*1 Black’s, and Mr. Muncy, Mr. Wilson reversed, and this ease is remanded opin- with this proceedings further consistent
ion.
Reversed Remanded.
Gorman Plaintiffs, al.,
et America,
The UNITED STATES al.,
et Defendants.
No. 30115.
Supreme Appeals Court Virginia. March 2002.
Submitted July
Decided 2002.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Maynard, July *2 McGinley, P. Rudolph DiTrapano,
Sean L. DiPiero, Timothy Mary Blaydes, J. Sadd Di- DiPiero, PLLC, Trapano, Barrett & Charles- ton, Virginia, plaintiffs. West Warner, Kasey Attorney, United States Horn, Stephen M. Assistant United States Attorney, Office, Attorney’s United States Charleston, Virginia, for West defendants. Grinberg, Benjamin Michele Salango, C. Flaherty, Bonasso, Sensabaugh P.L.L.C., & Charleston, Virginia, West for Amicus Curi- ae, West State Medical Association. DAVIS, they riding the vehicle in which were was Chief Justice. struck vehicle driven defendant Ter- upon case us certifica- This comes before ry [hereinafter Hoosier referred as “Mr. District Court from the United States tion Sammy Hoosier”]. Hubbard died as a result Virginia. the Southern District of *3 wife, Hubbard, injuries; Lynn his his of sus- 20, 2001,1 September the By order entered injuries tained serious and was comatose for following presents court the certified district accident; days following five the their five- Virginia's Medical question: “Does Hubbard, year-old daughter, Katie was ren- Liability provide a of Professional Act cause down; paralyzed dered waist the a by party against a third action son, Hubbard, nineteen-day-old their Seth injuries for to third provider foreseeable the was not Blood alcohol harmed. tests follow- proximately by party caused the health ing the showed that Mr. accident Hoosier negligent pa- provider’s treatment system, had trace amounts of alcohol in his Upon a of review the rec- tieni/tortfeasor?” testing while blood for medications revealed consideration, presented appellate the ord for Butalbital, Codeine, presence the and Vali- arguments, parties’ pertinent and the author- presumed It is um. that the Butalbital and ities, question in the certified the answer prescription are attributable Codeine to med- affirmative. We conclude that the West Vir- prescribed by longtime ications Mr. Hoosier’s Liability Act ginia Medical Professional physician, Dr. Prakob [hereinafter Sriehai “MPLA”], the referred to as [hereinafter to “Dr. Sriehai”].3 referred 55-7B-1, seq., et permit § does a W.Va.Code Dr. and Mr. Sriehai Hoosier have had party bring a third to cause of action relationship physician-patient approxi- since inju- provider a health care for foreseeable that, mately 1980. The district court found proximately by that ries were caused during year period the seventeen immediate- provider’s negligent treatment accident, ly preceding the Dr. Sriehai had However, in patient. to a tortfeasor order prescribed numerous Mr. medications for party maintain such a third action Hoosier, including several controlled sub- MPLA, plaintiff must establish the ele- management pain, stances for but § proof ments contained W.Va.Code 55- verify always Dr. Sriehai did that such (1986)(Repl.Vol.2000). 7B-3 medically necessary. medications were For injuries example, Mi'. various with which I. presented emergency Hoosier to the local AND FACTUAL PROCEDURAL range room were inconsistent with the HISTORY reported during to motion he Dr. Sriehai Court, visits, Upon physical certification this the dis- office limitations following Moreover, court trict has ascertained Dr. Sriehai found exist. follow- 20,1997, July plaintiffs ing herein Mr. facts.2 On Hoosier’s release from incarceration October, 1995,4 injured fatally during which he permanently and when had been were order, published this see determine relevant and shall them 1. For the version of facts state States, order”). part pur F.Supp.2d as a of its certification For Osborne v. United (S.D.W.Va.2001). question poses of our determination of the of law Court, only recite those certified we will pertinent query. A facts to the instant full recita Ques 2. Pursuant to the Uniform Certification by may district Act, 51-1A-1, tion of facts found court seq., Law et tions of 23, 2001, August be found in order. See its by accompanied question certified must be States, F.Supp.2d Osborne United upon the facts which it is based. statement of (mem.). (S.D.W.Va.2001) parties agreement Absent facts, pertinent court crafted its own district Dr. 3. The district court found that had underlying pro Sriehai of the facts instant statement ceeding. Plus, 51-1A-6(a)(2), (b) given prescriptions Esgic Mr. for Hoosier See Butalbital, pain which contains and a medication (Repl.Vol.2000) (requiring order of certifi medicine, Phenergan cough with Codeine. ‘‘[t]he facts relevant cation include fully showing question, nature of the contro versy period for a question and di 4. Mr. was incarcerated out which arose” Hoosier agree upon eight recting, parties after he had violated conditions cannot months "[i]f facts, supervision certifying supervised release. had then the court shall of his Such statement of medications, eluded, 23, 2001, presented August weaned from all he order entered visit, days At this plaintiffs satisfactorily Dr. Sriehai’s office. seven proven had release, Mr. reported after his Hoosier to relief their entitlement under the MPLA prescriptions he different needed nine negli- Dr. occasioned Srichai’s taking had while in medications that he been Thereafter, gent treatment of Mr. Hoosier. pain jail, were controlled several of which by order September entered not, substances; management appear, it does court above-quoted district certified the however, that Dr. Sriehai validated Court, question requesting of law to this necessary medications were mainte- party Court determine whether a third nance of Mr. health. Hoosier’s permitted by of action cause the MPLA. injuries they
As
result of the
sustained
*4
Hoosier,
plaintiffs5
Mr.
