Oakhurst Lodge, Inc., a California Corporation
Appearances:
A debtor that owned and operated a motel encumbered by a bank‘s liens filed chapter 111 bankruptcy. It confirmed a reorganization plan that maintained the automatic stay in effect post-confirmation and restructured its secured and unsecured debt. The confirmed plan binds. It obligates the debtor to pay creditors over time the amounts specified in the plan and creditors to withhold collection efforts while receiving their plan payments.
But the bank violated the stay by foreclosing its liens. This violation precluded the debtor from paying creditors the amount promised in the plan. Later, the debtor and the bank settled the stay-violation dispute for one-half of the amount promised to creditors under the plan. The settlement also did not disturb the foreclosure sale or restore ownership of the motel to the debtor. At the bank‘s request, should the court now enforce the settlement?
I. FACTS
A. Chapter 11 Filing
Oakhurst Lodge Inc. (“Oakhurst Lodge“) owned and operated a 60-room motel. It had several shareholders including Steven Marshall (“Marshall“), Chet Patel, and Sam Patel.
Unable to meet its financial obligations and wishing to continue operations, it filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy. Its most significant asset was the motel, as well as the fixtures, furniture and equipment necessary to operate it. Liabilities included seven secured debts, aggregating $3.9 million dollars.2 The bulk of its secured debt encumbered the motel and the land on which it sits. Those secured creditors include: (1) First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company (“First-Citizens Bank“), which held notes for $3.08 million dollars secured by first and second trust deeds; (2) the Collier Partnership (“Collier Partnership“), which held a note for $324,000 secured by a third trust deed; (3) the Olsen Family Trust (“Olsen Trust“), which held a note for $392,000 secured by a fourth trust deed; and (4) the County of Madera, which was owed secured real property taxes of $125,000.
Oakhurst also owed priority unsecured tax debt of $202,000,3 non-priority unsecured debt owed to non-insiders of
Oakhurst Lodge proposed, and confirmed, a five-year plan of reorganization. Funded by a one-time capital contribution of $230,000 from shareholders and by 60 monthly payments of $31,000 to $33,000 from motel operations, the plan had five key components. First, it restructured the secured debts owed to First-Citizens Bank, the Collier Partnership, and the Olson Trust. It reamortized First-Citizens Bank‘s notes with a 22-year period of monthly payments and the entire debt becoming due and payable at the end of the 22-year period. It deferred payments for 12 months on the Collier Partnership‘s secured debt, added accrued but unpaid interest to the principal amount of the debt, reamortized the debt over 30 years with an interest rate of 5.5% and with monthly payments commencing in the 13th month following confirmation, and fixed a maturity date on the entire debt that was 11 years after plan confirmation. It deferred payments on the Olson Trust‘s secured debt until First-Citizens Bank‘s entire secured debt was paid in full, provided an interest rate of 6% on such debt, and fixed a maturity date on the entire debt falling immediately after payment of First-Citizens Bank‘s secured debt. Each of these creditors retained its lien.
Second, excepting unsecured debt due insiders, over its five-year life, the plan paid (usually with interest) short-term secured debt, priority tax debt, and unsecured debt. The secured property tax debts owed to Madera County were to be paid in full with 5% interest. Both debts secured by personal property were reamortized over 5 years and were to be paid in full including 4% interest. Priority unsecured tax debt was to be paid in full plus unquantified statutory interest. Unsecured debts held by non-insiders were to be paid in full without interest. The plan paid insider unsecured creditors nothing.
Third, the rights of existing equity holders were terminated. In exchange for a capital contribution of $230,000, Steven Marshall and Jack Patel became the new equity holders, each having an equal interest in Oakhurst Lodge.
Fourth, the plan deferred the discharge until completion of payments under the plan. It did not revest estate property upon confirmation in Oakhurst Lodge as a reorganized debtor. Thus, it retained the protections of the automatic stay over the 5-year lifespan of the confirmed plan.
