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Nilda Iliana Rodriguez v. State
408 S.W.3d 628
Tex. App.
2013
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*1 RODRIGUEZ, Appellant Nilda Iliana Texas, Appellee.

The STATE

No. 03-10-00715-CR. Texas, Appeals of

Court of

Austin.

July 2013. Granted

Discretionary Review

Nov. *2 Belton, Kreimeyer, TX,

James H. Appellant. Garza,

Henry County Louis Bell District Odom, Attorney, Bob D. Assistant District TX, Belton, Attorney, for Appellee. JONES, Before Chief Justice Justices GOODWIN and FIELD.

OPINION GOODWIN, MELISSA Justice. Appellant Nilda Uiana Rodriguez ap- peals judgment from a convicting her of the offense of for the death of her seven-week-old son. See Tex. Penal For the reasons that follow, judgment we affirm the of convic- tion.

BACKGROUND Rodriguez gave to her birth son on Octo- ber 2008. She other had children at the time. After was discharged her son from the hospital, Rodriguez responsible for his care as well as other children’s starvation, the evidence established care. Her husband was overseas 3, 2008, condition and need for Her son died on December the child’s time. malnutrition, dehydration, apparent. readily as a result of medical treatment were *3 neglect. Rodriguez did not and medical for the expert opined An the State that the day son to a doctor from dehydrated take her was malnourished and child hospital that he went home from the until and that “his condition would have been day day, died. that EMS was the he On apparent anybody taking to who was care Rodriguez’s home. Her son called to was He also testi- of him on routine basis.” he was hospital pro- taken to the where dehydration fied the and that malnutrition nounced dead. nutrition over inadequate were a result of “that child period days, this wasn’t the paragraphs,

In two nutrition,” getting enough and that The State Rodriguez type “progresses of condition over time.” at- alleged Rodriguez that committed and performed autopsy The the coroner who tempted to commit the offense of similarly on child concluded the the that child “in course of and and the dehy- and cause of death was malnutrition in furtherance of the commission and at- The of the great-grandmother dration. felony, of the said tempted commission Rodriguez also testified that she told child attempt Rodriguez, Nilda Iliana did to days five before the child that died act clearly danger- commit and commit an sick,” “looks he look like he “don’t ous human life caused the death to which that will make two weeks” and Rodri- of [her child].” guez needed like.” calling “to be 911 looks I, In Paragraph the indictment named Rodriguez did not take her son to following clearly “act[s] death, day of doctor until the his but she (1) child, “starving” human life”: the said “yes, sir” when asked whether answered (2) “withholding and from” the said child him she fed and whether she treated him and to maintain “sufficient nutrition fluids like all of her other The children. evi- II, life.” In indictment Paragraph no dence also showed that there was medi- the following danger- “act[s] named condition, for cal reason her son’s such as human life”: vomiting diarrhea other medical Rodriguez Iliana then Nilda did and problems, withholding of suffi- except there fail to insure the said [child] cient nutrition fluids. and ingested and benefitted from sufficient fluids; and, and then nutrition did Rodriguez guilty found fail to there seek medical care when it thirty years’ punishment assessed con- apparent was said need- [child] finement Texas Department ed medical care and said Nilda Ilia- Criminal The trial court Justice. thereaf- na Rodriguez per- was then and there ter a judgment entered of conviction (1) legal having statutory son jury. child]; and

