Norris v. StanleyNorris v. Stanley
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jeanna Norris‘s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the Michigan State University (“MSU“) vaccine mandate policy. This Court previously denied Plaintiff‘s motion for a temporary restraining order, which sought the same relief (ECF No. 3).
I.
A trial court may issue a preliminary injunction under
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo. Smith Wholesale Co., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 873 n. 13 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Sixth Circuit has noted that “[a]lthough the four factors must be balanced, the demonstration of some irreparable injury is a sine qua non for issuance of an injunction.” Patio Enclosures, 39 F. App‘x at 967 (citing Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982)).
II.
A. Factor I: Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff‘s claim hinges in significant measure on the standard of review that this Court must apply given existing appellate authority. “If a protected class or fundamental right is involved, [the court] must apply strict scrutiny, but where no suspect class or fundamental right is implicated, [the court] must apply rational basis review.” Midkiff v. Adams Cty. Reg‘l Water Dist., 409 F.3d 758, 770 (6th Cir. 2005). Because this Court finds that no fundamental right is implicated in the present matter, the Court must apply a rational basis standard.
Under rational basis, the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the policy in question is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Under rational basis review, the governmental policy at issue “will be afforded a strong presumption of validity” and must be upheld as long as there is a rational relationship between the policy in question and some legitimate government purpose. Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). Further, “a plaintiff faces a severe burden and must ‘negate all possible rational justifications for the distinction.‘” Midkiff, 409 F.3d at 770 (quoting Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 771 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Although Plaintiff advocates that strict scrutiny should apply because MSU‘s vaccine policy violates her fundamental rights to privacy and bodily integrity under the
Plaintiff attempted to distinguish her case from Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) but was unsuccessful. She argues that her case is different because Jacobson never considered natural immunity, and because the policy in Jacobson was subject to bicameralism and presentment to the Massachusetts legislature, while the MSU policy was not. First, the asserted factual differences between Jacobson and Plaintiff‘s case are not relevant. Over the last year and a half, courts have looked to Jacobson to infer that a rational basis standard applies to generally applicable vaccine mandates; the facts of the case are obviously not going to be identical to every COVID vaccine case that has been or is currently being litigated. See, e.g., Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Plaintiffs assert that the rational-basis standard used in Jacobson does not offer enough protection for their interests and that courts should not be as deferential to the decisions of public bodies as Jacobson was, but a court of appeals must apply the law established by the Supreme Court.“); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (stating that Jacobson essentially applied a rational basis standard); Harris v. Univ. of Mass., Lowell, No. 21-cv-11244-DJC, 2021 WL 3848012 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2021) (applying rational basis to the university‘s “generally applicable public health measure[]“). This Court must apply the law from the Supreme Court: Jacobson essentially applied rational basis review and found that the vaccine mandate was rational in “protect[ing] the public health and public safety.” 197 U.S. at 25-26. The Court cannot ignore this binding precedent.
Given that rational basis applies to this case, the burden is on Plaintiff to show that the MSU vaccine mandate is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Plaintiff provided evidence in the form of testimony and declarations from an expert witness who stated that naturally acquired immunity is just as effective as vaccine immunity (see ECF No. 12). She thus argued that it was irrational for MSU to not carve out an exemption in its vaccine mandate for individuals like herself who have naturally acquired immunity from a previous COVID infection. On the other hand, Defendants presented competing evidence from their own expert witness that refuted the effectiveness of naturally acquired immunity (see ECF No. 9-1, 17). The Court heard the battle of the experts, and they essentially presented that there is ongoing scientific debate about the effectiveness of naturally acquired immunity versus vaccine immunity. In creating its vaccine policy, Defendants relied on guidance from the CDC, FDA, MDHHS, and other federal and state agencies that have extensively studied the COVID-19 vaccine. Put plainly, even if there is vigorous ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of natural immunity, it is rational for MSU to rely on
Finally, the Court notes a recent case out of the Central District of California: Kheriaty v. Regents of the University of California, No. 8:21-cv-01367 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021). The facts of this case are very similar to the present case. In Kheriaty, a professor at the University of California claimed to be naturally immune to COVID-19 due to a COVID infection he suffered in 2020, just as Ms. Norris. Id. at 1. He sought an injunction preventing the University from enforcing its vaccine mandate against him because he alleged his prior infection gave him superior immunity to COVID than vaccinated individuals. Id. In denying Mr. Kheriaty‘s injunctive relief, the district court applied a rational basis standard under Jacobson and found that despite competing studies and evidence on natural immunity, it was not irrational for the University to implement a vaccine mandate. Id. at 8. The University relied on CDC guidance and clinical trials that supported the effectiveness of the COVID
B. Factor II: Irreparable Harm
An irreparable harm is an extraordinary harm that cannot be properly compensated by money damages. See Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Plaintiff‘s only contention of irreparable harm is that she will be deprived of at least one constitutional right if MSU enforces its vaccine mandate against her. First, as stated above, Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights are not violated by MSU‘s vaccine mandate. Second, if Plaintiff was eventually unlawfully terminated, she would have proper money damages (see ECF No. 7 at PageID.349-50). Plaintiff‘s damages would be her lost wages, cost of health insurance coverage, and other compensable benefits that she receives from her job. See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov‘t, 305 F.3d 566, 579 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he loss of a job is quintessentially reparable by money damages.“). The Court appreciates and does not discredit that if Plaintiff was improperly terminated, she would face a great financial burden in waiting for this case to be fully litigated and receive these damages. But that is not an irreparable harm. Because Plaintiff faces no constitutional violation and she would have proper monetary compensation
C. Factors III & IV: The Equities
The equities weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff‘s motion for preliminary injunction. If MSU‘s vaccine mandate is not enforced, the harm to others and the public could be serious, according to health officials. The goal of the mandate is to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and keep people safe. Enjoining MSU‘s policy would increase risk based on the current record. This factor weighs in favor of Defendants.
D. Balancing the Factors
All factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff‘s motion for preliminary injunction, so Plaintiff‘s motion must be denied. This denial maintains the status quo by keeping the existing vaccine mandate in place at MSU, which is the purpose of a preliminary injunction.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff‘s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 4) is DENIED.
Date: October 8, 2021
/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge