Estate of Griswold
Mullen & Henzell and Lawrence T. Sorensen, Santa Barbara, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Since succession to estates is purely a matter of statutory regulation, our resolution of this issue requires that we ascertain the intent of the lawmakers who enacted
Factual and Procedural Background
Denis H. Griswold died intestate in 1996, survived by his wife, Norma B. Doner-Griswold. Doner-Griswold petitioned for and received letters of administration and authority to administer Griswold‘s modest estate, consisting entirely of separate property.
In 1998, Doner-Griswold filed a petition for final distribution, proposing a distribution of estate property, after payment of attorney‘s fees and costs, to herself as the surviving spouse and sole heir. Francis V. See, a self-described “forensic genealogist” (heir hunter) who had obtained an assignment of partial interest in the Griswold estate from Margaret Loera and Daniel Draves,1 objected to the petition for final distribution and filed a petition to determine entitlement to distribution.
See and Doner-Griswold stipulated to the following background facts pertinent to See‘s entitlement petition.
Griswold was born out of wedlock to Betty Jane Morris on July 12, 1941 in Ashland, Ohio. The birth certificate listed his name as Denis Howard Morris and identified John Edward Draves of New London, Ohio as the father. A week after the birth, Morris filed a “bastardy complaint”2
Morris married Fred Griswold in 1942 and moved to California. She began to refer to her son as “Denis Howard Griswold,” a name he used for the rest of his life. For many years, Griswold believed Fred Griswold was his father. At some point in time, either after his mother and Fred Griswold divorced in 1978 or after his mother died in 1983, Griswold learned that Draves was listed as his father on his birth certificate. So far as is known, Griswold made no attempt to contact Draves or other members of the Draves family.
Meanwhile, at some point after Griswold‘s birth, Draves married in Ohio and had two children, Margaret and Daniel. Neither Draves nor these two children had any communication with Griswold, and the children did not know of Griswold‘s existence until after Griswold‘s death in 1996. Draves died in 1993. His last will and testament, dated July 22, 1991, made no mention of Griswold by name or other reference. Huron County probate documents identified Draves‘s surviving spouse and two children—Margaret and Daniel—as the only heirs.
Based upon the foregoing facts, the probate court denied See‘s petition to determine entitlement. In the court‘s view, See had not demonstrated that Draves was Griswold‘s “natural parent” or that Draves “acknowledged” Griswold as his child as required by
The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points and reversed the order of the probate court. We granted Doner-Griswold‘s petition for review.
Discussion
Denis H. Griswold died without a will, and his estate consists solely of separate property. Consequently, the intestacy rules codified at
As noted, Griswold‘s mother (Betty Jane Morris) and father (John Draves) both predeceased him. Morris had no issue other than Griswold and Griswold himself left no issue. Based on these facts, See contends that Doner-Griswold is entitled to one-half of Griswold‘s estate and that Draves‘s issue (See‘s assignors, Margaret and Daniel) are entitled to the other half pursuant to
As relevant here,
Notwithstanding
It is undisputed here that
A. Acknowledgement
As indicated,
In statutory construction cases, our fundamental task is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196.) “We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Ibid.; People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228.) If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. (Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196; People v. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228.) If there is ambiguity, however, we may then look to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. (Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457,
Although no statutory definition appears, the common meaning of “acknowledge” is “to admit to be true or as stated; confess.” (Webster‘s New World Dict. (2d ed. 1982) p. 12; see Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1981) p. 17 [“to show by word or act that one has knowledge of and agrees to (a fact or truth) ... [or] concede to be real or true ... [or] admit“].) Were we to ascribe this common meaning to the statutory language, there could be no doubt that
Although the facts here do not appear to raise any ambiguity or uncertainty as to the statute‘s application, we shall, in an abundance of caution, test our conclusion against the general purpose and legislative history of the statute. (See Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 274, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196; Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 93, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160.)