the accident with
II.
Logan
filed suit in
Coun
the Circuit Court
ty
employer,
against Dr.
and his
Sriehai
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Man,
Community
Inc.
Health Foundation of
upon
When this Court
is called
“CHF”], alleging
referred
as
[hereinafter
question,
employ
resolve a
a
certified
we
resulting
from
“
plenary review.
‘A de novo
standard
negligent prescription
of controlled sub
by
applied
in addressing
[C]ourt
this
patient
prescrip
with
stances to a
a known
presented by a
legal
question
issues
certified
drug dependency. Mr.
tion
was also
Hoosier
appellate
a
from federal district
court.’
party
September
a
named as
defendant. On
1,
Co.,
Syl.
Light
Pt.
v. Allstate Ins.
203
9, 1999, the action was
the Unit
removed to
(1998).”
27,
2,
506
64
Syl. pt.
W.Va.
S.E.2d
States District Court for
Southern
ed
Debow,
486,
Aikens v.
W.Va.
208
District of West
due to CHF’s status
(2000).
1,
pt.
Syl.
576
Accord
Bower v. West
federally
program
as a
funded
under the
133,
inghouse Elec.
206
Corp.,
W.Va.
522
Department
United
and Hu
States
of Health
(1999) (“This
424
S.E.2d
Court undertakes
Services,
jurisdiction
man
and the exclusive
plenary
presented by
legal
review of
issues
brought
of federal
over claims
courts
question
a
certified
from federal district or
the Federal Tort
Act.6
Claims
court.”).
appellate
Thereafter, Dr. Sriehai and CHF moved to
party
substitute the United States as the
particular question
that has been
upon
position
CHF’s
an
defendant based
as
certified for our
determination
the case
agent of the
States and Dr. Srichai’s
United
judice requires
interpret
provi
sub
us
employee
acting
within
status as
thereof
Liability
sions
Professional
Medical
conjunction
scope
employment.
of his
such,
plenary
Act. As
we also accord a
review
with
the United States’ substitution
statutory inquiry.
to this
issue
“Where the
proceeding,
defendant to
Dr.
Sriehai
appeal
clearly
on an
from
circuit
court is
CHF were dismissed
this action.
question
involving
a
of law or
an interpreta
statute,
Following
arguments by
par-
apply
various
both
tion of
we
a de novo standard
justiciability
regarding
Syl. pt.
Chrystal
ties
of a thud
of review.”
R.M. v.
