New Hampshire Youth Movement v. ScanlanNew Hampshire Youth Movement v. Scanlan
In this consolidated action, several organizations and individuals bring suit against the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Attorney General seeking a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of 2024 New Hampshire House Bill 1569 (HB 1569) violate the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also request injunctive relief barring state officials from implementing those provisions.
Before the court consolidated the cases, the defendants separately moved to dismiss both actions. They argued, among other things, that none of the plaintiffs had standing to pursue any of their claims. The court largely denied both motions, though it concluded that certain plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue one or more claims. See Coal. for Open Democracy v. Scanlan, 794 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.N.H. 2025); New Hampshire Youth Movement v. Scanlan, No. 24-cv-291-SE, 2025 WL 2336868 (D.N.H. Aug. 13, 2025).1
The defendants now move for summary judgment, renewing their arguments that none of the remaining plaintiffs has standing to pursue any claims in light of the record evidence. Doc. no. 88. They also argue that the court should grant them judgment on certain counts because the underlying claims are speculative. After considering the record evidence, the court denies the defendants’ motion.
Standard of Review
Granting summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Background
On September 12, 2024, then-New Hampshire Governor Chris Sununu signed into law HB 1569, which went into effect on November 11, 2024. HB 1569 made several changes to New Hampshire‘s requirements relating to voter registration and identification.
HB 1569 also changed the procedures related to voter-qualification challenges. Under New Hampshire law, if a voter challenges the qualifications of any other voter registered in the town or ward in which the election is held, see
Four organizations and three individuals remain as plaintiffs in this case. The four organizations (together, the Organizational Plaintiffs) are Open Democracy, League of Women Voters, the Forward Foundation, and Youth Movement. The court explores more details about each Organizational Plaintiff‘s activities when addressing the defendants’ standing arguments. Broadly speaking, however, the Organizational Plaintiffs are all non-profit organizations that are interested in encouraging active civic participation and assisting individuals in exercising their right to vote.
The three individuals are Miles Borne, Alеxander Muirhead, and Lila Muirhead (together, the Individual Plaintiffs). At the time of the Open Democracy Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Individual Plaintiffs were each minor U.S. citizens who lived in New Hampshire. The Open Democracy Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that they will each turn 18 before the end of 2026 and intend to register to vote as soon as they do so. As discussed further below, Borne has since turned 18 and has registered to vote.
Discussion
The defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that none of the plаintiffs has standing to pursue any of the remaining claims in this case. They further argue that even if Open Democracy has standing to bring its claims with regard to HB 1569‘s elimination of the Challenged Voter Affidavit, those claims are too speculative to continue. The plaintiffs, of course, disagree. “[B]ecause standing is a prerequisite to a federal court‘s subject matter jurisdiction and [it] must assure [itself] of [its] jurisdiction under the federal Constitution before [it] proceed[s] to the merits of a case,” the court begins by addressing the defendants’ standing arguments. Dantzler, Inc. v. Empresas Berrios Inventory & Operations, Inc., 958 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotations and citation omitted).
“Standing doctrine assures respect for the Constitution‘s limitation of ‘[t]he judicial Power’ to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.‘” Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 731 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting
“[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, рarticularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. A showing “of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or [if] there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (further quotations omitted)); see Clapper v. Amnesty Int‘l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013). “Plaintiffs ‘must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek.‘” Webb v. Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC, 72 F.4th 365, 372 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 431).
“[T]he absence of standing may be raised at any stage of a case.” Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 730. “Each element of standing ‘must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.‘” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Thus, in “response to a summary judgment motion, the party invoking federal jurisdiction cannot rely on mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, supporting the elements of standing, which for purрoses of the summary
At the outset, the plaintiffs argue that if the court finds that there are material disputes of fact as to whether any plaintiff has standing to assert a claim, the court can and should deny the defendants’ motion without needing to analyze the remaining plaintiffs’ standing as to that claim. As a general matter, at this stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs’ argument has support. See, e.g., Davis v. Grimes, 9 F. Supp. 3d 12, 24 n.12 (D. Mass. 2014) (noting at the summary judgment stage that although one plaintiff “may no longer have standing,” it was “not an issue” because “the finding that one has standing to sue renders it superfluous to adjudicate the other plaintiffs’ standing” (quoting Montalvo-Huertas v. Rivera-Cruz, 885 F.2d 971, 976 (1st Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted))). But, where the scope of the defendants’ liability could change depending on the prevailing plaintiff, then the court should examine the standing for each plaintiff. See, e.g., Women‘s Med. Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 512 F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (D.R.I. 1981).
