Lead Opinion
OPINION
{1} Plaintiffs-Respondents (“Plaintiffs”) brought an environmental action in Santa Fe County against a number of oil and gas companies. The complaint stated various claims stemming from Defendants-Petitioners’ (“Defendants”) alleged contamination of Plaintiffs’ property. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that venue was proper in Santa Fe County against some, but not all Defendants. Cooper v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
{2} Plaintiffs own and reside on the Monument Springs Ranch in Lea County, New Mexico. Defendants, along with a number of other companies, lease the rights to conduct oil and gas operations on the property. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have released hazardous substances into surface and subsurface soils, strata and groundwater. Plaintiffs further allege that this contamination has caused property damage to the ranch and personal injuries to themselves.
{3} Plaintiffs filed suit in Santa Fe County, asserting claims for negligence, trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment, and infliction of emotional distress against: (a) foreign corporations with statutory agents in Santa Fe County (Amerada Hess Corp.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.; Dynegy Corp.; Concho Resources, Inc.; Arch Petroleum, Inc.; and Rice Engineering, Inc.); (b) a foreign corporation (Rhombus Energy Co.) and a foreign partnership (Rhombus Operating Co., Ltd.) who share a statutory agent in Chaves County; and (c) a domestic corporation (Primero Operating Co., Ltd.). The District Court ruled that the complaint “affect[ed] an interest in lands” and therefore dismissed the claims against all Defendants on the grounds that Santa Fe County was an improper venue.
{4} The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s determination that this lawsuit involved an interest in land. Cooper,
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether venue is proper in Santa Fe County.
{5} The motion to dismiss for improper venue raises a question of law which we review de novo. Williams v. Bd. of County Commits,
{6} If the defendant to a transitory action is a foreign corporation, then under Section 38-3-l(F) one final distinction applies. If the foreign corporation defendant does not have a registered statutory agent in New Mexico, then venue is proper in any New Mexico county. However, if the foreign corporation defendant “maintain[s] a statutory agent in this state upon whom service of process may be had” then venue is proper only in the county where a plaintiff resides, in the county where a contract at issue was made or is to be performed, in the county where the cause of action originated or indebtedness was incurred, or lastly, in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides. See § 38-3-KF).
B. Whether the object of this action is “lands or an interest in lands” under Section 38-3-l(D).
{7} Under Section 38-3-l(D)(l), “[wjhen lands or any interest in lands are the object of any suit in whole or in part, the suit shall be brought in the county where the land or any portion of the land is situate.” Thus, if the object of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is lands or an interest in lands, then venue will only be proper in Lea County. If, on the other hand, the action is transitory, then Plaintiffs are free to choose venue in accordance with the remaining provisions of Section 38-3-1.
{8} Claims for damages do not have lands or interest in lands as their object. Accordingly, a lawsuit comprised exclusively of claims for damages need not be brought in the county where the land is situated. Team Bank v. Meridian Oil Inc.,
{9} We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that Plaintiffs made a request for injunctive relief. The conclusion of Plaintiffs’ complaint requests that the trial court grant judgment against Defendants “for the injunctive relief set forth above.” However, careful review of the complaint reveals that Plaintiffs never set forth a request for any injunctive relief. Indeed, even if the trial court had granted all forms of relief requested by Plaintiffs in the complaint, no injunction would have ensued. Because this case did not involve an actual claim for injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals’ analysis of whether injunctions constitute an interest in land was advisory, and it is hereby overruled. Although we disagree with the reasoning employed in the Court of Appeals’ decision, the result that it reached was correct. Because the sole object of this suit is damages, Section 38-3-1 (D)(1) does not apply to this action. Jemez Land Co.
