Ohio Neighborhood Fin. v. BrownOhio Neighborhood Fin. v. Brown
Anthony M. Sharett and Samir B. Dahman, Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Columbus, OH, for Appellant.1
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Ohio Neighborhood Finance, Inc. (hereinafter “Ohio Neighborhood“) appeals the judgment of the Ironton Municipal Court, which denied its motion for relief from judgment. Ohio Neighborhood contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered a default judgment against Randy Brown (hereinafter “Brown“) with an interest of five percent per annum rather than twenty-five percent. However, because we find that Ohio Neighborhood used a
I.
{¶2} Ohio Neighborhood entered into a loan agreement with Brown on February 6, 2009, whereby Ohio Neighborhood loaned Brown $500. Under the loan agreement, Brown agreed to pay a loan origination charge of $30.00 and a credit investigation fee of $10.00. Coupled with interest, Brown was obligated to pay Ohio Neighborhood $545.16 on February 20, 2009. The “PROMISE TO PAY” section of the loan agreement provides “You [i.e., Brown] promise to pay us [i.e., Ohio Neighborhood] $500.00 (the Principal Amount of this loan) plus interest at a rate of 25% per annum on the principal outstanding for the time outstanding from the date of this Customer Agreement until paid in full. Interest shall be computed daily upon the principal balance outstanding by using the simple interest method, assuming a 365-day year.”2
{¶3} Brown did not repay the loan on February 20, 2009. Ohio Neighborhood demanded payment, but Brown failed to make the payments due and owing on the loan. On June 24, 2009, Ohio Neighborhood filed its complaint against Brown in Ironton Municipal Court. Ohio Neighborhood sought judgment against Brown in the sum of $580.16 with interest at the agreed upon rate of twenty-five percent per annum from the date of default.
{¶5} Ohio Neighborhood filed an objection to the magistrate‘s decision on November 30, 2009. Ohio Neighborhood argued that the interest rate on the judgment should be twenty-five percent as provided in the loan agreement between Ohio Neighborhood and Brown.
{¶6} The trial court‘s June 7, 2010 Judgment Entry affirmed the magistrate‘s decision. The Judgment Entry provides for judgment in favor of Ohio Neighborhood against Brown in the amount of $580.16, with interest at the rate of five percent.
{¶7} On August 2, 2010, Ohio Neighborhood moved for relief from judgment under
{¶8} The magistrate held a motion hearing on September 27, 2010, and, on September 28, 2010, the magistrate recommended denial of Ohio Neighborhood‘s
{¶9} Ohio Neighborhood appeals and asserts the following assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION TO REDUCE TO 5% PER ANNUM, THE INTEREST RATE ON THE DEBT IN THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT OHIO NEIGHBORHOOD FINANCE, INC.”
II.
{¶10} Ohio Neighborhood argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it affirmed the magistrate‘s decision. Specifically, Ohio Neighborhood objects to the trial court‘s decision to reduce the interest rate on Brown‘s debt from twenty-five percent per annum, as provided in the loan agreement, to five percent. Despite framing its argument in this fashion, Ohio Neighborhood actually appeals the denial of its motion for relief from judgment under
{¶11} We review a trial court‘s decision regarding a motion for relief from judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. Dayton Power and Light v. Holdren, Highland App. No. 07CA21, 2008-Ohio-5121, at ¶10; Harris v. Anderson, 109 Ohio St.3d 101, 2006-Ohio-1934, at ¶7. An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error of judgment; it implies that the court‘s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.
{¶12}
{¶13} “To prevail on a motion brought under
{¶14} Initially, we note that in its sole assignment of error, Ohio Neighborhood focuses its challenge on the merits of the trial court‘s decision. That is, Ohio Neighborhood argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing the interest rate on Brown‘s debt in its judgment. The trial court entered judgment against Brown on June 7, 2010, which provided for a five percent per annum interest rate as opposed to
{¶15} Ohio Neighborhood asserts that it “chose to file its
{¶16} We find, however, that Ohio Neighborhood used a
{¶17} In short,
{¶18} Here, Ohio Neighborhood did not directly appeal the trial court‘s judgment. On a direct appeal, Ohio Neighborhood could have raised the same issue that it raised in its
{¶19} Accordingly, we reject Ohio Neighborhood‘s assignment of error and dismiss its appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ironton Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.