The defendants argue that the court should analyze each plaintiff‘s standing because the defendants’ “ultimate liability changes depending on number and circumstances of Plaintiffs who could proceed to trial.” Doc. no. 108 at 9. But the defendants do not explain in their summary judgment papers how that is the case here, where the plaintiffs all seek the same relief. Nevertheless, the Open Democracy Plaintiffs and Youth Movement are represented by different attorneys. Because all of the plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees, there is at least some support for the notion that the defendants’ liability may depend on whether either Youth Movement or any of the Open Democracy Plaintiffs remains in the case.5 See Roberts, 512 F. Supp.
Although each plaintiff‘s standing is an individual inquiry and dependent on specific facts relative to that plaintiff, the defendants often make nearly identical arguments as to each Organizational Plaintiff and each Individual Plaintiff. Therefore, the court limits its analysis where appropriate for the sake of efficiency.
A. The Organizational Plaintiffs
“When an organization . . . seeks to establish Article III standing, it may proceed in one of two ways: it may show that it has ‘organizational standing’ to sue on its own behalf, or it may demonstrate that it has ‘associational standing’ to sue on behalf of its members.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 738 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2024); see Equal Means Equal v. Ferriero, 3 F.4th 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2021). Here, each of the Organizаtional Plaintiffs relies on organizational standing.6
The defendants argue that the evidence in the record shows that the Organizational Plaintiffs cannot satisfy any of the three prongs of the standing analysis for the purpose of organizational standing. As the court explained in its orders on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Organizational Plaintiffs’ theory of standing is derived largely from Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) and clarified by Food & Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024).
In Havens Realty, the defendant (Havens) allegedly engaged in a practice called racial steering, giving prospective home renters and buyers false information to direct them toward housing near others of the same race and away from housing near individuals of other races, thereby maintaining racial housing segregation. 455 U.S. at 366 & n.1. Several plaintiffs, including a housing organization called HOME, which provided housing counseling and referral services to prospective buyers and renters, sued Havens, allеging a violation of the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 367.
The Supreme Court held that HOME had organizational standing to pursue its claim because the complaint alleged that Havens‘s “steering practices . . . perceptibly impaired HOME‘s ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers.” Id. at 379. The Supreme Court stated that “[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization‘s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization‘s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization‘s abstract social interests.” Id.
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified Havens Realty‘s holding. In Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, several anti-abortion medical organizations sought to challenge a Food and Drug Administration action that eased regulations related to mifepristone, a drug used to terminate pregnancies. 602 U.S. at 376-77. The organizations relied on a Havens Realty theory to establish standing, alleging that the FDA had “impaired their ability to provide services and achieve their organizаtional mission” and that they had to “divert[] [their] resources in response to” the FDA‘s actions. Id. at 394-95 (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court rejected this argument, re-affirming that mere issue advocacy, even when accompanied by expenditures,
With that framework established, the court now turns to the defendants’ arguments regarding each Organizational Plaintiff.
1. Youth Movement
Because Youth Movement brings only Count I, the relevant question is whether Youth Movement cаn establish a legally cognizable injury attributable to HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit. Youth Movement seeks to effectuate political change through civic action and democratic participation. It runs several programs to help achieve its mission, including pledge-to-vote, voter-registration, and get-out-the-vote programs.