The legislative bill proposing enactment of former
Typically, disputes regarding parental acknowledgement of a child born out of wedlock involve factual assertions that are made by persons who are likely to have direct financial interests in the child‘s estate and that relate to events occurring long before the child‘s death. Questions of credibility must be resolved without the child in court to corroborate or rebut the claims of those purporting to have witnessed the parent‘s statements or conduct concerning the child. Recognition that an in-court admission of the parent and child relationship constitutes powerful evidence of an acknowledgement under
Additionally, construing the acknowledgement requirement to be met in circumstances such as these is neither illogical nor absurd with respect to the intent of an intestate decedent. Put another way, where a parent willingly acknowledged paternity in an action initiated to establish the parent-child relationship and thereafter was never heard to deny such relationship (
There is a dearth of case law pertaining to
In Lozano, the issue was whether the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff, who was the natural father of a 10-month-old child, to pursue a wrongful death action arising out of the child‘s accidental death. The wrongful death statute provided that where the decedent left no spouse or child, such an action may be brought by the persons “who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession.” (
Significantly, Lozano rejected arguments that an acknowledgement under
Apart from
In Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915, decided over a century ago, this court determined that the word “acknowledge,” as it appeared in former
Notably, the decisions construing former
In Estate of McNamara (1919) 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, for example, we were emphatic in recognizing that a single unequivocal act could satisfy the acknowledgement requirement for purposes of statutory legitimation. Although the record in that case
Similarly, in Estate of Gird, supra, 157 Cal. 534, 108 P. 499, we indicated in dictum that “a public avowal, made in the courts” would constitute a public acknowledgement under former
Finally, in Wong v. Young (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 391, 181 P.2d 741, a man‘s admission of paternity in a verified pleading, made in an action seeking to have the man declared the father of the child and for child support, was found to have satisfied the public acknowledgement requirement of the legitimation statute. (Id. at pp. 393-394, 181 P.2d 741.) Such admission was also deemed to constitute an acknowledgement under former
Although the foregoing authorities did not involve
In Blythe v. Ayres, supra, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915, the father never saw his illegitimate child because she resided in another country with her mother. Nevertheless, he “was garrulous upon the subject” of his paternity and “it was his common topic of conversation.” (Id. at p. 577, 31 P. 915.) Not only did the father declare the child to be his child, “to all persons, upon all occasions,” but at his request the child was named and baptized with his surname. (Ibid.) Based on the foregoing, this court remarked that “it could almost be held that he shouted it from the house-tops.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, we concluded that the father‘s public acknowledgement under former
In Estate of Wilson, supra, 164 Cal.App.2d 385, 330 P.2d 452, the evidence showed that the father had acknowledged to his wife that he was the father of a child born to another woman. (Id. at p. 389, 330 P.2d 452.) Moreover, he had introduced the child as his own on many occasions, including at the funeral of his mother. (Ibid.) In light of such evidence, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court‘s finding that the father had publicly acknowledged the child within the contemplation of the legitimation statute.
In Estate of Maxey, supra, 257 Cal.App.2d 391, 64 Cal.Rptr. 837, the Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the trial court‘s determination that the father publicly acknowledged his illegitimate son for purposes of legitimation. The father had, on several occasions, visited the house where the child lived with his mother and asked about the child‘s school attendance and general welfare. (Id. at p. 397, 64 Cal.Rptr. 837Ibid.) In addition, the father had addressed the child as his son in the presence of other persons. (Ibid.)
Doner-Griswold correctly points out that the foregoing decisions illustrate the principle that the existence of acknowledgement must be decided on the circumstances of each case. (Estate of Baird (1924) 193 Cal. 225, 277, 223 P. 974.) In those decisions, however, the respective fathers had not confessed to paternity in a legal action. Consequently, the courts
That those decisions recognized the validity of different forms of acknowledgement should not detract from the weightiness of a father‘s in-court acknowledgement of a child in an action seeking to establish the existence of a parent and child relationship. (See Estate of Gird, supra, 157 Cal. at pp. 542-543, 108 P. 499; Wong v. Young, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d at pp. 393-394, 181 P.2d 741.) As aptly noted by the Court of Appeal below, such an acknowledgement is a critical one that typically leads to a paternity judgment and a legally enforceable obligation of support. Accordingly, such acknowledgements carry as much, if not greater, significance than those made to certain select persons (Estate of Maxey, supra, 257 Cal.App.2d at p. 397, 64 Cal.Rptr. 837) or “shouted ... from the house-tops” (Blythe v. Ayres, supra, 96 Cal. at p. 577, 31 P. 915).
