NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
No. 21A244
Supreme Court of the United States
January 13, 2022
595 U.S. 109
ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS
No. 21A244. Argued January 7, 2022—Decided January 13, 2022*
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforces occupational safety and health standards “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment” as promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.
Held: Because applicants are likely to succeed on their claim that the Secretary lacked authority to impose the vaccine mandate, the applications for stays are granted. Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and possess only the authority that Congress has provided. “We expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.” Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Act does not plainly authorize the Secretary‘s vaccine mandate. The text of the Act that created OSHA repeatedly makes clear that the agency is charged with regulating “occupational” hazards and the safety and health of “employees.” See, e. g.,
The equities do not justify withholding interim relief. It is not the role of the Court to weigh tradeoffs among the competing interests alleged here; that is the responsibility of those chosen by the people through democratic processes. Congress has given OSHA the power to regulate occupational dangers, but it has not given that agency the
Applications for stays granted.
Scott A. Keller argued the cause for applicants in No. 21A244.
Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General of Ohio, argued the cause for applicants in No. 21A247.
Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for respondents in both cases.†
Notes
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
No. 21A244
Supreme Court of the United States
January 13, 2022
595 U.S. 109
Per Curiam.
The Secretary of Labor, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, recently enacted a vaccine
Many States, businesses, and nonprofit organizations challenged OSHA‘s rule in Courts of Appeals across the country. The Fifth Circuit initially entered a stay. But when the cases were consolidated before the Sixth Circuit, that court lifted the stay and allowed OSHA‘s rule to take effect. Applicants now seek emergency relief from this Court, arguing that OSHA‘s mandate exceeds its statutory authority and is otherwise unlawful. Agreeing that applicants are likely to prevail, we grant their applications and stay the rule.
A
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970. 84 Stat. 1590,
The Act contains an exception to those ordinary notice-and-comment procedures for “emergency temporary standards.”
B
On September 9, 2021, President Biden announced “a new plan to require more Americans to be vaccinated.” Re
After a 2-month delay, the Secretary of Labor issued the promised emergency standard. 86 Fed. Reg. 61402 (2021). Consistent with President Biden‘s announcement, the rule applies to all who work for employers with 100 or more employees. There are narrow exemptions for employees who work remotely “100 percent of the time” or who “work exclusively outdoors,” but those exemptions are largely illusory. Id., at 61460. The Secretary has estimated, for example, that only nine percent of landscapers and groundskeepers qualify as working exclusively outside. Id., at 61461. The regulation otherwise operates as a blunt instrument. It draws no distinctions based on industry or risk of exposure to COVID–19. Thus, most lifeguards and linemen face the same regulations as do medics and meatpackers. OSHA estimates that 84.2 million employees are subject to its mandate. Id., at 61467.
Covered employers must “develop, implement, and enforce a mandatory COVID–19 vaccination policy.” Id., at 61402. The employer must verify the vaccination status of each employee and maintain proof of it. Id., at 61552. The mandate does contain an “exception” for employers that require unvaccinated workers to “undergo [weekly] COVID–19 testing and wear a face covering at work in lieu of vaccination.” Id., at 61402. But employers are not required to offer this option, and the emergency regulation purports to pre-empt
C
OSHA published its vaccine mandate on November 5, 2021. Scores of parties—including States, businesses, trade groups, and nonprofit organizations—filed petitions for review, with at least one petition arriving in each regional Court of Appeals. The cases were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit, which was selected at random pursuant to
Prior to consolidation, however, the Fifth Circuit stayed OSHA‘s rule pending further judicial review. BST Holdings, 17 F. 4th 604. It held that the mandate likely exceeded OSHA‘s statutory authority, raised separation-of-powers concerns in the absence of a clear delegation from Congress, and was not properly tailored to the risks facing different types of workers and workplaces.
When the consolidated cases arrived at the Sixth Circuit, two things happened. First, many of the petitioners—nearly 60 in all—requested initial hearing en banc. Second, OSHA asked the Court of Appeals to vacate the Fifth Circuit‘s existing stay. The Sixth Circuit denied the request for initial hearing en banc by an evenly divided 8-to-8 vote. In re MCP No. 165, 20 F. 4th 264 (2021). Chief Judge Sutton dissented, joined by seven of his colleagues. He reasoned that the Secretary‘s “broad assertions of administrative power demand unmistakable legislative support,” which he found lacking. Id., at 268. A three-judge panel then dissolved the Fifth Circuit‘s stay, holding that OSHA‘s mandate was likely consistent with the agency‘s statutory and constitutional authority. See In re MCP No. 165, 21 F. 4th 357 (CA6 2021). Judge Larsen dissented.
