NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING CLINIC, INC.; Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc.-West; Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc.-East; Summit Medical Center, Inc.; Planned Parenthood of Mid-Michigan Alliance; Planned Parenthood of South Central Michigan; Stanley M. Berry; Timothy R.B. Johnson; Karoline S. Puder; Ronald C. Strickler, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Michael A. COX, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Defendant-Appellant, Kim L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney for Wayne County, Defendant, Standing Together to Oppose Partial-Birth-Abortion, Proposed Intervenor-Appellant
Nos. 05-2417, 05-2418
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Decided and Filed: June 4, 2007
487 F.3d 323
No doubt, a similarity remains between the two instruments: In either situation, the creditor may not require payment in full absent default. But the same could be said for any loan. Neither the banker nor the merchant nor the mortgage lender may demand full repayment from a debtor on a whim; each creditor may demand only those funds immediately owed. And yet that reality does not convert every run-of-the-mine mortgage into a contingent debt. Otherwise, the outstanding balance on all thirty-year mortgages would represent “contingent” debts even though the debtor has kept pace on his payments and even though full payment generally may not be required under the mortgage instrument until a default. The courts long ago rejected such an interpretation. See, e.g., Sec. Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1928) (distinguishing between attorney‘s fees that were a “liability still contingent at the time of bankruptcy” and the “principal debt, which is secured by a lien,” “was not inchoate at the time” and “had already become perfect when the principal note and the loan deed securing it were given“); Mertz v. Rott, 955 F.2d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 1992) (characterizing a mortgage as a “fixed liability” rather than a “contingent liability“); In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1978) (distinguishing between “mortgages” and “contingent liabilities“); United States v. Sheehy, 541 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Mountain Trust Bank v. Shifflett, 255 F.2d 718, 719 (4th Cir. 1958) (distinguishing between “mortgage debts” and “contingent liability“); Kelly v. Minor, 252 F. 115, 116 (4th Cir. 1918) (“An ordinary lien, such as a judgment, mortgage, or deed of trust, is for a definite amount, not dependent upon any contingency, and not affected by changes in the value of the property to which it attaches.“).
The question in the end is not whether the creditor may extract full repayment from the debtor (or his property) immediately; the question is whether the creditor has a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy,” see
III.
For these reasons, we affirm.
Before: MARTIN and COOK, Circuit Judges; BUNNING, District Judge.*
OPINION
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge.
The Michigan Attorney General appeals the district court‘s decision declaring unconstitutional a state law that regulates abortion methods. Because we find that Michigan‘s law fails to comply with the explicit limitations that the Supreme Court has established for statutes regulating abortion, we agree with the district court‘s disposition, and affirm.
I.
In 2004, after a proposal by a citizen initiative petition, the Michigan Legislature passed the Legal Birth Definition Act. The purpose of the Act was to prohibit the practice colloquially referred to as partial-birth abortion. The Act does not on its own terms ban any specific type of abortion procedure. Instead it creates a protected legal status for a partially-delivered fetus that it terms a “perinate.”
in that physician‘s reasonable medical judgment and in compliance with the applicable standard of practice and care, the procedure was necessary in either of the following circumstances:
(i) To save the life of the mother and every reasonable effort was made to preserve the life of both the mother and the perinate.
(ii) To avert an imminent threat to the physical health of the mother, and any harm to the perinate was incidental to
treating the mother and not a known or intended result of the procedure performed.
The plaintiffs in this case—six health care facilities and four obstetrician-gynecologists—filed suit on March 1, 2005, prior to the March 30, 2005 effective date of the Act. They sought declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, and moved simultaneously for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the Act during the pendency of the litigation. Two weeks after the complaint was filed, the parties stipulated to a Temporary Restraining Order until the district court could rule on the motion for preliminary injunction. The Michigan Attorney General subsequently issued an opinion purporting to limit the scope of the Act. The opinion provides that in light of federal case law, the Act “has the effect of banning, with certain exceptions, those dilation and extraction (D & X) abortion procedures that require the killing of a ‘perinate’ as defined in the Act. The [Act] does not have the effect of banning the dilation and evacuation (D & E) procedures.” A.G. Op. at 11 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Women‘s Medical Professional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003)). After the issuance of the Attorney General‘s opinion, Michigan filed a motion to dismiss under
With the consent of the parties, the district court consolidated the proceedings regarding the motions for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. It issued an opinion on September 12, 2005 in which it denied the state‘s motion to dismiss, reasoning that an Attorney General‘s opinion “does not constitute a ruling on the constitutionality of the Act.” Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 394 F.Supp.2d 978, 985 (E.D.Mich.2005). It also declared the statute unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy by prohibiting the D & E procedure, because it failed to adequately protect the health of the woman, and because it was void for vagueness due to its confusing language. Id. at 985-89. The district court‘s order did not provide any injunctive relief, but simply declared the Act unconstitutional. The district court also denied a motion to intervene filed by a group called “Standing Together to Oppose Partial-Birth-Abortion” or “STTOP.” See id. at 989-90. STTOP is a ballot-question committee of Right to Life of Michigan, Inc., which was formed to promote the passage of the Act.
