Nguyen v. BuiNguyen v. Bui
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- David K. Thomson, C. Shannon Bacon, Michael E. Vigil, Julie J. Vargas, Briana H. Zamora
OPINION
THOMSON, Justice.
{1} We consider whether a hearing officer improperly denied a petition for an order of protection under the Family Violence Protection Act (FVPA),
I. BACKGROUND
A. Orders of Protection Under the FVPA
{2} The FVPA allows victims of domestic abuse to petition the court for protective orders against their alleged abusers.
{3} Alternatively, a victim may file a petition for a domestic violence protection order directly.
{4} Subsequent to the filing of a petition or a statement by a law enforcement officer and any ex parte relief granted by the court, the merits of the petition or statement are considered on an expedited basis. The court must hold a hearing, addressing whether the temporary order should be continued, within ten days after granting the temporary order of protection under
B. Facts and Procedural History
{5} On February 4, 2021, eighteen-year-old Evelyn Nguyen (Petitioner) filed a Petition for Order of Protection from Domestic Abuse (Petition) under
{6} The hearing officer ultimately denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that Petitioner‘s status as a minor at the time of the alleged abuse meant that she was not able to file the Petition on her own until the age of eighteen. He concluded, however, that Petitioner would need to demonstrate that Respondent posed ongoing and present danger, stating “I do agree with [Respondent‘s counsel] and her argument that [Petitioner] must demonstrate a need for the order of protection now, this being a few years after the alleged abuse.”
{7} A hearing on the merits began with Petitioner testifying that she met Respondent in 2016, when she was about twelve years old and he was twenty. Over the course of the next two years, Respondent coerced her into a “sexual relationship” with him by paying special attention to her and telling her that no one else would love her if she did not have sex with him. On one occasion, when Respondent and Petitioner were both spending the night at the home of Petitioner‘s grandmother, Respondent entered Petitioner‘s bedroom and kissed, groped, and raped her. At other times, Respondent would sneak into the grandmother‘s home to “have sex” with Petitioner if she was staying there. She testified he raped her an “uncountable” number of times at her home, in his car, and at a church retreat. Petitioner alleges that he proposed to her when she was fourteen years old and emotionally manipulated her by “breaking up with her and cutting off contact to force [her] to feel sad and to come back to him.” Petitioner, in her own words, “removed [her]self from the situation” in the fall of 2018 and blocked Respondent on all social media accounts. The last time Petitioner saw Respondent was at church on December 24, 2019, but the two did not speak. Immediately after church, Respondent sent Petitioner a message on her new Instagram account, but the conversation was short, and Petitioner made clear that she did not want to speak to him anymore.
{8} Petitioner told her parents about the alleged abuse in August 2020 and began therapy. Petitioner filed the Petition in February 2021 after turning eighteen. Petitioner wrote therein that she had been afraid to tell anyone about the alleged abuse because Respondent threatened her and that she was “afraid of retaliation.” She added, “[Respondent] told [her] that no one else would ever love [her],” and she was “really afraid of [Respondent].”
{9} When questioned about the timing of the Petition, Petitioner explained that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to the trauma associated with the alleged sexual assaults, and her therapist suggested that the domestic violence order of protection would help her PTSD symptoms because she would not have to worry about seeing Respondent anymore. She testified that her PTSD and her fear of even seeing him has affected her everyday life, including in her workplace. In addition, she waited to file the Petition until she turned eighteen to be able to do it on her own.
{10} The hearing officer found that Respondent had not contacted Petitioner in the last fourteen months and that any contact that did occur was innocuous. He stated on the record, “not to minimize what happened in the past, and I‘m not doing that, but . . . I
{11} Petitioner filed Objections to the hearing officer‘s order, arguing that Section 40-13-5 of the FVPA does not include any requirement for a showing of immediate need for the protection order, that it does not include time frames in which a petitioner must apply for a domestic violence protection order, and that victims come to terms with their trauma at different times and in different ways. The district court reviewed the record and Objections, denied the Objections, and affirmed and adopted the hearing officer‘s Order of Dismissal.
{12} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court in a memorandum opinion, concluding that the district court erred “by requiring Petitioner to establish ‘immediacy‘” when seeking a domestic violence protection order under Section 40-13-5 of the FVPA. Nguyen v. Bui, A-1-CA-39647, mem. op. ¶ 2 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2021) (nonprecedential). It explained that there was no language in the statute imposing a temporal limitation after alleged abuse and that the statute permits granting a domestic violence protection order for a victim of criminal sexual penetration for any length of time, including the victim‘s lifetime. Id.
{13} Respondent appealed. This Court granted certiorari on the question whether the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the FVPA when it concluded that the FVPA only requires a finding that an act of domestic abuse occurred, even if there has not been any evidence that the petitioner is currently in imminent danger. We affirm the Court of Appeals, holding the plain language of Section 40-13-5 requires only a finding by the court that domestic abuse has occurred.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Section 40-13-5 of the FVPA Contains No Requirement That a Petitioner Show a Need for a Domestic Violence Protection Order
{14} The issue presented is one of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2002-NMSC-020, ¶ 16, 132 N.M. 382, 49 P.3d 61 (“The meaning of language used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.“).2
{15} “In construing a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. To accomplish this, we apply the plain meaning of the statute unless the language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction.” State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Analysis of Section 40-13-5 begins and ends with its plain language.
{16}
{17} We recognize that in some states, a petitioner must both fall into a class of people the statute seeks to protect (in this case a victim of domestic abuse) and be in imminent
{18} Failing to identify any ambiguity in the statute, Respondent invites us to consider legislative history, the context of the statute in relation to other statutes around it, the statute in comparison to the civil restraining order, and public policy implications. In addition, he presents information contained on the district court‘s website. Such extrinsic evidence is only considered when the statute is ambiguous or “[w]hen application of the plain meaning of the statute fails to result in a reasonable or just conclusion.” Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 10. Therefore, the statute must be read and given effect “as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should be or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise in the course of its administration.” State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 22, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perea v. Baca, 1980-NMSC-079, ¶ 22, 94 N.M. 624, 614 P.2d 541). Thus, the hearing officer erred in adding a requirement that Petitioner must show immediacy of harm upon proving domestic abuse. The district court erred in accepting this conclusion of law.
B. Respondent‘s Constitutional Arguments Are Undeveloped
{19} Respondent makes an incomplete and unsupported argument that restraining orders are unconstitutional, as they “interfere with the constitutional right of free movement and travel.” He notes that orders of protection affect government employment, raise potential deportation issues, upset custodial issues when children are involved, and impose criminal consequences if violated. First, Respondent cites no authority from any jurisdiction to support his argument. We therefore assume that no authority exists. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“We assume where arguments in briefs are unsupported by cited authority [that] counsel . . . was unable to find any supporting authority.“). “Issues raised in appellate briefs which are unsupported by cited authority will not be reviewed by us on appeal.” Id.
{20} Second, Respondent‘s constitutional argument also lacks any principled analysis. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (explaining that the appellate court does not review unclear or undeveloped arguments). This Court will, on rare occasion, address issues that are undeveloped or not raised at all by the parties. State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 20, 278 P.3d 517 (recognizing the “Court‘s inherent authority to raise an issue sua sponte when it is necessary to protect a party‘s fundamental rights“). However, as a general rule, this Court will not “promulgate case law based on our own speculation rather than the parties’ carefully considered arguments.” Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70. Accordingly, Respondent‘s constitutional arguments do not alter our analysis.
III. CONCLUSION
{21} We hold that Section 40-13-5 does not require a showing of immediate need for a
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
WE CONCUR:
C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice