Nancy ARMIJO, personal representative of the Estate of Luz Armijo, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 95-2114.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
July 5, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, 1996.
87 F.3d 1188
John S. Thal, Atkinson & Thal, P.C. (Timothy C. Holm and Donald A. DeCandia, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BALDOCK, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
On October 23, 1987, Luz Armijo was killed when his vehicle collided with a train operated by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (hereaftеr “Santa Fe“) at the North Gabaldon crossing in Valencia County, New Mexico. Acting as the personal representative for her husband‘s estate, Nancy Armijo brought this action for wrongful death and punitive damages under New Mexico law, alleging Santa Fe negligently or recklessly failed to provide adequate warnings at the North Gabaldon crossing and negligently operated the train that collided with Mr. Armijo. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favоr of Santa Fe on Ms. Armijo‘s negligent failure to warn claim on the ground that claim is preempted by federal law, Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 754 F.Supp. 1526, 1528-34 (D.N.M.1990), and certified its decision as final pursuant to
We reversed the grant of partial summary judgment and held, as a matter of law, that
Upon remand, Santa Fe renewed its motion for partial summary judgment and submitted additional evidence. The district court again granted summary judgment1 on Ms. Armijo‘s claim Santa Fe negligently failed to provide adequate warning devices at the North Gabaldon crossing. Ms. Armijo then dismissed her remaining claims for compensatory damages with prejudice, and the district court entered final judgment in favor of Santa Fe. This appeal followеd.
I
Ms. Armijo contends the district court erred in concluding her state law failure to warn claims are preempted. In Easterwood, the Supreme Court considered whether certain regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, as amended,
The Supreme Court held
In Hatfield II, we held federal preemption was triggered in early 1985, at which time $619.17 in federal funds had been spent on preliminary engineering, federally mandated active warning devices had been selected pursuant to
Instead, we believe that the financial commitment must be such that it shows a clear federal intent to require a federally approved warning devicе at the crossing in question, backed up by the actual expenditure of federal resources of more than a casual or de minimis nature, and specifically directed toward the ultimate installation of the improved warning devices at that crossing. Id. At the moment the federal government manifests such intent, the “financing of the improvement project and its direction and control” are removed from the railroad, and claims against the rаilroad relating to the adequacy of the warnings are preempted. Id.
In light of Easterwood, Hatfield II, and our other post-Easterwood decisions, the issue in this case is whether federal funds participated in some significant way in the installation of warning devices at the North Gabaldon crossing before October 23, 1987, the date of the accident. Our review of the record shows federal participation began, and New Mexico law was preempted, no later than January 25, 1983. On that date, the Secrеtary of Transportation agreed to provide ninety percent of the funds required to install reflectorized crossbucks at a number of railroad grade crossings in New Mexico, including the North Gabaldon crossing. At this point, the North Gabaldon crossing became a “project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of [warning] devices,”
Ms. Armijo draws our attention to the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in Shots v. CSX Transp. Inc., 38 F.3d 304 (7th Cir.1994), which reached the opposite conclusion on facts very similar to those in this case. Mr. Shots was injured at a railroad grade crossing in Indiana in 1989. Id. at 305. At the time of the accident, the crossing was equipped only with reflectorized crossbucks. Id. In 1975, the state of Indiana and the railroad entered into an agreement to “upgrade the passive protection at the Railroad‘s public rail-highway crossings in Indiana to minimum standards, as established by the State” by installing reflectorized crossbucks at a number of crossings, including the crossing where Mr. Shots was injured. Id. at 306. Thе Secretary of Transportation approved the project five days after
The [1975] agreement does not state or imply that the thousands of crossings covered by it would be adequately safe if equipped with reflectorized cross-bucks. The point is rather that these are the only form of safety device that the agreement covers. This limitation of scope is reinforced by the fact that the agreement is explicitly limited to providing the “minimum” in passive protections—the minimum being standard reflectorized cross-bucks for crossings, such as the one in question in this case, that lacked even that much in the way of a warning device. Minimum is not a synonym for optimum, or even adequate. We must not forget the context of the agreement. The State of Indiana had thousands of substandard crossings, and limited funds, even with federal largesse, to bring them all up to the optimal standard of safety. The task was to maximize grade-crossing safety in the state as a whole, subject to a budget constraint, so it was to be expected that adequate safety might be sacrificed at some crossings to enable minimum safety to be achieved at all. So far as can be gathered from the record compiled in the district court, the agreement was a step on the road to adequatе safety rather than a determination by the State of Indiana or the federal Secretary of Transportation as to what safety devices would be adequate at each of the thousands of crossings covered by it.
