JOHN O‘CONNELL, Appellee, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK et al., Appellants.
Docket Nos. 127527, 127594, cons.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
May 19, 2022
2022 IL 127527
JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, Neville, Michael J. Burke, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiff-appellee, John O‘Connell, worked for defendant-appellant the County of Cook (County) and participated in the County Employees’ and Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Cook County (Benefit Fund), managed by defendant-appellant Board of Trustees of the County Employees’ and Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Cook County (Board). After the Board granted O‘Connell‘s application for a disability benefit, the County terminated his employment. Shortly thereafter, the Board terminated his disability benefit, and the County ceased making contributions on his behalf to the Benefit Fund. In the circuit court, O‘Connell filed a complaint requesting declaratory judgment and mandamus relief against the County and the Board, seeking reinstatement of his disability benefit by the Board and contributions to the Benefit Fund by the County. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. O‘Connell appealed the circuit court‘s dismissal of counts I, III, and V of his complaint, and the appellate court reversed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the appellate court‘s judgment.
¶ 3 Taking as true O‘Connell‘s allegations in his complaint, O‘Connell began working for the County in 1999 and became a participant in the Benefit Fund, which involved the County transferring a portion of his salary each month to the Benefit Fund as his employee contribution (
¶ 4 On May 16, 2019, while O‘Connell was receiving the ordinary disability benefit payments, the County wrote to O‘Connell requesting that he provide medical documentation indicating his expected return-to-work date by May 29, 2019. In the letter, the County stated that if it did not timely receive the requested documentation or if he was not medically released to return to work in any capacity by May 29, 2019, he would be administratively separated that same day. The County extended O‘Connell‘s time to provide medical documentation until June 29, 2019, and the County thereafter separated him from the position effective July 1, 2019. After the County terminated O‘Connell‘s employment, the Board ceased paying the ordinary disability benefit due O‘Connell, and the County ceased making contributions to the Benefit Fund on O‘Connell‘s behalf.
¶ 5 On January 9, 2020, O‘Connell filed a five-count complaint against the County and the Board, alleging that the Illinois Pension Code (
¶ 6 In count I, O‘Connell sought a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to continued ordinary disability benefit payments by the Board, in addition to County contributions to the Benefit Fund, until credit for his years of service expired, which amounted to approximately two more years. O‘Connell asserted that an employee granted an ordinary disability benefit while still employed may continue receiving that benefit even if he is terminated from employment, if he is still disabled. O‘Connell alleged that, at the end of the period calculated pursuant to his years of service, he would be entitled to an early annuity option (
¶ 7 In count III, O‘Connell sought relief in mandamus on the same theory but added a specific request for relief against the County to retroactively “reinstate all contributions” to the Benefit Fund. In count III, O‘Connell alleged that the Board had no discretion to cease the ordinary disability benefit based on his employment status with the County. O‘Connell sought judgment issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to reinstate his ordinary disability benefit and the County to reinstate contributions related to his ordinary disability benefit, effective retroactively to July 2, 2019.
¶ 8 In count V, O‘Connell alleged that the Board violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (
¶ 9 Both the Board and the County filed combined motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (
¶ 10 As to the Board, the circuit court dismissed counts I and III pursuant to section 2-615 (
¶ 11 The circuit court dismissed count V‘s allegations against the Board pursuant
¶ 12 The appellate court reversed, holding that O‘Connell, as a former County employee, maintained a contractual right pursuant to the Pension Code to receive, postemployment, the ordinary disability benefit by the Board and the required contributions to the Benefit Fund on his behalf by the County. 2021 IL App (1st) 201031, ¶ 24. The appellate court applied the canons of liberal construction and considered the beneficial nature of pension laws to conclude that “[n]othing in the operative language [of the Pension Code] suggests that the disabled employee [who began receiving disability benefits when he was actively working] must continue to be employed to remain eligible for disability benefits or for the county to be required to continue making contributions.” Id.