Fifth, the plan reserved to Oakhurst Lodge all claims and rights against third parties, regardless of whether they arose before or after the petition or whether they arose before or after confirmation.
At confirmation, unpaid professional fees aggregated $12,000.6 And the plan obligated Oakhurst Lodge to pay these administrative expenses in full in cash after such amounts were allowed by the court.7
Unfortunately, Oakhurst Lodge did not fully perform its obligations under the confirmed plan.8
Four months after confirmation, First-Citizens Bank commenced proceedings to foreclose its trust deeds encumbering the motel. It did not first obtain relief from the automatic stay. Approximately ten months after plan confirmation, the bank completed its foreclosure. At the foreclosure sale, First-Citizens Bank was the successful bidder and acquired title to the property.
After acquiring title to the motel, First-Citizens Bank evicted Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. and sold the motel to Oakhurst Lodge, LP, an entity similar in name but unrelated to Oakhurst Lodge. Oakhurst Lodge, LP has operated the motel since acquiring it.
C. Conversion and Dismissal
About the time that First-Citizens Bank completed its foreclosure sale, the U.S. Trustee filed its motion to convert the case to chapter 7 or dismiss it. It did so because Oakhurst Lodge had not filed three post-confirmation quarterly operating reports and had not paid the post-confirmation fees due the U.S. Trustee. This court granted the motion and converted the case to chapter 7.
Shortly after his appointment, the chapter 7 trustee gave notice of an intent to abandon the “60-unit motel with residence” and “all fixtures and equipment involved in the operation of the motel.” When timely opposition was not filed in response, the trustee abandoned the motel, residence, and the fixtures and equipment used for its operation.9
After Oakhurst Lodge failed to appear at two meetings of creditors, the trustee moved to dismiss the chapter 7 case. The court dismissed the case. The chapter 7 trustee issued a report of no distribution, and the clerk closed the case.
D. Stay-Violation Litigation
Next, Oakhurst Lodge commenced an action against First-Citizens Bank in state court. This litigation continued unresolved for two years.
It then filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against First-Citizens Bank, Oakhurst Lodge, LP (the ultimate buyer of the motel), and Total Lender Solutions (the party who conducted the sale). Though the adversary complaint pleads causes of action for quiet title, cancellation of instruments, constructive trust, and civil contempt, the factual basis for each claim is the foreclosure of the motel in violation of the stay.
E. Mediation and Settlement
In the adversary proceeding, this court ordered the parties to mediation and appointed a mediator. After mediation, the parties reached a resolution of the dispute and reduced their settlement to writing.10 Marshall signed the settlement agreement as president of Oakhurst Lodge. Notwithstanding admonitions by the court prior to the mediation, Marshall believed that any settlement funds received need not be remitted to creditors according to the terms of the confirmed plan.
F. Vacated Orders
Later, this court vacated the order converting the case to chapter 7 and the order dismissing the chapter 7. This restored Oakhurst Lodge‘s case to chapter 11.
II. PROCEDURE
Oakhurst Lodge, acting through Marshall, repudiated the settlement agreement with First-Citizens Bank. First-Citizens Bank has responded by filing the present motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
The other adversary proceeding defendants have joined in the motion. Oakhurst Lodge and Steven Marshall, acting as an equity holder, oppose the motion.
III. JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to decide this motion. At the outset of a chapter 11 case, the bankruptcy court‘s subject matter jurisdiction extends not only to the case but also to civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to the case.
Similarly, as this dispute is a core proceeding, this court may issue final orders and judgments resolving it. Bankruptcy judges may issue final orders and judgments in matters that are core, and absent consent of the parties, bankruptcy judges may hear—but not finally decide—matters that are noncore.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Law Governing Settlement
A party seeking to enforce a settlement carries the burden of demonstrating the existence of a legally enforceable agreement. Andreyev v. First Nat‘l Bank of Omaha (In re Andreyev), 313 B.R. 302, 305 (9th Cir. BAP 2004). In the absence of controlling federal authority, state law governs the enforceability of settlement agreements. O‘Neil v. Bunge Corp., 365 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2004); United Comm. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1992). “A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.” Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 810 (1998). “The essential elements of a contract are: parties capable of contracting; the parties’ consent; a lawful object; and sufficient cause or consideration.” Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1230 (2004).