A.L.,
party
cause of action under the West
194
Charlie
W.Va.
claims. III. presented As for our the matter determi- question statutory nation con- concerns DISCUSSION struction, we must first examine the statuto- us, presently In the we are case before plaintiffs ry provisions upon base which the question of following asked to law answer right recovery. their 55- District Court certified the United States (1986) (Repl.Vol.2000) 7B-1 sets forth the Virginia: for the Southern District of West Liability purpose of the Medical Professional Virginia’s “Does West Medical Professional [MPLA], part,8 recognizing: Act Liability provide Act of action cause provider party third a health care That as human endeavor party proxi- possibility injury negli- foreseeable to the third or death from *5 gent protection of mately by provider’s health care conduct commands that caused the patient/tortfeasor?” public by providers negligent of the served health care treatment question recognized important as inter- The district court answered this be an state est; affirmative, finding that the the Hubbards’ duty juncture, acknowledge responsibility it is the and of the At this we wish to That
7. the Legislature rights of appearance to balance the our individu- of the West State Medical adequate compensa- proceeding. al citizens to and reasonable Curiae in this Association as Amicus provi- public interest appreciate partic- tion with the broad in the Medical We the Association’s case, by qualified providers health ipation sion of services care and will this we consider its protection the of rea- conjunction can themselves obtain contributions in with the defendants' liability coverage; sonably priced and extensive arguments. years, in recent the cost of insurance That dramatically coverage has risen while the nature entirety, In its 55-7B-1 diminished, leaving coverage and extent of has (Repl.Vol.2000)provides: injured providers the care and the without health hereby Legislature finds and declares that professional liability the full of insurance benefit citizens of this slate are entitled to the best the coverage; care and medical and facilities available many of the factors and reasons contrib- That providers care offer an and health essential basic uting and avail- to the increased cost diminished requires public policy that the of service ability liability professional insurance arise of encourage provision this state and facilitate the inability this effec- from the historic of state to of such service to our citizens: industry tively fairly regulate the and insurance possibili- That as in human endeavor the guarantee so as citizens that rates to our injury negligent ty of or death from conduct purchasers appropriate, that of insurance cover- public protection of the served commands arbitrarily, age treated and that rates are not recognized by providers health care be as competency experience and of the reflect the interest; important state providers. care insured health litigation system That our of is an Therefore, essential purpose of this is to the enactment providing component of state’s interest in provide comprehensive for a resolution adequate compensation to and reasonable those Legislature the finds matters and factors which injury persons who or death as a suffer accomplish goals the set must be addressed to professional negligence; Legislature result of doing, In so forth above. liability key part is of That insurance our in the common law and determined statutory rights reforms compensation system litigation, affording compensation of to of our citizens fulfilling death, injured regulation the need and fairness while rate injury and in the of injury; spreading by practices cost of the risks of making of other insur- and authority important component industry, of That a these further ance and in the willingness effectively regulate capacity licensing protections and disci- boards providers effectively pline providers under board to monitor and health together necessary professional competency, mutu- their so as to must as control be enacted possi- appropriate legislative re- public ingredients of protect the ensure to the extent al care; highest sponse. quality of ble the system litigation interpreted That our is an essen- tent will not be but the courts component given Syl. tial of this state’s interest in will full Pt. be force and effect.’ providing adequate Epperly, com- State v. reasonable (1951).”). pensation persons those who suffer from 488 See also West Hu- injury Garretson, professional Rights or death man Comm’n v. as result 196W.Va. (1996) (“A 118, 123, negligence; interpreted plain meaning on statute is context, provision in in- statutory its Therefore, purpose of this enactment necessary by policy that formed when provide comprehensive for a resolu- (footnote designed to statute was serve.” tion of the matters and factors which the omitted)). citation Legislature finds must be addressed to accomplish goals In set forth above. Upon reading the definition “medical doing, Legislature so has determined liability” contained in W.Va. that reforms in law 55-7B-2(d), the common and statu- Code are not left tory rights compensation of our citizens impression ambiguous, its terms are injury and death ... must be enacted capable or confusing, of more than one inter together necessary ingredi- and mutual stated, pretation. Simply provision rec legislative appropriate ents re- ognizes