¶ 13 Noting that article 9 of the Pension Code set forth “triggering events” that terminated an individual‘s ordinary disability benefit and that termination of employment was not among those events, the appellate court held that one could “presume that the legislature did not intend to include termination as a triggering event under some other guise.” Id. ¶ 26. The appellate court concluded that, because article 9‘s provisions “demonstrate a legislative intent to provide at least several years of benefits to disabled employees to ensure they have some income during their disability and to continue those benefits without a gap onwards into their retirement years,” reading termination from employment to disqualify an individual for an ordinary disability benefit would lead to an absurd result, by allowing counties to “simply fire severely disabled employees even after a brief period of disability” to avoid paying those employees’ pension contributions. Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 14 The appellate court further concluded that, because O‘Connell had a tangible pecuniary interest in his disability benefit and the County contributions to the Benefit Fund, the circuit court should not have dismissed O‘Connell‘s declaratory judgment action. Id. ¶ 31. Likewise, the appellate court held that, because following O‘Connell‘s termination the Board had a clear duty to make disability benefit payments and the County had a clear duty to make contributions to the Benefit Fund on his behalf, the circuit court improperly dismissed count III seeking relief in the form of mandamus against both defendants. Id. ¶ 32. In particular, the appellate court noted that, “under section 9-160 [of the Pension Code (
¶ 16 After the appellate court denied the Board‘s petition for rehearing, the County and the Board filed timely petitions for leave to appeal. On September 29, 2021, this court granted the County‘s petition for leave to appeal, and on November 24, 2021, this court granted the Board‘s petition for leave to appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Section 2-619.1 of the Code (
¶ 19 A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 (
¶ 20 The pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution guarantees that “[m]embership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”
¶ 21 As
¶ 22 “Although a court should first consider the language of the statute, a court must presume that the legislature, in enacting the statute, did not intend absurdity or injustice.” Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 510. “When a literal interpretation of a statutory term would lead to consequences that the legislature could not have contemplated and surely did not intend, this court will give the statutory language a reasonable interpretation.” Id. “A statute should be interpreted so as to promote its essential purposes and to avoid, if possible, a construction that would raise doubts as to its validity.” Id.
¶ 23 Article 9 of the Pension Code (
¶ 24 The County is required to “contribute all amounts ordinarily contributed by it for annuity purposes for any employee receiving ordinary disability benefit as though he were in active discharge of his duties during such period of disability.”
¶ 25 Section 9-108(a) of the Code defines “employee,” “contributor,” or “participant” as “[a]ny employee of the county employed in any position in the classified civil service of the county.”
¶ 26 Section 9-157 of the Pension Code provides for the ordinary disability benefit and states:
“An employee *** regardless of age on or after January 1, 1987, who becomes disabled after becoming a contributor to the fund as the result of any cause other than injury incurred in the performance of an act of duty is entitled to ordinary disability benefit during such disability, after the first 30 days thereof.
No employee who becomes disabled and whose disability commences during any period of absence from duty other than on paid vacation may receive ordinary disability benefit until he recovers from such disability and performs the duties of his position in the service for at least 15 consecutive days, Sundays and holidays excepted, after his recovery from such disability.
The benefit shall not be allowed unless application therefor is made while the disability exists, nor for any period of disability before 30 days before the application for such benefit is made. The foregoing limitations do not apply if the board finds from satisfactory evidence presented to it that there was reasonable cause for delay in filing such application within such periods of time.
The first payment shall be made not later than one month after the benefit is granted and each subsequent payment shall be made not later than one month after the last preceding payment.
* * *
An employee who has withdrawn from service or was laid off for any reason, who is absent from service thereafter for 60 days or more who re-enters the service subsequent to such absence is not entitled to ordinary disability benefit unless he renders at least 6 months of service subsequent to the date of such last re-entry.”
Id. § 9-157.
¶ 27 Section 157 of the Pension Code identifies events that trigger the termination of ordinary disability benefits:
“The disability benefit prescribed herein shall cease when the first of the following dates shall occur and the employee, if still disabled, shall thereafter be entitled to such annuity as is otherwise provided in this Article:
(a) the date disability ceases.
(b) the date the disabled employee attains age 65 for disability commencing prior to January 1, 1979.
(c) the date the disabled employee attains 65 for disability commencing prior to attainment of age 60 in the service and after January 1, 1979.
(d) the date the disabled employee attains the age of 70 for disability commencing after attainment of age 60 in the service and after January 1, 1979.
(e) the date the payments of the benefit shall exceed in the aggregate, throughout the employee‘s service, a period equal to ¼ of the total service rendered prior to the date of disability
but in no event more than 5 years. In computing such total service any period during which the employee received ordinary disability benefit and any period of absence from duty other than paid vacation shall be excluded.” Id.
¶ 28 Section 9-159 of the Code lists three additional triggering events that terminate an ordinary disability benefit.
¶ 29 Two other sections of article 9 establish mechanisms for disabled employees to convert their disability pensions into retirement pensions once their disability eligibility period has expired. Section 9-160 of the Pension Code, the “early annuity option,” provides:
“An employee whose disability continues after he has received ordinary disability benefit for the maximum period of time prescribed by this Article, and who withdraws before age 60 while still so disabled, is entitled to receive the annuity provided from the total sum accumulated to his credit from employee contributions and county contributions to be computed as of his age on the date of withdrawal.”