Doner-Griswold‘s authorities do not persuade us that
Second, even though Blythe v. Ayres, supra, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915, Estate of Wilson, supra, 164 Cal.App.2d 385, 330 P.2d 452, and Estate of Maxey, supra, 257 Cal.App.2d 391, 64 Cal.Rptr. 837, variously found such factors significant for purposes of legitimation, their reasoning appeared to flow directly from the express terms of the controlling statute. In contrast to
In an attempt to negate the significance of Draves‘s in-court confession of paternity, Doner-Griswold emphasizes the circumstance that Draves did not tell his two
Unlike the situation in Estate of Baird, Draves confessed to paternity in a formal legal proceeding. There is no evidence that Draves thereafter disclaimed his relationship to Griswold to people aware of the circumstances (see ante, fn. 3), or that he affirmatively denied he was Griswold‘s father despite his confession of paternity in the Ohio court proceeding. Nor is there any suggestion that Draves engaged in contrivances to prevent the discovery of Griswold‘s existence. In light of the obvious dissimilarities, Doner-Griswold‘s reliance on Estate of Baird is misplaced.
Estate of Ginochio, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d 412, 117 Cal.Rptr. 565, likewise, is inapposite. That case held that a judicial determination of paternity following a vigorously contested hearing did not establish an acknowledgement sufficient to allow an illegitimate child to inherit under
Finally, Doner-Griswold contends that a 1996 amendment of
Prior to 1996,
This legislative history does not compel Doner-Griswold‘s construction of
Alternatively, and as relevant here, under
See contends the question of Draves‘s paternity was fully and finally adjudicated in the 1941 bastardy proceeding in Ohio. That proceeding, he argues, satisfies both the Uniform Parentage Act and the Probate Code, and should be binding on the parties here.
If a valid judgment of paternity is rendered in Ohio, it generally is binding on California courts if Ohio had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and the parties were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Ruddock v. Ohls (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 271, 276, 154 Cal.Rptr. 87.) California courts generally recognize the importance of a final determination of paternity. (E.g.,
Doner-Griswold does not dispute that the parties here are in privity with, or claim inheritance through, those who are bound by the bastardy judgment or are estopped from attacking it. (See Weir, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1516-1517, 1521, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 33.) Instead, she contends See has not shown that the issue adjudicated in the Ohio bastardy proceeding is identical to the issue presented here, that is, whether Draves was the natural parent of Griswold.
Although we have found no California case directly on point, one Ohio decision has recognized that a bastardy judgment rendered in Ohio in 1950 was res judicata of any proceeding that might have been brought under the Uniform Parentage Act. (Birman v. Sproat (1988) 47 Ohio App.3d 65, 546 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 [child born out of wedlock had standing to bring will contest based upon a paternity determination in a bastardy proceeding brought during testator‘s life]; see also Black‘s Law Dict., supra, at pp. 146, 1148 [equating a bastardy proceeding with a paternity suit].) Yet another Ohio decision found that parentage proceedings, which had found a decedent to be the “reputed father” of a child,12 satisfied an Ohio legitimation statute and conferred standing upon the illegitimate child to contest the decedent‘s will where the father-child relationship was established prior to the decedent‘s death. (Beck v. Jolliff (1984) 22 Ohio App.3d 84, 489 N.E.2d 825, 829; see also Estate of Hicks (1993) 90 Ohio App.3d 483, 629 N.E.2d 1086, 1088-1089 [parentage issue must be determined prior to the father‘s death to the extent the parent-child relationship is being established under the chapter governing descent and distribution].) While we are not bound to follow these Ohio authorities, they persuade us that the 1941 bastardy proceeding decided the identical issue presented here.
Next, Doner-Griswold argues the Ohio judgment should not be given res judicata effect because the bastardy proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature. It is her position that Draves‘s confession may have reflected only a decision to avoid a jury trial instead of an adjudication of the paternity issue on the merits.
