureau of Land Management; Bruce Dawson, in his official capacity as Eastern States Field Manager, Bureau of Land Management; OUACHITA WATCH LEAGUE; Newton County Wildlife Association; Shawn Porter; G. Thomas McKinney; David Reagan; Susan Gateley; Robert B. Leflar; Sarah May Leflar; Kimberly Ison; John Ison; Billy Lindsey; Carol Lindsey; James Mitchell; Ruth Mitchell; John Lawrence Poff
No. 16-1952
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 30, 2017
539-544
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellees was Avi Kupfer, of Washington, DC. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Ruth Ann Storey, Jennifer Scheller Neumann, Romney S. Philpott, and Lane N. McFadden of Washington, DC.
Before SMITH1 and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and SIPPEL, District Judge.2
The United States Forest Service (“Forest Service“) developed a management plan for the Ozark-St. Francis National Forests and analyzed the plan‘s environmental effects in 2005. At that time, the Forest Service anticipated 10-20 new natural-gas wells within ten years. That expеctation arose from projections about natural-gas development in north central Arkansas‘s Fayetteville Shale Play. The projection missed the mark. Three years later, the Forest Service discovered that the better prediction was not 10-20 nеw wells, but 1,730. It nevertheless concluded, after consulting various experts, that this 85-fold increase in predicted drilling did not require a “correction, supplement, or revision” to the original environmental analysis. The Ozark Society (“the Society“) challenges this conclusion, contending that the Forest Service did not look hard enough at the environmental effects of drilling 1,730 wells versus 10-20. Because the Society has not identified any particular member who stands to be harmed by the government action it challenges, it lacks a concrеte interest in this dispute, and we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
The National Forest Management Act of 1976 requires the Secretary of Agriculture to develop “land and resource management plans” for each national forest.
The Ozark and St. Francis national forests are two separate national forests-one mostly in northern Arkansas‘s Ozark Mountains and the other in eastern Arkаnsas‘s delta region-that are managed together. The latest management plan for these forests dates from 2005. It took four years to develop. This “major federal action” required an environmental impact statement. That statement, also published in 2005, еxceeds 500 pages. It notes 49 active gas wells in the Ozark National Forest and anticipates 10-20 new wells within ten years.
By 2007, discovery of natural gas in north central Arkansas led to a boom in drilling in the Fayetteville Shale. See Thomas A. Daily & W. Christopher Barrier, Well, Now, Ain‘t That Just Fugacious!: A Basic Primer on Arkansas Oil and Gas Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 211, 211 (2007). That year, the Forest Service asked the Bureau of Land Management to make an updated prediction about future gas development in the Ozark National
The Society sued various federal-agency defendants in October 2011 to challenge the decision embodied in the 2010 SIR.4 The Society is а nonprofit conservation and recreation group that seeks to protect the natural character of Arkansas‘s Ozark Mountains, particularly its scenic wilderness. The Society sought a judgment declaring that the 2010 SIR decision was arbitrary and capriciоus and therefore in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. It also sought to enjoin further mineral leasing in the Ozark National Forest. The district court held that the Society had standing to sue but denied preliminary injunctive relief. It later granted summary judgment to the federal agencies for four reasons. First, the 2010 SIR was not a final agency action subject to judicial review. Second, the Forest Service was not obligated to supplement the 2005 environmental impact statement. Third, the federal agencies did not have to allow public participation when deciding whether to supplement the environmental impact statement. And fourth, the Society‘s challenge to one particular drilling permit was moot because the well had already been drilled. The Society appeals.
II. Discussion
First we must address whether the Society has standing to challenge the agency action at issue. Our constitutional responsibility is to “redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury,” and unless a party has suffered such an injury, we have “no charter to review and revise ... еxecutive action.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009). Put another way, we may adjudicate only “Cases” and “Controversies.”
Having a “specific and concrete plan ... to enjoy the national forests” distinguishes a particular harm to a recreational interest from mere generalized harm. Id. at 495. When the
The district court in this case concluded that the Society‘s “allegations and the affidavit of Robert Cross ... adequately set forth alleged concrete and particularized harm which will result from the drilling activities.” Paragraph 12 of thе Society‘s complaint describes the organization‘s background and its relationship with the Ozark National Forest:
The Ozark Society membership utilizes the Ozark National Forest, roadless areas, wilderness areas, and wild and scenic rivers for hiking, boating, and other outdoor recreation activities. The Ozark Society regularly schedules outings in the Ozark National Forest.... The Ozark Society has a vested interest in the environmental health of the Ozark National Forest.
Paragraph 80 describes the harm flowing from the defendants’ actiоns:
The defendants have engaged in a course of action which has caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable environmental harm in the Ozark National Forest. This harm causes a direct adverse impact on the Ozark Society‘s interest. The defendants have also denied the Ozark Society and the public the right to participate in the [National Environmental Policy Act] process for assessing such environmental harm. The defendants’ actions have caused harm to the Ozark Society‘s interest in the management and environmental well-being of the Ozark National Forest, and the Ozark Society‘s ability to participate in those management decisions.
The other alleged support for standing comes from the declaration of Robert Cross, the Society‘s Presidеnt. Cross declared that he has led and participated in hikes in the Ozark National Forest. He also recalled the Society holding a meeting there.
On de novo review, Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006), we conclude that the complaint and declaration do not establish the Society‘s standing. Paragraph 80 is a series of general and conclusory legal allegations-it provides no facts about how the defendants’ actions have harmed or will harm the Society, and it speaks only for the Society as a whole, rather than for an identified member. Paragraph 12 does allege that the Society “regularly schedules outings” in the Ozark National Forest, which might be sufficient to establish a specific plan to use the Forest in the future because it implies an ongoing use. Yet paragraph 12, like paragraph 80, attributes this plan only to the Society generally, rather than to an identified member. It stands to reason that some of the Society‘s members share the group‘s mission but not its use of the Forest. And while it is statistically probable that paragraph 12‘s language describes at least one pаrticular member, “[t]his requirement of naming the affected members has never been dispensed with in light of statistical probabilities, but only where all the members of the organization are affected by the challenged activity.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 498-99. The Society has not argued that the Forest Sеrvice‘s actions necessarily would affect all its members in a concrete way, and we would have to speculate to con-
The Society attempts to distinguish Summers by pointing out that the parties there had resolved their dispute about a particular forest project. But Summers also noted that the plaintiffs had “identified no other application of the invalidated regulatiоns that threatens imminent and concrete harm to the interests of their members.” Id. The Court came to this conclusion after considering an affidavit that showed no “specific and concrete plan” by a particular member to enjoy the national forests. Id. The Society also notes that the agency action in Summers invоlved agency-wide regulation while this case involves a single agency decision. Assuming this is a distinction, it still does not supply any member of the Society with an interest in the national forests affected by this agency decision.
Nor are we persuaded that this case is like Pacific Rivers Council v. United States Forest Service, on which the Society relies. 689 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated as moot, 570 U.S. 901 (2013). In Pacific Rivers, the organization‘s chairman declared that hе lived near and frequented the potentially affected area. Id. at 1022. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the chairman had “clearly stated that he and a number of Pacific Rivers’ members have used, and will continue to use, the national forests in the Sierras in a variety of рlaces and in a variety of ways.” Id. The Society, on the other hand, has alleged only that as a group it regularly uses the Ozark National Forest and that one identified member has used it in the past. This is short of the mark.
Because the Society challenges federal аction affecting the Ozark National Forest without alleging that a particular member has a specific plan to use that forest, there is no case or controversy before us, and we lack authority to adjudicate this dispute.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