Thus we do not think it can be realistically said, to use the formulation in Easterwood, that “the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed” at these crossings merely because he authorized federal funds to bring them up to minimum standards, utilizing passive warning devices solely. Indeed, it would have been an extraordinary act of irresponsibility for the Secretary of Transportation, by approving the agreement, to preclude tort liability for the railroad‘s failing to have active warning devices at any of the thousands of crossings covered by the agreement, or otherwise to prevent the state from requiring adequate safety devices at the busiest or most dangerous of thеse crossings, when no one in the federal government had made a determination that the improvements to be made would bring all the crossings up to a level of safety adequate to satisfy federal standards.
Ms. Armijo contends, and we agree, that the Seventh Circuit‘s analysis in Shots arguably supports her position the Secretary of Transportation‘s approval and funding of the 1983-1984 crossbuck project did not trigger preemption. It is undisputed that the purpose of the project was to bring a large number of railroad grade crossings into compliance with the requirements of the Manual, and that the Secretary of Transportation‘s approval of the project was not the result of an express administrative finding pursuant to
Finally, Ms. Armijo makes much of the fact that in 1984, after the crossbuck project was complete, the New Mexico Railroad Safety Program Diagnostic Team (hereafter “the Diagnostic Team“) placed the North Gabaldon crossing on a list of twenty-two railroad grade crossings requiring federally funded installation of active warning systems once funds became available. She also notes one оf the members of the Diagnostic Team was Douglas Bennett, a United States Department of Transportation engineer, and that Mr. Bennett signed an affidavit stating his signature on the Diagnostic Team‘s report “represented the [Secretary of Transportation]‘s approval of the recommendations” contained in that report. Ostensibly, Ms. Armijo would have us hold that even if the Secretary of Transportation‘s initial determination (that passive warning systems were active at the North Gabaldon crossing as of early 1982) preempted state law, the subsequent decision (that an active warning system was needed as of 1984) somehow suspended the preemption of state law until federal funds participated in some significant way in the installation of the active warning devices. We decline to so hold. The fundamental issue under both Easterwood and our post-Easterwood decisions is whether the federal government has “displace[d] stаte and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained” and “effectively set the terms under which railroads are to participate in the improvement of crossings.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670; see Hatfield II, 64 F.3d at 562. The mere fact that the federal government has changed its opinion regarding what warning devices are needed at a particular crossing at some point after making a prior determination a lesser warning system is sufficient is of no real significance: the issue is not what warning system the federal government determines to be necessary, but whether the final authority to decide what warning system is needed has been taken out of the railroad‘s and the state‘s hands under
II
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
EBEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I agree that preemption initially occurred at the time the federal government significantly participated in the installation of reflectorized crossbucks.1 However, I diverge
My disagreement with the majority concerns whether preemption was in place at the time of the accident in 1987. In CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), the Supreme Court held that preemption applies when the preconditions for the application of either section (b)(3) or section (b)(4) have been met. 507 U.S. at 670-72. Looking at these regulations as applied to the North Gabaldon crossing at the time of the accident, the preconditions for section (b)(4) no longer were met in 1987. The regulation addressing section (b)(4) provides:
For crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA.
The majority concludes that the diagnostic team‘s 1984 recommendation of automatic gates did not remove the crossbucks’ preemptive effect because the Secretary of Transportation did not affirmatively abandon the crossbucks project and either withdraw federal funding or allow previously allocated funding to be used at another site. No case law requires such an affirmative withdrawal, and I believe that such a requirement is in conflict with the plain language of sections (b)(3) and (b)(4). Rather, I believe that the regulations recognize that as conditions surrounding a particular crossing change and make the crossing more dangerous to motorists, a determination that passive warning devices are sufficient to protect motorists in one year should not continue to preempt state claims when it is determined the passive devices provide insufficient warning in a later year. Also, considering the “presumption against preemption” applied by the Supreme Court in Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 667-68, I believe that we must conclude that neither section (b)(3) nor section (b)(4) operated to preempt Armijo‘s claims at the time of the accident.2 Accord-