The Attorney General and STTOP both appeal from the district court‘s order.
II.
A full understanding of the legal issues presented by this appeal requires some background on the abortion procedures in question. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922 (“[O]ur discussion might seem clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to others. There is no alternative way, however, to acquaint the reader with the technical distinctions among different abortions methods and re-
During the first trimester, abortions are typically performed by “suction curettage,” where the doctor empties the uterus with suction by dilating the cervix, inserting a plastic tube into the uterus, and using suction to remove the embryo or fetus. Another relevant abortion method that is performed during the first trimester is a “medical abortion,” where the physician administers a medicine that both causes the death of the fetus and induces the uterus to contract and expel its contents.
During the second trimester, the increased size of the fetus requires more complex methods for its removal. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 925. The most common of these methods is called “dilation and evacuation,” or “D & E.” Id. D & E typically involves dilation of the cervix, followed by the extraction of part of the fetus through the cervix. The resistance caused by pulling the extracted portion of the fetus against the cervix causes the fetus to disjoin and, die, after which the remaining parts are extracted. Id. A variation on “D & E” is known as “dilation and extraction,” or “D & X,” or alternatively “intact D & E.”1 The D & X procedure involves evacuating or otherwise compacting the fetus‘s skull while the head is still in the uterus so that the head will pass easily through the cervix. Where the fetus presents itself head first, the head is emptied and compressed first, after which the entire fetus is removed intact. If the fetus presents itself feet first, in the breech position, it is partially delivered to the point where the physician can access the fetus‘s head so as to puncture it and remove the contents. See Taft, 353 F.3d at 439-40. In some circumstances, D & X is considered by certain medical experts to be safer for the pregnant woman than D & E because it “involves less risk of uterine perforation or cervical laceration because it requires the physician to make fewer passes into the uterus with sharp instruments and reduces the presence of sharp fetal bone fragments that can injure the uterus and cervix,” reduces the risk of retained fetal tissue or “free floating fetal head,” and takes less time and involves less blood loss, trauma, and exposure to anesthesia. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 936.
Another common second trimester procedure is induction, which appears to operate like a medical abortion occurring later in pregnancy, where a medication causes the uterus to contract and expel the fetus. Induction carries with it “all the potential complications of labor and delivery at term, and therefore, involves more pain, time and expense than D & E,” as well as exposing some women to more risks of infection or other complications.2
Joint App‘x at 68, 83 (Hertz Decl., Berry Decl.). The remaining methods of second trimester abortion are hysterectomy, or removal of the uterus (which leaves the woman sterile), and hysterotomy, which is akin to a premature caesarean section. Joint App‘x at 83. Both of these methods are obviously much more invasive and dangerous for the woman than D & E, D & X, or induction. Id.
The classifications of these particular abortion procedures are important because the Supreme Court and this Court have used them as a reference for which abortion procedures a state can permissibly prohibit under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1620-23; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920; Taft, 353 F.3d at 439-40. Casey held that a state may regulate abortion before viability so long as it does not impose an “undue burden” on a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy, and may regulate and even prohibit abortion after viability “except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
Stenberg applied this standard to a Nebraska law regarding procedures that critics labeled “partial-birth abortion.” 530 U.S. at 921. The Court held that the undue burden standard simply barred a state from prohibiting “the more commonly used D & E procedure,” as doing so would place “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Id. at 938 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877). This portion of Stenberg‘s holding is relatively straightforward: if a statute prohibits pre-viability D & E procedures, it is unconstitutional. See id.; see also Taft, 353 F.3d at 438. The other aspect of Stenberg‘s holding allowed a general statutory ban on less common abortion procedures (including D & X), presumably as part of a state‘s ability to regulate previability abortion methods, but with a caveat: “where substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women‘s health, Casey requires the statute to include a health exception when the procedure is ‘necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.‘” Id. at 938 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879). The Stenberg Court ruled that such an exception to Nebraska‘s ban on D & X was necessary, in light of the district court‘s “highly plausible record-based explanation” of why D & X “obviates health risks in certain circumstances,” in light of “a division of opinion among some medical experts,” and in the absence of controlled medical studies on the issue. Stenberg‘s two-part holding, in sum, was that it is an undue burden for a state to prohibit “the more commonly used D & E procedure,” and that “a statute that altogether forbids D & X creates a significant health risk,” and is therefore impermissible. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938.