provider’s health legal respon sponse. contract, damages, sibility for in tort or in person injuries who has sustained death recognizing greater repara- the need for of, provider’s of such provision result tion negli- occasioned medical provide, failure to to a care services gence, Legislature further clarified the “ ” patient. Despite general clarity of this ‘[mjedical professional liability’ term however, provision, Legislature’s use of any liability damages resulting “mean[ ] “patient” *6 the distinct terms injury any from the death or person of a for gives pause only us one of words is these tort or breach of contract based on health defined in the MPLA’s definitional section. rendered, care services or which should have 55-7B-2(e) (1986) § (Repl. See W.Va.Code rendered, by provider been a health care or Vol.2000) Therefore, (defining “patient”). we facility patient.” health care to a “person” must whether ascertain the words 55-7B-2(d) (1986) § (Repl.Vol.2000). It employed “patient” in the definition of language differentiating this definitional be- professional liability” sepa “medical refer person” “a patient” upon tween and “a which individuals or rate whether these are terms district finding court a based its third synonymous. See Sizemore v. Farm State right task, party recovery. then, Our is to Co., 591, 596, Gen. Ins. 202 W.Va. 505 S.E.2d above-quoted statutory decide whether the (1998) (“‘A 654, open 659 statute is to con permits language such a cause of action. only language struction where the used re primary object construing “The a interpretation quires ambiguity because of statute is to give ascertain and effect to the it susceptible which or renders of two more 1, Legislature.” pt. of the Syl. intent Smith or constructions or obscure doubtful Comm’r, Comp. v. State Workmen’s 159 meaning might reasonable minds be 108, (1975). 219 W.Va. S.E.2d 361 To deter ” disagree meaning.’ or uncertain as to its intent, legislative generally mine this we look Meek, 373, (quoting v. 132 W.Va. y Hereford precise language employed b 386, 740, (1949)) (emphasis 52 747 S.E.2d Legislature. language “Where the of a stat added)). is clear and ambiguity plain ute without meaning accepted is to resorting defining be without concept In of “medical 2, interpretation.” Syl. to the rales of pt. liability,” Legislature em Elder, 571, 165 v. State 152 ployed “person” W.Va. S.E.2d 108 the word both and the term (1968). 1, Jarvis, Syl. pt. Accord “patient”: “any liability v. 199 damages State result 635, (1997) (“ W.Va. 487 S.E.2d ‘A ing injury 293 statu death or person tory provision unambigu which is any clear and or tort breach of contract on based plainly expresses legislative rendered, ous in- health care services or which
673
309,
658,
651,
rendered,
487
316
by a
care
W.Va.
S.E.2d
199
should have been
‘(“ “[Cjourts
(1997)
facility
patient.”
presume
leg-
that a
provider
a
must
or health
added).
55-7B-2(d) (emphasis
says
in a statute what it means and
islature
’ ”
statute,
a
we
Ordinarily, when
construe
says there.”
in a statute what it
means
employed
legis-
ain
give effect to each word
County
Randolph
Bd.
(quoting Martin v.
a
“It has been
traditional
lative enactment.
297,
399,
Educ.,
312,
195
465 S.E.2d
W.Va.
statutory
Legis-
construction
‘the
rule
Nat’l
(quoting
Bank
414
Connecticut
every
word
presumed
lature is
intend
Germain,
249, 253-54, 112
503 U.S.
S.Ct.
v.
specific purpose
a statute
a
used
(1992) (cita-
1146, 1149,
391,
L.Ed.2d
397
117
”
meaning[.]’ Keatley
County Bd.
v. Mercer
omitted))));
v.
State ex rel. Ballard
tions
306,
487, 495,
Educ.,
200 W.Va.
649,
80, 87,
Vest, 136
65
653
W.Va.
(1997) (quoting
ex rel. Johnson v.
State
(1951) (“We
assume in the absence of
cannot
Robinson,
W.Va.
indicating
wording clearly
contrariwise that
(1979)).
words,
In other
Legislature
use words which are
would
legislature
a
presumed the
had
[i]t is
way
unnecessary,
and use them in such
word,
phrase
purpose in the use of
obscure,
clarify,
purposes
than
rather
and clause found
a statute and intended
in the
it had in mind
enactment
effective,
the terms so used to be
where-
statute.”).
interpretation
a
fore
statute which
word,
a
phrase
no
rather
gives a
or clause thereof
Here we
faced
effect,
it,
perform,
is statu
unique
“patient”
or makes
the word
function
situation:
word,
repetition
phrase
defined,
a
of another
is not.
torily
mere
but the word
“
thereof,
rejected
55-7B-2(e),
‘[pa
must be
as be-
clause
Pursuant W.Va.Code
unsound,
ing
if it
so
possible
to construe
person
be
to “a natural
who re
tient”’ refers
whole,
as to
all of its
the statute as
make
or should have received health
ceives
parts operative and effective.
provider
from licensed
contract,
Watson,
expressed
implied.” Absent a
Syl. pt.
parte
Ex
“person,”9
statutory
Mangus Ashley,
pertinent
definition
S.E. 648
Accord
cieties,
partnerships,
statutory
if
re
"pertinent
We
definition”
associations
refer to a
context,”
recognizing
but
given
presently
also
of the case
before us.
stricted
the nature
apply if "a
employed
legisla
does not
different
giving
such definition
effect to word
apparent
enactment,
Legislature
part
be
principle of
on the
"[i]t is
fundamental
intent
tive
*7
Zain,
54,
context”);
v.
meaning
State
207 W.Va.
statutory
of a
from the
construction that
isolation,
(1999)
"person”
(observing that
in
but it
however,
360,
39,
do,
355,
commonly
Ill.App.2d
resort
4
124
we must
N.E.2d
41
(1955) (citations omitted).
accepted meaning of this word.