duty having as- [the care, custody, control sumed over ANALYSIS duty had the [the child] [the child] Appellant’s Initial Brief food, provide protection, and medical care. the sole in her appel- issue raised brief, Rodriguez Rodriguez challenges testified that lant’s the va- respon- she during lidity sible for her son’s care his life. indictment. She contends: dispute support appel- She does not that her son died of “The indictment does not subject lant’s conviction murder because court not did matter jurisdic- child, tion, predicate felony we complaint consider this paragraph each of the indict- Teal, first time appeal. See ment, acts, omission, committed [is] S.W.3d at 178-79. “The proper test required by section [of determine if a charging instrument alleges Texas Penal See Tex. Penal Code].” ‘an allegations offense’ is whether the in it 19.02(b)(3), Rodriguez §§ 22.04.1 contends are clear enough that one can identify the prosecuted her under the alleged.” they are, Id. at 180. “If *4 wrong theory statute and of law. She then the indictment is sufficient to confer argues that only alleged the indictment subject jurisdiction.” matter Id. Applying omissions, acts, not affirmative and that here, this test we conclude that the allega- a injury by to sup- omission cannot tions in the indictment “are clear enough port the offense of that one can identify” offense is murder under section however, a Rodriguez, did not file 19.02(b)(3) of the Penal upon Code based indictment, motion to quash object to the underlying felony injury to a child. trial, any the indictment at time during the See id. We overrule Rodriguez’s sole is- argument or otherwise raise this with the sue raised brief. She, therefore, trial court. pre failed to this appellate serve issue for review. See Appellant’s Supplemental Brief (“If 1.14(b) Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. object defect, defendant does not to a er Although analysis our should be com- ror, irregularity or formof or substance in plete, this requested supplemental Court an indictment or information before the briefing from parties. We asked date on which the trial on the merits com raise, whether we can and should on our mences, he right waives and forfeits the to motion, own sufficiency of the evidence defect, error, object or irregularity to the support the conviction and “whether the may and he objection not raise the that, evidence was prove sufficient to appeal any postconviction or in pro other alleged, the appellant committed an act ceeding.”); Teal v. 230 S.W.3d clearly dangerous to human life in the 176-77, (discuss 182 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) committing course of 1.14(b) ing article and holding that defen In response, parties child.” both filed right object dant waived to indictment supplemental briefs that both addressed defects). issues. context, To the Rodriguez’s extent Rodriguez’s we address complaint is that the challenge indictment failed to in her supplemental brief to the and, therefore, charge an offense legal sufficiency the trial the evidence to § 1. Section of the Penal Code states Tex. Penal Code Section 22.04 the elements of murder as follows: provides of the Penal Code the elements for (b) person A commits an offense if ... § he: the offense of Id. child. 22.04. attempts felony, commits or to commit a by by This offense be committed or "act” manslaughter, other than and in the course 22.04(a). § "omission.” Id. The elements for of and in furtherance of the commission or upon the offense of a child based attempt, flight or in immediate from the require legal "a "omission” the actor to have attempt, or commission he commits or at- statutory duty or act” "assumed tempts to commit an act care, custody, or control of child.” Id. to human life that causes death of an 22.04(b). individual. 2010). measure the See Tex. We of conviction. judgment of the offense by the elements (“A evidence may be amended P. brief R.App. 38.7 correct hypothetically in a defined re justice whenever supplemented v. Cada charge. terms the reasonable quires, on whatever v. (Tex.Crim.App.2011); Malik State, 252 Bigon v. may prescribe.”); court (Tex.Crim.App.1997). (“Ap (Tex.Crim.App.2008) “accurately sets charge is one that Such jurisdiction and courts have the pellate law, the indict is authorized out the (ci error.”) authority unassigned review ment, unnecessarily increase the omitted); tations Carroll unnecessarily proof or burden of State’s liability, State’s theories restrict the (“Once is appellate court jurisdiction of particular adequately describes invoked, reviewing function exercise of its Byrd was tried.” the defendant which discretion or only limited its own (Tex.Crim. *5 statute.”) (quoting restrictive Carter valid Malik, App.2011) (quoting (Tex.Crim. State, v. 656 S.W.2d 240).3 App.1983)).2 legal sufficiency of assessing Standard Review of evidence, “to duty we have a ensure sufficiency reviewing the When sup presented actually the evidence that conviction, we support of the evidence com a conclusion that the defendant ports light in the all of the evidence consider charged.” crime that was mitted the to the verdict to determine most favorable 742, 750 v. Williams of fact could any whether rational trier v. (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Winfrey the essential elements of (Tex.Crim.App.2010). found 323 S.W.3d beyond a doubt. reasonable Jack Act or Omission 307, 319, 99 Virginia, 443 U.S. S.Ct. son v. (1979); challenge 61 L.Ed.2d 560 Brooks to her to the indict- Similar brief, in her Rodri- (Tex.Crim.App. ment raised inju- opinion person commits offense of 2. we address in this A Whether must knowingly, supplemental intentionally, ry the issues raised in briefs to a child if she 38.1(f) Tex.R.App. (appel P. by See negligence debatable. recklessly or with criminal presented for lant’s brief must contain issues review); recklessly intentionally, knowingly or or act Garrett v. bodily by omission causes a child serious (concluding (Tex.Crim.App.2007) 928-29 bodily injury. injury or required to appeals of was not address court bodily inju- An omission that causes serious opinion in its factual of evidence constituting if the ry is an offense conduct though supplemental requested even court statutory duty legal or or actor has motion). briefing on its own care, custody con- has or the actor assumed care, person A has assumed trol a child. Rodriguez object charge of did not to the act, custody by if she or control a child was court. The instructed: words or course of conduct acted so if person commits the offense of murder A person a reasonable to conclude that cause attempts to a felo- she commits or comment accepted responsibility protec- for she has manslaughter, ny, and in other than tion, food, care shelter and medical course of and in furtherance of commis- child. flight attempt, or or in immediate from sion Rodriguez theory at trial was that The State’s attempt, she commits the commission or clearly danger- attempts to child to commit an act committed the offense of the death to human life that causes Tex. Penal Code and omissions. See acts an individual. § 22.04.

