DAVID EARL MYERS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
F083570
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Filed 5/23/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. David R. Zulfa and Michael G. Bush, Judges.*
Pam Singh and Peter Kang, Public Defenders, and Crystal N. Ratliff, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kari Ricci Mueller and Melissa Lipon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
* Judge Zulfa presided on August 31, 2021; Judge Bush presided over all other hearings pertinent to this appeal.
OPINION
INTRODUCTION
The Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act) (Pen. Code,1
Here, David Earl Myers was serving a one-year commitment that was due to expire October 15, 2020. The district attorney filed a petition to extend her2 commitment for one year. Because the extension trial did not begin prior to Myers‘s scheduled release date on her commitment, Myers was released from SDSH‘s custody pursuant to Cobb.
Myers‘s extension trial subsequently began August 23, 2021. On August 31, 2021, the superior court found that she continued to meet MDO criteria, ordered her commitment extended for one year, and remanded her back into the custody of SDSH. At that point, Myers had been out of custody and not on outpatient status for over 10 months. She was thereafter in the custody of SDSH for less than seven weeks prior to October 15, 2021.
The pertinent question on appeal is when Myers‘s one-year extension on her commitment began. Myers argues that her extended commitment runs from the ending date of her previous commitment: October 15, 2020. The Attorney General argues that it runs from the date the trial court remanded Myers back into custody after finding she continued to be an MDO: August 31, 2021. The Attorney General contends Myers‘s release from custody pursuant to Cobb should not be credited toward her term of extended commitment just as time spent on outpatient status would not be credited under
Based on the plain language of
BACKGROUND
In 2001, Myers pled guilty to annoying or molesting a child under 18 years of age (
On October 6, 2020, Myers moved for release pending trial, arguing that the extension petition was “filed so late as to render her unable to prepare for trial prior to the expiration of commitment.” On October 16, 2020, citing Cobb, the superior court ordered Myers released from the custody of SDSH pending trial. During her release, which lasted until August 31, 2021, Myers “was not under the jurisdiction of [S]DSH“; “was not under the jurisdiction of [S]DSH‘s Conditional Outpatient Treatment Program (CONREP)“; and “was no longer a client of the [S]DSH system.”
Trial by jury was waived. Myers‘s court trial began — after multiple continuances and time waivers — on August 23, 2021. On August 31, 2021, the superior court found Myers continued to meet MDO criteria and ordered her commitment extended for one year from October 15, 2020 to October 15, 2021.
On October 7, 2021, the People filed a motion asking the superior court to change the start and end dates of Myers‘s recommitment to August 31, 2021 and August 31, 2022, respectively. The People emphasized that, absent this modification and “contradictory to the legislative intent of the MDO statute,” (1) Myers‘s time on Cobb release would essentially be credited toward her recommitment term; and (2) she would only be in the actual custody of SDSH from August 31, 2021, to October 15, 2021. A hearing was held on October 12, 2021. The court granted the People‘s motion on October 14, 2021. Noting the “unusual situation,” the court determined that “the time
On November 23, 2021, Myers filed in this court a “PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE, PROHIBITION, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF.” (Boldface omitted.) She asked us to issue a writ directing the superior court to vacate the October 14, 2021 order on four grounds. First, that the People‘s motion was one for reconsideration and subject to
In an “INFORMAL RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE” (boldface omitted) filed on February 14, 2022, the Attorney General argued that the recommitment dates set forth in the August 31, 2021 order were erroneous and the court retained jurisdiction under
“As to the statutorily-set dates, the [MDO] statute‘s purpose is to ensure that the new commitment result[s] in a year for treatment. The statute‘s text contemplates that new year will commence at the end of the
prior commitment — because that text does not allow interruption between (1) a prior commitment and (2) the commencement of a new commitment. However, there has been a judicial determination that, as a matter of due process, literal terms of the text at times must not be followed — so a person is entitled to an interruption in treatment via release at [the] end of one commitment, pending trial on the new commitment. (Cobb, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 250-251, 252-253.) Reconciling the statute‘s purpose with Cobb‘s judicial revision of the statutory text, the statute must require the new one-year commitment to commence on the date that would result in a new, one-year of treatment. Thus, when there has been the judicially required interruption of custodial treatment prior to the new commitment, the statute‘s purpose requires that the new one-year commitment commence[s] on the day that custodial treatment resumes after interruption. [¶] . . . [¶] “Per the text, ‘The commitment shall be for a period of one year from the date of termination of . . . a previous commitment . . . .’ (
§ 2972, subd. (c) ). But it is understood that such language is construed according to the statutory purpose of ensuring a full year available for custodial treatment. For example, by statute, ‘time spent on outpatient status’ does ‘not count as actual custody,’ and thus does not count ‘toward the person‘s term of extended commitment.’ (§ 2972, subd. (c) .) It thus has been recognized that a ‘petition does not need to be filed in order to extend an
MDO‘s commitment unless the MDO has received a year of inpatient treatment.’ (People v. Morris (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 527, 544.)