Accord In re Sea
Estate,
426,
right’s
417,
App.
87 Ohio
95
given
“Each
word of
statute should be
779,
(1950) (defining person
N.E.2d
784
and a
must
con-
some effect
statute
be
(internal
being”
quotations
“[a] human
and
import
in
with the
strued
accordance
its
omitted)).
citation
language.
similar
words and
Other authorities
Undefined
terms
ly
“person”
being,”10
“a
legislative
giv-
will
define
human
used
enactment
be
common,
man, woman,
ordinary
accepted
being;
“[a]n
en them
and
individual human
6,
meaning.” Syllabus point
part,
child,”11
State
being
and “a human
as distin
525,
Manchin,
rel.
175
guished
ex
Cohen v.
W.Va.
thing.”12
from an animal or a
(1984).
“The natural and obvious generally to allow intended individuals ‘person’ re living being.” word human damages cover attributable to Welosky, Massachusetts 276 Mass. (1931) (internal regardless 177 N.E. quota omitted). they actually generic “patients”.13 tions citations It is “a whether Ac comprehensive ... cordingly, word [that] nature in hold that the West beings[.]” Act, human cludes Illinois v. Guzzar Liability Medical Professional absurdity, support position some other reasonable construc- 13.In of their MPLA that the tion, produce absurdity, which will not action, will permit parly does not a third cause of Therefore, made.”). although ju- be this State’s rely upon prior defendants this Court’s statement risprudence replete references the stat- Miller, 705, 706, of dicta in Rand v. 185 W.Va. utory "person” definition word as it is (1991), to the effect that 2-2-10(i), defined there never- *8 malpractice ”[t]he of a essence medical action is authority theless exists a noticeable dearth for physician-patient Despite relationship.” simplistic explanation a more and fundamental however, pronouncement, guided by we are also term of this as it used in the definition of holding our recent in State ex rel. Weirton Medi- professional liability” by "medical W.Va.Code Mazzone, cal Center which ”[t]he counsels that 55-7B-2(d) (1986) (Repl.Vol.2000). § Accord- provisions Liability of the Medical Professional ingly, guidance we will look to other tribunals for Act, (1986), gov- §§ W.Va.Code 55-7B-1 to -11 formulating "person” in a definition of as it is falling parameters[.]” Syl. ern actions within its in used of the context MPLA. 1359317,-W.Va.-, pt. — part, in 2002 WL - (6th (No. 19, 2002). Dictionary ed.1990) 10. Black's Law June (citations omitted). Thus, we adhere to the conclusion reached in the proceeding pre- instant that the MPLA not does English Dictionary VII The Oxford 11. non-patient bringing clude a a cause of injuries by negli- action for occasioned medical gence. Unabridged 12. Random House Webster’s Dictio- (2d ed.1998). nary 1445 55-7B-1, par against provider a health care permits § a third cause of action seq., et Code injuries proximate- for were a health foreseeable ty bring a cause of action negli- ly by provider’s care caused health for provider foreseeable care patient. How- gent of a tortfeasor by treatment proximately caused the health were ever, third party in to maintain such a order negligent treatment of tortfeasor provider’s MPLA, plaintiff must action under the which patient.14 The manner in such third proof in contained establish the elements may plaintiff proceed with such party (1986) (Repl.Vol.2000). § 55-7B-3 W.Va.Code governed by require is further action provisions of MPLA. “The ments of the Question Certified Answered. Act, Liability Medical Professional (1986), govern MAYNARD, Justice, §§ to -11 ac dissenting. Code 55-7B-1 Syl. pt. falling parameters[.]” within its tions (Filed 2002) July part, in ex rel. Med Ctr. v. State Weirton easy It me is not for to dissent — 1359317, W.Va. -, Mazzone, 2002 WL My sympathy for the majority opinion. - (No. 2002). S.E.2d - June 30360. suffering plaintiffs light in of their terrible that, Therefore, hold in order to we further naturally to want to see them causes me party maintain a third action under the West law, injuries. The compensated for their Act, Liability Virginia Medical Professional