II
The Sixth Circuit concluded that a stay of the rule was not justified. We disagree.
A
Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Secretary lacked authority to impose the mandate. Administrative agencies are creatures of statute. They accordingly possess only the authority that Congress has provided. The Secretary has ordered 84 million Americans to either obtain a COVID–19 vaccine or undergo weekly medical testing at their own expense. This is no “everyday exercise of federal power.” In re MCP No. 165, 20 F. 4th, at 272 (Sutton, C. J., dissenting). It is instead a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees. “We expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.” Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). There can be little doubt that OSHA‘s mandate qualifies as an exercise of such authority.
The question, then, is whether the Act plainly authorizes the Secretary‘s mandate. It does not. The Act empowers the Secretary to set workplace safety standards, not broad public health measures. See
The dissent protests that we are imposing “a limit found no place in the governing statute.” Post, at 133 (joint opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.). Not so. It is the text of the agency‘s Organic Act that repeatedly makes clear that OSHA is charged with regulating “occupational” hazards and the safety and health of “employees.” See, e. g.,
The Solicitor General does not dispute that OSHA is limited to regulating “work-related dangers.” Response Brief for OSHA in No. 21A244 etc., p. 45 (OSHA Response). She instead argues that the risk of contracting COVID–19 qualifies as such a danger. We cannot agree. Although COVID–19 is a risk that occurs in many workplaces, it is not an occupational hazard in most. COVID–19 can and does spread at home, in schools, during sporting events, and everywhere else that people gather. That kind of universal risk is no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life—simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock—would significantly expand OSHA‘s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.
The dissent contends that OSHA‘s mandate is comparable to a fire or sanitation regulation imposed by the agency. See post, at 133–134. But a vaccine mandate is strikingly unlike the workplace regulations that OSHA has typically imposed. A vaccination, after all, “cannot be undone at the end of the workday.” In re MCP No. 165, 20 F. 4th, at 274 (Sutton, C. J., dissenting). Contrary to the dissent‘s contention, imposing a vaccine mandate on 84 million Americans in
That is not to say OSHA lacks authority to regulate occupation-specific risks related to COVID–19. Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of an employee‘s job or workplace, targeted regulations are plainly permissible. We do not doubt, for example, that OSHA could regulate researchers who work with the COVID–19 virus. So too could OSHA regulate risks associated with working in particularly crowded or cramped environments. But the danger present in such workplaces differs in both degree and kind from the everyday risk of contracting COVID–19 that all face. OSHA‘s indiscriminate approach fails to account for this crucial distinction—between occupational risk and risk more generally—and accordingly the mandate takes on the character of a general public health measure, rather than an “occupational safety or health standard.”
In looking for legislative support for the vaccine mandate, the dissent turns to the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117–2, 135 Stat. 4. See post, at 133. That legislation, signed into law on March 11, 2021, of course said nothing about OSHA‘s vaccine mandate, which was not announced until six months later. In fact, the most noteworthy action concerning the vaccine mandate by either House of Congress has been a majority vote of the Senate disapproving the regulation on December 8, 2021. S. J. Res. 29, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021).
It is telling that OSHA, in its half century of existence, has never before adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind—addressing a threat that is untethered, in any causal sense, from the workplace. This “lack of historical precedent,” coupled with the breadth of authority that the Secretary now claims, is a “telling indication” that the mandate extends beyond the agency‘s legitimate reach. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
B
The equities do not justify withholding interim relief. We are told by the States and the employers that OSHA‘s mandate will force them to incur billions of dollars in unrecoverable compliance costs and will cause hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. See Application in No. 21A244, pp. 25–32; Application in No. 21A247, pp. 32–33; see also 86 Fed. Reg. 61475. For its part, the Federal Government says that the mandate will save over 6,500 lives and prevent hundreds of thousands of hospitalizations. OSHA Response 83; see also 86 Fed. Reg. 61408.
It is not our role to weigh such tradeoffs. In our system of government, that is the responsibility of those chosen by the people through democratic processes. Although Congress has indisputably given OSHA the power to regulate occupational dangers, it has not given that agency the power to regulate public health more broadly. Requiring the vaccination of 84 million Americans, selected simply because they work for employers with more than 100 employees, certainly falls in the latter category.
* * *
The applications for stays presented to JUSTICE KAVANAUGH and by him referred to the Court are granted.
OSHA‘s COVID–19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 61402, is stayed pending disposition of the applicants’ petitions for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and
It is so ordered.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
No. 21A244
Supreme Court of the United States
January 13, 2022
595 U.S. 109
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring.
