Nilda Iliana Rodriguez v. State
408 S.W.3d 628
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Rodriguez gave birth to a son Oct. 8, 2008; she was sole caregiver while husband was overseas.
- The child died Dec. 3, 2008 from malnutrition, dehydration, and medical neglect.
- Rodriguez did not seek medical care for the child after hospital discharge until the death.
- The State charged felony murder with underlying injury to a child, alleging acts clearly dangerous to life.
- The indictment described both acts of starvation/withholding nutrition and the failure to seek care as dangerous to life.
- Jury found Rodriguez guilty of felony murder and sentenced her to 30 years’ confinement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indictment validity for felony murder under injury to a child | Rodriguez argues injury-by-omission cannot support felony murder | State contends indictment identifies underlying felony and act clearly dangerous to life | Indictment sufficient to identify felony murder under 19.02(b)(3) based on injury to a child |
| Sufficiency of evidence: act vs. omission under 19.02(b)(3) | Evidence relies on omissions, not an act clearly dangerous to life | Evidence can show an act or omission; omission may still yield act clearly dangerous to life | Evidence legally sufficient; omissions can satisfy underlying act clearly dangerous to life |
| Need for an affirmative act causing death | Act clearly dangerous to human life caused death | No affirmative act; omissions caused death, not an act | Jury could infer an act clearly dangerous to life; structure requires act causing death, but evidence supported act clearly dangerous to life nonetheless |
| Juror instructions and statutory definitions | Charge omitted statutory definitions of act/omission | Hypothetically correct charge suffices | Sufficiency evaluated against a hypothetically correct jury charge; definitions not required in charge |
| Alternative charging options suggested by dissent | State could have charged under 19.02(b)(2) or injury-to-a-child by omission | Not required for the present judgment; other charges exist but not needed to sustain |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (felony murder can be based on injury to child underlie)
- Spence v. State, 325 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (interprets underlying felonies for felony murder)
- Hopper v. State, No. 03-03-00508-CR, 2004 WL 2108665 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004) (upholds injury-to-child as underlying felony for felony murder)
- Villanueva v. State, 227 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (recognizes act/omission as two means of injury to child)
- Hill v. State, 881 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994) (addressed omission vs. act in injury-to-child cases)
- Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (defines felony murder as unintentional murder in course of committing a felony)
- Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (plain language of 19.02(b)(3) includes underlying felonies generally)