O.I.C.L., Petitioner, vs. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent.
No. SC15-1570
Supreme Court of Florida
[September 22, 2016]
POLSTON, J.
O.I.C.L. seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in O.I.C.L v. Department of Children & Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), and the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), regarding the definition of a dependent child under
I. BACKGROUND
A private petition for an adjudication of dependency under
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition for child dependency. The trial court ruled that O.I.C.L. did “not qualify as dependent under section 39.01 because he left his Mother in Guatemala and he now resides with and is cared for by his Uncle, against whom there are no allegations of abandonment, abuse, or neglect.”
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed. Id. The Fourth District ruled that the uncle qualified as a “caregiver” under
Judge Forst dissented in the Fourth District. Although he generally agreed with the majoritys analysis and conclusion, Judge Forst believed that the trial court failed to adequately address whether O.I.C.L. presented a prima facie case of child dependency under
II. ANALYSIS
O.I.C.L. argues that the Fourth District failed to acknowledge
While the petition for child dependency was filed approximately two months before O.I.C.L.s 18th birthday, O.I.C.L. reached majority age in 2015. Now that O.I.C.L. is over 18 years old the question of whether O.I.C.L. should be deemed a dependent child pursuant to Florida law is no longer an issue. See Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992) (“A case is moot when it presents no actual controversy or when the issues have ceased to exist.“); Lund v. Dep‘t of Health, 708 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“The general rule in Florida is that a case on appeal becomes moot when a change in circumstances occurs before an appellate courts decision, thereby making it impossible for the court to provide effectual relief.“).
“[W]hen a Florida court is presented with a dependency petition, the courts concern should be whether the allegations made in support of an adjudication of dependency satisfy Floridas statutory grounds for such an adjudication, not whether the [individual] hopes to obtain [Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ)] status.”
Accordingly, the fact that obtaining a state court order of child dependency is a first step in potentially securing SIJ status from the federal government at a later date does not change our mootness analysis by transforming the immigration
Citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)), the dissent claims that mootness should not prevent this Courts review because these types of petitions are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” However, petitions for adjudications of dependency can be and are filed on behalf of children, including undocumented children, before the children are about to turn 18 years of age. In fact, the Third District Court of Appeals decision in In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (pending review in this Court, SC16-179), addresses an issue that is very similar to the issue in this case, but the Third Districts decision involves a child who is currently less than 18 years of age. Therefore, the legal questions raised are not likely to evade appellate review, and we cannot ignore the mootness of this particular case.
III. CONCLUSION
Because O.I.C.L. is no longer a child as defined in chapter 39 and cannot be adjudicated a dependent child of the State of Florida pursuant to
It is so ordered.
CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
LABARGA, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.
CANADY, J., concurring in result.
I agree with the view that this case should be discharged because it is moot. I would conclude that the retention of jurisdiction provided for in
The full statutory context makes clear that even if the court may act on a petition after a child has reached 18 years of age, the authority to do so extends only to petitions filed either by the Department of Children and Families or a community-based care provider—not to petitions filed by a private party. The petitions referred to in
Although O.I.C.L. has already reached majority age, “[i]t is well settled that mootness does not destroy an appellate courts jurisdiction . . . when the questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur.” Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1005 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 1984)). The prevalence of seventeen-year-old unaccompanied minors seeking adjudications of dependency presents precisely the type of situation that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). In these cases, if reaching majority age renders the case moot, dependency litigation will rarely survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied.
In fiscal year 2015, an estimated 39,970 unaccompanied minors were apprehended at the border.2 Approximately 2,908 of those children were released to sponsors in Florida.3 This number increased in fiscal year 2016, with
First, the average age of unaccompanied minors entering the country is around sixteen or seventeen, and . . . many of these youths are SIJS eligible. Further, for someone who has not been apprehended by the immigration agency, this is the age at which he may consider getting a drivers license or taking college entrance tests. These events can trigger a realization that he is unauthorized, because he does not have the required identification. At this point, he may be more likely to seek help and get screened for eligibility. Lastly, age seventeen might be so common because many state laws lose jurisdiction over youths at age eighteen, so SIJS-eligible youths eighteen and older may not be able to obtain the predicate state court order and therefore never apply
for federal immigration protection. These hypotheses are certainly not exhaustive, but they are reflective of the conventional understanding of child advocates.
Id. at 290-91 (footnotes omitted).
The Fourth District recognized that dependency petitions filed on behalf of unaccompanied minors have become increasingly common, observing that:
These types of petitions . . . routinely share the following common elements: the child is about to turn eighteen years old; the Department of Children and Families (“DCF“) neither supports nor opposes the childs petition; the child agrees not to seek any services from the State; one or more of the childs parents sign consent forms agreeing to entry of a dependency order; no testimony is presented to the court opposing the petition; and, DCF files no briefs in any subsequent appeal. As courts are likely to continue encountering more of these cases in the future, we believe some guidance on the proper handling of these cases is required.