The central question we face today is: Who decides? No one doubts that the COVID–19 pandemic has posed challenges for every American. Or that our state, local, and national governments all have roles to play in combating the disease. The only question is whether an administrative agency in Washington, one charged with overseeing workplace safety, may mandate the vaccination or regular testing of 84 million people. Or whether, as 27 States before us submit, that work belongs to state and local governments across the country and the people‘s elected representatives in Congress. This Court is not a public health authority. But it is charged with resolving disputes about which authorities possess the power to make the laws that govern us under the Constitution and the laws of the land.
*
I start with this Court‘s precedents. There is no question that state and local authorities possess considerable power to regulate public health. They enjoy the “general power of governing,” including all sovereign powers envisioned by the Constitution and not specifically vested in the federal government. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519, 536 (2012) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.);
The federal government‘s powers, however, are not general but limited and divided. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). Not only must the federal government properly invoke a constitutionally enumerated source of authority to regulate in this area or any other. It must also act consistently with the Constitution‘s separation of powers. And when it comes to that obligation, this Court has established at least one firm rule: “We expect Congress to speak clearly” if it wishes to assign to an executive agency decisions “of vast economic and political significance.” Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We sometimes call this the major questions doctrine. Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).
OSHA‘s mandate fails that doctrine‘s test. The agency claims the power to force 84 million Americans to receive a vaccine or undergo regular testing. By any measure, that is a claim of power to resolve a question of vast national significance. Yet Congress has nowhere clearly assigned so much power to OSHA. Approximately two years have passed since this pandemic began; vaccines have been available for more than a year. Over that span, Congress has adopted several major pieces of legislation aimed at combating COVID–19. E. g., American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117–2, 135 Stat. 4. But Congress has chosen not to afford OSHA—or any federal agency—the authority to issue a vaccine mandate. Indeed, a majority of the Senate even voted to disapprove OSHA‘s regulation. See S. J. Res. 29, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021). It seems, too, that the agency pursued its regulatory initiative only as a legislative “‘work-around.‘” BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F. 4th 604, 612 (CA5 2021). Far less consequential agency rules have run
What is OSHA‘s reply? It directs us to
The Court rightly applies the major questions doctrine and concludes that this lone statutory subsection does not clearly authorize OSHA‘s mandate. See ante, at 117–118. Section 655(c)(1) was not adopted in response to the pandemic, but some 50 years ago at the time of OSHA‘s creation. Since then, OSHA has relied on it to issue only comparatively modest rules addressing dangers uniquely prevalent inside the workplace, like asbestos and rare chemicals. See In re: MCP No. 165, 20 F. 4th 264, 276 (CA6 2021) (Sutton, C. J., dissenting from denial of initial hearing en banc). As the agency itself explained to a federal court less than two years ago, the statute does “not authorize OSHA to issue sweeping health standards” that affect workers’ lives outside the workplace. Brief for Department of Labor, In re: AFL–CIO, No. 20–1158, pp. 3, 33 (CADC 2020). Yet that is precisely what the agency seeks to do now—regulate not just what happens inside the workplace but induce individuals to undertake a medical procedure that affects their lives outside the workplace. Historically, such matters have been regulated at the state level by authorities who enjoy broader
*
Why does the major questions doctrine matter? It ensures that the national government‘s power to make the laws that govern us remains where Article I of the Constitution says it belongs—with the people‘s elected representatives. If administrative agencies seek to regulate the daily lives and liberties of millions of Americans, the doctrine says, they must at least be able to trace that power to a clear grant of authority from Congress.
In this respect, the major questions doctrine is closely related to what is sometimes called the nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, for decades courts have cited the nondelegation doctrine as a reason to apply the major questions doctrine. E. g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion). Both are designed to protect the separation of powers and ensure that any new laws governing the lives of Americans are subject to the robust democratic processes the Constitution demands.
The nondelegation doctrine ensures democratic accountability by preventing Congress from intentionally delegating its legislative powers to unelected officials. Sometimes lawmakers may be tempted to delegate power to agencies to “reduc[e] the degree to which they will be held accountable for unpopular actions.” R. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol‘y 147, 154 (2017). But the Constitution imposes some boundaries here. Gundy, 588 U. S.,
The major questions doctrine serves a similar function by guarding against unintentional, oblique, or otherwise unlikely delegations of the legislative power. Sometimes, Congress passes broadly worded statutes seeking to resolve important policy questions in a field while leaving an agency to work out the details of implementation. E. g., King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485–486 (2015). Later, the agency may seek to exploit some gap, ambiguity, or doubtful expression in Congress‘s statutes to assume responsibilities far beyond its initial assignment. The major questions doctrine guards against this possibility by recognizing that Congress does not usually “hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). In this way, the doctrine is “a vital check on expansive and aggressive assertions of executive authority.” United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC, 855 F. 3d 381, 417 (CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also N. Richardson, Keeping Big Cases From Making Bad Law: The Resurgent Major Questions Doctrine, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 355, 359 (2016).
