DAVID MEINHARDT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF SUNNYVALE, Defendant and Respondent; SUNNYVALE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
D079451
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Filed 3/9/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. 19CV346911)
Messing Adam & Jasmine and Gregg McLean Adam for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
“California cases have uniformly held that a trial court‘s complete denial of a petition for administrative mandamus is a final judgment that may be appealed by the petitioner.” (Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1113 (Dhillon).) And, as the Supreme Court in Dhillon explained, a ruling nominally denominated as an “order” on a petition for writ of administrative mandate1 may, in fact, constitute a “final judgment” when such order has the effect of a final judgment. (Id. at p. 1115.) That is because it is “’ “not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
In addressing whether a ruling has sufficient finality to constitute a judgment, the Dhillon court stated, ” ’ “As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.” ’ ” (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115.) The Dhillon court applied this test in concluding that the trial court‘s “order” on the plaintiff‘s petition for writ of administrative mandate in that case “was an appealable final judgment.” (Id. at p. 1116.)
Dhillon is consistent with numerous published cases that have concluded that an order denying a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment for
Published authority also reveals an important consequence that follows from this case law. In a case in which a court has entered a ruling on a writ petition that constitutes a final judgment, any party seeking appellate review of that ruling must timely appeal from that final judgment—and the time to file a notice of appeal is not restarted by the trial court‘s subsequent entry of a document styled as a “judgment” that merely reiterates the prior final judgment. (See City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 182-183 (City of Calexico) [dismissing cross-appeal where party failed to timely appeal from September 24 ruling denying two petitions for writ of mandate that constituted a final judgment and stating, “[t]he mere fact that the trial court entered a subsequent judgment after issuing the September 24 ruling is irrelevant, because the September 24 ruling was itself a final judgment” (id. at p. 192)]; Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 582-583 (Laraway) [concluding that an order that “completely resolved all issues between all parties” on petitioner‘s writ petition was a final judgment from which no timely appeal was taken and stating that the “[r]ules of [c]ourt do not provide, once a judgment . . . has been entered, . . . the time to appeal can be restarted or extended by the filing of a subsequent judgment . . . making the same decision“]; accord Valero Refining Co.-California v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. Hearing Bd. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 618, 633, fn. 10 (Valero) [“Contrary to the suggestion by the [defendants], the appealable judgment was the court‘s order granting a writ of mandate, not a ‘judgment’ that it subsequently entered“].)
In this case, plaintiff Officer David Meinhardt failed to timely appeal from a trial court ruling that denied his petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety, completely resolved all of the issues in the matter, and
In light of the case law described above, we solicited supplemental briefing from the parties on the timeliness of Officer Meinhardt‘s appeal. In his supplemental brief, Meinhardt contends that to dismiss his appeal would contravene applicable statutory language, conflict with certain case law, and be ”patently inequitable.” He further contends that City of Calexico is distinguishable and that this court “should resist the impulse to extend Laraway‘s questionable logic further.”
While we have carefully considered Officer Meinhardt‘s arguments, Laraway and City of Calexico are directly on point and mandate dismissal of his appeal. We publish our opinion to explain how Dhillon supports the conclusion that Laraway and City of Calexico were correctly decided, and to reiterate the critical importance of determining whether a ruling on a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment in seeking appellate review of such a ruling.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Officer Meinhardt‘s petition for writ of administrative mandate
In May 2019, Officer Meinhardt filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to
In his petition, Officer Meinhardt sought “to rectify the . . . Board‘s abuse of discretion and misapplication of law in upholding a forty-four (44) hour suspension against [him] for engaging in speech that was critical of policies implemented by the new Department Chief . . . .”
After the Board filed an answer to the petition and lodged the administrative record, the parties filed briefs on the petition.
In May 2020, the trial court held a telephonic hearing on Officer Meinhardt‘s writ petition.3 On August 6, 2020, the trial court issued a signed ruling titled “ORDER” denying Meinhardt‘s petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety.
At the outset of the ruling, the trial court described the telephonic hearing on the petition and stated, “After consideration of the pleadings, the exhibits (including the administrative record), the authorities cited by counsel in their briefs and the arguments made by counsel at the hearing, and no party having requested a statement of decision, the Court issues the following order.” The court proceeded to address the merits of the petition for several pages, and concluded its ruling by stating, “Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus is DENIED.”