Second, Gonzales complicated the meaning of Stenberg‘s holding regarding the need for a health and life exception. The federal Act prohibiting D & X contains no health exception, see
We now proceed to examine how this precedential framework applies to the Michigan abortion law at issue in this case.
III.
Because the district court in this case appears to have addressed the constitutionality of the Act without crafting any injunctive relief, the issue on appeal involves only a question of law that we review de novo. In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 986, 988 (6th Cir. 2000).
The state focuses its appeal on three issues. First, it contends that the district court‘s remedy was too broad, and that instead of finding the entire statute unconstitutional, the district court should have enjoined only the unconstitutional applications of the statute and otherwise upheld it, particularly in light of the Attorney General‘s opinion limiting the scope of the statute. Next, Michigan argues that the district court should have found the case to be moot in light of the Attorney General‘s opinion, as Plaintiffs could not fear prosecution for violations of any unconstitutional applications of the statute in light of the opinion. Finally, the state claims that the district court should have certified a question regarding the scope of the statute to the Michigan Supreme Court before rendering a decision on its constitutionality. STTOP also appeals the district court‘s denial of its motion to intervene, both as a matter of right and its request for permissive intervention.
A. Scope and Meaning of the Statute and the Attorney General‘s Opinion
The district court found that the Act imposed an undue burden by prohibiting the D & E procedure, and failed to contain an adequate exception to protect the woman‘s health and life. In challenging both of these determinations, the state contends that the district court did not give adequate deference to the Attorney General‘s Opinion.
1. Undue Burden Related to D & E
Michigan does not challenge the plaintiffs’ claim that it cannot prohibit the use of the D & E abortion method under Stenberg and Taft. Instead, it argues that “[a]s demonstrated by the Attorney General‘s Opinion, the Act must be construed to apply to only the dilation and extraction (D & X) procedure with a life and health exception consistent with Taft in order to
Michigan largely relies on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006), in which the Court addressed a New Hampshire law that prohibited a physician from performing an abortion on a minor until 48 hours after written notice of the pending abortion was sent to the minor‘s parents. Although the statute in Ayotte provided exceptions for instances when the woman‘s health was at risk, the lower federal courts had determined that the provision was insufficient to adequately address such health concerns, and that the parental notification law should be enjoined entirely. Id. at 325-26. The Supreme Court addressed only the remedy, determining that it was too broad and that only the unconstitutional portions of the statute should have been enjoined. Id. at 326.
The Ayotte court addressed “three interrelated principles [that] inform our approach to remedies.” Id. at 329. First, the Court seeks to avoid “nullify[ing] more of a legislature‘s work than is necessary,” because doing so “frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.” Id. For this reason where partial, rather than facial, invalidation is possible, it is the “required course.” Id. Second, the Court noted that “mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from rewriting state law to conform it to constitutional requirements even as we strive to salvage it.” Id. This consideration counsels in favor of looking to how clearly the court has “already articulated the background constitutional rules at issue and how easily we can articulate the remedy.” Id. Thus where the Court has established a bright line constitutional rule, it is more appropriate to invalidate parts of the statute that go beyond the constitutional line, whereas “making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex, may call for a ‘far more serious invasion of the legislative domain’ than we ought to undertake.” Id. at 330 (quoting United States v. Nat‘l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 n. 26 (1995)). Finally, the Court considers legislative intent, and inquires whether the legislature would prefer to have part of the statute remain in force. Id. At the same time, however, the Court is “wary of legislatures who would rely on our intervention,” because where states merely cast as wide a net as possible and leave it to the courts to determine the permissible extent of a statute‘s reach, they run the risk of delegating legislative
At first blush, there could appear to be some degree of tension between the Supreme Court‘s command in Ayotte that lower federal courts consider partial invalidation of a law‘s unconstitutional portions before enjoining it in its entirety, and its prior decision in Stenberg, in which it upheld the complete invalidation of Nebraska‘s statute relating to D & E procedures. The Nebraska statute addressed in Stenberg generally prohibited what it termed “partial-birth abortion” (with certain health-related exceptions), which it defined as “an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery.” 530 U.S. at 922. The statutory definition of “partial delivery” included delivery “into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof.” Id. Much like the Michigan Attorney General argues here, the Nebraska Attorney General sought to have the Court uphold the statute based on his narrowing construction, contending that the statutory language of the Nebraska statute differentiated between D & E and D & X. The Court determined that it had to “reject his interpretation, for it conflicts with the statutory language,” reasoning that “we are ‘without the power to adopt a narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent.‘” 530 U.S. at 942, 944 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988)). As the Court noted, “D & E will often involve a physician pulling a ‘substantial portion’ of a still living fetus, say an arm or leg, into the vagina prior to the death of the fetus.” Id. at 939. Thus, the Attorney General‘s claim that the statute only applied to D & X procedures was simply at odds with the plain language of the statute.