The defendants argue that Youth Movement cannot show a legally cognizable injury because the summary judgment record demonstrates that HB 1569 does not perceptibly impair Youth Movement‘s ability to provide its core services. They argue that Youth Movement disclaimed any financial diversion of resources in response to HB 1569. According to the defendants, Youth Movement provided no documents that reflect staff or volunteer diversion, and “the mere fact that Youth Movement‘s staff and volunteers had to ensure its voter outreach activities accurately reflect current law is not an abnormal operational cost or a deviation from
Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, the summary judgment record establishes that HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit perceptibly impairs Youth Movement‘s pledge-to-vote, voter-registration, and get-out-the-vote programs, which the defendants do not dispute are critical to Youth Movement‘s core mission. At best, the defendants have shown that there is a material dispute. Youth Movement is now implementing additional steps in its pledge-to-vote program to ensure that its voters who pledge to vote have the required documentary evidence necessary to register to vote. Doc. no. 88-5 at 27-28. It is also bringing in additional volunteers to register voters in advance of elections and growing its voter-registration program to help voters avoid difficulties satisfying HB 1569‘s proof-of-citizenship requirement on election day.
The defendants claim that these impacts on Youth Movement‘s core activities are insufficient to establish injury. Case law says otherwise. In its order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Youth Movement‘s complaint, the court discussed the United States District Court for the District of Columbia‘s opinion in League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. CV 25-0946 (CKK), 2025 WL 1187730 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2025). In that case, several organizations, including nonpartisan, not-for-profit voting rights organizations (Nonpartisan Plaintiffs), moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of certain provisions of an executive order “purporting to change the rules of federal elections.” Id. at *1. Much like HB 1569, one of the challenged provisions directed the Election Assistance Commission to require people registering to vote using a federal form “to submit ‘documentary proof of United States citizenship‘” instead of permitting registration through attestation alone. Id. at *11. The district court held that the Nonpartisan Plaintiffs likеly had organizational standing to challenge the documentary-proof provision “because that provision would directly interfere with their core activities, including providing voter registration services throughout the Nation.” Id. at *31.
The district court has since granted the Nonpartisan Plaintiffs summary judgment, determining that the documentary-proof provision‘s impact on the Nonpartisan Plaintiffs constituted sufficient injury to confer standing. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of President, No. CV 25-0946 (CKK), 2025 WL 3042704 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2025) (LULAC II). Those impacts include that the “documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement would render obsolete several of the online tools that the Nonpartisan Plaintiffs have developed and routinely use to help eligible people register to vote, requiring the organizations to either update or replace those tools.” Id. at *15. Further, “adding such a requirement would force the Nonpartisan Plaintiffs to update educational information that they provide to prospective voters, much of which they have translated into multiple languages.” Id. The court further held that a “documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement would also require the Nonpartisan Plaintiffs to invest additional resources in training their staff and volunteers, both to understand the new requirement and to handle the sensitive personal information contained in passports and other documents listed in the Executive Order as acceptable proof of citizenship.” Id. The court
The Nonpartisan Plaintiffs’ injuries that the court identified in LULAC II are nearly identical to Youth Movement‘s injuries here, аs shown in the summary judgment record. And other courts have likewise held that similar injuries are sufficient to confer organizational standing in actions challenging voting laws and regulations. See Get Loud Ark. v. Thurston, 748 F. Supp. 3d 630, 653-54 (W.D. Ark. 2024) (plaintiff that provided voter registration services had standing to challenge Election Commission rule changing signature requirement because the rule “‘perceptibly impaired’ [the plaintiff‘s] ability to provide voter registration services to Arkansans, as evidenced by the precipitous decline in registrations through [the plaintiff] since the Rule was put into place“); see also Republican Nat‘l Comm. v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 120 F.4th 390, 397 (4th Cir. 2024) (state action that inhibited committee‘s ability to “counsel voters to support Republican candidates” caused injury sufficient to confer standing because it affected and interfered with organizational mission). Drawing all reasonable inferences in Youth Movement‘s favor, the organization has suffered a legally cognizable injury as a result of HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit.