That same day, the clerk of court served the August 6 ruling denying the petition for writ of mandate on the parties by mail. The clerk‘s service of the ruling is memorialized in the record by a proof of service.4
C. The Board‘s August 14 notice of entry
On August 14, the Board electronically served Officer Meinhardt with a document titled “Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order,” together with a file-stamped copy of the August 6 order.
D. The September 25 “judgment”
On September 25, 2020, the clerk filed a document signed by the trial court on September 17 titled “JUDGMENT,” that states:
“On August 6, 2020, the Court issued an Order Denying Petitioner David Meinhardt‘s Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. For the reasons set forth in the Order, the Court hereby enters
Judgment for Respondents City of Sunnyvale, et al., and against Petitioner David Meinhardt, who shall take nothing by this action. “IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.”
The August 6 ruling denying Officer Meinhardt‘s petition for writ of administrative mandate was attached to the September 25 “judgment.”5
E. Officer Meinhardt‘s appeal
On October 15, 2020, Officer Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal that stated that he was appealing from the September 17, 20206 “judgment” denying his petition for writ of administrative mandate.
F. The parties’ supplemental briefs
While this appeal was pending, this court sent the parties a letter soliciting supplemental briefing. The letter stated in relevant part:
“The parties are directed to file simultaneous supplemental letter briefs, no longer than five single-spaced pages, answering the following question:
“Was [Officer Meinhardt‘s] October 15, 2020 notice of appeal timely filed in this case?
“In answering this question, the parties are directed to discuss [City of Calexico, supra,] 64 Cal.App.5th 180. (See id. at pp. 185-195 [explaining that ’ [a]n order granting or denying a petition for writ of mandate that disposes of all of the claims between the parties is an immediately appealable final judgment,’ (id. at p. 190) and concluding that a clerk‘s service of a file-endorsed ruling denying petitions for writ of mandate and an accompanying dated declaration of service triggered the 60-day period to appeal set forth in
California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) ].)”
Officer Meinhardt and the Board each filed a supplemental brief responsive to our request.
DISCUSSION
Officer Meinhardt‘s appeal is untimely and must be dismissed
We must consider, sua sponte, whether we have appellate jurisdiction over Officer Meinhardt‘s appeal. (E.g., Drum v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 [“because the timeliness of an appeal poses a jurisdictional issue, we must raise the point sua sponte“].)
A. Governing law
1. The time within which a party must file a notice of appeal
“(a) Normal time
“(1) . . . [A] notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:
“(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served;
“(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service;”
“. . . [N]o court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. If a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss the appeal.”
2. Determining the existence of a final judgment in the context of a petition for writ of mandate
a. The statutory scheme
An application for a writ of mandate is a “SPECIAL PROCEEDING[] OF A CIVIL NATURE” governed by the provisions of part 3 of the
“A judgment in a special proceeding is the final determination of the rights of the parties therein.”
Chapter 2 of title 1 of part 3 of the
“The court shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside the order or decision, or denying the writ. Where the judgment commands that the order or decision be set aside, it may order the reconsideration of the case in light of the court‘s opinion and judgment and may order respondent to take such further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law, but the judgment shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.”
In outlining the law governing the issuance of stays of administrative orders in the context of administrative mandate,
“(g) . . . [T]he court in which proceedings under this section are instituted may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision pending the judgment of the court, or until the filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment or until the expiration of the time for filing the notice, whichever occurs first.”
“The provisions of Part II of this Code relative to new trials and appeals, except in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Title, apply to the proceedings mentioned in this Title.”
Among the provisions of “Part II” of the
“A judgment . . . in a civil action or proceeding may be reviewed as prescribed in this title.”
“(a) An appeal . . . is to the court of appeal. An appeal . . . may be taken from any of the following:
“(1) From a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment . . . .”
Thus, as the Dhillon court succinctly summarized, “A final judgment in a special proceeding is appealable . . . .” (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115.)