{10} The dissent suggests that Plaintiffs’ complaint made reference to a continuing nuisance and therefore adequately invoked injunctive relief. Dissent ¶ 37. With regard to the continuing nuisance claim, Plaintiffs’ complaint only “seek[s] a recovery of the reasonable and necessary costs associated with restoring those portions of the Ranch that remain contaminated by the Defendants’ operation, to their condition prior to that contamination occurring.” Even though the complaint makes reference to a continuing nuisance, Plaintiffs’ request for relief is clearly for monetary, not injunctive, relief. The dissent also argues that the trial court may impose injunctive relief for a continuing nuisance and therefore, for purposes of venue, Plaintiffs’ continuing nuisance claim should not be restricted to a claim for monetary relief and should be “construed as implicating equitable relief in the form of abatement or injunction.” Dissent ¶ 40. However, even if the trial court, in its discretion, decided to award injunctive relief sua sponte, this does not change “the object of [the] suit.” Consequently, “the object of [the] suit” continues to be one for damages and therefore venue in the present case is not determined by Section 38-3-l(D)(l).
C. Whether the county in which a foreign corporation’s non-resident statutory agent maintains an office for receiving service of process provides proper venue under Section 38-3-1(F).
{11} Under Section 38-3-1, when subsection (D) does not apply, proper venue depends on whether the defendant is a resident of New Mexico. Section 38-3-l(F) allows a plaintiff to sue a foreign corporation defendant who is admitted to do business and who maintains a statutory agent in the county where the statutory agent resides. In this case, Plaintiffs are suing both resident and foreign Defendants. Because Plaintiffs filed suit in Santa Fe County pursuant to their interpretation of the venue rules pertaining to foreign corporations, we begin by addressing venue as it relates to these foreign corporations. The statutory agents serving the foreign corporation Defendants, namely CT Corporation System (“CT”) and Prentice Hall Corporation System (“Prentice Hall”), are located in Santa Fe and are themselves foreign corporations. We now address whether the presence of these statutory agents in Santa Fe is sufficient to make Santa Fe the proper venue.
1. The Court of Appeals’ Opinion
{12} In addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals relied on Aetna Finance Co. v. Gutierrez,
{13} The Court of Appeals failed to properly weigh NMSA 1978, § 53-17-9 (1967), which was enacted after Section 38-3-1, and which explicitly authorizes the appointment of a non-resident statutory agent. We presume that when the Legislature decided to unconditionally allow non-residents to serve as statutory agents, it was aware of existing law. See State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep’t (In re Kira M.),
2. Whether CT and Prentice Hall “reside” in Santa Fe County for purposes of venue
{14} Section 38-3-l(F) provides that:
suits against foreign corporations admitted to do business and which designate and maintain a statutory agent in this state upon whom senice of process may be had shall only be brought [(1)] in the county where the plaintiff, or any one of them in case there is more than one, resides or [(2)] in the county where the contract sued on was made or is to be performed or [(3)] where the cause of action originated or indebtedness sued on was incurred or [ (4) ] in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides.
(Emphasis added.) In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the Defendants in question are foreign corporations admitted to do business in New Mexico. The issue at bar- is whether Plaintiffs may place venue in Santa Fe County where the statutory agents designated by the foreign corporations reside, when the statutory agents themselves are non-residents.
? Resolution of this issue requires us to define “resides” as it applies to statutory agents who are foreign corporations under Section 38-3-l(F). Using our definition of “non-resident” from Aetna Finance Co., Defendants claim that the statutory agents in the present case do not reside in New Mexico and that venue cannot, therefore, be placed where the statutory agent resides. Defendants argue that venue is proper only in Lea County where Plaintiffs reside and where the cause of action originated. Even though Aetna Finance Co. contains language in support of Defendants’ position, it is distinguishable from the present ease. In that case, the foreign corporation was suing a domestic defendant. The plaintiff corporation had offices in Albuquerque and sought venue in Bernalillo County under Section 38-3-l(A). This Court looked to subsection (F) to determine whether Aetna “reside[d]” in Bernalillo County for venue purposes. We ultimately held that it did not. In so holding, this Court employed broad language that we today limit. In the present dispute, the foreign corporations are defendants and we therefore look not to subsection (A), but rather to subsection (F), to determine what venue is proper. To the extent that Aetna Finance Co. can be read to hold that foreign corporations can never “reside” in New Mexico for venue purposes under subsection (F), it is overruled.