guez urges ciency that the conduct in the support evidence to convictions child). proven at indictment and trial —“starvation “omissions,” neglect” and that —were agree however, We with Rodriguez, offense of to a child prove had to “an support felony omission cannot murder be- dangerous to human life” to requires cause an “act.” conviction of felony murder. See Tex. Pe- 19.02(b)(3), 22.04; §§ Penal See Tex. Code nal §§ One of the 1.07(a)(1) (defining see also id. “Act” to allegations State’s “starving [the movement, “bodily mean whether volun- The child].” evidence at trial established tary involuntary, speech”), includes that Rodriguez’s son starved to death over (a)(34) time, (defining period “Omission” as “failure to a Rodriguez was re- act”). sponsible primarily cared for him dur-

ing time, that period of including feeding “Felony him, murder is an uninten and that the child’s condition was tional murder committed in the apparent. expert course of The for the State and committing felony.” Threadgill coroner testified that the child died as a result of malnutrition dehydration, (citation omitted). expert and the testified that the only felony ex condition “progresses over time.” After pressly seeing excluded from offenses that *6 days died, child five before he the great- may serve as the underlying felony is man grandmother Rodriguez told that she slaughter. See Tex. Penal Code calling needed “to be 911 looks like.” 19.02(b)(3); State, Spence v. 325 S.W.3d 646, (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (focusing The jury could have reasonably text objective “literal to determine the inferred from this evidence that Rodriguez meaning of that text at the time of its committed acts—such continuously statutes). interpreting enactment” when feeding her son far less than he needed— 19.02, Informed the text of section we in starving her son that “clearly were dan conclude that be based Jackson, gerous to human life.” See upon the underlying offense of ato (in 319, at U.S. 99 S.Ct. 2781 sufficiency See, child whether act or omission. review, assume that the trier of fact drew State, e.g., 254, Johnson v. 4 S.W.3d 258 reasonable inferences in a manner that (affirming felony supports the responsibility verdict and murder conviction premised on underlying trier of fact “to draw reasonable inferences child); offense of Hopper v. facts”); from basic facts to ultimate State, 03-03-00508-CR, No. 2004 WL State, 270, also Driver v. 358 S.W.3d 276-77 ( 2108665, (Tex.App.-Austin 23, at *1 Sept. 2011, Tex.App.-Houston pet. [1st Dist.] d) (mem. 2004, pet. op., ref designated 'd) (disagreeing ref with the defendant that (same); publication) see also Villa “possession underlying of cocaine as an State, 744, nueva v. 227 S.W.3d 747-48 felony proof murder forecloses (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (concluding that act bodily movement that constitutes an act and omission are two means of proving life, clearly dangerous to human or as the child); of injury to a case, Baldwin v. in ‘allowing’ this State, 237, 264 S.W.3d 242-43 (Tex.App. ingest holding child to cocaine” and “the 'd) 2008, pet. [1st Houston ref (noting Dist.] legally evidence was sufficient to support was instructed to convict jury’s findings based that [the defendant’s] upon cocaine, “act or upholding possession omission” and suffi together with his I support appellant’s conviction. that al eient son in circumstances placing his it, joined request ac in that had ingest constitute not have his son to would lowed to his Appellant that were at that time. panel tions been on the 897, life”); v. 881 S.W.2d Hill in sufficiency son’s of the evidence argued never 1994), aff'd, (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 902-03 and therefore has not original brief De (Tex.Crim.App.1996);4 913 S.W.2d 581 See ground appeal. preserved 628, 633, v. 658 S.W.2d pauw 38.1(f); v. P. Rochelle Tex.R.App. 'd) (noting ref (Tex.App.