b. Dhillon
In Dhillon, the Supreme Court considered whether a trial court‘s order granting, in part, a surgeon‘s petition for writ of administrative mandate and remanding the matter for further administrative proceedings was an appealable final judgment. (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) Dhillon involved a surgeon who filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate related to the suspension of his clinical privileges by the owner of the hospitals at which he practiced. (Id. at pp. 1112-1113.) The trial court granted the surgeon‘s writ petition in part. (Id. at p. 1113.) Specifically, the trial court determined that the surgeon was entitled to an administrative hearing prior to the suspension of his clinical privileges and ordered the hospital owner to conduct such a hearing. (Ibid.) The hospital owner appealed the ruling. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, stating, ” ‘The superior court‘s order remanding the matter to [the hospital owner] is not a final, appealable order.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Dhillon court granted review and noted the division of authority with respect to whether such an order was an appealable final judgment:
“The Court of Appeal‘s dismissal order deepened a longstanding conflict concerning the appealability of a trial court‘s order, on a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, remanding the matter for further proceedings before the administrative body. California cases have uniformly held that a trial court‘s complete denial of a petition for administrative mandamus is a
final judgment that may be appealed by the petitioner. [Citations.] The cases have also held that a trial court‘s judgment granting administrative mandamus, and ordering the substantive relief sought by the petitioner, is a final judgment that may be appealed by the respondent agency. [Citations.] In each of these situations, it is clear that ’ “no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of ” ’ the court‘s decree. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 698 (Griset), quoting Lyon v. Goss (1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 670.) California courts have, however, divided over whether the same is true of a trial court‘s order that does not grant substantive relief, but instead remands the cause for further proceedings before the administrative agency.” (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1113-1114.)
The Dhillon court explained that it had granted review to resolve this division of authority. (Id. at p. 1114Dhillon court stated that it was required to determine “whether the trial court‘s order in this case was a final judgment.” (Id. at p. 1115.) The Dhillon court recounted the following general principles for determining whether a ruling of the trial court constitutes a final judgment:
” ’ “We have previously recognized that a judgment is final, and therefore appealable, ‘when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘It is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication
which is determinative. As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.“’ [Citations.] ‘We long have recognized a “well-established policy, based upon the remedial character of the right of appeal, of according that right in doubtful cases ‘when such can be accomplished without doing violence to applicable rules.’ ” ’ (Ibid.)
Applying these principles, the Dhillon court concluded that the trial court‘s order was an appealable final judgment because it granted or denied each of the surgeon‘s claims and “did not reserve jurisdiction to consider any issues.” (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1116-1117.) The Dhillon court reasoned, “once the trial court issued the writ, nothing remained to be done in that court; no issue was then left for the court‘s ’ “future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1117, quoting Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Dhillon court considered the surgeon‘s contention that “the trial court‘s order . . . was not a final judgment because it was not a ‘judgment’ as that term is defined by
further action as required.”9 (Dhillon, supra, at p. 1117, fn. 3.) According to the surgeon, “the trial court‘s order fell into none of these categories.” (Ibid.)
The Dhillon court rejected this argument, reasoning:
“Assuming that
subdivision (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 defines a ‘judgment’ for the purposes of determining whether an order in an administrative mandamus proceeding is an appealable final judgment, [the surgeon‘s] argument nevertheless lacks merit. Although the order did not explicitly set aside the discipline imposed on [the surgeon], that consequence was implicit in the trial court‘s determination that [the surgeon] was entitled to further administrative proceedings before he could be disciplined. By commanding [the hospital owner] to conduct those proceedings, the trial court necessarily set aside [the hospital owner‘s] order imposing the discipline. (See Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698 [ ’ “It is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative” ‘].)” (Ibid.)
c. Case law in which courts have concluded that a ruling granting or denying a petition for writ of mandate is a judgment
As stated in part I, ante, Dhillon is consistent with numerous cases in which courts have stated that a ruling granting or denying a petition for a writ of mandate is in “effect” a final judgment (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 698) because the ruling finally determines the rights of the parties, and is therefore appealable, even if it is in the “form” of an order. (Ibid.; see, e.g., Sandlin, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 820; Molloy, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 753; Tomra Pacific, Inc., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 481-482; Public Defenders’ Organization, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409; Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 944, fn. 1 (Townsel); Haight v. City of San Diego (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 413, 416, fn. 3 (Haight).)
“Generally, only judgments may be appealed. [Citation.] ‘A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.’ [Citation.] Petitions for extraordinary writs, such as petitions for writs of mandate, are special proceedings. [Citation.] Accordingly, an order granting or denying a petition for an extraordinary writ constitutes a final judgment for purposes of an appeal, even if the order is not accompanied by a separate formal judgment. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)10
Similarly, in Tomra Pacific, Inc., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 463, two plaintiffs filed notices of appeal from an “order denying petitions for a writ of mandate” (id. at p. 469, italics added) that sought to compel repayment of certain loans between state funds. The Tomra Pacific, Inc. court stated that the order was in fact an appealable final judgment:
“We note that the order denying the petitions for a writ of mandate is not termed a judgment and does not explicitly address the declaratory relief causes of action. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the order before us constitutes an appealable final judgment as it left no issue for further consideration.” (Id. at pp. 481-482.)
