Natomas Unified School etc. v. Sacramento County Bd. etc.Natomas Unified School etc. v. Sacramento County Bd. etc.
Teresa Stinson, Elizabeth Linton; Weintraub Tobin Chediak Coleman Grodin Law Corporation and Brendan J. Begley for Defendant and Appellant.
DLA Piper US, Stanley J. Panikowski, Gaspard Rappoport and Amanda McCaffrey for Former School District Superintendents as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael L. Newman, Assistant Attorney General, Srividya Panchalam, Benjamin T. Conway, Carly J. Munson and Alexis M. Piazza, Deputy Attorneys General for the Attorney General of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
C. Athena Roussos; Mary M. Sechser for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Abigail Trillin, William S. Koski; Cynthia L. Rice, Reina Canale, Phyllis Shafton Katz; Nedra Shawler and Joyeta Basu for Youth & Education Law Project Stanford Law School, California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., and Legal Services for Children as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Alexandra Santa Ana, Mona Tawatao; Stephanie Horwitz, Michael Harris; Victor Leung; Linnea Nelson, Brandon Greene; Jonathan Markovitz and
Mary Louise Frampton as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Orbach Huff & Henderson and Sarah L.W. Sutherland for Plaintiff and Respondent.
California law requires school districts to expel a student in a limited set of circumstances, including, for instance, when the student furnishes a firearm, brandishes a knife at another person, or possesses an explosive. State law also grants school districts discretion to expel a student if they make two findings. First, the school district must find the student committed one of several statutorily enumerated acts, including, as relevant here, that the student possessed a dangerous object or an imitation firearm. Second, the school district must find either (1) “[o]ther means of correction are not feasible or have repeatedly failed to bring about proper conduct” or (2) “[d]ue to the nature of the act [or
violation], the presence of the pupil causes a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others.” (
In this case, Natomas Unified School District (the District) expelled a student, I.O., under its discretionary authority. At an expulsion hearing, the District heard evidence that I.O. brought two unloaded BB guns and a sealed bag of plastic BBs to his middle school, showed the guns to two friends, and fired one of the unloaded guns at the ground. The District also heard evidence that one of the friends who saw the guns feared testifying at the expulsion hearing because I.O. and his mother had asked the student‘s family to speak about I.O.‘s character. Based on this evidence, the District found I.O. unlawfully intimidated a witness. It further found he should be expelled. It reasoned that he committed an expellable offense in possessing the BB guns and posed a continuing danger to himself or others—a conclusion it reached after preventing I.O. from presenting character witnesses and excluding his evidence tending to show his classmates did not believe he posed a danger.
On I.O.‘s appeal from the trial court‘s judgment in the District‘s favor, we reverse for two reasons. First, we find the District‘s “continuing danger”
BACKGROUND
I
Legal Background
Children in California have a right to a public school education. (Levi v. O‘Connell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 700, 707; see also
Under these provisions, the expulsion process begins with a school‘s principal or a school district‘s superintendent recommending expulsion for one of the grounds listed in
Following a hearing on a student‘s proposed expulsion, the school district‘s governing board must decide whether to expel the student, with the required findings varying depending on the charges. (
II
Factual Background
A. I.O. Brings Two BB Guns to His School
I.O. formerly attended a middle school in the District. On two consecutive days in 2019, when he was 11 years old, he brought two plastic BB guns and a sealed bag of plastic BBs to his middle school. Both guns were unloaded and had orange tips. I.O. kept the guns in his backpack during school hours and showed them to two friends after school.
On the first day, I.O. told his friends he had a “gun” and revealed part of one of the BB guns while off school property. But after some giggling, he
Whitten arrived shortly afterward, finding I.O. crying. I.O. told her, “[T]his man scared me[.] I was just going to take it to the park[.] I want to be a police officer.” I.O. added he was sorry. Mia Emmitt, a retired police officer and substitute teacher, arrived soon after and walked with Whitten and I.O. to Whitten‘s office. After reaching Whitten‘s office, Emmitt and Whitten searched I.O.‘s bag and found two unloaded BB guns and a sealed pack of BBs. A school resource officer afterward conducted a threat assessment. He found two unloaded BB guns and no credible threat.
B. The District Expels I.O.
Whitten recommended that the District expel I.O., citing
principal to recommend expulsion if a student possessed a dangerous object (
Following Whitten‘s recommendation, I.O.‘s parents requested a hearing to determine whether expulsion would be appropriate. The District then scheduled a hearing before a three-member panel, consisting of two principals and a vice principal from other schools in the District. (See
To make its case in favor of expulsion, the school relied largely on unsworn written statements from two parents and two students. One parent said he saw a student with a gun, and another parent said she notified Whitten after hearing about the gun. The two students discussed seeing the BB guns.