-Amarillo pet. 124-25 clearly dangerous to “an act phrase (“[Sjtated 1990) ap policy [of of the rules in Penal Code and human life” not defined that all matters be pellate procedure is] ordinary has a “common and phrase brief.”). The original in the Court’s raised properly meaning juror that a could so briefing did not request for additional term”). understand such impliedly grant supple even “grant or review”; thus, this mental issue for Court light in the most Viewing the evidence verdict, required we conclude that is not address favorable to evidence, legally sup sufficient to and I believe should the evidence was Jackson, the conviction. See 443 U.S. See port decline to do so this case. Ganett 2781; (Tex. see also Garcia S.Ct. 928-29 (Tex.App.-El appellate Crim.App.2007) (concluding that 'd) (“Texas ref case law is pet. Paso issues not required court not address holdings that when an adult replete brief, even when court original raised to a child at defendant has had sole access briefing). requests supplemental sustained, injuries are the time its majority’s analysis I concur in the support a convic evidence is sufficient to appellant’s original raised in brief issues child, if the tion for or murder judgment of the and the Court.1 dies.”) cases). (collecting *7 JONES, Justice, CONCLUSION J. Chief WOODFIN dissenting. reasons, judg- we affirm the For these ment of conviction. the horrific nature of Despite case, a duty, in this this has conduct Court FIELD; Concurring Opinion by Justice the assessing legal sufficiency in the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Chief evidence, pre to ensure that the evidence JONES. actually supports a conclusion that sented FIELD, Justice, concurring. K. SCOTT the committed the crime that defendant charged. was Williams v. requested supplemental The Court (Tex.Crim.App.2007); briefing on whether the evidence is suffi- S.W.3d Hill, argument, Rejecting appellants of food.” the child] 4. upon waged "simply with to a child based "omission” a court noted that it was battle appellants argued opposite and the to Rodri in Id. The court also noted that semantics.” — guez's position failing provide here—that to supported evidence at trial well have they appropriate food and medical care when well as omissions. the convictions for acts as legal duty had a to do so "a course of was Id. action, affirmative not a course of omission.” (Tex.App.-Fort Worth express opinion I no about the 1994), aff'd, 913 S.W.2d 581 the evidence. " 1996). they Appellants ‘acted in’ stated starving "depriving and [the child]” [the (Tex. (2) Deon, Winfrey starving withholding and suffi- Crim.App.2010). liquids “If cient nutrition the evidence estab and necessary precisely what the has criminal alleged, lishes State maintain his life. The conduct (1) do in alleged alleged but the acts that the State has paragraph second failing “ingested not constitute criminal offense under the to ensure that Deon circumstances, totality of the then that benefited from” sufficient nutrition and fluids, evidence, law, sup failing as a matter cannot to seek medical care Williams, port conviction.” for him when the need was apparent and at 750. appellant legal statutory had duty to do alleged so. The State the above de- case, In this proved evidence at trial scribed conduct as both the manner and conduct indict- causing injury means of to Deon as well as appellant ment: that failed to provide ade- clearly the act dangerous to human life quate necessary nutrition and medical care causing his death. son, thereby causing But his death. particular offense State chose DISCUSSION charge appellant requires Appellant accused have caused the death an affir- essentially appeal concedes on “act,” mative not that the at trial “omission.” evidence established that appellant evidence here fails to show that she caused her death by son’s starvation any clearly neglect. committed “act” or an A plain “act and medical reading Code, however, dangerous to human life” that caused her the Texas Penal shows Thus, son’s death. that failing provide adequate the evidence insuffi- nutrition to support necessary cient her conviction for medical care are “omis- murder. Because sions” and majority concludes cannot constitute “an act otherwise, human life” respectfully required by dissent.