Similarly, in Townsel, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 940, the petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate requesting that an entity vacate its decision upholding the termination of his employment. The Townsel court concluded that the trial court‘s order denying the petition was properly treated as a final judgment, reasoning in relevant part:
“The record does not show that judgment was entered on the order. However, even if a separate formal judgment has not been entered on an order denying a petition for writ of mandate, the order is properly treated as a final judgment in a special proceeding for purposes of appeal. (Haight, [supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 416, fn. 3].)” (Id. at p. 944, fn. 1.)
final judgment in a special proceeding for purposes of appeal.” (Id. at p. 416, fn. 3.)
d. Laraway and its progeny
In Laraway, the petitioner “sought certain public records” from a school district. (Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 580.) The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandate and prohibition and sought injunctive and declaratory relief from the school district and several of its employees (collectively “District“). (Id. at pp. 580-581.) On August 23, 2000, the trial court entered an ” ‘order regarding petitioner‘s motion for writ of mandamus, prohibition, injunctive and declaratory relief.’ ” (Id. at p. 581, italics added in Laraway.) The August 2000 order “completely resolved all issues between all parties” and did not “contemplate nor direct the preparation of any further order or judgment.” (Id. at p. 582.)
On January 29, 2001, the trial court in Laraway filed a “judgment” that “simply reiterated that the court had ‘ruled by Order dated August 23, 2000’ on the petition, set forth the same rulings as contained in the order denying the petition, added a provision that judgment was entered in favor of respondent and against petitioner, and awarded respondent $0 in costs against petitioner.” (Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.)
In late March or early April 2001,11 the petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the January 2001 “judgment.” (Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) On April 19, 2001, the District filed a cross-appeal from the January 2001 “judgment.” (Ibid.)
On appeal, the Laraway court “sua sponte raise[d] the jurisdictional and dispositive issue of whether the prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction, a timely notice of appeal, was ever filed in this case.” (Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) In considering this issue, the Laraway court noted that the August 23, 2000 order “contemplated no further action, such as the preparation of another order or judgment [citation], and disposed of all issues between all parties.” (Id. at p. 583.) The Laraway court concluded that the August 2000 order “was properly treated as a final judgment.” (Ibid., citing Townsel, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 944, fn. 1; Haight, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 416, fn. 3.)
The Laraway court added that “the subsequent judgment entered on January 29, 2001 was simply a repetition of the August 23, 2000 order.”
“Once a final, appealable order or judgment has been entered, the time to appeal begins to run. The [r]ules of [c]ourt do not provide, once a judgment or appealable order has been entered, that the time to appeal can be restarted or extended by the filing of a subsequent judgment or appealable order making the same decision. Thus, once the August 23, 2000 order was entered, the time within which to file a notice of appeal therefrom began to run, and could not be restarted by the relabeling of the trial court‘s earlier decision and then entering such ‘judgment’ at a later date.
“Because the parties failed to file timely notice of appeal from the August 23, 2000 order, the petitioner‘s appeal and respondent‘s cross-appeal, filed more than 180 days after entry of the August 23, 2000 order, were untimely, and both such appeals must be dismissed.” (Ibid.)
In City of Calexico, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 180, this court relied on Laraway12 in concluding that a party had failed to timely file a cross-appeal from a September 24 ruling denying two petitions for writ of administrative mandate because the ruling was a final judgment.13 (City of Calexico, supra, at p. 183.) The City of Calexico court reasoned in part:
“In the September 24 ruling, the trial court denied all of the parties’ claims for relief in their entirety, and did not contemplate any further action in the case. Thus, as in Laraway, the September 24 ruling is ‘properly treated as a final judgment’ because it ‘contemplated no further action, such as the preparation of another order or judgment [citation], and disposed of all issues between all parties.’ (Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.)
“While the City correctly notes in its letter brief that ‘the City filed a proposed judgment with the superior court, which the superior court signed
on November 21, 2019,’ as in Laraway, this second judgment ‘simply reiterated’ that the court had ruled on the petition and ‘set forth the same rulings as contained in the order denying the petition.’ ”
(Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) There is nothing in the September 24 ruling itself, nor anything else in the record, demonstrating that the trial court contemplated that the court or the parties would take further action in the case such that the September 24 ruling was not final and therefore, appealable. The mere fact that the trial court entered a subsequent judgment after issuing the September 24 ruling is irrelevant, because the September 24 ruling was itself a final judgment. (See Laraway, supra, at p. 583.)”14 (City of Calexico, at p. 192.)