A closer reading of Ayotte and Stenberg reveals that their remedial approaches are not inconsistent with each other, despite differences between the remedy eventually imposed in each case. First, a substantive distinction between the statutes addressed in the two cases rendered partial invalidation a more natural approach in Ayotte than in Stenberg. The Ayotte Court concluded that in general, New Hampshire‘s parental notification requirement was constitutional. 546 U.S. at 326. Under the Court‘s precedent, however, it was undisputed that the law had to have an exception that would allow abortions without consent from a parent or a judge where they were necessary to protect the life and health of the woman, and the Court found New Hampshire‘s health exception insufficient. Id. at 327-28. Because the unconstitutional portion of the statute (the emergency health exception) was a provision that could be addressed separately from the underlying rule (the parental consent requirement), it was a strong candidate for partial invalidation. In contrast, the underlying rule in Stenberg simply functioned to prohibit D & E procedures. In order to modify this rule to undo the undue burden, a full-blown rewriting of state law would have been required, a course that Ayotte itself cautions against.
The Ayotte Court also distinguished Stenberg‘s remedy by noting that “the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and we did not contemplate, relief more
The bottom line is that the limited remedy under either constitutional avoidance or partial invalidation must be consistent with the text of the statute, lest the courts usurp the legislative function. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (“[I]t would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all the possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside to announce to whom the statute may be applied.“) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)). This point was recently reinforced in Gonzales, where the Court deemed applicable the doctrine of constitutional avoidance without disturbing the doctrine‘s inapplicability with respect to the Nebraska statute addressed in Stenberg. 127 S.Ct. at 1631. The Court specifically “put ... to rest” what it described as the “antagonistic ‘cannon of construction under which in cases involving abortion, a permissible reading of a statute [was] to be avoided at all costs.‘” Id. (quoting Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 977 (Kennedy, J. dissenting)). Even so, it affirmed Stenberg‘s “uncontroversial proposition that the canon of constitutional avoidance does not apply if a statute is not ‘genuinely susceptible to two constructions.‘” Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998)).
With this background and the preference for a limited remedy in mind, it is apparent that Stenberg largely governs our analysis here, given the striking similarities it shares with this case. Much like the Nebraska statute, the Michigan statute applies as soon as a portion of the fetus passes beyond the vaginal introitus.4 As the Supreme Court in Stenberg and the
The reasoning set forth in the Michigan Attorney General‘s opinion actually reinforces our determination that its narrowing construction is at odds with the language of the statute. The opinion states that “the D & E procedure requires dismemberment or disarticulation of the fetus and removal of the dead fetus ‘piece-by-piece’ from the woman‘s uterus—there is no intact extraction of the fetus,” and concludes that as a result “the fetus would never achieve the status of a perinate under the statute.” A.G. Op. at 9. This conclusion is based on either a misunderstanding or an inaccurate description of the D & E procedure. Stenberg and Taft—and the evidence before the district court in this case—make clear that D & E involves and even requires removing a portion of the fetus from the uterus before dismemberment. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 939; Joint App‘x at 67 (Hertz Decl.). Under this procedure, the fetus would therefore become a perinate, as part of it will pass the vaginal introitus, and its subsequent demise would subject the physician to criminal liability based on the Michigan statute. As the Court stated in Stenberg, “[t]he relevant question is not whether the legislature wanted to ban D & X; it is whether the law was intended to apply only to D & X. The plain language covers both procedures.” 530 U.S. at 939 (emphasis in original). The same reasoning applies here.