Settlements between the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) and a third party affecting property of the estate have long been subject to controlling federal authority requiring court approval. Lincoln Nat‘l Life v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1933) (citing § 27 of the Bankruptcy Act, the court held the trustee “may not compromise or arbitrate anything except under the court‘s approval“); Matter of Nat‘l Pub. Serv. Corp., 68 F.2d 859, 862 (2nd Cir. 1934) (bankruptcy court always has the last word with respect to compromises).
As a result, the existence of a binding contract between the parties is a necessary but not sufficient basis to enforce a settlement agreement. Absent bankruptcy, the settlement would be enforceable under California law. The central question then is the effect of bankruptcy law on the bargained-for resolution.
B. The Effect of Plan Confirmation
Confirmation of a chapter 11 plan binds the debtor, creditors, and equity security holders.
As applicable here, the binding nature of the plan cuts two ways. In the first instance, it cuts against First-Citizens Bank by requiring it to withhold collection efforts, including foreclosure.
In the second instance, the binding nature of the plan cuts against Oakhurst Lodge. Confirmed plans resemble consent decrees, which have characteristics of both a contract and a judgment. Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d at 588 (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992)). The plan obligated Oakhurst Lodge to pay First-Citizens Bank the secured debt specified in the plan. And absent relief from the confirmation order or a court-approved modification of the plan, it continues to bind Oakhurst Lodge and restricts its freedom to settle disputes with third parties in a manner that reduces the amount creditors will receive under the terms of the confirmed plan.
C. Subsequent Events
1. Conversion and dismissal
The court next considers the effect of the conversion and dismissal of the case on the confirmed plan. While there is no case directly on point, Ninth Circuit authority suggests limited circumstances under which the binding effect of a confirmed chapter 11 plan may be vacated. These circumstances include (1) a successful appeal of the confirmation order, In re Lowenschuss, 170 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1999); (2) a revocation of such order within 180 days if confirmation was procured by fraud,
Moreover, conversion of a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 does not vacate the order confirming the plan. See
Admittedly, the answer to the same question after conversion from chapter 13 is different. See Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1838 (2015) (citing § 103(i)) (“When a debtor exercises his statutory right to convert, the case is placed under Chapter 7‘s governance, and no Chapter 13 provision holds sway.“). And an argument might be advanced for applying Viegelahn‘s logic in the context of a case converted from chapter 11 to chapter 7. To begin with,
While facially appealing, the court rejects this argument. A Ninth Circuit decision has stated that “section 1144 is the only avenue for revoking confirmation of a plan of reorganization.” In re Orange Tree Assocs., Ltd., 961 F.2d at 1447 n. 6 (quoting In re Longardner & Assoc., Inc., 855 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1988)). And this precedent implies that a chapter 11 plan‘s binding effect survives conversion to chapter 7 or dismissal.
Further, while both chapter 13 and chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code contain a provision allowing a court to vacate a confirmation order procured by fraud, those provisions are notably different.
Moreover, unwinding the effect of a confirmed chapter 13 plan is more straightforward than unwinding the effect of a confirmed chapter 11 plan. By inference, the finality of the confirmation order, therefore, retains more importance after conversion from chapter 11 than it does after conversion from chapter 13. See Caviata Attached Homes, 481 B.R. at 46 (noting that reliance on the chapter 11 confirmation order supports a strong need for finality).