In Valero, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th 618, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to
The Valero court considered whether it had appellate jurisdiction over the matter, explaining, “In this case, the air district parties filed their notice of appeal more than 60 days after the superior court clerk mailed the parties a file-stamped copy of the appealable judgment accompanied by a proof of service, and so we requested supplemental briefing concerning the appeal‘s timeliness.” (Valero, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.) In a footnote immediately following this statement, the Valero court stated, “Contrary to the suggestion by the air district parties, the appealable judgment was the court‘s order granting a writ of mandate, not a ‘judgment’ that it subsequently
B. The August 6 ruling is a final judgment
The trial court‘s August 6 ruling denied Officer Meinhardt‘s petition for writ of administrative mandate in its entirety and did not contemplate any further action in the case. (See pt. II.B, ante.) Although the August 6 ruling is denominated an “Order,” the law is well established in this context that, “ “ ‘[i]t is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative.” ’ ” (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115, quoting Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698.)
Applying that test here, and consistent with Laraway and City of Calexico as well as the cases cited in part III.A.2.c, ante, the August 6 ruling is “ ‘properly treated as a final judgment’ because it ‘contemplated no further action, such as the preparation of another order or judgment [citation], and disposed of all issues between all parties.’ ” (City of Calexico, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 192, quoting Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.)
Further, the fact that the trial court entered a document denominated as a “judgment” on September 25 (see pt. II.D, ante) after having issued the August 6 ruling is irrelevant, because the August 6 ruling was itself a final judgment. Thus, Officer Meinhardt‘s period within which to appeal was not restarted by the trial court‘s filing of the September 25 document styled as a “judgment” that merely reiterated the rulings contained in the court‘s August 6 ruling. (See Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 583; City of Calexico, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 195; accord Valero, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 633, fn. 10.)
C. Officer Meinhardt‘s arguments to the contrary are ultimately unpersuasive
Officer Meinhardt‘s supplemental letter brief on appealability contends that the August 6 ruling was not a final judgment. Although he makes several arguments that are worthy of consideration, for the reasons described below, we conclude that none is persuasive.
Officer Meinhardt properly notes that “[t]he right to appeal is ‘entirely statutory and subject to complete legislative control.’ ([Quoting,] Trede v. Superior Court (1943) 21 Cal.2d 630, 634.)” He further notes that
This argument is ultimately unpersuasive because, as stated in part III.A.2.a, ante,
2. Officer Meinhardt‘s “premature” appeal theory is unpersuasive
Officer Meinhardt argues that an order granting or denying a writ petition is not a judgment, but that it may be deemed a judgment in order to permit a “premature” appeal from such an order to proceed. He contends that the “equitable sentiments” that underlie “Griset and other cases17” is “to
According to Officer Meinhardt, he was not required to appeal from the purportedly nonappealable August 6 ruling denying his petition for writ of mandate. He argues, “[t]he takeaway is that because appellant correctly filed his appeal within 60 days after notice of entry of judgment19 he required neither application of the safe harbor rule nor [r]ule 8.104(d) [pertaining to premature appeals] to make his appeal valid.” (Boldface omitted.)
We acknowledge that there is language in some case law that is arguably consistent with such a theory. For example, the Public Defenders’ Organization court stated, “[A]n order granting or denying a petition for an extraordinary writ constitutes a final judgment for purposes of an appeal, even if the order is not accompanied by a separate formal judgment,” thereby potentially suggesting the legal relevance of a “separate formal judgment.” (Public Defenders’ Organization, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409.) We reject this argument for several reasons.
To begin with, unlike in In re Social Services Payment Cases, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 1249, in none of the cases cited in part III.A.2.c, ante, did the reviewing court state that an order granting or denying a petition for an extraordinary writ is nonappealable. Nor did any of these cases cite to the rule of court pertaining to premature appeals.20
In contrast, an order granting or denying a petition for writ of mandate in its entirety, when such order contemplates the taking of no further action in the case, concludes the special proceeding of a civil nature. As such, it is properly considered a final judgment. (See Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115.) Thus, Dhillon supports the principle that an order that finally resolves a petition for writ of mandate is itself a final judgment, rather than the theory that such order may be deemed a final judgment if an appeal is taken therefrom.
