O.I.C.L., a Minor Child v. Florida Department of Children and Families
205 So. 3d 575
| Fla. | 2016Background
- A private dependency petition was filed on behalf of 17-year-old O.I.C.L. ~2.5 months before his 18th birthday, alleging abandonment/neglect by parents and lack of a parent/custodian capable of providing care (§39.01(15)(a) and (e)).
- O.I.C.L. was detained by ORR after illegal entry and released to an uncle in Palm Beach County; uncle provided voluntary care and no allegations were made against him.
- Trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, finding the uncle was a capable caregiver and therefore O.I.C.L. was not dependent.
- The Fourth District affirmed, reasoning ORR’s release to the uncle made the uncle a caregiver under §39.01(10), creating a presumption he could provide supervision and care.
- The Supreme Court accepted review on conflict grounds with In re Y.V. and In re T.J., but dismissed the case as moot because O.I.C.L. had reached age 18 and Florida dependency statutes apply only to persons under 18.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness: whether the appeal remains justiciable after O.I.C.L. turned 18 | O.I.C.L.: case presents live controversy and warrants review because dependency adjudication can affect SIJ and retention may be available | State/majority: once over 18, chapter 39’s definition of child ends court’s authority; no effective relief possible | Dismissed as moot — individual is over 18, so cannot be adjudicated dependent under Florida law |
| Statutory scope of "child"/dependency (§39.01 definitions) | O.I.C.L.: dependency statute should be applied to petitions filed while petitioner was a child; adjudication could have allowed retention for SIJ purposes | Majority: chapter 39 defines child as unmarried person under 18; court lacks authority to adjudicate an adult as dependent | Held that statutory definitions limit dependency to those under 18; mootness controls |
| Retention of jurisdiction for SIJ (§39.5075(6)) | O.I.C.L./dissent: court could retain jurisdiction until age 22 for SIJ if petition/application filed before 18, regardless of private petition origin | Concurrence/majority: retention provision applies only where department or community-based care provider initiates the statutory retention mechanism; private petition does not trigger extended retention | Majority rejects retention as a basis to avoid mootness here; concurrence limits §39.5075(6) to petitions arising under §39.5075(4) by DCF or community providers |
| Trial court fact-finding under §39.01(15)(e) | Dissent: trial court failed to make separate findings on (15)(e) (whether any parent/custodian was capable); remand required | Majority: did not address merits due to mootness | Dissent would have quashed and remanded for proper factual findings; majority dismissed as moot |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Y.V., 160 So.3d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (private petition alleging parental abandonment/ inability to care can establish prima facie dependency)
- In re T.J., 59 So.3d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (remanding where petition established prima facie dependency under §39.01(15)(e))
- Godwin v. State, 593 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1992) (mootness: no actual controversy or issues have ceased to exist)
- Lund v. Dep’t of Health, 708 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (change in circumstances can render appellate case moot when effective relief is impossible)
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1973) (doctrine: "capable of repetition, yet evading review")