The remaining two prongs of the standing analysis require less discussion. The defendants argue that the record evidence shows that HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit is not the cause of Youth Movement‘s purported injuries because “[t]here cannot be causation where an organization cannot offer demonstrable evidence of injury.” Doc. no. 88-1 at 25. Of course, this argument fails, because the evidence in the record establishes that HB 1569
The defendants’ arguments as to redressability likewise fail.7 Although the defendants contend that the Organizational Plaintiffs “offer no proof whatsoever that reenacting [Qualified Voter Affidavits] would result in more voter registrations or how that would mitigate their purported resource diversion,” doc. no. 88-1 at 28-29, that argument is nonsensical. Certainly, if there is evidence in the record that the elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit caused Youth Movement the injuries discussed above, reinstatement of the Qualified Voter Affidavit would redress that harm.
The defendants also argue that neither Youth Movement nor any plaintiff can meet the redressability prong of the standing analysis because they do not seek prospective relief. Rather, the defendants contend, the plaintiffs seek to reinstate a repealed statute “and revive a statutory scheme that is no longer in force.”8 Doc. no. 88-1 at 29. That argument is misplaced. The plaintiffs request that the court declare that certain of HB 1569‘s provisions violate the United States Constitution and ask that the court issue an injunction prohibiting the defendants from implementing or enforcing those provisions. If the plaintiffs are successful, then HB 1569‘s challenged provisions are “a nullity” and “the original statute ‘must stand as the only valid expression of the legislative intent.‘” Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC, 13 F.4th 524, 528 n.2 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Frost v. Corp. Comm‘n, 278 U.S. 515, 526-27 (1929)). Thus, an injunction
But, even if the court were to accept the defendants’ argument as true, the plaintiffs have still satisfied the redressability prong of the standing analysis. The defendants appear to suggest that nullification of HB 1569 would result in the complete absence of any law governing the requirements for prospective voter registration and voter challenges. Although that view is not supported by the law, if correct, the result would be that no proof of eligibility to vote is required and no challenge-process exists until the New Hampshire state legislature enacts a new, constitutional law. Such a result would still redress the harms about which the plaintiffs complain in this case. See M.S. v. Brown, 902 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that “federal courts undoubtedly have the power to strike down existing laws as unconstitutional, even where doing so would require the enactment of a new law” (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88 (1982) (further citations omitted))).
For these reasons, the evidence in the record is sufficient to support all three prongs of the standing analysis with regard to Youth Movement. It has organizational standing to pursue Count I.
The defendants argue that Open Democracy does not have standing to assert Counts I, II, or III because the summary judgment record shows that HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit and the Challenged Voter Affidavit does not perceptibly impair Open Democracy‘s ability to provide its core services and, therefore, does not cause it to suffer any injury. As they were with Youth Movement, the defendants are wrong.
With regard to Count I and the chаllenge to the elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit, the defendants agree that Open Democracy‘s voter registration drives and educational materials are part of its core services to effectuate its mission of safeguarding political equality for the people of New Hampshire. Doc. no. 88-30 at 23. According to the defendants, evidence in the record shows that Open Democracy‘s only injuries related to the elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit are 56 staff hours devoted to updating its educational materials. Doc. no. 88-1 at 15-16. The defendants argue that these hours are insufficient to establish injury, particularly because Open Democracy must update its educational materials whenever there is a change in the law, as it did in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Even if the effort to update the educational materials were insufficient, the defendants understate the evidence of Open Democracy‘s injuries. Evidence in the record shows that since HB 1569 eliminated the Qualified Voter Affidavit, Open Democracy has been able to help fewer high school students register to vote because the students did not possess qualifying documentary proof of citizenship despite Open Democracy‘s increased educational efforts. Doc. no. 88-30 at 23. Open Democracy has also been unable to assist many other voters through other voter outreach efforts (e.g. phone banks and community events), such as those who lost or lack access to documentary proof of citizenship.
The defendants argue in their reply to the Open Democracy Plaintiffs’ objection that the cited evidence of diversion of resources is insufficient to create a dispute of material fact because it does not identify a specific source of the diverted resources. Doc. no. 108 at 6 n.3. That argument is curious, as Open Democracy specifically pointed to evidence that it diverted resources that would otherwise have been spent on campaign finance reform efforts and securing fair districting maps. Doc. no. 88-6 at 18; doс. no. 88-30 at 28. The defendants acknowledge that those goals are two of Open Democracy‘s core missions. Doc. no. 88-1 at 21.