section Penal Code. Ac- BACKGROUND cordingly, I cannot escape the conclusion (alleging injury indictment twins, Appellant gave birth Deon and omission”) sister, “by felo- early his October 2008. Deon and, ny murder under the facts of this case weighed pounds 6 ounces at birth. Sev- further, that the evidence is legally en insuffi- weeks later he died as a result of *8 felony cient to support her conviction dehydration. malnutrition and At the time death, of his he weighed only pounds. 6 The evidence at trial established that Deon Felony murder is an unintentional mur starved to death. The evidence also der committed in committing the course of showed that there no was medical reason felony. a v. Threadgill for the child’s condition the except with- 654, 665 (citing holding proper of nutrition and that his (Tex. Fuentes v. condition and need for medical treatment Crim.App.1999)). felony-murder In a readily apparent any-

would been (1) prosecution, the State an prove must caring one him on a routine basis. underlying felony (attempted or commit indictment, ted,

In a two-paragraph excepting manslaughter the or an offense (2) charged appellant “felony manslaughter), mur- included within an act der” using “injury clearly to child” the dangerous (attempted a under- to human life committed), (3) felony lying offense. The criminal death an conduct the individu (4) (1) al, alleged (i.e., in the paragraph dangerous first act causation death), proper failing nutrition and a connection received caused felony and underlying between The State necessary obtain medical care. (“in in the course dangerous act conduct— characterized all of flight of ... or immediate furtherance for the actions and inactions —as “acts” from”). State, 312 v. S.W.3d Contreras However, the murder.1 purposes Tex. (Tex.Crim.App.2010); see 583-84 “act” to specifically Penal Code defines 19.02(b)(3). § same felo Penal Code The movement, whether volun- bodily mean “a also underlying act of the can nious 1.07(a)(1). § tary involuntary[.]” Id. hu as the act serve Despite attempt to the State’s differentiate life; danger an proof man no additional an appellant’s conduct or characterize underlying felony is beyond “act,” starving all of the conduct— required. Johnson v. child, withholding sufficient nutrition (Tex.Crim.App.1999); see Lomax life, liquids necessary failing to maintain ingests sufficient nutri- ensure that 19.02(b)(3), 2007). According to section fluids, failing tion and obtain neces- however, it is clear failing sary medical care—are instances of to human life must cause A to act or take some action. failure to act felony- death of an individual before 1.07(a)(34) (“‘Omis- § is an omission. Id. applies. rule See Tex. Penal Code murder act.”). An sion’ means failure to “act” part action on the involves affirmative argued appellant The State at trial that person, of a while an “omission” involves her “ac- committed Appellant’s of action. conduct as forgoing starving withholding her son and tions”— alleged in the proved indictment —and from him—and adequate nutrition omissions, failing to ensure that her son trial —involved not acts.2 “inactions”— argued: closing argument, 1. In withholding ... act of [T]he sufficient The defendant in this case withheld nutri- nutrition, child, hydration, killed the made did make tion. Starved her child. She him die.... This is her act in com- hydrated. he him about sure was She didn't feed mitting injury enough. to a child that then led to the That is the act in furtherance of mur- to child. death of child. That's what She didn’t sure that he benefited make der is. from the She didn’t make sure nutrition. jury charge did the Penal not contain right weight. put She he on amount of Code definition of either "act” or "omission.” get didn't him to a doctor. This could have obligated charge jury The trial court is stopped. happen have to been This didn’t applicable "law to the case.” Tex. baby and that could have lived. But she 36.14; Murphy art. Code Crim. Proc. get didn't medical care. She didn't take (Tex.App.-Austin no him a free clinic. And that is an act Thus, pet.). trial court must instruct the furtherance child. *9 on each element of the offense statutory each definition that affects acted, food, be- Because she withheld meaning of of the Har an element offense. by getting cause she failed to act him to that State, 740, (Tex.App. kins v. 268 S.W.3d 742 doctor, felony hospital, guilty she’s of 2008, ref'd); pet. Murphy, Fort 44 Worth murder. term, phrase, at If a S.W.3d 661. word later, argument, closing And final jury properly that the must use to resolve the argued: defined, statutorily [Bjut issues is the trial court charged ... what she’s with is with- food, statutory to the holding withholding must submit the definition hydration, with- State, 348, jury. 721 n. holding Arline v. S.W.2d 352 Doing an nutrition. that's 1986); Harkins, 4 to human life. And in so 742-43; doing causing Murphy, of 44 the death him. at S.W.3d at 661.

637 injury a child can conduct constituting The offense be be “an act dangerous to human life.”3 felony used as the offense for predicate Contreras, at Relying language felony- on the of the Johnson, 258); 584 4 (citing S.W.3d see statute, rejects murder the majority ap- State, 08-03-00508-CR, Hopper v. No. pellant’s injury contention that felony to a 2108665, (Tex.App.-Austin 2004 WL at *6 “by child support omission” cannot the of- 2004, refd) (mem. 23, pet. Sept. op., not fense of murder. 408 S.W.3d at Further, designated publication). for it is agree 631.1 with the majority’s conclusion be possible a child to commit plain language section “by ted omission.” See Tex. Penal Code 19.02(b)(3) necessarily exclude 22.04(a); State, § also Villanueva “by as child omission” an un- 744, 227 747 S.W.3d derlying a felony-murder prose- “by “by terms act” or (reaffirming that See, Lomax, cution. e.g., 233 S.W.3d at omission” means of constitute alternative (“The plain language 309 of Section child). addition, committing injury 19.02(b)(3) also does not exclude starving failing a child to obtain neces underlying felony felony- DWI an for a sary support medical care can conviction prosecution, and we must under- See, for the child. the Legislature stand to have meant what State, 237, e.g., 264 243 Baldwin v. S.W.3d plain language Section 2008, (Tex.App.-Houston pet. [1st Dist.] expresses.”). reject appellant’s I further ref'd) (evidence permit was sufficient to contention because while the feloni- same jury reasonably children infer that suf ous conduct can both the under- bodily injury appel fered because serious lying felony the act clearly dangerous intentionally knowingly lant failed to life, to human it does not have to. After provide adequate nutrition and medical all, is, definition, while an omission care); State, see also Rosales v. act, failure to that does not mean that a (Tex.App.-Tyler pet. S.W.2d defendant an omission ref'd); Hill v. 900- S.W.2d in some engage type not also of act dur- 1994), aff'd, 01 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 913 ing the course of that There omission.4 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). S.W.2d 581 But the an proof can be additional omission) (or constituting issue here beyond is whether conduct the felonious act Thus, underlying felony. “omission”—a “failure to act”—can also of the like the Here, court submit "conduct” the trial did not Penal Code defines the term Nevertheless, relevant definitions. under Tex to include Tex. Penal "an act omission.” law, we measure the of the 1.07(a)(10). evidence the elements of the offense as hypothetically defined correct in a injury-to-a- example, 4. For in Hill v. charge. Cada case, appellants physically re- (Tex.Crim.App.2011); Malik v. son, chaining up, strained their him in order (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Such deny him food. Hill v. charge "accurately sets out is one 1994), (Tex.App.-Fort 902-03 Worth law, indictment, by the is authorized does not aff’d, (Tex.Crim.App.1996). 913 S.W.2d 581 unnecessarily increase the burden of State's Appeals The Fort Court of noted that Worth unnecessarily proof or restrict the State's the *10 proved appellants that the "acted” liability, adequately ories of and describes the particular restraining for which defendant offense the in their child and also that the Byrd v. was tried.” providing appellants by to act” "failed not Malik, (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (quoting adequate nourishment. Id. 240). S.W.2d at clearly trial, “act constituted an contention dence at reject I

