NORTHERN FROZEN FOODS, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. RONALD E. MOTON, SR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
No. 99938
Cоurt of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
March 6, 2014
[Cite as N. Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Moton, 2014-Ohio-825.]
BEFORE: Boyle, A.J., Jones, J., and Kilbane, J.
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-795157
Ronald E. Moton, Sr., pro se
293 Second Avenue
Mansfield, Ohio 44902
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald A. Mausar
Amanda Rasbach Yurechko
Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A.
Lakeside Place, Suite 200
323 Lakeside Avenue, West
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ronald Moton, Sr. (“Moton“), appeals the trial court‘s decision granting judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Northern Frozen Foods, Inc., d.b.a. Northern Haserot (“Northern Haserot“). He further appeals the trial court‘s decision denying his motion for change of venue and motion to dismiss. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
Procedural History and Facts
{¶2} In November 2012, Northern Haserot commenced the underlying action, seeking a judgment for the outstanding balance owed on an account held by Moton for food products delivered to Moton‘s company, “The King of Bar-B-Que Ribs Company, Inc.” Northern Haserot attached a copy of the account application, an aged charge payment summary, and the “Terms of Sale on Credit/Credit Agrеement/Personal Guarantee” (“the agreement“), which was signed by Moton. Northern Haserot alleged that Moton owed $9,249.83 on the account plus interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum from September 28, 2012.
{¶3} Relevant to this appeal, the agreement contains both a forum-selection clause (identifying Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas as having venue and jurisdiction) and a personal guaranty provision.
{¶4} In December 2012, Moton filed a single document, titled “answer, change of venue, and motion for dismissal.” Moton denied “all complaints in the captive case” and sought a change of venue, alleging that the Richland County Common Pleas Court
{¶5} Northern Haserot opposed the motion, arguing that Moton expressly consented to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction when he executed the agreement. It further argued that Moton‘s motion provided no grounds to dismiss the complaint and that Northern Haserot had sufficiently pled a claim for relief.
{¶6} The trial court ultimately denied Moton‘s motion, and on February 5, 2013, set the matter for a case management conference on February 27, 2013. Northern Haserot subsequently moved for summary judgment on February 12, 2013. Moton did not oppose the motion for summary judgment. Instead, on February 22, 2013, Moton filed a “motion for opposition of the court scheduling of the conferenсe,” arguing that the court had no jurisdiction and disputing Northern Haserot‘s legal authority to pursue an action against him personally. Moton also filed a “motion for disqualification” of the trial judge in the trial court, arguing that the trial court was “ignoring” his arguments by virtue of the court not finding them compelling.
{¶7} On April 19, 2013, the trial court struck Moton‘s improperly filed motion for disqualification. On April 26, 2013, the court granted Northern Haserot‘s unopposed motion for summary judgment, ordering judgment in its favor and against Moton for
App.R. 16 and 12
{¶8} Preliminarily, we note that Moton‘s brief filed with this cоurt is very difficult to decipher and does not comply with
{¶9} Pursuant to
Summary Judgment
{¶10} In his first seven assignments of error, Moton appears to be challenging the trial court‘s award of summary judgment on three different grounds: (1) the sufficiency of Northern Haserot‘s evidence, namely, the account invoices; (2) the trial court‘s refusal to
Standard of Review
{¶11} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard. Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d 1, 10, 746 N.E.2d 618 (8th Dist.2000). Accordingly, we afford no deference tо the trial court‘s decision and independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. N.E. Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 121 Ohio App.3d 188, 192, 699 N.E.2d 534 (8th Dist.1997).
{¶12}
- no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated,
- the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
- it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, аnd viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.
State ex rel. Duganitz v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 77 Ohio St.3d 190, 191, 672 N.E.2d 654 (1996).
{¶13} The moving party carries an initial burden of setting forth specific facts that demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the movant fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate, but if the movant does meet this burden, summary judgment
Satisfying Its Burden
{¶14} Moton does not appear to dispute the amount of money owed on the account. Instead, he appears to dispute whether Northern Haserot satisfied its burden demonstrаting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find no merit to his argument.
{¶15} The record reveals that Northern Haserot obtained summary judgment after establishing that Moton owed an outstanding balance of $9,249.83 on an accоunt for goods provided by Northern Haserot. Specifically, Northern Haserot produced a copy of the agreement executed by Moton, a statement of the account, and the invoices evidеncing the outstanding balance. It further produced the affidavit of Joel Waters, Northern Haserot‘s authorized representative and custodian of records, who swore to the outstanding balance, and that each of the invoices, including those containing a trade name of “UniPro Foodservice” or “Brandt Meat Company, a Division of Northern Haserot” were all due and owing. Moton never filed a brief in opposition оpposing any of this evidence.
{¶16} Accordingly, through the executed agreement, the copy of the invoices, and the affidavit of Joel Waters, Northern Haserot produced evidence that it was entitled tо judgment as a matter of law.
Case Management Conference
Personal Liability
{¶18} Moton further argues that the trial court erred in finding him personally liable on the account when he specifically wrote the title, “President,” next to his signature on the agreemеnt. Moton‘s argument, however, ignores that the agreement contained an express personal guaranty in the body of the agreement. Specifically, the agreement provides in relevant part:
As a cоndition of Northern Frozen Foods, Inc., d.b.a. Northern Haserot, extending credit to Purchaser, the Undersigned hereby personally guarantees payment in full for all product or goods delivered by Northern Frozen Foods, Inc., d.b.a. Northern Haserot, plus service charges, collection costs, return check fees and attorney fees, and waive[s] any presentment, demand, protest and any other notice from Northern Frozen Foods, Inc., d.b.a. Northern Haserot regarding this guarantee of payment. It is further agreed that the use of titles with respect to individual signatures below shall have no legal significance and shall in no way be construed to relieve the individual guarantors of their personal obligations under this paragraph.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶20} Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly granted judgment in favor of Northern Haserot and against Moton in his individual capacity.
Venue and Jurisdiction
{¶21} In his final assignment of error, Moton argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to change venue and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. He contends that Richland County — the place of his residence, his business, and where he received all deliveries giving rise to the complaint — is the only proper venue. He further implies that thе Richland County Court of Common Pleas is the only court to have personal jurisdiction over him. Moton‘s arguments, however, lack merit.
{¶22} Moton expressly consented to venue being proper in Cuyahoga County under the аgreement. Moton has not disputed the validity of the forum-selection clause during the proceedings. Instead, he has maintained that his health conditions precluded him from conveniently appearing in Cuyahoga Cоunty. Based on the express
{¶23} Moton‘s eight assignments of error are overruled.
{¶24} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordеred that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR