Rеdan R. Norman, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Ron O‘Brien et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16AP-191 (C.P.C. No. 15CV-10711)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Rendered on August 23, 2016
2016-Ohio-5499
(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
On brief: Redan R. Norman, pro se.
On brief: Ron O‘Briеn, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason S. Wagner, for appellees.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, Redan R. Norman, appeals from a judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss of defendants-appellees, Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O‘Brien and Judge Dale A. Crawford. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} In 1999, a jury convicted Norman of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of kidnapping, all with specifications. Norman received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Norman appealed his conviction and sentence, and this court affirmed. State v. Norman, 10th Dist. No. 99AP-398 (Dec. 23, 1999).
{4} Appellees responded in a December 31, 2015 motion to dismiss, asserting, pursuant to
{5} In a Fеbruary 29, 2016 entry, the trial court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded an action fоr declaratory judgment is an improper avenue for attacking a criminal conviction and thus dismissed Norman‘s сomplaint on that basis. Moreover, the trial court noted that because it granted appellees’ motion based on the impropriety of using a declaratory judgment as a means of attacking a criminal cоnviction, it need not address appellees’ immunity arguments. Norman timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
{6} Norman assigns the following errors for our review:
- The court erred in dismissing aрpellant‘s declaratory judgment complaint without making a declaration of appellant‘s rights as required by law.
- The court abused its discretion when it made an ambiguous ruling of the issues before the court, and in doing so, failed to fulfill its function in a declaratory judgment action.
III. First and Second Assignments of Error - Motion to Dismiss
{7} Norman‘s first and second assignmеnts of error are interrelated and we address them jointly. Together, they assert the trial court erred when it granted appellees’ motion to dismiss.
{8} A
{9} “A declaratory judgment aсtion is a civil action and provides a remedy in addition to other legal and equitable remedies available.” Burge v. Ohio Atty. Gen., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-856, 2011-Ohio-3997, ¶ 7, citing Victory Academy of Toledo v. Zelman, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-1067, 2008-Ohio-3561, ¶ 8. “‘The essential elements for declaratory relief are (1) a real controversy exists between the parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable in character, and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.‘” Id., quoting Walker v. Ghee, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-960 (Jan. 29, 2002). “‘A trial court properly dismisses a declaratory judgment action when no real сontroversy or justiciable issue exists between the parties.‘” Id., quoting State v. Brooks, 133 Ohio App.3d 521, 525 (4th Dist.1999).
{10} In granting appellees’ motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded Norman‘s complaint for declaratory judgment constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the judgment of conviction in Norman‘s criminal case. We agree. We have previously held “[i]t is well-sеttled that a declaratory judgment action cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence in a criminal case.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Wilson v. Collins, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-511, 2010-Ohio-6538, ¶ 9. As we stated in Burge, a declaratory judgment action:
will not lie to determine whether rights theretofore adjudicated hаve been properly decided, nor will it lie to determine the propriety of judgments in prior actions between the same parties. An action for declaratory judgment cannot be used as a subterfuge for, or for thе veiled purpose of, relitigating questions as to which a former judgment is conclusive. Declaratory relief dоes not provide a means whereby previous judgments by state or federal courts may be reexamined, nor is it а substitute for appeal or post conviction remedies.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ¶ 10, quoting O‘Donnell v. State, 4th Dist. No. 05CA3022, 2006-Ohio-2696, ¶ 13, and Wilson at ¶ 9.
{11} After review of the record, we find Norman is attempting to use a declaratory judgment action to collaterally attack his prior criminal conviction. As such, Norman does not present a justiciable controversy capable of resolution by declaration under the declaratory judgment act. Burge at ¶ 14; Wilson at ¶ 10. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting appellees’
IV. Disposition
{12} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in granting appellees’
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN, P.J., and BROWN, J., concur.