After conversion from chapter 13, unwinding the effects of a confirmed but failed chapter 13 plan ordinarily is as simple as requiring the chapter 13 trustee to refund undistributed plan payments. See
Unlike chapter 13 plans, however, chapter 11 plans are frequently implemented by complex transactions that would be difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle after confirmation. Such transactions may include transfers of property of the estate; mergers or consolidation of the debtor with other entities; cancellation of indentures; changes to the interest rate or other terms of outstanding securities; amendment of the debtor‘s charter; issuance of securities for cash, for property or existing securities. See
In chapter 11, moreover, debtors, creditors, and third parties substantially change their position in reliance on the confirmation order. Considering this reliance rationale for the narrow ground for revocation under
Any number of scenarios can and do play out under the terms of a confirmed plan. Credit is extended, assets are sold, corporate entities are created or merged, and so on. Presumably mindful of the intricate chain of events that is often set in motion by the order of confirmation, Congress made the considered choice that only fraud would warrant an attempt to “unscramble the egg,” and even then only within the 180-day time frame imposed by § 1144.
In re Winom Tool & Die, Inc., 173 B.R. 613, 616 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994). Given these reliance interests in play, confirmed chapter 11 plans have a binding effect that is durable.
Indeed, even dismissal of a chapter 11 case does not vacate the confirmation order. Matter of Depew, 115 B.R. 965, 967-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (“dismissal does not revoke debtors’ discharge[,] and their obligations to creditors, as set forth in the confirmed plan, remain unaltered.“); In re Space Bldg. Corp., 206 B.R. 269, 274 (D. Mass. 1996) (“[C]ourts which have considered whether dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 11 case revokes a confirmed Plan, consistently have determined that it does not.“); U.S. v. Ramirez, 291 B.R. 386, 391-92 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Am. Bank and Trust Co. v. United States ex. Rel. Internal Revenue Service (In re Barton Indus., Inc.), 159 B.R. 954, 957-60 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
In short, neither the conversion of Oakhurst Lodge‘s chapter 11 case to chapter 7 nor the dismissal of its chapter 7 case affect the binding nature of the confirmed plan. In any event, any argument that the conversion or dismissal dissolved the confirmation order would be misplaced: the court vacated both the conversion and dismissal orders on First-Citizens Bank‘s
2. The chapter 7 trustee‘s abandonment of the motel
The chapter 7 trustee‘s abandonment of the motel also does not impact Oakhurst Lodge‘s ability to seek redress for the stay violation. First, this court construes the chapter 7 trustee‘s abandonment narrowly. The trustee abandoned only an interest in a “60-unit motel with [a] residence” and “all fixtures and equipment involved in the operation of the motel.” See
Second, even if the language of the trustee‘s abandonment were construed to include the right to redress the stay violation, the plan‘s reservation of claims to Oakhurst Lodge precluded the chapter 7 trustee from abandoning this asset. The confirmed plan reserved to the debtor “all powers granted by the Bankruptcy Code,” and Oakhurst Lodge preserved unto itself all “rights against any and all third parties” whether those “rights arose before, on or after the petition date, the confirmation date, the effective date and/or the distribution date.” First-Citizens Bank‘s post-confirmation violation of the stay falls neatly within the rights and claims reserved to Oakhurst Lodge as the reorganized debtor. As a result, the trustee lacked the power to abandon that right despite the language of the abandonment.
Third, the trustee could not abandon any right held by the debtor to seek redress for violation of its in personam stay. As Matter of S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1146-48 (5th Cir. 1987) explains, the stay has both in personam and in rem protections. The former protects the debtor, and the latter protects the estate. Section 362 provides:
[A] petition . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of—
(1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of a case under this title . . . ;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title . . . .
And a single act can violate both the in rem rights of the estate and the in personam rights of the debtor. Such a single act occurred here. Specifically, First-Citizens Bank‘s foreclosure violated both the estate‘s in rem right to preserve property for the benefit of all creditors, see
In brief, Oakhurst Lodge now holds rights—on behalf of both the estate and itself as a reorganized debtor—to pursue the stay violation occasioned by the foreclosure. This is true despite the chapter 7 trustee‘s abandonment of the motel, residence, and related property. The abandonment does not eliminate Oakhurst Lodge‘s standing, therefore, to pursue the underlying adversary action in which this motion to enforce a settlement arises.