To support this argument, Doner-Griswold relies upon Pease v. Pease (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 29, 246 Cal.Rptr. 762 (Pease). In that case, a grandfather was sued by his grandchildren and others in a civil action alleging the grandfather‘s molestation of the grandchildren. When the grandfather cross-complained against his former wife for apportionment of fault, she filed a demurrer contending that the grandfather was collaterally estopped from asserting the negligent character of his acts by virtue of his guilty plea in a criminal proceeding involving the same issues. On appeal, the judgment dismissing the cross-complaint was reversed. The appellate court reasoned that a trial court in a civil proceeding may not give collateral estoppel effect to a criminal conviction involving the same issues if the conviction resulted from a guilty plea. “The issue of appellant‘s guilt was not fully litigated in the prior criminal proceeding; rather, appellant‘s plea bargain may reflect nothing more than a compromise instead of an ultimate determination of his guilt. Appellant‘s
Even assuming, for purposes of argument only, that Pease‘s reasoning may properly be invoked where the father‘s admission of paternity occurred in a bastardy proceeding (see Reams v. State ex rel. Favors (1936) 53 Ohio App. 19, 4 N.E.2d 151, 152 [indicating that a bastardy proceeding is more civil than criminal in character]), the circumstances here do not call for its application. Unlike the situation in Pease, neither the in-court admission nor the resulting paternity judgment at issue is being challenged by the father (Draves). Moreover, neither the father, nor those claiming a right to inherit through him, seek to litigate the paternity issue. Accordingly, the father‘s due process rights are not at issue and there is no need to determine whether such rights might outweigh any countervailing need to limit litigation or conserve judicial resources. (See Pease, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 34, 246 Cal.Rptr. 762.)
Additionally, the record fails to support any claim that Draves‘s confession merely reflected a compromise. Draves, of course, is no longer living and can offer no explanation as to why he admitted paternity in the bastardy proceeding. Although Doner-Griswold suggests that Draves confessed to avoid the publicity of a jury trial, and not because the paternity charge had merit, that suggestion is purely speculative and finds no evidentiary support in the record.
Finally, Doner-Griswold argues that See and Griswold‘s half siblings do not have standing to seek the requisite paternity determination pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act under
Although Griswold‘s mother was not acting pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act when she filed the bastardy complaint in 1941, neither that legislation nor the Probate Code provision should be construed to ignore the force and effect of the judgment she obtained. That Griswold‘s mother brought her action to determine paternity long before the adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act, and that all procedural requirements of an action under
In sum, we find that the 1941 Ohio judgment was a court order “entered during the father‘s lifetime declaring paternity” (
Disposition
“`Succession to estates is purely a matter of statutory regulation, which cannot
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
GEORGE, C.J., KENNARD, J., WERDEGAR, J., CHIN, J., concur.
Concurring Opinion by BROWN, J.
I reluctantly concur. The relevant case law strongly suggests that a father who admits paternity in court with no subsequent disclaimers “acknowledge[s] the child” within the meaning of
Nonetheless, I believe our holding today contravenes the overarching purpose behind our laws of intestate succession—to carry out “the intent a decedent without a will is most likely to have had.” (16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) p. 2319.) I doubt most children born out of wedlock would have wanted to bequeath a share of their estate to a “father” who never contacted them, never mentioned their existence to his family and friends, and only paid court-ordered child support. I doubt even more that these children would have wanted to bequeath a share of their estate to that father‘s other offspring. Finally, I have no doubt that most, if not all, children born out of wedlock would have balked at bequeathing a share of their estate to a “forensic genealogist.”
To avoid such a dubious outcome in the future, I believe our laws of intestate succession should allow a parent to inherit from a child born out of wedlock only if the parent has some sort of parental connection to that child. For example, requiring a parent to treat a child born out of wedlock as the parent‘s own before the parent may inherit from that child would prevent today‘s outcome. (See, e.g., Bullock v. Thomas (Miss. 1995) 659 So.2d 574, 577 [a father must “openly treat” a child born out of wedlock “as his own” in order to inherit from that child].) More importantly, such a requirement would comport with the stated purpose behind our laws of succession because that child likely would have wanted to give a share of his estate to a parent that treated him as the parent‘s own.
Of course, this court may not remedy this apparent defect in our intestate succession statutes. Only the Legislature may make the appropriate revisions. I urge it to do so here.