{16} We next look to the language of Section 38-3-KF) to determine if CT and Prentice Hall “reside” in Santa Fe for purposes of venue. The meaning of language used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Rowell,
{17} We believe that the plain meaning of the term “resides” best effectuates the Legislature’s intent in enacting Section 38-3-1. When the Legislature determined in 1955 that “suits against foreign corporations admitted to do business and which designate and maintain a statutory agent in this state upon whom service of process may be had shall only be brought ... in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides,” only resident New Mexicans could serve as statutory agents. Section 38-3-l(F); Cooper,
{18} Our rules of venue represent the Legislature’s intent to ensure that the location of a trial is convenient for both parties to a lawsuit:
Venue relates to the convenience of litigants, and reflect[s] equity or expediency in resolving disparate interests of parties to a lawsuit in the place of trial[J In transitory actions the venue rules reflect an attempt to balance the common-law right of a defendant to be sued in his [or her] most convenient forum (usually the county of his [or her] residence) with the right of the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to sue.
Team Bank,
{19} In the context of a statutory agent, we hold that the term “resides” has a plain meaning which we believe the Legislature intended. A statutory agent who maintains an office in New Mexico for the purpose of receiving service of process “resides” in New Mexico regardless of whether it is a foreign corporation or a New Mexico resident. Accordingly, in the present case, venue was proper in Santa Fe County for the Defendants who maintained CT and Prentice Hall as their statutory agents in Santa Fe County.
{20} Section 38-3-l(F) is silent on the issue of whether a properly joined defendant is subject to venue in the same county in which another defendant is subject to venue by virtue of the residence of a statutory agent. However, with regard to transitory actions, Section 38-3-l(A) demands that venue be brought, among other alternatives, “in the county where either the plaintiff or defendant, or any one of them in case there is more than one of either, resides.” See Teaver v. Miller,
III. CONCLUSION
{21} The Court of Appeals’ determination that the object of this lawsuit is not land or an interest in lands is affirmed. We also affirm, but for different reasons, the Court of Appeals’ holding that venue in Santa Fe County was proper against Amerada Hess Corp.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.; Dynegy Corp.; Concho Resources, Inc.; Arch Petroleum, Inc.; and Rice Engineering, Inc. We hold that venue is proper in Santa Fe County for all Defendants still involved in this lawsuit.
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. This does not prevent a foreign corporation from appointing a statutory agent in any other county in this state and making venue proper in that county.
. Because the trial court dismissed all Defendants from the case for improper venue and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Rhombus Energy Co.; Rhombus Operating Co., Ltd.; and Primero Operating Co., Ltd., these Defendants remain dismissed from the case since Plaintiffs did not appeal this issue.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
{23} I respectfully dissent from Section 11(B) of the majority opinion. The majority concludes that this case is not controlled by the venue provision relating to claims involving an interest in lands, Section 38 — 3—1(D)(1), because, under the majority’s view, Plaintiffs seek only monetary damages. I am unable to agree with the majority’s conclusion that “the sole object of this suit was damages,” and I believe that the majority’s narrow construction of Plaintiffs’ complaint in order to reach this conclusion represents a significant departure from established rules of pleading in New Mexico. I believe that this change in pleading requirements places an unnecessary burden on plaintiffs in the drafting of complaints, takes an unwarranted step back to technical rules of pleading, and also unnecessarily restricts the power of trial courts to grant appropriate relief. Moreover, regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ complaint invokes equitable relief in the present case, I believe that the Legislature intended to treat all private nuisance actions as local claims subject to the venue requirements in Section 38-3 — 1(D)(1). As a result, I believe that the district court correctly determined that venue was proper only in Lea County, and I would therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice. Based on my resolution of this issue, I would not reach the issue presented in Section 11(C) of the majority opinion.