majority, appellant’s is de life” as “act” to human dangerous predicated be felony cannot that the Penal The definitions by fined Code. a child felony the offense of the Penal Code in section 1.07 contained Rather, inju- per se. when “by omission” offenses, we are Penal Code apply underly- the “by omission” is ry to a statutory definitions ignore free to the not mur- ing our See Hines substitute own. must der, of the case specific facts suffi- the evidence is whether determine 1995) (“[W]e Penal are bound to construe (1) the omission to demonstrate both cient in in of definitions provisions light Code (2) child, causing the to the itself.”); Tex. Pe Code see also the Penal human clearly dangerous to requisite act 1.05; § Tex. Gov’t Code nal Code said, being causing death. That life 311.011(b). for conduct Consequently, § “by to a child I believe that though human clearly dangerous to be an “act can, by an accompanied when omission” 19.02(b)(3), must first section it life” under act, of- dangerous additional 1.07(a)(1), “act” as section be an defined murder, not do so it does fense of this code explicitly “[i]n which states that in this case. movement, bodily ... means a ‘[a]efi notes, majority the evidence theAs Tex. voluntary involuntary[.]” whether demonstrated that Deon starved trial 1.07(a)(1). danger § “Clearly Penal Code time and that he period death over a type life” ous to human describes dehy- a result of malnutrition and died as dispense but it not required, act majority The 408 S.W.3d at 630. dration. “act” there be an requirement that that could then concludes “[t]he 1.07(a)(1), modify section nor does under reasonably inferred from this evidence statutory eliminate “bodi definition to committed acts—such [appellant] that I not be ly Accordingly, movement.” do than continuously feeding her far less son in not lieve that “omission” that does that were starving her son he needed—in “act,” i.e., bodily “a any associated volve ” life.’ 408 ‘clearly dangerous to human movement,” clearly can an “act serve as agree I with that at 633. cannot section to human life” under dangerous conclusion. 19.02(b)(3). felony-murder requires The statute Further, dangerous cause act must merely “clearly “act” but that is an act Lawson, 64 of the victim. See the death and, impor to human life” more dangerous J., (Cochran, concur- at 399-400 to human tantly, clearly dangerous an act (“Not com- ring) only must the defendant of an individu life “that causes the death that is mit an act Lawson v. al.” See life, it must specific also be that human (Cochran, J., con which causes victim’s death. (to murder, prove felony curring) prove danger- State must that but for actor, under prove specific “that the act, must the deceased not have died.” would circumstances, Thus, specifically articulated original.)) under (Emphasis dan committed some that was Penal felony-murder applicable statute and further, and, definitions, requires to human life gerous felony murder (1) “clearly of the dangerous bodily act caused the death movement” that “a (2) victim”); life,” to human “causes Tex. Penal Code conclude, does, individual,” majority of an occurs cannot death (other conduct, than the evi with some as shown connection *11 manslaughter or a consequence lesser-included offense from them. Id. at 16. Specu Hines, See, manslaughter). e.g., of 906 lation theorizing is mere or guessing about (plugging S.W.2d at 520 definition of “an- the possible meaning of facts evidence 1.07(a)(4) other” from Penal Code section presented. Id. A by conclusion reached section conducting into 21.07 when statuto- speculation may not be completely unrea ry interpretation public lewdness stat- sonable, sufficiently but it is not on based ute). Here, facts or evidence. Id. although the jury was free to make inferences from the