So, the defendants may take issue with the magnitude of Open Democracy‘s injuries from the elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit, but that is not relevant to the court‘s standing analysis. Giving Open Democracy all reasonable inferences, the evidence in the record shows that it has suffered a legally cognizable injury from the elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit. See, e.g., LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *15.
As for Counts II and III, the defendants do not challenge Open Democracy‘s injuries from the elimination of the Challenged Voter Affidavit. Even if they had done so, it would have been in vain. In its order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Open Democracy Plaintiffs’ complaint, the court held that Open Democracy had sufficiently alleged an injury from the elimination of the Challenged Voter Affidavit. The court stated:
[T]he elimination of thе Challenged Voter Affidavit interferes with one of Open Democracy‘s core services—here, recruiting, training, and deploying poll observers and poll workers, some of whom help voters whose eligibility will be challenged at the polls. Without the Challenged Voter Affidavit, Open Democracy will need to recruit more poll observers and enhance their training to counteract the burden to challenged voters (Count II) and the related decline in protective procedures that voters have (Count III), further draining organizational resources. It will also need to shift volunteers who would otherwise serve as poll workers to serve as poll observers. Thus, the elimination of the Challenged Voter Affidavit affects and interferes with Open Democracy‘s core business activities.
Coal. for Open Democracy, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 41.
Evidence in the record shows that Open Democracy has indeed suffered these exact injuries. Though Open Democrаcy previously focused on college towns alone, since HB 1569 it has recruited and trained additional poll observers to ensure that there is a trained observer at each polling location in the state. Doc. no. 88-30 at 25, 28. It has further redirected staff time away from other organizational priorities, training and deploying volunteers as poll observers instead of poll workers.
Similar to the court‘s analysis of Youth Movement‘s standing, the causation and redressability prongs as they apply to Open Democracy‘s claims require little discussion. There is a clear causal nexus between Open Democracy‘s injuries and HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit and Challenged Voter Affidavit. And the court has already addressed and rejected the defendants’ arguments regarding redressability.
3. Remaining Organizational Plaintiffs
The defendants offer similar arguments regarding League of Women Voters and the Forward Foundation‘s standing to assert Count I. Specifically, they argue that there is no evidence in the record to show that HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit perceptibly impairs either plaintiff‘s core business activity and instead shows only a setback to abstract social interests. Once again, the defendants are wrong.
As the defendants agree, evidence in the record shows that League of Wоmen Voters’ core activities consist of “‘Voter Services which includes voter information, candidate forums, answering voter‘s questions via social media, via e-mail, via phone calls or in person.‘” Doc. no. 88-1 at 17 (quoting doc. no. 88-7 at 8). Giving the plaintiffs all reasonable inferences, evidence in the record shows that HB 1569 impairs League of Women Voters’ ability to provide information to voters effectively. See, e.g., doc. no. 88-31 at 13-14 (discussing League of Women Voters’ inability to advise prospective voters who lack access to documentary proof of citizenship as to how they can register to vote considering HB 1569‘s failure to provide guidance on the definition of “other reasonable documentation“). Evidence also shows that League of Women Voters has been required to redirect its staff and financial resources to increase its educational efforts in response to HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit, taking resources from its advocacy and education services related to other priorities.
Evidence in the record establishes that the Forward Foundation has suffered similar injuries. The defendants acknowledge that the Forward Foundation‘s core activities include:
In short, giving the plaintiffs all reasonable inferences, evidence in the record shows that League of Women Voters and the Forward Foundation have suffered legally cognizable injuries from HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit. And, as with the other Organizational Plaintiffs, the defendants’ arguments regarding causation and redressability fail for the reasons discussed above.
B. The Individual Plaintiffs
The defendants argue that evidence in the record shows that none of the Individual Plaintiffs — Miles Borne, Alexander Muirhead, or Lila Muirhead — has standing to pursue their claim in Count I. Specifically, the defendants argue that evidence in the record shows that the Muirheads have not suffered and will not suffer a legally cognizable injury from HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit. They also argue that Borne does not have standing because his claim is moot.