I. Section 38-3-l(D)(l) Applies to Nuisance Claims
{24} As explained below, I believe that Plaintiffs’ complaint invokes injunctive relief. However, because this case involves a private nuisance claim, I believe the proper venue is controlled by Section 38 — 3—1(D)(1) regardless of whether it involves injunctive relief. I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Section 38-3-1(D)(1).
{25} Section 38-3-l(D)(l) states: “When lands or any interest in lands are the object of any suit in whole or in part, the suit shall be bi'ought in the county where the land or any portion of the land is situate.” Section 38-3-l(D)(l) (emphasis added). It is difficult to imagine a broader statute relating to the proper venue for actions involving land. “[T]he plain language of the statute [is] the primary indicator of legislative intent.” Whitely v. N.M. State Pers. Bd.,
{26} The primary basis of Plaintiffs’ complaint is Defendants’ pollution of their land, the resulting interference with their use and enjoyment of the land, and the diminution in the value of the property. Plaintiffs also seek to restrain Defendants’ use of Defendants’ real property in the form of oil and gas leases. See Duvall v. Stone,
{27} Because Section 38-3-l(D)(l) expressly applies to “any intex'est in land” and requires only that the interest be an object of the claim “in part,” I believe that the plain language of this provision clearly applies to Plaintiffs’ claim. This plain language analysis is supported by both the context sux*x*ounding Section 38 — 3—1(D)(1) and its pux~pose. At common law,
[ajctions for damages to real property, for nuisance, or for the obstruction of one’s right of way were regarded as local and had to be brought where the cause of action arose; if brought elsewhere, they were subject to dismissal on demurrer. Actions for personal injury or injury to personal property and actions based on transactions, including for breach of contract, were regarded as transitory.
Kane v. Schulmeyer,
{28} In analyzing the relationship between Section 38-3-1 and the common law, the Court of Appeals, rather than noting the significance of the word “transitory” in Section 38-3-l(A), focused on the omission of the word “local” from Section 38-3-l(D). Cooper,
{29} I agree with the Court of Appeals that “New Mexico has never fully embraced the common-law transitory-local dichotomy.” Cooper,
{30} Similarly, although the Court o'f Appeals believed that Jemez Land Co. “largely disposes” of the present case, this Court’s analysis in Jemez Land Co. is fully explained by Section 38-3-l(E) governing trespass actions and is inapplicable to nuisance claims. In Jemez Land Co., this Court discussed the relationship between the venue provisions for trespass actions and the venue provisions for actions having as part of their object any interest in land.
{31} I believe that the general distinction between transitory and local actions in the common law is both logical and practical.
rule exists for salutory reasons. It prevents courts unfamiliar with local property rights and laws from interfering with the title to real property. Moreover, since such actions often involve the testimony of local witnesses concerning the cause of action and the historical usages of the property, the restricted venue makes it more likely that the action will be tried in a convenient forum with full disclosure of all relevant facts, and notice to all interested parties.
French v. Clinchfield Coal Co.,
{32} “Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Martinez,
{33} An action for nuisance is highly dependent on community-based interests. “A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (1979), quoted in Scott,
II. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Continuing Nuisance Adequately Invoked Injunctive Relief
{34} The majority acknowledges that Plaintiffs’ complaint included a request “for the injunctive relief set forth above” in the demand for judgment. However, the majority concludes that Plaintiffs’ failure to “set forth any injunctive relief’ in the body of the complaint restricts the relief sought to money damages and precludes the trial court from awarding injunctive relief. I respectfully disagree with this conclusion on three separate bases: (1) it is inconsistent with the rales of .pleading in New Mexico; (2) it overlooks language in the complaint; and (3) it conflicts with the trial court’s discretion to award proper relief.