D. The Standard for Approval of the Settlement
By what standard should approval of a post-confirmation compromise in chapter 11 between a reorganized debtor and a third party be approved or denied? Two rules jockey for position. Most courts inquire whether the settlement materially alters the terms of the confirmed plan under
This court concludes that a post-confirmation settlement that materially
In contrast to the standards governing chapter 11 plan modification, Rule 9019 operates under more discretionary standards articulated in In re A & C Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Under these standards, the court may approve such a settlement if it was negotiated in good faith and is fair and equitable. Id. “Fair and equitable” involves a consideration of four factors: (i) the probability of success in the litigation; (ii) the difficulties to be encountered in collection; (iii) the complexity of the litigation, and the expense, delay and inconvenience necessarily attendant to the litigation; and (iv) the paramount interest of creditors and a proper deference to the creditors’ expressed wishes, if any. Id. So applying these flexible standards to a settlement that changes creditors and equity holders’ rights under a confirmed plan would undercut their procedural and substantive rights under
This conclusion is consistent with long-held notions as to when a compromise or settlement is governed by Rule 9019 as opposed to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or Rules. Rule 9019 is silent on the subject. But current Rule 9019 derives from Section 27 of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and former Rule 919, a rule that had been adapted from § 27 of the Bankruptcy Act. See In re City of Stockton, 486 B.R. 194, 196 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (tracing the history of Rule 9019 from § 27 of the Act and noting that the Code carried forward case law applicable to § 27). Section 27 of the former Bankruptcy Act provided as follows: “The trustee may, with the approval of the court, compromise any controversy arising in the administration of the estate upon such terms as he may deem for the best interests of the estate.” Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 27, Act of July 1, 1988, 30 Stat. 553-54, as amended, Chandler Act, § 27, Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 855, repealed 1979 (emphasis added). Section 27 was thus “intended to supply a summary and inexpensive way of settling questions arising in the administration of bankrupt estates.” In re Ben L. Berwald Shoe Co., 1 F.2d 494, 496 (N.D. Tex. 1924), rev‘d on other grounds, 10 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1926). But it was never intended to supplant those provisions of the Bankruptcy Act governing plan confirmation. See 2A Collier
Given its roots in § 27 of the Bankruptcy Act, Rule 9019 likewise cannot displace the rigorous standards for plan confirmation and modification in chapter 11. Such standards cannot be jettisoned when settling a dispute that invokes their application. Rather, Rule 9019 must yield.
E. The Settlement Modifies the Confirmed Plan
1. Secured creditors rights are altered
Under the terms of the confirmed plan, secured creditors, including the Collier Partnership and the Olsen Trust, bargained for and received under the terms of the confirmed plan a promise to pay the principal amount of their secured loans plus interest at 5.5% and 6%, respectively. For example, the Collier Partnership was to receive a stream of income starting one year after confirmation with the entire amount due and payable 11 years after confirmation. The Olsen Trust agreed to defer all payments until the first and second trust deeds due First-Citizens Bank had been paid in full (estimated to be 22 years after confirmation). But each creditor was to retain its lien until the entire amount of its principal and interest had been paid in full.
But the settlement does not pay secured creditors’ claims in full. Because it fails to pay their claims in full, the settlement materially alters the rights of the secured creditors. Equally important to the analysis is the settlement‘s endorsement of a foreclosure that eliminated junior liens. When First-Citizens Bank foreclosed its first and second trust deeds, it wiped out the liens held by the Collier Partnership and the Olsen Trust, leaving them with unsecured claims against Oakhurst Lodge. See
Yet the settlement allows the wrongful foreclosure sale to stand, contravening the terms of the confirmed plan that afforded the Collier Partnership and the Olsen Trust retention of their liens until their secured claims were paid in full with interest. As a result, the settlement materially and impermissibly alters their bargained-for rights under the confirmed plan.