Whichever the doctrine, the point is the same. Both serve to prevent “government by bureaucracy supplanting government by the people.” A. Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, American Enterprise Institute, J. on Govt. & Soc., July–Aug. 1980, p. 27. And both hold their lessons for to-
*
The question before us is not how to respond to the pandemic, but who holds the power to do so. The answer is clear: Under the law as it stands today, that power rests with the States and Congress, not OSHA. In saying this much, we do not impugn the intentions behind the agency‘s mandate. Instead, we only discharge our duty to enforce the law‘s demands when it comes to the question who may govern the lives of 84 million Americans. Respecting those demands may be trying in times of stress. But if this Court were to abide them only in more tranquil conditions, declarations of emergencies would never end and the liberties our Constitution‘s separation of powers seeks to preserve would amount to little.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
No. 21A244
Supreme Court of the United States
January 13, 2022
595 U.S. 109
JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN, dissenting.
Every day, COVID–19 poses grave dangers to the citizens of this country—and particularly, to its workers. The disease has by now killed almost 1 million Americans and hospitalized almost 4 million. It spreads by person-to-person contact in confined indoor spaces, so causes harm in nearly all workplace environments. And in those environments, more than any others, individuals have little control, and therefore little capacity to mitigate risk. COVID–19, in short, is a menace in work settings. The proof is all around us: Since the disease‘s onset, most Americans have seen their workplaces transformed.
So the administrative agency charged with ensuring health and safety in workplaces did what Congress commanded it to: It took action to address COVID–19‘s continuing threat in those spaces. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued an emergency temporary standard (Standard), requiring either vaccination or masking and testing, to protect American workers. The Standard falls within the core of the agency‘s mission: to “protect employees” from “grave danger” that comes from “new hazards” or exposure to harmful agents.
Yet today the Court issues a stay that prevents the Standard from taking effect. In our view, the Court‘s order seriously misapplies the applicable legal standards. And in so doing, it stymies the Federal Government‘s ability to counter the unparalleled threat that COVID–19 poses to our Nation‘s workers. Acting outside of its competence and without legal basis, the Court displaces the judgments of the Government officials given the responsibility to respond to workplace health emergencies. We respectfully dissent.
I
In 1970, Congress enacted the
Acting under that statutory command, OSHA promulgated the emergency temporary standard at issue here. The Standard obligates employers with at least 100 employees to require that an employee either (1) be vaccinated against COVID-19 or (2) take a weekly COVID-19 test and wear a mask at work.
Multiple lawsuits challenging the Standard were filed in the Federal Courts of Appeals. The applicants asked the courts to stay the Standard‘s implementation while their legal challenges were pending. The lawsuits were consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See
II
The legal standard governing a request for relief pending appellate review is settled. To obtain that relief, the applicants must show: (1) that their “claims are likely to prevail,” (2) “that denying them relief would lead to irreparable injury,” and (3) “that granting relief would not harm the public interest.” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. ---, --- (2020) (per curiam). Moreover, because the applicants seek judicial intervention that the Sixth Circuit withheld below, this Court should not issue relief unless the applicants can establish that their entitlement to relief is “indisputably clear.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. ---, --- (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief) (internal quotation marks omitted). None of these requirements is met here.
III
A
The applicants are not “likely to prevail” under any proper view of the law. OSHA‘s rule perfectly fits the language of the applicable statutory provision. Once again, that provi
The virus that causes COVID-19 is a “new hazard” as well as a “physically harmful” “agent.” Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 572 (11th ed. 2005) (defining “hazard” as a “source of danger“); id., at 24 (defining “agent” as a “chemically, physically, or biologically active principle“); id., at 1397 (defining “virus” as “the causative agent of an infectious disease“).
The virus also poses a “grave danger” to millions of employees. As of the time OSHA promulgated its rule, more than 725,000 Americans had died of COVID-19 and millions more had been hospitalized. See
Finally, the Standard is “necessary” to address the danger of COVID-19. OSHA based its rule, requiring either testing and masking or vaccination, on a host of studies and government reports showing why those measures were of unparalleled use in limiting the threat of COVID-19 in most
OSHA‘s determinations are “conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.”
