STATE OF NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF GAME AND FISH, Appellee-Petitioner, v. TIMOTHY L. RAWLINGS, Appellant-Respondent.
No. A-1-CA-36131
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
December 7, 2018
VARGAS, Judge.
Opinion Number: ________________
Filing Date: December 7, 2018
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Raymond Z. Ortiz, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Regina Ryanczak, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
The Simons Firm, LLP
Quinn Scott Simons
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
VARGAS, Judge.
{1} The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish (Game and Fish) appeals from the district court‘s order reversing Game and Fish‘s decision to deny Respondent‘s application for a New Mexico outfitter‘s license. Game and Fish raises four issues on appeal. First, Game and Fish argues that its hearing officer‘s decision to deny Respondent‘s application for an outfitter‘s license was supported by substantial evidence in accordance with
BACKGROUND
{2} After working as a licensed hunting guide in New Mexico for three years, Respondent submitted an application for a New Mexico outfitter‘s license to Game and Fish. Game and Fish denied his application pursuant to
That the license and/or license privileges of [Respondent] to hunt, fish, trap and guide in the State of Arizona be revoked and he be denied another for a period of five years; that the current licenses be suspended as of the date of this hearing and that they be revoked as of the date the order in this case is signed by the director; [and] that he be required to complete the hunter education course and provide proof to the Department‘s law enforcement branch before applying for any other licenses to hunt in the State [of Arizona.]
Respondent requested an administrative review of Game and Fish‘s decision, pursuant to
{3} The district court reversed the decision of Game and Fish, finding that Game and Fish acted arbitrarily and capriciously, applied an inapplicable subsection of
DISCUSSION
{4} Initially, we note that while Game and Fish raised issues of substantial evidence and abuse of discretion by the district court, the only argument developed in its brief involves the district court‘s interpretation of the relevant statutes and regulations. As such, this case requires us to interpret provisions of our statutes governing our statewide system for hunting activities set out in
Standard of Review
{5} This Court “conduct[s] the same review of an administrative order as the district court sitting in its appellate capacity[.]” Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm‘n, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶ 16, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806. We will not disturb a decision of Game and Fish unless it acted in a manner that is: “[(1)] arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; [(2)] not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or [(3)] otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. ¶ 17; see Rule 1-074. “A ruling by an administrative agency is arbitrary and capricious if it is unreasonable or without a
Statutory Interpretation
{6} When interpreting a statute, a court‘s primary goal is to “facilitate and promote the [L]egislature‘s purpose.” United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., 2010-NMSC-030, ¶ 17, 148 N.M. 426, 237 P.3d 728 (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In discerning that purpose, “we look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Flores v. Herrera, 2016-NMSC-033, ¶ 8, 384 P.3d 1070 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the plain meaning rule provides that “statutes are to be given effect as written and, where they are free from ambiguity, there is no room for construction[,]” this rule must be applied with caution, as “a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute‘s meaning.” State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 2, 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, courts will reject the literal language of the statute if doing so is necessary to “conform to the obvious intent of the [L]egislature, or to prevent its being absurd.” Id. ¶ 3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 15, 309 P.3d 1047 (indicating that the statute must be interpreted in the context of the statute as a whole with an eye toward its purposes and consequences). We consider all parts of the statute together, “read[ing] the statute in its entirety and constru[ing] each part in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole.” Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 14, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350. Furthermore, a statute “whose construction is in question, [is] to be read in connection with other statutes concerning the same subject matter.” State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep‘t v. Djamila B., 2014-NMCA-045, ¶ 10, 322 P.3d 444 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), aff‘d on other grounds sub nom., In re Mahdjid B., 2015-NMSC-003, 342 P.3d 698. Finally, we interpret statutes “to avoid rendering the Legislature‘s language superfluous.” Baker, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 24.
The District Court Properly Applied Section 17-2A-3(C)(3) to Respondent‘s Application
{7} It is unlawful in New Mexico for a person to work as an unlicensed hunting guide or outfitter.
{8} We initially consider the meaning of the term “revoke” and its counterpart, “suspend” as they are used in
D. “revoke a license” means to prohibit the conduct authorized by the license;
E. “suspend a license” means to prohibit, for a stated period of time, the conduct authorized by the license. “Suspend a license” also means to allow, for a stated period of time, the conduct authorized by the license, subject to conditions that are reasonably related to the grounds for suspension[.]
H. “Revocation” means when a person‘s hunting, fishing, trapping, guiding and outfitting privileges, or other privileges or authorities granted by an agreement, license or permit issued by the department, are taken away by the commission after notice and opportunity for a hearing.
I. “Suspension” means when a person‘s hunting, fishing, trapping, guiding and outfitting privileges, or other privileges or authorities granted by an agreement, license or permit issued by the department, are taken away by the commission, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, until the person comes back into compliance.
{9} The language of the decision by the Arizona Commission regarding the Respondent‘s Arizona license does not fit easily into the definitions promulgated by the Legislature contained in the ULA or the definitions promulgated by Game and Fish contained in its regulations. While using the term “revoked,” the decision of the Arizona Commission clearly contemplates the possibility of future hunting, fishing, trapping and guide privileges for the Respondent, ordering that “he be denied another [license] for a period of five years ... [and] that he be required to complete the hunter education course ... before applying for any other licenses[.]“.
{10} Under the ULA and Game and Fish regulations, however, the term “revoke” denotes a finality that cannot be overcome under any circumstances. In the instance of revocation, the conduct permitted by a license is “prohibited” under the ULA, see
{11} Game and Fish contends that the Arizona Commission‘s use of the term “revoked” is dispositive, arguing that had the Arizona Commission intended to “suspend” Respondent, it would have set conditions he must satisfy to lift the suspension. Game and Fish, however, ignores two critical points. First, at least one of the definitions of “suspension” on which it encourages us to rely provides that suspension “means to prohibit, for a stated period of time,” which is precisely what happened in this case. The Arizona Commission prohibited Respondent from obtaining a license which would permit him to hunt, fish, trap and guide for five years and subsequently restored his privileges by granting him a new license. See
{12} Game and Fish further argues that Respondent‘s claim “that his revocation was really a suspension ... results in a skewed
{13} The Compact requires that “[a] participating state shall recognize the suspension of license privileges of a person by another participating state as though the violation resulting in the suspension ... had occurred in the home state; and ... could have been the basis of the suspension of license privileges in the home state.”
{14} In this case, notwithstanding that the decision of the Arizona Commission stated that it “revoked” Respondent‘s privileges, it subsequently allowed him to obtain a new license after the proscribed time had passed and he complied with the requirements set out in the decision. The Compact requires us to “recognize the suspension ... as though the violation ... had occurred in the home state[,]”
{15} As the hearing officer‘s decision was not in accordance with the law when it denied Respondent‘s application, relying on
CONCLUSION
{16} The decision of the district court is affirmed.
{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
WE CONCUR:
HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge
EMIL J. KIEHNE, Judge