{35} First, Rule 1-008(A) NMRA 2002 merely requires “a demand for judgment for the relief to which [the pleader] deems himself [or herself] entitled” following “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 1-008(A) does not require the pleader to set forth the relief in both the body of the complaint and in the demand for judgment.
[N]otice pleading does not require that every theory be denominated in the pleadings-general allegations of conduct are sufficient, as long as they show that the party is entitled to relief and the averments are set forth with sufficient detail so that the parties and the court will have a fair idea of the action about which the party is complaining and can see the basis for relief.
Schmitz v. Smentowski,
{36} Second, I believe that Plaintiffs’'complaint gives fair notice to Defendants that injunctive relief is both requested and, assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, warranted. See Schmitz,
Defendants are mandatorily required not to conduct their operations in such a manner as to potentially pollute the natural resources including portions of the underlying shallow fresh water aquifer____It is possible for the Defendants to conduct their day-to-day operations without polluting the environment, and if such pollution occurs, to promptly and properly clean up the pollution before it spreads and restore the property to its uncontaminated condition. The pollution is abatable and can be cleaned up in an “economically feasible” manner, taking into consideration the natural resources that have already been polluted and the natural resources that will be polluted if the abatement and clean up are not performed by the Defendants.
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs also alleged that “Defendants have caused pollution and contamination, and their subsequent and continuous failures to clean up or adequately clean up such pollution and contamination, has permitted and allowed further pollution and contamination to occur. This wrongful conduct has caused and will cause further additional damage each day Defendants permit or allow such contamination to persist.” (Emphasis added.) Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs pursued a count for private nuisance on the basis that
Defendants owe the Plaintiffs the duty to conduct their operations and maintain their equipment and well materials in such a manner that they do not create and/or maintain a nuisance____ The afore described acts and omissions of the Defendants unreasonably interferes with, and will continue to unreasonably interfere with, the use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs’ Ranch and the normal and expected use and enjoyment of not only the surface and subsurface soils or strata of Plaintiffs’ ranch, but, in addition, the use and enjoyment of portions of the underlying groundwater.
(Emphasis added.) As the majority recognizes, Plaintiffs then requested “injunctive relief1’ in the demand for judgment.
{37} Even if Plaintiffs were required to plead their request for injunctive relief with particularity, these allegations should suffice. Under Rule 1-008(F), “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” Plaintiffs’ complaint clearly alleged a continuing nuisance and included a statement of facts supporting this claim. In a nuisance action, “[mjonetary damages are inadequate where the harm is continuing in its nature,” Scott v. Jordan,
{38} Third, I do not believe that the complaint controls the form of relief available in a continuing nuisance claim. Rule 1-054(0 NMRA 2002 expressly provides that “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.” Under this rule, “New Mexico now clearly allows any appropriate relief to be granted in a case regardless of what is specifically requested in the pleadings____Thus the filing of a complaint seeking relief of one sort is not an irrevocable election of remedies precluding the granting of relief of another kind.” State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid,
{39} As Scott and Padilla recognize, injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy for a continuing nuisance. “When an equitable ground exists, courts of equity have power to give relief against either public or private nuisances by compelling the abatement or restraining the continuance of an existing nuisance, or enjoining the commission or establishment of a contemplated nuisance.” Hase v. Summers,
{40} The majority misunderstands my reliance on Rule 1-054(C). I do not contend that a trial court could award injunctive relief suasponte, see Scott,
{41} I conclude that Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim has as part of its object an interest in land within the meaning of Section 38-3-1(D)(1), making venue proper only in Lea County. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint for improper venue. The majority holding otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
. I disagree with the Court of Appeals’ statement that ”[t]he common-law treatment of tort actions for injuries to land as local claims appears to have been as much a matter of tradition as of logic.” Cooper,