Apart from the witness statements, the school presented two witnesses at the hearing: Whitten and Emmitt. Before the hearing, Emmitt submitted an unsworn statement characterizing the BB guns as “very realistic looking, albeit fake handguns.” But at the hearing, after swearing an oath to tell the truth, she said the guns “were real small, real fake looking.” She also discussed her efforts to determine I.O.‘s motive for bringing the guns. I.O. told her he wanted to become a police officer after hearing from an officer at a recent career day and so decided “to take these little BB guns to the park and shoot them at trees to maybe practice.” He also told her he brought the guns to school because that would allow him to go directly to the park for practice after school on his way home. Emmitt found I.O. “completely genuine,” though a little ignorant. In her view, “he was just a little boy that wanted to go practice.” She added that she had no “safety concern at all” after considering I.O.‘s demeanor, found “this [wa]s probably a stupid mistake,” and believed I.O. should not be expelled.
Whitten spoke next.2 Apart from reading an incident report and the witness statements, her statements largely touched on a new charge against I.O. that had yet to be mentioned to I.O. and his family—intimidating a witness in violation of
To establish the new charge, Whitten said she earlier spoke to a parent of one of the students who saw the BB guns. In Whitten‘s retelling, the parent said I.O.‘s family visited her home and asked her and her family to speak on I.O.‘s behalf at the hearing.
But the family felt uncomfortable with the
After hearing these statements, I.O.‘s mother tried to explain. She said, “I did not request the parent to speak on [I.O.‘s] behalf. I only asked for a letter of character reference because [I.O.] knows them” and “walks home with that family every day from school.” But a panel member found her explanation lacking. He said even if I.O.‘s mother had no intent to intimidate, “when someone now says that they‘re scared to come here and show their face or be involved in this, that is -- that is why this is -- this Ed Code is in place.” He then admonished her: “It‘s not appropriate to . . . intervene in a hearing like this or process like this by going to someone‘s house.”
Following the admonishment, Dr. Hamilton allowed I.O.‘s parents to present their son‘s side of the case. I.O.‘s parents intended to question one of his teachers at the hearing and, to that end, asked the school to bring the teacher to the hearing. I.O.‘s parents believed the teacher—who recently wrote that I.O. “is very patient and caring to his classmates,” “is a cheerful, pol[ite], and enthusiastic learner,” and “is a positive influence on the class and a joy to have in class“—would provide a fuller picture of I.O. because she interacted with I.O. on a daily basis. But the school declined to produce the teacher at the hearing. Dr. Hamilton attempted to provide an explanation on the record, but the record captured only this: “[W]e don‘t (unintelligible).” The District later
acknowledged that off the record it informed I.O.‘s parents that the teacher could not testify because “[i]nformation regarding [I.O.‘s] general character was not probative. . . .”3
I.O.‘s parents also sought to present a family member, who was a parole officer, as a witness who could testify about the BB guns and I.O.‘s character. But a District director refused to allow the family member to testify because he did not witness the incident. I.O.‘s mother further discussed various student comments (20 in her count) telling him “we miss you,” “we want you
With limited witness options, I.O.‘s parents relied principally on one witness: I.O. I.O. acknowledged he took the BB guns to school on two days, took a gun out of his backpack on one occasion, and shot the gun at the ground. He said he wanted to “show my friends” and to do “target practice after school.” He added that he had just received the BB guns and had never before shot a BB gun, apart from the one instance when he fired the unloaded gun at the ground. He acknowledged it was wrong to bring the BB guns to school.
Following the hearing, the panel recommended that I.O. receive a suspended expulsion. It cited the same statutes that Whitten had cited in her expulsion
recommendation and added a new statute,
The District‘s governing board later adopted the panel‘s findings and the panel‘s suspended expulsion order without modification.
C. The County Board‘s Decision
I.O. appealed the District‘s decision to the Sacramento County Board of Education (the County Board), which, per
relevant to this topic. Third, it found the District wrongly relied on
The County Board ordered the District‘s expulsion decision expunged from I.O.‘s school records and deemed the expulsion not to have occurred.
D. The Trial Court‘s Decision
Following the County Board‘s decision, the District filed a combined petition for writ of administrative mandamus and civil complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief with the trial court. The District asked the trial court to order the County Board to set aside its decision, to declare that the County Board acted in excess of its authority, and to enjoin the County Board. It also sought an immediate stay of the County Board‘s decision to prevent I.O. from enrolling at his middle school before a decision on the merits.