The Supreme Court‘s holding in Gonzales is also of little avail to Michigan on this point. Gonzales left undisturbed the holding from Stenberg that a prohibition on D & E amounts to an undue burden on a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy. 127 S.Ct. at 1626-27. Although the Court upheld the federal ban, it explicitly distinguished it from the Nebraska ban addressed in Stenberg. Most significantly for present purposes, the “anatomical landmarks” in the federal ban ensured that it did not prohibit standard D & E. The Nebraska statute‘s reference to a “substantial portion” of the fetus did not lend itself to a similar limitation. When compared to these other two statutes, the Michigan statute, which applies when “any anatomical part” of the fetus passes the vaginal introitus, is easily the most sweeping and the most burdensome of the three. That is, whatever “substantial part” means, it must require the removal of more than “any anatomical part,” and both
Additionally, as the plaintiffs point out and the district court found, the statute‘s plain language would also apply to some suction curretage abortions, medical abortions and induction abortions, because the signs of life identified in the statute, such as a heartbeat, are often present after the fetus or embryo passes beyond the vaginal introitus in such procedures. 394 F.Supp.2d at 985-86. This fact further supports the conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional, particularly because it would prohibit several of the most common pre-viability abortion methods. As Stenberg instructs us, this effect creates an unconstitutional undue burden in violation of Casey. The Act‘s failure to distinguish between pre- and post-viability abortions only exacerbates this problem. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (“The fact that Nebraska‘s law applies both pre- and post-viability aggravates the constitutional problem presented.“).
Our decision is also well supported by the Supreme Court‘s warning to be wary of statutes that set an extremely wide net of prohibited conduct, and leave it to the courts to set the constitutional boundaries. The rationale behind this rule is that such an approach would involve “substitut[ing] the judicial for the legislative department of the government.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330. This warning is apropos here—the Michigan legislature appears to have cast a wide net that would prohibit virtually all methods of abortions once a fetal heart beat is detectable, including the constitutionally protected D & E procedure, despite knowing that some of these procedures were constitutionally protected, and perhaps with the intention of prohibiting everything the federal courts will allow. A court order prohibiting the statute from applying beyond the D & X procedure would involve the Court too deeply in the legislative process, as warned against in Ayotte. The language the legislature settled upon would in fact allow some D & X procedures while prohibiting most constitutionally protected procedures—an approach that undermines our ability to narrow or partially invalidate the statute to render it constitutional under both Stenberg and Ayotte. Ultimately, because any limitation would be entirely at odds with the language of the statute, such an approach would contravene the holding of Stenberg.
In support of its position, Michigan also points to this Court‘s decision in Taft, which upheld an Ohio statute prohibiting partial birth abortion. A reading of the statute at issue in Taft presents a clear distinction from the Michigan statute. The statute in Taft explicitly stated that “[t]his section does not prohibit the suction curettage procedure of abortion, the suction aspiration procedure of abortion, or the dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion.” 353 F.3d at 452 (citing
The state also points to the legislative history of the Act to support its claim that it was intended to prohibit only D & X,
The state finally contends that the Attorney General‘s Opinion should have been granted a greater degree of deference by the district court as a persuasive authority for interpreting Michigan law. This argument is similarly belied by Stenberg. The Court noted that “[t]his Court‘s case law makes clear that we are not to give the Attorney General‘s interpretative views controlling weight,” adding that “our precedent warns against accepting as ‘authoritative’ an Attorney General‘s interpretation of state law when ‘the Attorney General does not bind the state courts or local law enforcement agencies.‘” 530 U.S. at 940. The parties agree that the Michigan Attorney General cannot bind the state‘s courts. Although the Attorney General argues that he can bind local prosecutors, this would not appear to be sufficient under Stenberg, particularly because, as the plaintiffs point out, an Attorney General‘s Opinion has no precedential value, and can be revised any time by this or successive Attorneys General. Moreover, as the Stenberg Court noted, “even were we to grant the Attorney General‘s views ‘substantial weight,’ we still have to reject his interpretation, for it conflicts with the statutory language.” 530 U.S. at 942. For the reasons already discussed, the Michigan Attorney General‘s Opinion also conflicts irreconcilably with the statutory language. Therefore, the district court correctly rejected deferring to the Attorney General‘s opinion here.
The district court‘s decision that Michigan‘s broad abortion statute created an unconstitutional undue burden on a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy because it prohibits D & E was in full accordance with the Supreme Court‘s guidance in both Stenberg and Ayotte, and has in no way been undermined by the interim decision in Gonzales. It is therefore affirmed.
2. Life and Health Exception
The life and health exceptions in the Michigan statute provide as follows:
(2) A physician or an individual performing an act, task, or function under the delegatory authority of a physician is immune from criminal, civil, or administrative liability for performing any procedure that results in injury or death of a perinate while completing the delivery of the perinate under any of the following circumstances:
(a) If the perinate is being expelled from the mother‘s body as a result of a spontaneous abortion.
(b) If in that physician‘s reasonable medical judgment and in compliance with the applicable standard of practice and care, the procedure was necessary in either of the following circumstances:
(i) To save the life of the mother and every reasonable effort was made to preserve the life of both the mother and the perinate.
