EDWARD J. O’HARA v. JANE M. MACKIE
(AC 35648)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued April 8—officially released July 8, 2014
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Schaller, Js.
Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Emons, J.
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Barbara M. Schellenberg, with whom, on the brief, was Richard L. Albrecht, for the appellee (defendant).
PER CURIAM. The self-represented plаintiff, Edward J. O’Hara, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant, Jane M. Mackie. The plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in (1) denying his application for the issuance of a subpoena; (2) excluding medical documents from evidence; (3) refusing to hear his motion for attorney’s fees; (4) refusing to award him alimony; and (5) sealing medical documents.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The parties were married in 2007. On July 18, 2012, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the marriage. On July 31, 2012, the defendant filed a cross complaint seeking dissolution of the marriage. On August 10, 2012, the plaintiff amended his complaint and sought an annulment of the marriage. Following a trial, the court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage in accordance with the defendant’s cross complaint and issued various orders. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The plaintiff’s first claim is that the court erred in denying his application for a subpoena. Applying the abuse of discretion standard of review, we reject this claim. See Clark v. Clark, 130 Conn. App. 786, 789, 26 A.3d 640 (2011).
The plаintiff filed an application for the issuance of a subpoena in which he sought permission to subpoena the defendant as a witness, and an order requiring her to bring ‘‘[a]ll records concerning examinations and test for venereal diseases with Dr. Patricia Y. Allen or Drs. Marks & Ellis, NYC,’’ to trial. The court denied the application without explanation.
Under
We cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion in denying the application. The defendant testified at trial; no subpoena to ensure her presence was needed. The records requested in the subрoena were purportedly those kept by two New York physicians. Thus, as in Clark v. Clark, supra, 130 Conn. App. 791, the information sought could have been obtained through other more appropriate means. See
II
During the trial, the plaintiff sought, over various objections from the defendant, to have medical documents pertaining to the defendant admitted into evidence. The court reviewed each document before admitting some as full exhibits while excluding others as duplicative, privileged medical records, unauthenticated, incomplete or otherwise inadmissible.
‘‘Our standard of review for evidentiary matters allows the trial court great leeway in deciding the admissibility of evidence. The trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice appears to have been done. . . . The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law.’’ (Internal quotation mаrks omitted.) Nweeia v. Nweeia, 142 Conn. App. 613, 626, 64 A.3d 1251 (2013).
After careful consideration of the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion with respect to the documents that it did not admit into evidence.
III
The plaintiff’s third claim is that the court erred in refusing to hear his motion for attorney’s fees.
On August 3, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees. On April 1, 2013, shortly before trial was scheduled to commence, the court held a hearing. During the hearing, the court determined that the motion fоr attorney’s fees would require an additional evidentiary hearing, which it did not have time to schedule before trial. The court therefore proposed to address the motion at the time of trial. The plaintiff agreed to that proposal.
Despite agreeing to the proposal, the plaintiff never renewed his motion for attorney’s fees at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. See Campbell v. Campbell, 120 Conn. App. 760, 764, 993 A.2d 984 (2010) (‘‘matters invоlving judicial economy, docket management or courtroom proceedings . . . are particularly within the province of a trial court’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
IV
The plaintiff’s fourth claim is that the court abused its disсretion in refusing to award him alimony.
Our standard of review is well established. ‘‘We will not reverse a trial court’s rulings regarding financial orders unless the court incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably have conсluded as it did. . . . A fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in awardin
On appeal, the plaintiff bases his claim for alimony in large part on his receiving state aid. The rеcord does not reflect that the plaintiff received state aid. In fact, the plaintiff neither alleged in his complaint nor presented evidence to the court that he received state aid. Save for the dеfendant’s testimony, which was that neither she nor the plaintiff had received state aid, the topic was never presented to the court. In any event, the record supports the court’s determination with respect to alimony. The court heard evidence that the marriage lasted less than six years and that no children were born of the marriage. The court also had before it exhibits and testimony regarding the education, occupatiоn, employability and finances of the parties. On the basis of the evidence before it, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in not awarding alimony to the plaintiff.
V
The plaintiff’s fifth claim is that the court abused its discretion in sealing medical documents. We conclude that this claim was waived and therefore decline to afford it review.
‘‘[W]aiver is [t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or notice. . . . In determining waiver, the conduct of the parties is of great importance. . . . When a party consents to or expresses sаtisfaction with an issue at trial, claims arising from that issue are deemed waived and may not be reviewed on appeal. . . . Thus, [w]aiver . . . involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omittеd.) State v. Cancel, 149 Conn. App. 86, 100, 87 A.3d 618, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 954, A.3d (2014).
The plaintiff assented to the court’s decision to seal the documents. We therefore conclude that he waived any claim challenging that decision.
The judgment is affirmed.