A trial judge with Sacramento County Superior Court denied the District‘s request for an immediate stay. The court explained, based on the limited evidence before it, that it “disagree[d] with the district that the board . . . appears to have exceeded its authority in overturning the decision. I don‘t believe they‘ve exceeded their authority.” The court added that “none of the evidence that the school district has presented . . . indicates that the student poses any continuing danger to school safety.”
Following the adverse ruling, the District sought an order assigning the case to a judge from a different court. It reasoned that because the suit involved two adversarial
public entities from Sacramento County, the matter should be before a judge from a county other than Sacramento County. (See
After the reassignment, the trial court found the County Board‘s decision should be set aside, finding none of the County Board‘s stated reasons for its decision persuasive. The court afterward ordered the County Board to set aside its decision and, after finding the District‘s suit enforced an important public policy, awarded the District over $150,000 in attorney fees.
I.O. and the County Board appealed.4
DISCUSSION
I
Timeliness of Appeal
We start with the District‘s contention that I.O. and the County Board filed their appeals too late. Although the trial court purported to enter judgment on January 4, 2021, in a document titled “Judgment Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate” (the Judgment), the District contends the court actually entered judgment on October 2, 2020, in a document titled “Ruling on Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus” (the Ruling). It then contends I.O.‘s and the County Board‘s appeals are untimely because they filed their appeals on January 26, 2021, and March 2, 2021, respectively, more than 60 days after the trial court clerk served them with the Ruling on October 2, 2020. We disagree.
The normal time for filing an appeal is the earlier of “(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled
‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).) The District focuses on the first of these timelines. It argues the trial court‘s October 2020 Ruling, and not its January 2021 Judgment, served as the court‘s judgment. It then contends the 60-day timeline for filing an appeal was triggered in October 2020 when the trial court clerk served the parties with a filed-endorsed copy of the Ruling.
We turn next to the law. “An application for a writ of administrative mandamus,” like the one the District filed here, “is a ‘special proceeding of a civil nature.’ ” (Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115 (Dhillon).) A “judgment” in these types of proceedings “is the final determination of the rights of the parties therein” (
But the October 2020 Ruling neither finally determined the rights of the parties nor commanded the County Board to set aside its decision. Although the court said the County Board‘s “decisions . . . are set aside” in the Ruling, it did not in fact command the County Board to set aside its decision until the January 2021 Judgment. Nor did it specify the full relief the District would ultimately receive, which led the parties to further disputes over the appropriate terms for the judgment. As the District itself acknowledged in a letter to the trial court at the time, the District and the County Board could not settle on the terms of the proposed judgment following the court‘s Ruling and sought a hearing to resolve their dispute. After the District proposed various versions of the judgment, the trial court finally entered the Judgment in January 2021.
Considering these circumstances, we cannot say the October 2020 Ruling was “the final determination of the rights of the parties” (
The District‘s counterarguments do not persuade us to find otherwise. It first contends “an order granting a petition for an extraordinary writ constitutes a final judgment for purposes of an appeal, even if the order is not accompanied by a separate formal judgment.” We acknowledge that several courts have stated as much. (See Public Defenders’ Organization v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409;
Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 43, 58, review granted June 15, 2022, S274147.) But we find these cases misstate the relevant law. As our Supreme Court has explained, “cases have . . . held that a trial court‘s judgment granting administrative mandamus, and ordering the substantive relief sought by the petitioner, is a final judgment.” (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1113-1114, italics added.) And as our Supreme Court has further explained, “[a]s a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final.” (Id. at p. 1115.) For the reasons already covered, the trial court‘s Ruling was not a final judgment under this standard. It neither ordered the full substantive relief that the District sought—including the District‘s requested “[j]udgment ordering the [County Board] to set aside the Decision“—nor resolved all issues except the fact of compliance or noncompliance.
The District next suggests the trial court clerk evinced its own understanding that the Ruling served as the judgment. That is so, it reasons, because “[w]hen the Court filed its October 2, 2020, Ruling . . ., the Court [clerk] immediately entered judgment on the same day in the court record, as reflected in the Court‘s Register of Actions.” (Italics omitted.) But the register of actions does not refer to any judgment until January 4, 2021, when the court entered the January 2021 Judgment. That indicates that the court clerk understood the January 2021 Judgment, and not the earlier Ruling, to be the judgment. In any event, the substance and effect of a decision, not the clerk‘s offered label in the register of actions, is the controlling consideration. (See Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115 [” ’ “It is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative” ’ “].)