however, simply provide not for recov- does proof plaintiff must establish elements ery tragedy. Regardless in instance of § in 55-7B-3 contained W.Va.Code recover, badly plaintiffs I of how want the (Repl.Vol.2000).1 do, majority’s I I cannot concur with the reasons, then, we foregoing intellectually For the an- holding and remain honest question determining scope the affirmative the certified of Medical Profes- swer (“MPLA”). However, by Liability posited the district court. sional Act party third cause of action must conform to opinion disagree majority I for with requirements prosecu- MPLA’s First, agree I not several reasons. do liability professional claims tion supports MPLA con- language generally. majority. by the The statute clusion reached lia- question professional “medical defines bility” resulting
IV. “any damages any injury person from the death or CONCLUSION on tort of contract based or breach rendered, conclusion, or which should have question we In answer the cer- services rendered, provider or been a health care District Court for tified the United States patient.” facility to a W.Va.Code District of West the Southern 55-7B-2(d) added). majori- (emphasis § Pro- affirmative. The West Medical Act, ty Legislature’s use of the Liability § 55-7B- contends fessional decision permit party bring a word deliberate seq., et a third does necessary Although provisions the resolution of 14. This result is consistent other by persons question, ap- the MPLA refer to claims note with certified instant See, e.g., opposed patients. W.Va.Code 55- proval conclusion the district court's ultimate be, part, purpose (explaining of MPLAto 7B-1 party appropri- cause of action was that a third "provision adequate of] and reasonable com- judice and its ate the facts of the case sub persons injury pensation those who suffer from finding plaintiffs the ele- that the had satisfied negligence” or death as a result of particular, proof requisite thereto. ments of 55-7B-4(a) added)); (emphasis agree Hoosier’s and *9 that the duration' of Mr. (1986) (establishing (Repl.Vol.2000) of statute year physician-patient re- Dr. Srichai’s seventeen injury to a "[a] for cause of action for limitations knowledge lationship; of Hoo- Dr. Mr. Srichai’s liability person alleging medical objec- drug dependency; prescription sier’s (emphasis against ed)); provider” add- tive Mr. Hoosier’s substance evidence of (1986) (Repl.Vol. § 55-7B-11 his numerous as a result of medication abuse 2000) severability any procedure (explaining ”[i]f supported plaintiffs’ claims D.U.I. the for arrests provision application the thereof of this article or for relief. any person or circumstance held invalid” to added)). (emphasis 676 generally exponentially potential liability
“allow
to
dam-
individuals
recover
the
of health
2,
ages
pro-
providers.
Syllabus
to
Point
attributable medical
See
New
Pennybacker,
774,
hart v.
liability regardless
they
of
120W.Va.
200
fessional
whether
S.E.
”
(“Where
particular
350
‘patients.’
construction
actually
are
absurdity,
of a
statute would
result
State,
of
common law
Under the
construction,
some other reasonable
relationship
physician-patient
required
was
produce
absurdity,
will not
will be
malpractice
to maintain medical
action.
made.”).
short,
majority opinion
In
the
dis
See, e.g.,
Corp.,
v.
Weaver
Union Carbide
regards
applicable
of statutory
the
rules
con
556,
(1989);
378
180 W.Va.
S.E.2d 105
Sisson
interpretation
struction
at an
to arrive
of the
Council,
v. Seneca Mental Health
185 W.Va.
clearly
MPLA that is
purposes.
mimical
its
33,
(1991);
404
425
Gooch v. West
Second,
majority opinion ig-
I believe the
Virginia Dept.
Safety, 195
Public
W.Va.
of
longstanding
nores
principles
tort law. In
357,
(1995);
Miller,
628
Rand
v.
year
that
old
infamous
first
law school case
705,
(1991).
185
408
W.Va.
S.E.2d 655
This
Co.,
of Palsgraf
Long
R.
Island
N.Y.
said,
previously
determining
Court
“In
has
(1928),
warned him or her about all the direct pre-
side effects of each and
medicine
scribed. And
what result?
settlement. may argue happen will not
ion