Id. § 9-160.
Section 9-174, the “credit purchase option,” also provides that disabled employees whose credit for ordinary benefit purposes has expired and who continue to be disabled have the right to continue contributing to the pension fund at the “current contribution rate” for a period not to exceed 12 months and to receive annuity credit for those periods so paid.
¶ 30 As noted by the appellate court, these latter sections illustrate that, under most circumstances, a permanently disabled employee may enjoy an uninterrupted flow of benefits from the time his application for the ordinary disability benefit is granted until conversion to a disability pension or the employee‘s death. In this case, the Board halted O‘Connell‘s benefit once the County terminated his employment, before his ordinary disability benefit period expired and thus before he qualified for the early annuity option or the credit purchase option. O‘Connell also lost approximately two years of contributions to the Benefit Fund, which would have increased his retirement annuity. O‘Connell argues that these benefits are rendered illusory if the County can discharge a disabled employee and thereby end his ordinary disability benefit before he has received it “for the maximum period of time” allowed by article 9 of the Pension Code.
¶ 31 The Board and the County argue that, once the County terminated O‘Connell‘s employment, he became a “former employee” not entitled to the ordinary disability benefit pursuant to section 9-157 of the Pension Code. The Board argues that article 9 clearly provides the ordinary disability benefit only for a current employee (
¶ 32 Likewise, the County argues that article 9 requires it to contribute amounts for annuity purposes only for a current employee receiving the ordinary disability benefit as though he were in active discharge of his duties.
¶ 33 O‘Connell counters that the language of section 9-157 of the Pension Code is inclusive enough to encompass former employees. O‘Connell argues that article 9 uses the term “employee” to refer to both current and former employees.
¶ 34 The parties’ arguments as to whether O‘Connell, as a former employee, is entitled to the ordinary disability benefit he was receiving, upon termination of his employment, are misguided. The plain language of section 9-157 of the Pension Code entitles a disabled employee to the ordinary disability benefit, after the first 30 days of his disability, if he is an employee and a contributor to the fund, when he becomes disabled.
¶ 35 Once the Board grants the employee the ordinary disability benefit, section 9-157 then enumerates triggering events, which do not include termination of employment, that halt the ordinary disability benefit.
¶ 36 The applicant‘s status as employee and contributor, along with his disability, is determined at the time of his initial application. Iwanski v. Streamwood Police Pension Board, 232 Ill. App. 3d 180, 191 (1992) (because police officer, who filed application for disability pension prior to discharge but also prior to hearings on application,
¶ 37 Accordingly, section 9-157‘s plain language provides that O‘Connell became entitled to the ordinary disability benefit in 2017, when he initially applied, as an employee who became disabled after becoming a contributor to the fund. See
¶ 38 This statutory construction is consistent with our previous caselaw. In Di Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 24, this court determined whether a probationary firefighter, an applicant for a duty-related disability pension, was entitled under article 4 of the Pension Code (
¶ 39 In Di Falco, this court upheld the view that the Pension Code‘s statutory scheme requires that an individual must be employed as a firefighter at the time of application for disability pension benefits. Id. at 30-31. This court noted that article 4 of the Pension Code indicated that, “in order to begin receiving a disability pension, fire fighters must not have been discharged.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 29. This court concluded that “[t]o allow fire fighters who have been discharged to apply for disability pensions under section 4-110 would disrupt the pension scheme established by the legislature.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 30. This court held that it was the “plaintiff‘s failure to
¶ 40 O‘Connell thus maintained standing to seek relief for reinstatement of his ordinary disability benefit by the Board and of contributions by the County. See Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co., 108 Ill. 2d 243, 254 (1985) (standing requires injury in fact to a legally recognized interest); see also Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492-93 (1988) (injury for standing must be distinct and palpable, fairly traceable to the defendant‘s actions, and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief). O‘Connell further stated a sufficient cause of action for declaratory judgment (see The Carle Foundation v. Cunningham Township, 2017 IL 120427, ¶ 26 (declaratory judgment action involves a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest, a defendant with an opposing interest, and an actual controversy between the parties) and a valid complaint for mandamus (see Novola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997) (valid complaint for mandamus “must allege facts which establish a clear right to the relief requested, a clear duty of the respondent to act, and clear authority in the respondent to comply with the writ“).
CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the cause for further proceedings.
¶ 43 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 44 Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 45 Cause remanded.