Griset, which Officer Meinhardt properly notes did refer to a “ ‘premature but valid appeal from the judgment,’ ” (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 700, quoting Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 740 (Morehart))21 is distinguishable because the
3. None of the case law that Officer Meinhardt cites demonstrates that his appeal was timely filed
Officer Meinhardt also cites two cases in support of his contention that his appeal was timely filed. He notes that in Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 362 (Protect Our Water), in an appeal from a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal stated the following in a footnote:
“[Respondent] filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing the appeal was filed more than 60 days after service of the order denying the writ of mandate. However, the appeal was filed within 60 days after entry of the judgment, and the judgment is appealable. (See Catalina Investments, Inc. v. Jones (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, fn. 3; MCM Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 359, 367, fn. 3.)”
We respectfully decline to follow this footnote of Protect Our Water to the extent that it may be read to suggest that an order that fully resolves a petition for writ of mandate and contemplates no further action in this case is not a judgment.22 The court‘s analysis is cursory, and fails to address Laraway, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 579 or discuss the cases on which it relies. Further, the two cases that the Protect Our Water court cites do not, in our view, persuasively support the Protect Our Water court‘s denial of the motion to dismiss. Catalina Investments, Inc. v. Jones, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 1, states merely that “a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate is appealable,” without discussing the type of ruling that constitutes a judgment. (Id. at p. 5, fn. 3.) In MCM Construction, Inc., the court stated, “both the order denying its writ petition and the final judgment are appealable orders where no issues remain to be determined.” (MCM Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 367, fn. 3.) However, in our view, neither an order denying a writ petition, nor a final judgment, is
Officer Meinhardt also cites Hadley v. Superior Court (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 389 (Hadley). In Hadley, a court clerk entered a minute order denying a petition for writ of mandate. (Id. at p. 392.) Contending that no final judgment had been entered, the petitioner subsequently filed a motion for entry of judgment. (Ibid.) After the trial court denied the motion, the petitioner filed an application for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal directing the trial court “to render and enter judgment in [the action] pending in respondent court . . . .” (Id. at p. 391.) The Hadley court issued a peremptory writ requiring respondent court to enter judgment. (Id. at p. 396.) The Hadley court reasoned that “a minute order signed by the clerk and entered in the minutes,” does not constitute a “final judgment in a proceeding for administrative mandamus after the issuance of an alternative writ and trial on the merits.” (Id. at p. 393, italics altered.)
It is well established that a minute order dismissing a case that is not signed by a judge is not a judgment. (See Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 759, 765; see
4. We continue to follow Laraway
Finally, Officer Meinhardt offers “seven reasons,” why this court should not follow Laraway. While the bulk of these arguments are addressed by our analysis above, in the interests of fairness and completeness, we discuss each contention here. We also note that Officer Meinhardt does not contend that any cases have questioned the reasoning of Laraway since its publication in 2002, and we are not aware of any such cases.
First, Officer Meinhardt notes that Laraway was not brought pursuant to
Second, Officer Meinhardt states that Laraway “appears to be the only published case in California that has dismissed an appeal as untimely,” for failure to timely appeal in this context. The Laraway and the City of Calexico courts both dismissed appeals in this context, and, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we find the reasons for these dismissals to be persuasive. Thus, we also reject Officer Meinhardt‘s third argument that Laraway takes “laudable efforts to preserve appellate rights and transforms them into a mandate to extinguish appellate rights,” his fourth argument that City of Calexico should not be “applied retroactively to appellant,” and his fifth argument that Laraway and City of Calexico fail to “account” for the fact that an appeal from an order denying a petition for writ of mandate is, according to Officer Meinhardt, a “premature” appeal.
We also reject Officer Meinhardt‘s sixth argument that application of the holdings in the Laraway / City of Calexico line of cases is undesirable because it would force “litigants to appeal every conceivable final order.” The law is well established that, as the Dhillon court stated, a judgment is determined by its “effect” rather than its “form.” (Dhillon, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1115.) Consequently, litigants seeking appellate review of a ruling that is, in effect, a judgment are required to timely appeal from such judgment.
Finally, Officer Meinhardt argues that there “is an overwhelming fairness and equity issue,” (boldface omitted) and contends that the “rules are clear
D. Officer Meinhardt‘s appeal must be dismissed
We concluded in part III.B, ante, that the August 6, 2020 ruling is a final appealable judgment. That same day, the clerk of court served the parties with the August 6 ruling and filed a proof of service showing the date that the ruling was served. (See pt. II.B, ante.) Pursuant to
IV. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Officer Meinhardt is to bear costs on appeal.
AARON, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
GUERRERO, J.