Alexander and Lila Muirhead are minor citizens who live in New Hampshire. They will each turn 18 before the end of 2026 and intend to register to vote as soon as they are eligible. Because the Muirheads’ claim is based on a future injury, there must be evidence in the record to show that the threatened injury is certainly impending or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur. Reddy, 845 F.3d at 500.
In its order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Open Democracy Plaintiffs’ complaint, the court held that the Individual Plaintiffs had alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing to assert Count I, which challenges HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit. The court stated:
Because HB 1569 eliminatеs the Qualified Voter Affidavit, each of the [Individual] Plaintiffs will need to produce documentary proof of citizenship to register. The defendants conceded at oral argument that “even just pulling” a documentary form of citizenship “out of your back pocket” can create an injury sufficient to establish standing. Further, because they intend to register to vote when eligible, the [Individual] Plaintiffs’ injury is substantially likely to occur.
Coal. for Open Democracy, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (citations omitted).
The defendants point to evidence in the record that the Muirheads know what documents they need to possess to register to vote and do, in fact, possess those documents. Thus, they argue, the Muirheads are not likely to suffer any harm from HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit.
The defendants’ argument fails because it ignores the court‘s prior holding denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss. That is, the requirement that the Muirheads must produce documentary evidence to register to vote itself constitutes an injury sufficiеnt to confer standing. See Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1120 (10th Cir. 2020); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2009). Indeed, as the court noted, the defendants conceded
2. Miles Borne
The defendants argue that Borne does not have standing because his claim is moot.10 Specifically, evidence in the record shows that Borne has turned 18, registered to vote in 2025 with little difficulty, and does not intend to register to vote anywhere else.
Borne‘s circumstances “fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review,” which is routinely “appropriate” “in the context of election cases.” FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462-63 (2007) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974)); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Challenges to election laws are one of the quintessential categories of cases which usually” are disputes “capable of repetition, yet evading review.“); La Botz v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 889 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that “[e]lectoral disputes are . . . ‘paradigmatic’ examples of cases that cannot be fully litigated before the particular controversy expires” and that “[i]n the electoral context, many courts have concluded that a plaintiff need only show that others similarly situated might suffer a comparable harm in the future“). Indeed, courts “have applied the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to hear challenges to
For those reasons, Borne‘s claim in Count I is not moot, and the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to his claim.
II. Merits
The defendants argue that even if Open Democracy has standing to assert Counts II and III, which allege that HB 1569‘s elimination of the Challenged Voter Affidavit violates voters’ rights under the United States Constitution, the court should dismiss both counts because the claims are “wildly speculative.” Doc. no. 88-1 at 38. The defendants point to what they describe as “ample safeguards to ensure no voter is erroneously prevented from voting based on a voter challenge.”
The defendants’ arguments do not mention or grapple with the frameworks that govern Open Democracy‘s claims relating to the Challenged Voter Affidavit. Count II, which alleges that HB 1569‘s elimination of the Qualified Voter Affidavit constitutes an unjustifiable burden on the right to vote, is analyzed under the so-called Anderson-Burdick framework. Seе Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). Anderson-Burdick requires the court to “weigh the ‘character and magnitude of the asserted injury to’ the voters’ rights against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed.‘” Common Cause Rhode Island v. Gorbea, 970 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789); see Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008).
In short, the defendants ask the court to draw the conclusion that their “ample safeguards” establish that it is impossible for any eligible voter to be deprived of her right to vote due to a challenge at the polls, despite the elimination of the Challenged Voter Affidavit. Particulаrly considering the defendants’ failure to point to any evidence that the “safeguard” of the Challenged Voter Affidavit was unnecessary, the court declines to do so and is unable to do so considering the standard on summary judgment.
The defendants’ argument fares no better as to Open Democracy‘s procedural due process claim in Count III. To prevail on its due process claim, Open Democracy must first “identify a protected liberty or property interest” and second, show that the defendants “deprived
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendants’ summary judgment motion (doc. no. 88).
SO ORDERED.
Samantha D. Elliott
United States District Judge
February 6, 2026
cc: Counsel of Record.