Here, dehydration malnutrition and presented, evidence neither the evidence caused Deon’s death. These conditions at trial nor reasonable inferences there by act, appellant’s were caused failure from support the conclusion appellant i.e., providing adequate not nutrition an committed “act dangerous child and not medical care obtaining human life” that caused her son’s death. him. The evidence not any reflect There simply is no evidence in the record “act” associated with these “omissions.” before us in the course of starving majority “continuously construes feed- son, medically neglecting her appellant en her son ing far less than he needed” an gaged any type of bodily affirmative so, but disagree, “act.” even the “act” of movement that caused Deon’s death. Nor feeding any amount of food not could itself any is there evidence from which a jury fact, have caused Deon’s death. could reasonably make this inference. is opposite Any true. amount food fed The majority’s contrary conclusion to the to Deon provided would have nutri- some speculation based on rather than facts tion and off dehy- staved malnutrition and evidence. dration, not caused these conditions. Thus, even if one feeding construed too Although the evidence established that “act,” does, to be little as the majority it death, omissions caused Deon’s death,

was not an act that caused but the evidence does not show that she com- rather one that prolonged life.5 any all, mitted act at let alone an “act

Juries permitted are to draw clearly dangerous reasonable to human life” that evidence, they inferences from but are Consequently, caused his death. the evi- permitted not to draw conclusions based dence fails to establish an essential ele- speculation. on Hooper v. 214 ment of the charged offense of mur- (Tex.Crim.App.2007). An in appellant der—that committed an act ference is a conclusion reached consid to human life that ering other facts deducing logical caused her son’s death.6 expert, pediatrician The State's medical causing the See death. Tex. Penal Code abuse, specializing 19.02(b)(2) ("A §§ in child testified that the person commits wasting away body of the from malnutrition if ... knowingly he causes the death of an "progresses individualf.]”); 6.03(b) ("A over time depends ... and a little person acts know bit how much being the child is fed. ingly, If knowledge, or with respect with ato all, absolutely he’s happen not fed at it will result his conduct when he is aware that rapidly. If more he’s small fed amounts but reasonably his conduct is certain cause the amounts, adequate not happen result.”). will over a Or simply the State could prolonged prolonged period of charged time.” to a child omis —more 22.04(a), (b)(1). sion. id. "Knowingly” See 6. The State charge appellant did not have to causing bodily injury” "serious child is as it did. It could have degree felony, her with first which carries the same 19.02(b)(2), punishment range under section which does id. See 19.02(c); require 22.04(a)(1), (e). proof only §§ an "act” but

CONCLUSION under section

Felony murder clearly dangerous proof of

requires clearly danger- life—not conduct

to human omission to human life caused

dangerous to human life—that Without evidence of an individual.

death or, “an specifically, more an “act”

showing to human life” death, evidence in Deon’s

caused

case, law, cannot a matter am there- for murder. I

conviction compelled to find that the evidence

fore appellant’s to support insufficient

legally According-

conviction

ly, I would sustain not, majority Because the

challenge. respectfully dissent. ROGERS, Appellant

Emmett Walkcon,

Robert ORR and

Ltd., Appellees.

No. 02-12-00333-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court

Fort Worth.

Aug. Minton, The Law Offices of

Michael W. P.L.L.C., Worth, Minton, Fort Michael W. TX, Appellant.

Case Details

Case Name: Nilda Iliana Rodriguez v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jul 31, 2013
Citation: 408 S.W.3d 628
Docket Number: 03-10-00715-CR
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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