2. Unsecured creditors’ rights are altered
The settlement is insufficient to pay priority and general unsecured creditors, including deficiency claims held by the now sold-out third and fourth trust deed holders, under the terms of the confirmed plan. Including secured and unsecured debt, the amount necessary to fund the confirmed plan is approximately $1.48 million.12
Because the motel will not be returned to Oakhurst Lodge under the settlement‘s terms, there would never be additional funds for payment of creditors. The settlement therefore materially alters the modified plan as to unsecured creditors by paying them only slightly more than one-half of the amount provided for in the plan.
3. Equity holders’ rights are altered
The plan provides that Oakhurst Lodge, as a reorganized debtor, would have two shareholders, Marshall and Jack Patel, who were obligated to contribute new value of approximately $230,000. The record contains no admissible evidence as to whether this new-value contribution was ever made. First-Citizens Bank has not sustained its burden to show a lack of equity holders interests in Oakhurst Lodge having rights that must be satisfied under the confirmed plan.
The settlement alters the equity holders’ rights under the plan. This is because the confirmed plan contemplated Oakhurst Lodge‘s emerging from the chapter 11 process operating the motel free of debt, except long-term secured debt. Depending on post-confirmation operating profits and the value of the motel, the equity interests owned by Marshall and Patel may or may not have had value at this time had the foreclosure not occurred. But the settlement leaves the motel in the hands of First-Citizens Bank‘s buyer, Oakhurst Lodge, LP. So contrary to the confirmed plan‘s terms, the settlement relegates equity holders to ownership of an empty shell with shares of no value.13
The proponent of a plan or the reorganized debtor may modify such plan at any time after confirmation of such plan and before substantial consummation of such plan, but may not modify such plan so that such plan as modified fails to meet the requirements of sections 1122 and 1123 of this title. Such plan as modified under this subsection becomes the plan only if circumstances warrant such modification and the court, after notice and a hearing, confirms such plan as modified, under section 1129 of this title.
Here, the settlement modifies the confirmed plan but does not comply with
1. Substantial consummation
The plan proponent carries the burden that there has been no substantial consummation. In re Antiquities of Nev., Inc., 173 B.R. 926, 929 (9th Cir. BAP 1994).
“[S]ubstantial consummation” means--(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; and (C) commencement of distribution under the plan.
Apart from Oakhurst Lodge‘s initial assumption of its business after confirmation, First-Citizens Bank has made no showing on the question of substantial consummation. First-Citizens Bank carries the burden on that issue, so plan modification must fail.
2. Statutory process for modification
Plan modification requires compliance with
3. Adequate means of implementation
“Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a plan shall . . . provide adequate means for the plan‘s implementation.”
V. CONCLUSION
For each of these reasons, the settlement materially alters creditors and equity holders’ rights under the confirmed plan but does not satisfy
Dated: March 28, 2018
Fredrick E. Clement
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Instructions to Clerk of Court
Service List
The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the BNC or, if checked _, via the U.S. mail.
Debtor(s), Attorney for the Debtor(s), Bankruptcy Trustee (if appointed in the case), and X Other Persons Specified Below:
Donna M. Standard, Esq.
35625 E. Kings Canyon Road
Squaw Valley, California 93675
Frank Weiser, Esq.
3460 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1212
Los Angeles, California 90010
Robert A. Hawkins, Esq.
Chapter 7 Trustee
1849 N. Helm, #110
Fresno, California 93727
Office of the United States Trustee
2500 Tulare Street
Suite 1401
Fresno, California 93721
Oakhurst Lodge, LP
C/O Michael Heath
Agent for Service of Process
P. O. Box 616
Novato, California 94948-0616
Aaron Malo, Esq.
SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON
650 Town Center Drive, 4th Floor
Costa Mesa, California 92626--1993
Nicole L. Glowin, Esq.
T. Robert Finley, Esq.
Helen Cayton, Esq.
WRIGHT, FINLAY & ZAK
4665 MacArthur Court, Suite 200
Newport Beach, California 92660
Michael Wilhelm, Esq.
WALTER & WILHELM LAW GROUP
205 E. River Park Cir. Suite 410
Fresno, California 93720