O.I.C.L. v. Dep‘t of Children & Families, 169 So. 3d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
The frequency with which such dependency petitions are filed, and the failure of trial courts to make adequate factual findings—as occurred in this case—create a situation in which improper denials are likely to recur. Yet, with unaccompanied minors customarily filing petitions within a year or two of reaching eighteen, these cases are likely to evade review. Here, we have recognized that the Fourth Districts conclusion conflicts with the decisions of the First District in In re Y.V. and the Third District in In re T.J. Accordingly, I would
What is more, I would not dismiss this case as moot because it is clear that the federal and state statutory schemes, which provide a pathway for unaccompanied minors to obtain lawful permanent residency via SIJS, allow for retention of jurisdiction. Although chapter 39 specifies that only a child may be found dependent, O.I.C.L. was a child at the time the dependency petition was filed and an appropriate adjudication by the trial court could have resulted in the retention of jurisdiction over his dependency case.
The concurring in result opinion asserts that the retention of jurisdiction provided for in
Accordingly, the fact that a private petition for adjudication of dependency was filed on behalf of O.I.C.L. is not dispositive of whether the state court may retain jurisdiction over his dependency case for the purpose of obtaining SIJS. The determining factor regarding retention of jurisdiction is whether the petition for SIJS and the application for adjustment of status were filed before he reached eighteen. For this reason, it is imperative to consider whether the trial court made an appropriate determination of dependency that would have qualified O.I.C.L. for SIJS before his eighteenth birthday.
At the time this case arose, seventeen-year-old O.I.C.L. resided with his uncle who provided him with supervision and care on a voluntary basis. Nonetheless, a private petition for dependency was filed on behalf of O.I.C.L. alleging that he was dependent under
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a final order denying the petition for dependency. The trial court found that the O.I.C.L. had been living with his uncle since being released to him by ORR.5 Consequently, the trial court
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the denial of the petition. As noted by the majority opinion, the Fourth District explained that O.I.C.L. was released by ORR to his uncle, who qualified as a caregiver pursuant to
This Court subsequently granted review of the Fourth Districts decision based on express and direct conflict with In re Y.V. and In re T.J.
CONFLICT
In In re Y.V., the First District reversed the dismissal of a private petition for dependency filed on behalf of an unaccompanied minor who was being cared for by his uncle in Florida. 160 So. 3d at 577. The petition alleged that Y.V. was a dependent child pursuant to
Similarly, in In re T.J., the Third District reversed the summary denial of a private petition for dependency filed on behalf of an unaccompanied minor who was being voluntarily cared for by an aunt in Florida after her mothers death. 59 So. 3d at 1189. The petition alleged that T.J.s father left her mother when the child was an infant, and the fathers whereabouts were unknown at the time the petition was filed. Id. The Third District determined that the petition established a prima facie case for dependency under
ANALYSIS
Accordingly, when a petition alleges sufficient facts for dependency under any of the seven statutory grounds, the trial court must make factual findings as to each separate ground in order to properly determine whether a child is dependent. In this case, O.I.C.L.s petition alleged facts presenting a prima facie case for dependency under
To properly determine O.I.C.L.s dependency under
The trial court in this case did not apply the correct law when it failed to make any factual findings about whether O.I.C.L. had a parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care. Moreover, the trial court ruling is not supported by competent substantial evidence because the testimony from O.I.C.L. and his uncle did not establish that O.I.C.L. had a parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care. Thus, the trial courts denial of the dependency petition with regard to
The conflict of decisions presented here and the apparent need for guidance in the lower courts merit a suitable resolution by this Court. Accordingly, I dissent from the majoritys opinion that this case is moot, and would quash the Fourth Districts decision and remand this case for an adequate evidentiary hearing.
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D15-53
(Palm Beach County)
Jan Peter Weiss and Liah Shitomi Frazier, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner
Stephanie Christina Zimmerman, Deputy Director & Statewide Director of Appeals, Childrens Legal Services, Bradenton, Florida, for Respondent
Bernard Pines Perlmutter of The University of Miami School of Law Children & Youth Law Clinic, Coral Gables, Florida,
Stephanie Lauren Varela, Julissa Rodriguez, Elliot H. Scherker, Katherine Marie Clemente, and Joshua Eli Truppman of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Robin L. Rosenberg, Tampa, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Floridas Children First
Paolo Giuseppe Annino and Brandon Ray Smoot, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida State University College of Law Public Interest Law Center
Larry Scott Rifkin, Jacqueline Villalba of Rifkin & Fox-Isicoff, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Edward Maurice Mullins of Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman P.A., Miami, Florida, for Amici Curiae The International Law Section of The Florida Bar and The Public Interest Law Section of The Florida Bar
Jennifer Lissette Anzardo, Miami, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Americans for Immigrant Justice