B
The Court does not dispute that the statutory terms just discussed, read in the ordinary way, authorize this Standard. In other words, the majority does not contest that COVID-19 is a “new hazard” and “physically harmful agent“; that it poses a “grave danger” to employees; or that a testing and masking or vaccination policy is “necessary” to
But nothing in the Act‘s text supports the majority‘s limitation on OSHA‘s regulatory authority. Of course, the majority is correct that OSHA is not a roving public health regulator, see ante, at 117-118: It has power only to protect employees from workplace hazards. But as just explained, that is exactly what the Standard does. See supra, at 130-131. And the Act requires nothing more: Contra the majority, it is indifferent to whether a hazard in the workplace is also found elsewhere. The statute generally charges OSHA with “assur[ing] so far as possible . . . safe and healthful working conditions.”
Consistent with Congress‘s directives, OSHA has long regulated risks that arise both inside and outside of the workplace. For example, OSHA has issued, and applied to nearly all workplaces, rules combating risks of fire, faulty electrical installations, and inadequate emergency exits—even though the dangers prevented by those rules arise not only in workplaces but in many physical facilities (e. g., stadiums, schools, hotels, even homes). See
That is especially so because—as OSHA amply established—COVID-19 poses special risks in most workplaces, across the country and across industries. See
The result of its ruling is squarely at odds with the statutory scheme. As shown earlier, the Act‘s explicit terms authorize the Standard. See supra, at 129-131. Once again, OSHA must issue an emergency standard in response to new hazards in the workplace that expose employees to “grave danger.”
If OSHA‘s Standard is far-reaching—applying to many millions of American workers—it no more than reflects the scope of the crisis. The Standard responds to a workplace health emergency unprecedented in the agency‘s history: an infectious disease that has already killed hundreds of thousands and sickened millions; that is most easily transmitted in the shared indoor spaces that are the hallmark of American working life; and that spreads mostly without regard to differences in occupation or industry. Over the past two years, COVID-19 has affected—indeed, transformed—virtually every workforce and workplace in the Nation. Employers and employees alike have recognized and responded to the special risks of transmission in work environments. It is perverse, given these circumstances, to read the Act‘s grant of emergency powers in the way the majority does—as constraining OSHA from addressing one of the gravest workplace hazards in the agency‘s history. The Standard protects untold numbers of employees from a dan
IV
Even if the merits were a close question—which they are not—the Court would badly err by issuing this stay. That is because a court may not issue a stay unless the balance of harms and the public interest support the action. See Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U. S. 571, 580 (2017) (per curiam) (“Before issuing a stay, it is ultimately necessary to balance the equities—to explore the relative harms” and “the interests of the public at large” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)); supra, at 129. Here, they do not. The lives and health of the Nation‘s workers are at stake. And the majority deprives the Government of a measure it needs to keep them safe.
Consider first the economic harms asserted in support of a stay. The employers principally argue that the Standard will disrupt their businesses by prompting hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. But OSHA expressly considered that claim, and found it exaggerated. According to OSHA, employers that have implemented vaccine mandates have found that far fewer employees actually quit their jobs than threaten to do so. See
These considerations weigh decisively against issuing a stay. This Court should decline to exercise its equitable discretion in a way that will—as this stay will—imperil the lives of thousands of American workers and the health of many more.
* * *
Underlying everything else in this dispute is a single, simple question: Who decides how much protection, and of what
Here, an agency charged by Congress with safeguarding employees from workplace dangers has decided that action is needed. The agency has thoroughly evaluated the risks that the disease poses to workers across all sectors of the economy. It has considered the extent to which various policies will mitigate those risks, and the costs those policies will entail. It has landed on an approach that encourages vaccination, but allows employers to use masking and testing instead. It has meticulously explained why it has reached its conclusions. And in doing all this, it has acted within the four corners of its statutory authorization—or actually here, its statutory mandate. OSHA, that is, has responded in the way necessary to alleviate the “grave danger” that workplace exposure to the “new hazard[ ]” of COVID-19 poses to employees across the Nation.
And then, there is this Court. Its Members are elected by, and accountable to, no one. And we “lack[ ] the background, competence, and expertise to assess” workplace health and safety issues. South Bay United Pentecostal Church, 590 U. S., at --- (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). When we are wise, we know enough to defer on matters like this one. When we are wise, we know not to displace the judgments of experts, acting within the sphere Congress marked out and under Presidential control, to deal with emergency conditions. Today, we are not wise. In the face of a still-