Lastly, the District contends the Ruling granted it the exact relief it sought and left no issue open for future consideration except the fact of compliance
Ruling. But that is not quite true. In the Ruling, the court explained its reasoning for rejecting the County Board‘s decision, said the writ was granted, and said the County Board‘s decisions are set aside. But it did not actually grant the District the full relief it sought, nor did it command the County Board to do anything, until the January 2021 Judgment. Only then did the court provide for “judgment granting the petition . . . in favor of [the District]” and provide for the issuance of a writ of mandate commanding the County Board to set aside its decision. The District‘s conduct before the trial court, moreover, undermines its current claim that the January 2021 Judgment was merely redundant of the Ruling. Again, following the Ruling, the District negotiated with the County Board on the terms of the proposed judgment and sought a hearing to resolve the parties’ disputes. These prior efforts to obtain a judgment in its favor bely the District‘s current assertion that the Ruling itself already resolved all the parties’ disputes. (See Davis v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 669, 673 [“The city‘s filing of its ‘[Proposed] Judgment’ belies its assertion that nothing more needed to be done, for if nothing more were needed then why did the city file its proposed judgment“].)
II
The District‘s “Continuing Danger” Finding
Satisfied we have jurisdiction, we turn to I.O.‘s and the County Board‘s contention that the District misinterpreted
Under
the nature of the act [or violation], the presence of the pupil causes a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others.” (
Our focus here is on the “continuing danger” provision, which the District relied on for its secondary finding. According to the District, the statutory text
But according to I.O., the County Board, and the Attorney General (as amicus curiae), a school district must consider a student‘s circumstances more broadly before finding the student poses a continuing danger. I.O. reasons that “[e]ven considering only ‘the nature of the act’ under
Our reading of
Those principles in mind, we turn first to
Considering the phrase “due to” in the context of
We also find this interpretation compatible with the whole of the statute, even if it results in the “[d]ue to the nature of the act [or violation]” language playing a different role than the District prefers. Like the District, we agree this language is important. It ensures, for instance, that a school board does not find a student poses a continuing danger for reasons having no meaningful connection to “the nature of the act [or violation]” that led to the recommended expulsion. But we find it does not, as the District believes, bar
as between one interpretation requiring a school district to make a finding of dangerousness based on a single moment in a child‘s life, and another interpretation requiring a school district to make a finding of dangerousness based on all the relevant facts, we find the latter interpretation more sensible and consistent with the Legislature‘s likely intent.
Review of the overall statutory scheme reinforces our reading of
All these other provisions require a school district to evaluate whether a student poses a danger based on all the relevant facts without any explicit limit on the scope of the district‘s inquiry. And if the Legislature intended a broad inquiry to evaluate dangerousness in these provisions, we find it odd to conclude that it intended a far narrower inquiry in
child‘s true dangerousness based on all the relevant facts when deciding whether to extend a suspension while awaiting an expulsion decision (see
We further find this construction consistent with the Legislature‘s general intent in
These findings together demonstrate that although school districts must have the ability to suspend and expel students, they should only do so when appropriate to promote safer school environments and improve pupil behavior. And in evaluating whether expulsion promotes the goal of safer school environments, commonsense favors a scheme that evaluates the student‘s actual dangerousness based on all the relevant facts, not a scheme that artificially evaluates dangerousness based solely on a single moment in time. The former approach, not the latter, better aligns with the Legislature‘s intent to promote safe school environments while also limiting unnecessary expulsions.
For all these reasons—
Several classmates, in turn, wrote “we miss you,” “we want you back,” “everyone has your back and supports you,” and “everyone makes mistakes, you are not a bad person.” All this evidence tended to show that those at school who knew I.O. best—his teacher and his classmates—did not believe he posed a danger to the physical safety of himself or others. Yet the District, misreading
III
The District‘s Witness Intimidation Finding
Lastly, we consider I.O.‘s and the County Board‘s challenge to the District‘s finding that I.O. intimidated a witness in violation of
Here, in finding I.O. violated this provision, the District relied on two written statements—one from a fellow student and another from the student‘s mother. Both the student and his mother sought to avoid testifying at I.O.‘s hearing and, after receiving a pre-filled form, checked a box saying they feared retaliation. The student wrote: I.O. “and his mom came to my house and started talking to my mom about the statement.”
The student‘s mother, similarly, wrote: “I really don‘t want to attend this hearing because boy [and] his mom came to our house, and want me to write statement. But I really don‘t know about this boy. And I am scare[d] to show them our faces who we are.” Based on this evidence, the panel found I.O. intimidated a witness within the meaning of
We conclude the District‘s finding lacks evidentiary support. Again,
The District, believing the evidence sufficient, counters that it is enough that I.O.‘s friend and his mother “felt intimidated by [I.O.‘s] mother‘s actions to the point that they were fearful of the consequences of testifying at the hearing.” (Italics omitted.) But the District misconstrues
conduct, not the conduct of any parent. (
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the postjudgment order granting attorney fees are reversed. I.O. and the County Board are entitled to recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
HOCH, J.