“In this case, [Myers]‘s prior commitment expired October 15, 2020. A new commitment did not take over; rather, at her request and under the rule of Cobb, she was unconditionally released until respondent ordered her remanded on August 31, 2021. [Citation.] As reconciled with Cobb‘s due-process-based revision, the statute thus set the new, one-year commitment to begin on that date, and to expire 364 days later. Another reading of the statute, as revised by Cobb, would be absurd in light of the statutory purpose of ensuring another full year of custodial treatment.” (Fn. omitted.)
DISCUSSION
” ‘Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo.’ [Citation.]” (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 265.)
a. Overview of statutory construction
“The court‘s role in construing a statute is to ‘ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citations.] In determining the Legislature‘s intent, a court looks first to the words of the statute. [Citation.] ‘[I]t is the language of the statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.’ [Citation.] [¶] When looking to the words of the statute, a court gives the language its usual, ordinary meaning. [Citations.] If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs. [Citations.]” (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215; accord, California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 266.)
“An exception exists to the plain meaning rule. A court is not required to follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would frustrate the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole or otherwise lead to absurd results.” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 129 (Switzer); accord, People v. Popular (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 479, 484.) “However, the absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute‘s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better.” (Switzer, supra, at p. 129.) “Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a “super-legislature.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see People v. Bell (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 315, 351-352 [” ‘Each time the judiciary utilizes the “absurd result” rule, a little piece is stripped from the written rule of law and confidence in legislative enactments is lessened. . . .’ “].)
b. Overview of MDO Act
“Enacted in 1985, the MDO Act requires that an offender who has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe mental disorder and who continues to pose a danger to society receive appropriate treatment until the disorder can be kept in remission.” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1218.) “[I]t has ‘the dual purpose of protecting the public while treating severely mentally ill offenders.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1122.) ” ‘The act addresses treatment in three contexts — first, as
“An initial MDO commitment occurs as a condition of parole and is governed by
The trial on the petition “shall commence no later than 30 calendar days prior to the time the person would otherwise have been released, unless the time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown.” (
“If the court or jury finds that the patient has a severe mental health disorder, that the patient‘s severe mental health disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and that by reason of the patient‘s severe mental health disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the court shall order the patient recommitted to the facility in which the patient was confined at the time the petition was filed, . . . or committed to [SDSH] if the person was in prison.” (
“The commitment shall be for a period of one year from the date of termination of parole or a previous commitment or the scheduled date of release from prison as specified in Section 2970. Time spent on outpatient status, except when placed in a locked facility at the direction of the outpatient supervisor, shall not count as actual custody and shall not be credited toward the person‘s maximum term of commitment or toward the
Thereafter, the district attorney may annually petition to extend the MDO‘s commitment in one-year increments. (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 94, 103; see
c. The Cobb decision
The California Supreme Court issued Cobb on March 8, 2010. In that case, Cobb was civilly committed as an MDO in 2005 as a parole condition. (Cobb, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 246-247.) On March 6, 2006, the district attorney filed a petition for continued treatment in advance of a May 27, 2006 parole termination date. (Id. at p. 247.) However, a trial on the petition did not begin at least 30 days before Cobb was scheduled to be released. (Id. at p. 247; see
On appeal, Cobb argued that he was denied due process because he had remained confined while his extension trial was continued — without good cause — beyond his scheduled release date. (Cobb, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 246.) Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District affirmed the recommitment order. (Id. at p. 249 found to be an MDO” in 2005 (id. at p. 251); and (2) ” ‘[t]his notice and opportunity to be heard’ ” was ” ‘constitutionally sufficient to allow [him] to be confined — even after his . . . release date — until the end of [an extension] trial’ ” (ibid.). The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. (See id. at pp. 251-252). It held:
“[W]ithout a time waiver or good cause,
section 2972 does not permit continued confinement when an extension trial does not begin before the scheduled release date. ‘As we explained in Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, if an extension petition is not filed before the current commitment ends, the defendant is no longer subject to constraint under the [MDO Act]. If a petition is filed before the expiration date, but too late to allow a reasonable time for trial preparation,’ the defendant may be entitled to release pending trial on the extension petition.” (Cobb, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 252, fn. omitted.)
II. Analysis
The Attorney General contends that, in the situation here, in which Myers was released from custody pending trial pursuant to Cobb, such a conclusion frustrates the purpose of the statute: to ensure that a recommitment results in “a full year available for custodial treatment.” The Attorney General further argues that this purpose and Cobb — in tandem — “require the new one-year commitment to commence on the date that would result in a new, one-year of treatment.”
Since its amendment in 2000 (see Stats. 2000, ch. 324, § 3),
As previously noted, Cobb was issued in 2010. Besides holding that due process precludes continued confinement when the extension trial does not begin before the MDO‘s scheduled release date (Cobb, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 252), it held that a trial court did not lose jurisdiction to hold an extension trial if the timing of the trial did not comport with the 30-day rule of
The plain language of
III. Conclusion
Under
DISPOSITION
Myers‘s writ petition is granted. Let a writ issue directing the Kern County Superior Court to (1) vacate its October 14, 2021 order granting the People‘s motion to change the start and end dates of Myers‘s recommitment to August 31, 2021, and August 31, 2022, respectively; (2) enter a new and different order denying this motion; and (3) reinstate its August 31, 2021 order that recommitted Myers for a one-year period commencing on October 15, 2020.
DETJEN, J.
WE CONCUR:
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.