(ii) To avert an imminent threat to the physical health of the mother, and any harm to the perinate was incidental to treating the mother and not a known or intended result of the procedure performed.
As discussed above in Part II of this opinion, the Supreme Court‘s holding in Stenberg pertaining to the need for a health exception to otherwise valid D & X prohibitions was modified somewhat in Gonzales. It is not immediately apparent how this decision should affect Michigan‘s statute. On the one hand, Gonzales‘s holding that an exception allowing D & X might not always be medically necessary was premised on a conflicted factual record, and doubts about the medical need for such an exception would appear to apply with equal force in this case. On the other hand, the factual findings that cast doubt on the safety implications of D & X were not part of the record in this case, were not a basis for the passage of the Michigan statute, and were made by the legislative body of an entirely separate sovereign, suggesting the possibility that they could be of diminished relevance here.
The most straightforward implication of Gonzales in this context might be its statement that facial challenges are not the preferred mechanism for challenges pertaining to health exceptions to prohibitions on the D & X procedure, suggesting that such a challenge should not be entertained here. Even so, it is not apparent how and whether Gonzales diminishes the rule requiring an exception to protect the woman‘s life that does not impose upon her an increased medical risk. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769 (prohibiting a “‘trade-off between the woman‘s health and additional percentage points of fetal survival.‘“) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979)). The federal statute contains an apparently adequate life exception that allows D & X where necessary to save the life of the woman, which went unchallenged in Gonzales. See
For purposes of resolving the instant case, we can affirm the district court‘s decision without addressing the complicated implications of Gonzales for the life and health exceptions of the Michigan statute. The bottom line is that the life and health exceptions are exceptions to an unconstitutional and un-fixable general prohibition on certain abortion procedures. That is to say it is unnecessary for us to address exceptions to an unconstitutional and unenforceable general rule. Because we find the general prohibition to be unconstitutional, and we are unable and unsuited to rewriting a prohibition on the D & X procedure alone, there is little to gain by an attempt to resolve this issue.
3. Void for Vagueness
The district court further concluded that the Act was void for vagueness due to its confusing and ambiguous nature. The district court specifically noted that the Act “does not specify what medical procedures are banned and does not set forth specific penalties for violation of its terms.” 394 F.Supp.2d at 989. It also found that “the term ‘perinate’ is not a commonly used definition within the medical community,” and further based its vagueness determination on the failure to define the terms “imminent threat” and “every reasonable effort.” Id.
A statute is void for vagueness where it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplat-
We believe that the void for vagueness challenge presents a closer question than the undue burden challenges under Stenberg discussed above. It would in some ways seem that Plaintiffs’ argument that the statutory language is clearly unconstitutional and that the Attorney General‘s Opinion cannot be read as a reasonable interpretation cuts against their void for vagueness argument. It does appear that some of the terms in the health and life exceptions are poorly defined, and would fail to notify physicians of exactly when these exceptions would apply, although these shortcomings do not bear upon the separate question of whether the general, prohibited conduct is vague, aside from the exceptions. At any rate, in light of our decision to affirm the district court‘s decision under Stenberg, we decline to reach the separate void for vagueness claim.
B. Mootness
Michigan argues that the plaintiffs’ claims became moot after the issuance of the Attorney General‘s opinion, which interpreted the statute as not applying to constitutionally protected abortion procedures. The state contends that based on the opinion, the plaintiffs no longer have a fear of prosecution for performing constitutionally protected abortions.
We reject the state‘s mootness argument for several reasons. First, the opinion does not even provide an accurate description of the constitutionally protected D & E procedure, and thus cannot be said to allay fears of prosecution for performing constitutionally protected abortions. The opinion describes D & E as requiring dismemberment within the fetus prior to removal of any of the parts, which would prevent the fetus from ever becoming a perinate. A.G. Op. at 9. This reading is entirely at odds with the evidence before the district court as well as the description of D & E given in Stenberg. Significantly, the Stenberg Court based its holding in part on the evidence that “D & E will often involve a physician pulling a ‘substantial portion’ of a still living fetus, say, an arm or leg, into the vagina prior to the death of the fetus.” 530 U.S. at 939. Additionally, Hertz explained in his declaration here that “[i]t is not unusual that I will pull a fetal part past the vaginal introitus before it is disarticulated from the rest of the fetus,” due to the narrowing of the distance between the cervix and the vaginal introitus that occurs during the procedure. Joint App‘x at 67 (Hertz Decl. at 5). This process clearly involves the fetus becoming a perinate, and the physician would be subject to prosecution for conducting the subsequent abortion. Because even the Attorney General‘s opinion incorrectly describes the D & E procedure, it would not allay any fear of prosecution that a physician might have when he performs a constitutionally protected D & E abortion where part of the perinate passes the vaginal introitus, because that procedure would not be covered by the opinion. This ambiguity renders the opinion itself vague (wholly independent from the question of whether the statute is vague), as it “conditions potential criminal liability on confusing and ambiguous criteria.” Colautti, 439 U.S. at 394. As a result, it “presents serious problems of notice, discriminatory application, and chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.” Id.
Even though “cessation of the allegedly illegal conduct by government officials has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than similar action by private parties,” a party still bears a heavy burden to show that a case is mooted. Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 705 (6th Cir.2003);7 see also Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir.2003) (“The ‘heavy burden of persuading’ the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting mootness.“). In this case, that burden is increased by the fact that the voluntary cessation only appears to have occurred in
C. Certification to the Michigan Supreme Court
The state‘s claim that the question of the Act‘s meaning should be certified to the Michigan Supreme Court is simply contravened by express language in Stenberg, a nearly indistinguishable case. There, although the Nebraska Attorney General had not sought certification to the state supreme court in the lower federal courts, the Court stated that certification would still not have been appropriate, as “[c]ertification of a question (or abstention) is appropriate only where the statute is ‘fairly susceptible’ to a narrowing construction.” 530 U.S. at 945.
A prerequisite to certification to a state supreme court is a determination that the statute in question is subject to a narrowing interpretation. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (stating that before a federal court certifies a question to a state supreme court, it must “‘first ascertain whether a construction ... is fairly possible’ that will contain the statute within constitutional bounds.“) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Because we agree with the district court that the language of the statute here is not subject to a limiting construction, this prerequisite for certification is not met. See also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 945 (“[W]e have never held that a federal litigant must wait a state-court construction or the development of an established practice before bringing the federal suit.“). We therefore reject the state‘s argument that the district court should have certified the question to the Michigan Supreme Court before rendering its decision.
IV.
A. STTOP‘s Motion for Intervention as of Right
We turn now to STTOP‘s appeal of the denial of its motion for intervention. Rule 24 provides in pertinent part that
[u]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant‘s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant‘s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
We note at the outset that the significance of STTOP‘s appeal of the denial of its motion for intervention is somewhat unclear in light of our decision to affirm the summary judgment entered by the district court on the merits. The finality of the summary judgment decision clearly has potential to render moot STTOP‘s motion to intervene. On the other hand, in light of STTOP‘s argument that it would have argued the case and developed the factual record differently than the state, a remand might be necessary to provide STTOP such an opportunity if the motion to intervene was incorrectly denied. In light of this possibility, we will address STTOP‘s appeal of the denial of its motion for intervention.
STTOP argues that as a public interest group involved in the process leading to the adoption of the challenged statute, it has a legal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit. It cites to several cases from the Ninth Circuit applying such a rule. Plaintiffs distinguish the cases cited by STTOP by arguing that all of them involved long-standing groups with a broader interest than a single piece of legislation, as opposed to STTOP, which was created and continues to exist only for the purposes of advocating the passage and continued viability of the Act. See Idaho Farm Bureau Fed‘n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing conservation group to intervene in suit related to protected status of snail species); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 526-28 (9th Cir. 1983) (allowing Audobon Society to intervene as of right in suit challenging a birds of prey conservation area); State of Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing National Organization for Women to intervene in suit challenging ratification procedures for Equal Rights Amendment).
We have cited favorably to the Ninth Circuit cases relied on by STTOP in Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, for the propositions that “a public interest group that is involved in the process leading to adoption of legislation has a cognizable interest in defending that legislation,” and that “‘rules governing intervention are construed broadly in favor of the applicants.‘” 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997). In Miller, we allowed the Michigan Chamber of Commerce to intervene as of right in a suit challenging amendments to the state‘s campaign finance law whose enactment the chamber had supported. We noted that the Chamber‘s legal interest was supported by four significant factors:
(1) a vital participant in the political process that resulted in legislative adoption of the 1994 amendments in the first place, (2) a repeat player in Campaign Finance Act litigation, (3) a significant party which is adverse to the challenging union in the political process surrounding Michigan state government‘s regulation of practical campaign financing, and (4) an entity also regulated by at least three of the four statutory provisions challenged by plaintiffs.
Id. at 1247. In finding that the Chamber had a legal interest, we noted that “the intervention issue raised in this appeal is a close one.” Id. Here, STTOP might share two of these four factors with the Chamber
The plaintiffs rely largely on our opinion in Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Comm., Ltd., which affirmed the denial of a motion to intervene as of right by a committee that existed to support a local referendum to amend a zoning ordinance. 425 F.3d 309, 316 (6th Cir. 2005). Because the committee‘s interest lay only in passing the referendum, the Court reasoned that “[a]ny substantial legal interest held by ‘the duly authorized committee for a referendum which circulated the referendum petitions’ was terminated when the referendum was held and the results certified.” Id. at 317. Similarly, where STTOP was created and continues to exist for the purpose of passing and upholding the Act, its legal interest can be said to be limited to the passage of the Act rather than the state‘s subsequent implementation and enforcement of it.
The rationale behind denying intervention in Providence Baptist also points to a useful distinction from the Ninth Circuit cases cited in Miller and relied upon here by STTOP—those cases all involved challenges by a public interest group to the procedure required to pass a particular rule, as opposed to the government‘s subsequent enforcement of the rule after its enactment. See id. (“In contrast to the cases cited by Hillandale Committee in its brief, this case raises no issue as to the validity of the election.“); see also Idaho Farm Bureau, 58 F.3d at 1397 (involving an underlying suit challenging the process by which a rule was adopted by the Secretary of the Interior); Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 526 (same); Freeman, 625 F.2d at 886 (underlying suit involved state procedure for ratification of constitutional amendment). We find this distinction to be compelling, as the public at large—including public interest groups—has an interest in the procedure by which a given legal requirement is enacted as a matter of democratic legislative process. On the other hand, in a challenge to the constitutionality of an already-enacted statute, as opposed to the process by which it is enacted, the public interest in its enforceability is entrusted for the most part to the government, and the public‘s legal interest in the legislative process becomes less relevant.
To be sure, public interest groups who are regulated by the new law, or, similarly, whose members are affected by the law, may likely have an ongoing legal interest in its enforcement after it is enacted. See Grutter, 188 F.3d at 401 (finding that proposed intervenors, who were applicants to University of Michigan, had a substantial legal interest in the school‘s admissions process). If the statute in this case regulated STTOP or its members, STTOP would likely have a legal interest, much like the intervenors in Grutter who were applicants to the University of Michigan. Alternatively, had STTOP sought to intervene in a suit challenging the legislative process by which the statute was enacted, its legal interest would be significantly stronger due to its involvement in the pas-
Without these sorts of limitations on the legal interest required for intervention, Rule 24 would be abused as a mechanism for the over-politicization of the judicial process. Because STTOP lacks a substantial legal interest in the outcome of the case, we affirm the district court‘s denial of its motion to intervene as of right, and need not address the other elements of intervention.
B. Permissive Intervention
Rule 24(b) provides that
[u]pon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
(2) when an applicant‘s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
“The denial of permissive intervention should be reversed only for clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge.” Purnell v. Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 951 (6th Cir. 1991). Here, the district court explained that it would not allow permissive intervention, reasoning that STTOP and Right to Life of Michigan were “openly hostile to Plaintiffs,” and that based on their ideological goals, STTOP‘s “presence would seriously delay the adjudication and resolution of the matter since other issues would be raised by STTOP.” 384 F.Supp.2d at 990. This conclusion appears to be supported by the record, and is evinced by STTOP‘s brief here, which takes an ideological approach to the litigation rather than attempting to argue for the Act‘s validity under the relevant Supreme Court precedent. The district court also allowed STTOP to file an amicus brief along with two other separate entities. The district court appears to have addressed the relevant criteria required by Rule 24(b), and its denial of permissive intervention cannot be said to have been an abuse of discretion.
V.
We certainly are reluctant to interfere with a statute that represents the will of the elected representatives of the people of Michigan, and do not do so lightly. If, however, the Michigan legislature had sought in good faith to enact a statute that prohibited the abortion procedures it deemed objectionable while complying with the limits imposed by the Constitution, it had plenty of guidance on how to proceed. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Stenberg predates the Michigan statute by five years. Further, in Taft, we fully upheld an Ohio statute pertaining to such procedures the year before the Michigan statute was passed. Michigan could have simply copied that statute word-for-word, and been virtually guaranteed a favorable result in the courts of this Circuit. It instead opted to use statutory language that pushed almost every boundary that the Supreme Court has imposed for these types of laws, and which have recently been reaffirmed in Gonzales. Because the statute cannot be squared in any way with these limitations, and the Attorney General‘s opinion is similarly inconsistent with the relevant court decisions and with the statute itself, the district court correctly
We therefore affirm the district court‘s entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the basis of its determination that the Act imposes an undue burden on a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy under Stenberg. We also affirm the district court‘s denial of STTOP‘s motions for intervention.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Henry HUNT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 06-5690
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Submitted: May 30, 2007. Decided and Filed: June 7, 2007.